© 2004 International Monetary Fund May 2004
IMF Country Report No. 04/126
New Zealand: Financial System Stability Assessment,
including Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes on
the following topics: Monetary and Financial Policy Transparency,
Banking Supervision, and Securities Regulation
This Financial System Stability Assessment on New Zealand was prepared by a staff team of the
International Monetary Fund as background documentation for the periodic consultation with the
member country. It is based on the information available at the time it was completed on April 8, 2004.
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International Monetary Fund
Washington, D.C.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
NEW ZEALAND
Financial System Stability Assessment
Prepared by the Monetary and Financial Systems and Asia Pacific Departments
Approved by Tomás J. T. Baliño and Daniel Citrin
April 8, 2004
This Financial System Stability Assessment is based primarily on work undertaken during a visit to New Zealand
and Australia from October 30 to November 18, 2003. The mission comprised Anne-Marie Gulde-Wolf (mission
chief), Paul Kupiec (deputy mission chief), Barbara Baldwin, Matthew Jones, Jodi Scarlata, Antonio Garcia
Pascual, and Charmane Ahmed (all IMF/MFD); Abdelhak Senhadji (IMF/APD); Michael Ainley (banking
supervision expert, U.K. FSA), Janet Holmes (securities expert, Ontario Securities Commission), and Barry Topf
(foreign exchange expert, Bank of Israel). The main findings of the mission are:
New Zealand has a profitable and well-functioning financial system, operating in a framework of well-
developed financial markets. Short-term risks to stability appear low, given the favorable macroeconomic
outlook, and sound and transparent financial policies. Stress tests for systemically important banks show
resilience consistent with the sector’s relatively high levels of capital and profits. Dynamic stress tests
involving shocks to agriculture and to external funding show more persistent effects on bank profits, but do not
raise systemic concerns.
New Zealand’s approach to banking regulation is based on disclosure and market discipline, and employs
limited prudential requirements. The sole supervisory objective is to ensure systemic stability. Given the high
share of foreign ownership, home-country supervision may also act as an additional discipline on bank
behavior. Notwithstanding the clear strength of the present framework, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
(RBNZ) would benefit from increased real-time knowledge of potential stress in the banking system.
The absence of a depositor-protection mandate, along with the foreign ownership of all systemically important
banks, would pose unique challenges to the RBNZ if a financial crisis were to occur. The high level of
Australian bank ownership suggests that the successful management of systemic challenges will also require
close cooperation with the Australian authorities. The RBNZ has been reviewing possible crisis management
options and has intensified trans-Tasman cooperation in banking regulation and failure management.
Recent reforms in securities regulation and the restructuring of the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) have
strengthened the securities regulatory framework. To fully implement the IOSCO Principles would require:
(i) a stronger regime for prevention and detection of market abuse; (ii) a more robust supervisory regime for
market intermediaries and collective investment schemes; (iii) improvements to the disclosure regime for
issuers; and (iv) stronger public oversight of private sector monitors.
The mission members drafted this report.
FSAPs are designed to assess the stability of the financial system as a whole and not that of individual
institutions. They have been developed to help countries identify and remedy weaknesses in their financial sector
structure, thereby enhancing resilience to macroeconomic shocks and cross-border contagion. FSAPs do not
cover risks specific to individual institutions, such as asset quality, operational or legal risks, or fraud.
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Contents Page
Glossary .....................................................................................................................................4
I. Executive Summary and Overall Stability Assessment .........................................................5
II. Macroeconomic, Financial Sector, and Regulatory Context.................................................7
A. Macroeconomic Background ....................................................................................7
B. Financial Sector Context ...........................................................................................7
C. Supervision and Regulation ....................................................................................14
III. Short-Term Stability Issues................................................................................................16
A. Stress Testing the Financial System........................................................................16
B. Nonbank Financial Institutions ...............................................................................20
C. Foreign Currency Exposure and Functioning of Exchange Markets ......................21
D. Money and Bond Markets.......................................................................................22
E. Systemic Liquidity Provision ..................................................................................23
IV. Medium-Term and Structural Issues .................................................................................24
A. Banking Supervision...............................................................................................24
B. Crisis Management..................................................................................................25
C. Cooperation with Australia .....................................................................................26
Tables
1. Principal Recommendations ..................................................................................................6
2. New Zealand: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, 1999–2003 ..........................................8
3. New Zealand: Financial Soundness Indicators, 1999–2003..................................................9
4. New Zealand: Financial System Structure, 2000–02...........................................................11
5. Sensitivity Stress-Test Scenarios .........................................................................................18
6. Market Risk Results.............................................................................................................18
7. Credit Risk Results ..............................................................................................................19
8. Model Assumptions .............................................................................................................19
Figures
1. Foot and Mouth Disease Scenario .......................................................................................20
2. Funding Shock Stress Scenario............................................................................................20
Annexes
I. Observance of Financial Sector Standards and Codes—Summary Assessments ................28
Annex Tables
1. Recommended Action Plan to Improve Observance
of
the Basel Core Principles.............32
2. Recommended Action Plan to Improve Observance of IMF’s MFP Transparency Code
PracticesMonetary Policy ............................................................................................36
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3. Recommended Action Plan to Improve Observance of IMF’s MFP Transparency Code
PracticesBanking Supervision .....................................................................................38
4. Recommended Action Plan to Improve Observance of IMF’s MFP Transparency Code
PracticesSecurities Regulation.....................................................................................41
5. Recommended Action Plan to Improve Observance of the IOSCO Principles...................44
GLOSSARY
APG Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering
APRA Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority
ASRB Accounting Standards Review Board
BCP Basel Core Principles
CAR capital adequacy ratios
CIS collective investment schemes
ESAS Exchange Settlement Account System
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FSA Financial Services Authority
FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Program
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
IAS International Accounting Standards
ICANZ Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions
LoLR Lender-of-last Resort
MED Ministry of Economic Development
MFP Code IMF Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary
and Financial Policies
MOU Memorandum of understanding
NBFI Nonbank financial institutions
NZD New Zealand Dollar
NZFOE New Zealand Futures and Options Exchange
NZX New Zealand Stock Exchange Limited and/or New Zealand
Stock Exchange (as appropriate)
OCR official Cash Rate
PTA Policy Targets Agreement
OMO open market operations
RBNZ Reserve Bank of New Zealand
RC Registrar of Companies
ROSCs Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes
SC Securities Commission
SDDS Special Data Dissemination Standard
SFE Sydney Futures Exchange
SRO Self-regulatory organization
TP Takeover Panel
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND OVERALL STABILITY ASSESSMENT
1. The New Zealand financial sector is dominated by institutions that are based in
Australia. Supervisory practices are based on a liberal disclosure-based regime, with
limited supervisory intervention. The low savings rate creates a large dependency on
foreign funding. In the absence of appropriate controls, these structural features have the
potential to engender vulnerabilities.
2. The favorable macroeconomic outlook, the profitable and well-functioning
financial system, and overall sound and transparent financial policies mitigate the
aforementioned vulnerabilities, and make short-term risks appear low. New Zealand’s
large net foreign indebtedness position owes entirely to private sector borrowings. Its strong
sovereign rating reflects prudent fiscal policies and no net foreign-currency debt. The
strength of the financial system reduces concerns about the lack of an active supervisory
framework. In the medium and longer run, supervisory enhancements are recommended to
ensure that an adequate framework to monitor and support financial stability remains in
place.
3. The mission’s main findings can be summarized as follows:
The five foreign-owned banks that dominate the financial system are profitable and
well capitalized. For these institutions, the discipline of New Zealand’s market-based
disclosure regime is supplemented by active home country supervision.
The foreign exchange market has allowed the private sector to manage its foreign
exchange risks and secure cover from a diverse set of counterparties under a wide
range of market conditions. Foreign exchange hedging is widespread.
Stress tests show resilience in the banking sector, consistent with the sector’s high
levels of capital and profits. Significant exchange rate swings and house price
declines could be absorbed by all big banks. Dynamic stress test scenarios involving
shocks to agriculture and to external funding costs show more persistent effects on
bank profits, but do not raise systemic concerns.
Banking supervision is based on disclosure and market discipline, with the sole
objective of ensuring systemic stability. The supervisory regime employs limited
prudential requirements, with no active on-site role for supervisors. The benefits of
this regime include low compliance costs, greater flexibility for financial institutions,
an enhanced role for market discipline, and reduced moral hazard risks. The ongoing
strength of the financial system has reduced concerns about the lack of an active
supervisory component.
The absence of a depositor-protection mandate, along with the foreign ownership of
all systemically important banks may pose unique challenges for the RBNZ if a
financial crisis were to occur. Outsourcing of New Zealand bank operating systems to
parent institutions and Australian depositor preference law may complicate crisis
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management. These risks have been recognized and control measures are being
analyzed. Efforts underway to improve cooperation with the Australian authorities are
welcome.
Nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), while not systemically important, are also
profitable. Overseas regulators provide additional supervision for a handful of the
largest nonbank institutions, which account for around half of the assets of the sector.
Securities markets are relatively small, with trading and ownership concentrated
offshore. Restructuring of the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) and reforms in
regulation have strengthened the regulatory framework, but some gaps remain that
may delay early detection and enforcement actions against improper conduct.
Table 1. Principal Recommendations
1
Issue Recommendation
Disclosure-based regime Maintain the quality, scope, and timeliness of disclosure to
ensure it continues to meet best international practice.
Importance of independent
directors
Fit-and-proper criteria should continue to apply in a
comprehensive manner. The RBNZ could offer independent
bank directors the possibility of discussing areas of concerns
without absolving directors of their statutory responsibilities.
Surveillance For banks, monitor more regularly liquidity and large exposure
early warning indicators. Consider commissioning third-party
reports and establish a small specialist team to make focused,
on-site visits on particular aspects of credit and operational risk.
Bank resolution and crisis
management
Review possible approaches to bank resolution, and the
operational and legal consequences that might arise, with a
view to establishing internal operational guidelines.
Nonbank supervision Review practices and resource needs for the government
agencies involved in oversight, especially the offices of the
Registrar and the Government Actuary, with a view towards
enhancing public access to timely and comprehensive data.
Securities markets regulation Enhance regulatory framework by including minimum
standards of conduct for collective investment scheme
operators, improving reporting mechanisms, strengthening
standards and penalties relating to market abuse, and
strengthening oversight of market intermediaries that are not
exchange members.
1
More specific suggestions are discussed at the appropriate places in the main body of the
report and in the standards assessments.
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II. MACROECONOMIC, FINANCIAL SECTOR, AND REGULATORY CONTEXT
A. Macroeconomic Background
4. New Zealand has a resilient macroeconomic framework, benefiting from a series
of reforms undertaken over the past 20 years. Key features include a floating exchange
rate, deregulated financial markets, far-reaching privatization, a sound and transparent
medium-term framework, and an inflation-targeting framework under an independent central
bank. These factors, combined with favorable economic conditions, have underpinned New
Zealand’s strong real GDP growth rate of nearly four percent per annum since 1999.
5. Within the above framework, New Zealand has, in the recent past, seen
significant capital inflows to compensate for persistent low savings rates. The country
has accumulated a relatively high level of foreign debt, and gross debt now exceeds
100 percent of GDP, with the bulk of this being owed by the private sector. Given the
conservative fiscal stance, foreign capital inflows are matched by high private sector
borrowing from the banking sector. The strong sovereign rating reflects prudent fiscal
policies and no net foreign currency debt by the public sector.
6. Recent macroeconomic conditions have been favorable, even though the
continuing appreciation of the New Zealand Dollar (NZD) may dampen external
performance. Strong domestic demand contributed to high-capacity utilization rates, and
unemployment reached a 16-year low in 2003. Inflation declined to about 1½ percent in the
year to December 2003, reflecting the impact of the currency appreciation. The currency has
appreciated by 66 percent against the U.S. dollar and 36 percent on a trade weighted basis
between December 2001 and February 2004. The current account deficit is approaching a
three-year high of 4½ percent of GDP, reflecting the relatively strong cyclical position of the
New Zealand economy and the substantial appreciation of the NZD (Table 2).
B. Financial Sector Context
7. New Zealand’s financial sector and its regulatory environment underwent
significant changes over the past two decades. Previously dominated by publicly-owned
banks, which operated in a tightly regulated market, the sector is now almost fully in private,
foreign ownership, and the scope of regulation has been radically reduced from that of the
mid 1980s. NBFIs and securities markets have declined in importance and are now secondary
players, as banks have expanded their range of activities.
The banking sector
8. The banking sector includes 18 registered banks and, at end-2002, held assets
exceeding $NZ 200 billion (about 160 percent of GDP). Only two smaller banks are New
Zealand-owned, including a recently formed retail bank that is owned by the
government-owned post office (NZ Post). Ten banks operate as foreign branches, five are
local subsidiaries of foreign parent banks, and one is a joint venture between a foreign bank
and a local company.
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Table 2. New Zealand: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, 1999–2003
(End of period, unless otherwise stated)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total population (million, end-2002) 3.942
GDP per capita (2002) in USD 16,762
Real sector
Real GDP (percentage change) 4.0 3.9 2.7 4.3 3.5
Nominal GDP (in NZD billion) 105.7 112.3 120.5 126.4 133.1
CPI inflation (e.o.p.) 0.5 4.0 1.8 2.7 1.6
Household savings ratio (in percent of disposable income) 4.8 -0.8 -4.4 -3.1 -8.2
Monetary and credit data (change in annual averages)
Monetary base 19.0 8.9 9.6 9.2 6.6
Money (M1) 19.5 6.9 15.3 12.8 7.8
Broad money (M3) 3.5 3.4 13.5 11.9 6.1
Domestic credit 8.3 8.5 7.6 12.1 5.3
Yield on government bills 5.2 6.7 5.9 5.8 5.4
Yield on government bonds 6.4 6.9 6.4 6.4 5.8
Reference bank lending rate 1/ 8.5 10.2 9.9 9.8 9.8
Yield spread, 90-day to 10-year bonds (b. p., end of period) 166 -66 191 13 41
Stock market index (percent change, end of period) 6.8 -13.8 8.0 -5.1 25.6
Public finances (in percent of GDP)
Central government financial balance (operating balance) 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.7 3.0
Central government net of revaluations and accounting
changes
0.2 0.8 1.8 2.2 4.3
External sector (levels, unless otherwise indicated)
USD exchange rate (end of period) 0.52 0.44 0.42 0.53 0.66
Trade balance (NZD billion) -0.8 1.4 3.1 0.7 -1.5
Current account (NZD billion) -6.7 -5.5 -3.1 -4.7 -5.9
Foreign direct investment (Net, NZD billion) 0.6 2.0 3.0 0.4 ...
Portfolio investment (Net, NZD billion) -3.0 -0.7 0.4 1.8 ...
Gross official reserves, e.o.p. (USD billion) 4.5 3.9 3.6 4.8 5.1
Reserve cover (expressed in months of imports) 2/ 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.3 3.7
Reserve cover (short-term external debt) 17.7 15.9 15.0 13.0 16.3
Total external debt (NZD billion) 102.9 99.9 110.2 108.8 103.9
of which: Public sector debt (NZD billion) 3/ 17.4 17.3 16.7 18.5 18.7
of which: Banking sector debt (NZD billion) - loans only ... 60.3 70.6 71.4 76.0
Central bank short-term foreign-currency liabilities
(NZD billion) 4/
0.7 1.4 0.7 1.0 0.7
Sources: Statistics New Zealand, RBNZ, New Zealand Stock Exchange, and New Zealand Treasury.
1/ This is a surveyed retail interest rate and represents a “base” lending rate offered to new business borrowers,
weighted by each surveyed institution’s total NZ dollar claims.
2/ Imports of goods and services (excluding factor income).
3/ Annual figures for 1998 and 1999, December quarter for 2000–02, June quarter for 2003.
4/ Remaining maturities of one year or less.
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Table 3. New Zealand: Financial Soundness Indicators, 1999–2003
(In percent, unless otherwise indicated)
1999 2000 2001 2002 Jun-03 Sep-03
Banking sector 1/
Total system assets (NZD billion) 158.4 180.1 189.6 204.5 212.5 ...
Total assets of locally incorporated banks (NZD billion) 107.9 116.0 126.7 135.2 142.5 ...
Share of system assets in foreign branches 31.9 35.6 33.2 33.9 32.9 ...
Capital adequacy 2/
Tier 1 regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (weighted average) 7.1 7.7 7.6 8.5 8.6 ...
Minimum observed tier 1 regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 6.5 6.7 6.3 7.1 7.7 ...
Total regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (weighted average) 10.3 11.1 10.7 11.3 11.4 ...
Minimum observed total regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 9.6 9.6 9.5 10.5 10.3 ...
Aggregate system equity to aggregate system assets 3.2 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.4 ...
Aggregate equity asset ratio for locally incorporated banks 4.6 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.5 ...
Asset composition
Investments as a percentage of total system assets
Balances with central banks and other financial institutions 4.0 3.9 4.4 3.7 3.8 ...
Government bond holdings 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.3 ...
Other trading securities 7.6 6.5 5.9 5.8 5.0 ...
Total liquid assets 13.4 12.1 11.7 11.0 10.1 ...
Loans, advances and lease finance 77.0 72.9 75.8 75.9 75.9 ...
Sectoral distribution of loans to total loans
Households 47 46 45 45 47 48
Financial sector 1/ 7 6 5 6 5 4
Insurance sector 1/ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Construction sector 1/ 1 1 1 1 1 1
Communications sector 1/ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Non-residents 1/ 7 11 13 14 13 12
Mortgage loans (residential and commercial) 1/ 50 58 56 57 59 59
Aggregate risk-weighted assets to total assets 1/ 67 64 65 64 63 63
Asset quality and provisioning
Aggregate impaired assets to total assets (in basis points) 1/ 34.1 30.4 31.7 25.4 28.1 ...
Aggregate impaired and past due assets to total assets (in basis points) 47.8 44.8 88.4 53.6 55.7 ...
Aggregate total provisions to total assets (in basis points) 3/ 43.7 39 36.3 35.3 43.1 ...
Aggregate specific provisions to total assets (in basis points) 3/ 12.7 10.3 8.1 9.5 8.8 ...
Aggregate total provisions to total impaired and past due assets 3/ 91.4 87.1 41.1 65.9 77.4 ...
Aggregate specific provisions to impaired assets 3/ 37.2 33.9 25.4 37.4 31.3 ...
Earnings and profitability
Profit before tax and provisions to average assets 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.0 ...
Profit after tax and extraordinary items to average assets 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 ...
Profit after tax and extraordinary items to average equity 22.5 24.0 24.6 26.1 24.2 ...
Interest margin 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.6 ...
Noninterest income to total revenues 36.1 37.8 36.7 32.4 32.4 ...
Total operating expenses to total revenues 56.9 54.8 48.4 45.5 44.0 ...
Funding and liquidity
Liquid assets to total assets 13.4 12.1 11.7 11.0 10.1 ...
Liquid assets to deposits and other borrowings 28.6 26.9 23.7 22.3 19.8 ...
Loans, advances, and lease finance to deposits and other borrowings 105.2 105.9 102.2 101.6 100.2 ...
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Table 3. New Zealand: Financial Soundness Indicators, 1999–2003 (continued)
(In percent, unless otherwise indicated)
1999 2000 2001 2002 Jun-03 Sep-03
Funding and liquidity (continued)
Loans, advances, and lease finance to NZD retail funding 192.8 195.5 188.1 186.0 185.0 ...
Liabilities to related entities to total liabilities 16.2 19.3 15.5 12.7 11.1 ...
Share of total liabilities owed to nonresidents 29.2 31.0 33.9 30.5 29.0 29.3
FX denominated liabilities to total liabilities 21.9 22.5 22.6 18.2 19.4 19.3
Share of FX denominated liabilities owed to related entities 53.5 39.2 47.5 37.5 33.0 33.0
Banking sector sensitivity to market risk
Avg. peak end-of day interest rate exposure as a share of equity 4/ 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 ...
Avg. end-of period interest rate exposure as a share of equity 4/ 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.1 ...
Avg. peak end-of day FX exposure as a share of equity (b.p.) 4/ 5/ 6.8 7.8 6.1 6.2 10.3 ...
Avg. peak end-of day equity exposure as a share of equity (b.p.) 4/ 0.6 0.6 1.8 1.2 0.6 ...
Insurance sector indicators -Life Insurance
Growth rate of gross premiums written (% change from last year) 3.9 -8.6 -5.3 2.9 ... ...
Life Surplus to Total Assets 13.0 12.0 13.9 16.6 ... ...
Investment income / Investment assets 9.5 6.4 2.8 -3.1 ... ...
Insurance sector indicators - Non Life Insurance
Growth rate of gross premiums written (% change from last year) 3.8 4.9 -2.2 4.3 ... ...
Combined ratio 99.1 100.0 101.3 98.5 ... ...
Investment income to investment assets 4.9 6.3 5.5 4.0 ... ...
Underwriting profit to net investment income 16.4 -0.2 -18.7 42.6 ... ...
Solvency Margin 63.5 61.8 67.2 59.7 ... ...
Household sector indicators
Rate of growth of assets 5.9 1.2 4.6 9.0 ... ...
Rate of growth of liabilities 10.5 6.8 8.0 10.0 ... ...
Rate of growth of housing value 5.2 1.0 5.2 14.8 ... 23.8
Rate of growth of personal bankruptcies -6.9 -8.6 8.6 -10.4 ... 3.8
Net financial assets to disposable income 72.6 67.2 60.8 47.6 ... ...
Debt servicing cost to disposable income 8.0 9.1 8.4 9.0 ... 9.2
Corporate sector indicators
Corporate debt to equity ratio 87.9 93.2 96.4 95.0 ... ...
Growth rate of company liquidations -29.7 -22.6 -26.9 -47.2 ... ...
EBITDA to interest expenses 248.7 251.8 257.9 325.1 ... ...
ROA 4.0 3.7 3.6 4.6 ... ...
ROE 9.5 9.5 9.6 12.4 ... ...
Current ratio 127.9 121.0 124.3 130.5 ... ...
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Ministry of Economic Development, Statistics New Zealand.
1/ Excludes interbank exposures, NZD claims for residents, all non-resident claims.
2/ Includes only local incorporated banks.
3/ Excludes interbank exposures. June 2003 flow data represent 12 month running totals.
4/ Simple average of order in council market risk measures. June 2003 flow data represent 12 month running totals.
5/ 1998 average excludes one small bank with an extreme reported value.
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Table 4. New Zealand: Financial System Structure, 2000–02
(End of period, unless otherwise stated)
Number Assets
(NZD billion)
Percent of
Total Assets
2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002
Banks
18 17 17
180.1 189.6 204.5 70.7 71.2 73.6
Domestic 1 2 2
1.4 1.7 2.2 0.5 0.6 0.8
Foreign-owned branches 11 10 10
64.2 62.3 69.3 25.2 23.4 24.9
Foreign-owned, incorporated locally 6 5 5
114.6 125.0 133.0 45.0 46.9 47.8
Nonbanks
311 303 290 74.5 76.8 73.5
29.3 28.8 26.4
Managed funds 1/ 56 56 56
47.5 47.9 44.4 18.7 18.0 16.0
Life insurance companies 39 40 36
12.4 12.0 10.7 4.9 4.5 3.8
Non-life insurance companies 85 83 75
3.7 4.0 3.5 1.5 1.5 1.3
Finance companies 46 48 50
6.0 7.7 9.2 2.4 2.9 3.3
Building societies 2/ 10 10 11
2.4 2.6 2.9 0.9 1.0 1.0
Credit unions 74 65 61
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1
Bonus Bonds Trust 1 1 1
2.1 2.2 2.4 0.8 0.8 0.9
Total financial system
329 320 307
254.6 266.4 278.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources:
Banks - Individual Bank Disclosure statements.
Superannuation - Government Actuary annual report, with 2002 estimated from RBNZ partial survey data.
Managed funds - RBNZ quarterly and annual surveys.
Life insurance companies & Non-life insurance companies - MED, Insurance and Superannuation Unit.
Finance companies - Reserve Bank, Annual Statistical Return and Reserve Bank Bulletin June 2003.
Building societies - Reserve Bank, Annual Statistical Return.
Credit unions - Report of the registrar of credit unions.
1/ Managed funds (superannuation, unit trust, group investment funds, excluding insurance companies): data are funds
under management. Include ten large charities as fund managers.
2/ Building societies have added to them the Public Service Investment Society (PSIS), a similar kind of savings
intermediary.
9. New Zealand’s banking sector is profitable and well capitalized. Over the last five
years aggregate industry return on assets has exceeded 1½ percent, and after-tax returns on
equity have consistently exceeded 20 percent. Capitalization, whether measured by
equity-asset ratios or by regulatory capital measures, is above international minimum
prudential benchmarks. The aggregate equity-asset ratio of locally incorporated banks is
4.6 percent. Tier 1 regulatory capital adequacy ratios (CARs) are all in excess of 8.5 percent
and total CARs are approaching 11.5 percent (Table 3). Among registered banks, the least
well-capitalized institution has a Tier 1 CAR of 7.7 percent and a total CAR of 10.3 percent.
Impaired assets are low, comprising only slightly more than 0.5 percent of bank assets.
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General and specific provisions cover about three-quarters of total impaired and overdue
assets.
10. The banking sector is dominated by five registered banks. They hold nearly
90 percent of the sector’s assets and deposits (Table 4), and earn more than 80 percent of
industry profits. One of the five banks operates as a branch of an Australian parent, despite a
recently amended rule that is intended to require local incorporation for systemically
important banks. The other four banks are subsidiaries of Australian parent banks.
11. Banks are retail oriented, with mortgage lending amounting to nearly 60 percent
of the overall loan portfolio, and have only modest exposures to other sectors.
Agricultural loans are the second most important group, accounting for slightly more than
11 percent of lending. Lending for purposes other than property acquisition may be
understated in official statistics, as consumer and small business loans reportedly are often
secured by residential property. Given the high share of mortgages, recent increases in house
prices have given rise to concerns about a possible reversal of property prices. Banks have
argued that risk mitigating factors include the low average loan-to-value ratios of about
60 percent, conservative conditions on new lending (with most lending above a loan-to-value
ratio of 80 percent covered by mortgage insurance). Also, there is a substantial increase in
the demand for housing due to net immigration and cultural preference for home ownership.
Stress tests conducted as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP)
(Section III) examine this issue further.
12. The banking system is funded to a large extent by domestic deposits. A
significant share of the country’s capital inflows are, however, borrowings undertaken by the
banking sector. About 30 percent of bank liabilities (nearly 50 percent of GDP) are owed to
nonresidents (Table 3). About half of the foreign liabilities of banks are to affiliates. About
one-third of banks’ foreign borrowing is denominated in NZDs, with the rest split between
Australian dollars, U.S. dollars, and other currencies, generally swapped back into NZDs.
Only a minor share of the foreign borrowing is on-lent in foreign currency.
Nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs)
13. The nonbank financial sector accounts for only a quarter of financial system
assets (Table 4). Among the different institutions, managed funds—superannuation funds,
unit trusts, and group funds—account for the largest share of system assets at 16 percent.
Insurance companies account for another five percent of assets, followed by finance
companies with three percent of assets. Building societies and credit unions are quite small,
with less than one percent of system assets.
14. The managed funds industry is the most important vehicle for investing
household funds outside of the banking system, accounting for $NZ 44 billion in assets
at end-2002. Almost two-thirds of managed funds are invested in unit trusts or group
investment funds. Two of the largest funds-management companies are owned by major
banks and two by large multinational insurance companies. Private superannuation funds are
- 13 -
also a significant component of the managed funds sector, accounting for $NZ 17 billion in
assets at end-2002. However, the removal of tax incentives has reduced the importance of
these funds as a vehicle for household savings. A new government-run New Zealand
Superannuation Fund was established in 2001 to partially pre-fund the public pension
system. At end-January 2004, it had about $NZ 3.1 billion in assets, and is expected to grow
by about $NZ 2 billion a year.
15. The insurance sector in New Zealand remains small relative to other countries.
Measured in premiums per capita, New Zealand ranks only twenty-eighth in the world. Life
insurance is dominated by a bank subsidiary and three subsidiaries of major foreign
insurance companies, but the remaining four large banks also have life insurance affiliates.
The life insurance sector has gradually declined in importance over the past five years, due to
competition from other products and institutions. In contrast, the nonlife sector has enjoyed
stable growth and now amounts to almost twice the life insurance market by premium
income. Two government-run agencies (the Accident Compensation Commission and the
Earthquake Commission) provide mandatory workers compensation/accident insurance and
earthquake insurance, respectively. These agencies held approximately $NZ 5.9 billion and
$NZ 4.1 billion in assets at end-June 2003.
16. Finance companies, building societies, and credit unions undertake bank-like
activities and finance themselves largely by deposit taking. Finance companies and
building societies have grown rapidly in the past five years, but remain small compared to the
major banks. Credit unions have declined in size and membership, holding less than one
percent of total financial system assets. Finance companies operate in areas not fully covered
by the major banks, including household lending (where finance companies provide over a
third of consumer credit); higher-risk property lending; and vehicle, plant, and machinery
leasing. Building societies concentrate on deposit taking and property lending only. The
largest finance company is a subsidiary of one of the major banks; most others are privately
held. The sector is profitable, with returns on equity above 20 percent for the sector as a
whole, and returns on assets of around 2 percent. Building societies, which are member-
owned, are also profitable but lag behind banks and finance companies, with returns on
equity averaging nine percent for the last three years and return on assets averaging about
0.75 percent.
Securities markets
17. New Zealand equity markets are comparatively small with market capitalization
of about 44 percent of GDP. Reflecting a preference for property investment, ownership of
New Zealand-listed equities remains mostly in the hands of offshore investors and domestic
institutional investors, with only about one-fourth held directly by households. Securities
market intermediaries include share brokers, futures dealers, investment advisers, and
managers of collective investment schemes (CIS). The New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX)
is the country’s only registered securities exchange and was demutualized in December 2002.
Efforts are underway to increase access by small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs),
including the recent launch of a new market with listing standards tailored to SMEs. The
- 14 -
parent corporation of the New Zealand Futures and Options Exchange (NZFOE)—the only
futures and options exchange in the country—has announced that trading in NZFOE products
will be transferred to Australia in 2004.
C. Supervision and Regulation
18. New Zealand regulators do not carry any duty to protect individual depositors
or policyholders, or to safeguard individual institutions, unlike many other
jurisdictions. There is no official deposit protection or policyholder protection scheme. The
New Zealand supervisory and regulatory framework was introduced as a component of the
financial sector reforms initiated in the 1980s, while much of the current nonbank regulatory
framework, particularly in relation to securities markets, was established in the 1970s.
The banking sector
19. The current supervision framework is built around three main pillars: self
discipline, market discipline, and regulatory discipline. A cornerstone of the
self-discipline component is a requirement that directors attest quarterly that their bank’s
risk-management systems are adequate, and that they are being properly applied. This
procedure reinforces self discipline and reduces complacency by threatening civil and
criminal penalties in case of noncompliance and by exposing directors in the event of
misleading or adverse disclosures. Market discipline is promoted through the issuance of
quarterly disclosure statements on the bank’s financial condition, risk profiles, and risk-
management policies. Market discipline is reinforced by the absence of deposit insurance,
and a cultural ethos of “buyer beware.” The disclosure requirements and associated audit
requirements are meant to ensure that higher-quality data is provided to creditors and
investors on a more frequent basis than would otherwise be the norm. Finally, regulatory
discipline is enforced through the application of various prudential requirements by the
RBNZ, which is charged with licensing and supervising registered banks.
20. The RBNZ has a range of enforcement powers, and complements self- and
market discipline with off-site reviews and high-level discussions with banks. Activities
include regular RBNZ scrutiny of all quarterly disclosure statements, maintenance of active
working relationships with banks through annual consultation with senior management, as
well as through more informal contacts, regular meetings with other bank regulators and
credit-rating agencies, and annual meetings with the boards of the larger banks. However, the
RBNZ lacks a regular or targeted on-site supervision program, even though its Act does
provide the necessary powers to do so. Recent legislative changes have expanded the
RBNZ’s powers in certain areas, including a prior approval requirement for all significant
changes in bank ownership. The 2003 amendments to the RBNZ Act have also clarified and
expanded the Bank’s registration and enforcement powers and obligations.
21. The RBNZ achieved material compliance with most Basel Core Principles in the
assessment of observance, in spite of the special features of the regulatory framework.
Where differences exist, for example, in the monitoring of credit risks, these relate in some
- 15 -
cases to a conscious decision to leave oversight of such risks largely to the market. In other
cases, certain risks that are not supervised are not currently relevant to New Zealand.
22. A second layer of supervision is provided by the home-country supervision of all
the systemically important banks and their nonbank subsidiaries. The parent companies
of the local banks have generally imposed their own credit culture and risk-management
policies, systems, and procedures on their subsidiaries; such systems have already been
vetted by the home-country supervisor and are designed to meet its prudential requirements.
Home supervisors also conduct periodic on-site visits. The RBNZ has signed memoranda of
understanding with the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority and the U.K. Financial
Services Authority. The RBNZ maintains regular contact with foreign authorities, but does
not participate in on-site work nor does it receive supervisory reports sent to home-country
regulators.
Nonbank financial institutions and securities markets
23. Oversight of much of the nonbank sector and securities markets is indirect.
Reliance is placed upon a combination of market disclosure, rating agency assessments,
monitoring activities of self-regulatory organizations, trustees and auditors, and licensing and
registration requirements for certain categories of institutions.
24. For both the nonbank financial sector and securities markets, substantial
reliance is placed on self-regulatory organizations, trustees acting as private monitors,
and on the auditors of financial statements to ensure the provision of accurate
information. Additional oversight is provided by regulators outside of New Zealand for a
handful of the largest institutions (which account for over half the sector’s total assets),
because they are subsidiaries of large multinational banks or insurance companies. A large
number of NBFIs are not monitored by an overseas regulator or an exchange, since they are
domestically owned. While none of them is systemically important, the failure of any of the
larger nonbank institutions could nevertheless have a significant impact on market stability
through negative reputational effects on other institutions.
25. The Ministry of Economic Development (MED) is the main regulator of
nonbank institutions through its various business units, including the Registrar of
Companies and the Government Actuary. The MED has a role in ensuring compliance
with applicable laws for insurance companies, superannuation funds, building societies, and
credit unions, and to a more limited extent finance companies and managed funds. The legal
framework grants it some enforcement powers, including the ability to: (i) compel the entities
they regulate to provide additional information, as deemed necessary to facilitate oversight
and keep investors informed; (ii) appoint auditors; (iii) suspend registration; and (iv) place
companies in statutory management or liquidation. Despite these powers, ongoing oversight,
including review of periodic financial reports, is limited for some sections of the nonbank
sector.
- 16 -
26. For the securities sector, the principal regulator is the Securities Commission,
while the Takeovers Panel and Registrar of Companies have more narrowly defined
mandates. The principal elements of the securities regulatory framework are: initial and
ongoing disclosure requirements for public issuers, including collective investment schemes;
entry standards and oversight of some market intermediaries (principally exchange
members); supervision of most collective investment scheme operators by trustees and
private supervisors; regulation of takeovers; and certain restrictions on abusive conduct in
secondary markets. For securities markets, the NZX and the NZFOE establish and monitor
prudential standards and rules for the conduct of trading on the exchange, including
disclosure requirements. Most other market intermediaries, however, are subject to minimal
or no regulatory supervision. This includes, most notably, investment advisors.
27. The government, securities regulators, and NZX are taking steps to raise the
quality of securities regulation to high international standards. To date, the government
has provided sufficient funding to the Securities Commission and the Takeover Panel to
enable them to fulfill their responsibilities. Management of NZX is investing in its regulatory
functions and it cooperates with the Securities Commission and the Takeover Panel in
addressing regulatory concerns in areas of shared responsibility. Overall, the main
government regulatory agencies, MED, Securities Commission and the RBNZ, seem well
coordinated and maintain close contacts that enable them to monitor issues relating to cross-
linkages between NBFIs and banks. However, some gaps remain in the regulatory
framework. These gaps may make it more difficult for securities regulators to detect
incompetent or fraudulent conduct at an early stage and, in some instances, to take effective
enforcement action. The government and securities regulators are aware of these weaknesses,
are familiar with the relevant international best practices, and intend to carry out significant
reforms in the next few years.
28. New Zealand’s observance of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Principles
for Anti–Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) is
being assessed by a team from FATF and the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering
(APG). Field work has been completed, and the ROSC from the assessment will be
circulated to the Board once it is completed.
III. S
HORT-TERM STABILITY ISSUES
29. In all areas of short-term stress considered, the exposures of the New Zealand
financial system appear well-contained. Systems are in place to ensure an adequate
response if stresses were to occur.
A. Stress Testing the Financial System
30. In preparation for the FSAP, the RBNZ coordinated a stress-testing exercise
among the five systemically important banks. Stress tests were undertaken by banks and
results were aggregated by the RBNZ. The mission did not have access to individual bank
data.
- 17 -
31. The stress tests focused on risks judged relevant to the New Zealand market
(Table 5). Stress testing of the Australian parent groups of New Zealand banks was beyond
the scope of the New Zealand FSAP. Available data suggest that Australian banking groups
are profitable and well capitalized, with the New Zealand operations accounting (on average)
for less than twenty percent of group assets or profits. The mission reviewed the publicly
available reports on APRA’s stress tests of these groups, which focused on Australian
property price risks and found these risks to be manageable. Risks perceived most important
to New Zealand bank operations at this stage include significant changes in exchange rates,
New Zealand interest rates, property prices, and the price of agricultural output. The stress
test also included two dynamic macroeconomic scenarios, one based on the outbreak of foot-
and-mouth disease, a scenario that would lead to a significant shock to agricultural output
and far-reaching repercussions on the economy at large. A second scenario simulated a sharp
increase in the cost of foreign funding for New Zealand banks.
32. The results show a high degree of resilience of the banking system. Market-risk
shocks applied to bank trading books (which were large shocks compared to historical
experience) produced only small losses, given the small size of the bank’s trading book
(Table 6). A maximum loss for one bank of less than 15 percent of pre-tax profits emerges if
nominal New Zealand interest rates were to increase by 300 basis points, and bank positions
were all fixed at their most disadvantageous internal risk management limit. Results of the
credit-risk scenario, involving a 20 percent decline in property prices and some decline in
household income, would differ depending on, among other factors, portfolio concentration
on commercial property. The worst individual bank loss estimate would be below half of the
bank’s March 2003 annual pre-tax profits. These results are, in part, due to the characteristics
of bank mortgage portfolios in New Zealand, including a 60 percent average loan-to-value
ratio, and several contract features that allow homeowners to remain current on their loans
while facing temporary unemployment and reductions in income.
33. Results of the foot-and-mouth scenario suggest it would not pose a risk to the
solvency of the major banks. The dynamic scenarios are based on macroeconomic
assumptions provided by the RBNZ (Table 8). Results of these dynamic stress tests are
summarized in Figures 1 and 2. For the foot-and-mouth scenario, such a shock would impose
a modest but long-lasting drag on the profitability of systemically important banks. These
banks’ direct exposures to the agricultural sector are contained, and the exchange rate
depreciation associated with the scenario bolsters the profitability of other export industries.
In mission discussions, banks offered the opinion that the stress scenario assumptions were
perhaps too optimistic, and that a serious outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease might have
more wide-ranging effects than anticipated in the RBNZ simulations.
- 18 -
Table 5. Sensitivity Stress-Test Scenarios
Market-Risk Scenarios
Scenario Exchange Rates
1 30 percent depreciation of the New Zealand dollar relative to all other currencies
2 30 percent appreciation of the New Zealand dollar relative to all other currencies
Interest Rates
3 300 basis point increase in interest rates across the NZ yield curve
4
300 basis point increase in the long end (5+ years) of the NZ yield curve, short rates
unchanged
Credit-Risk Scenarios
Scenario Commodity Prices
1 A decline in the dairy payout to $2.50/kg for two consecutive years
Property prices and economic weakness
2
20 percent decline in residential property prices, with unemployment rising from 5
to 9 percent, and households’ real disposable income falling by 4 percent
3 20 percent fall in commercial property prices, 20 percent fall in corporate earnings
Source: RBNZ.
Table 6. Market Risk Results
1/
Shock
Average Loss as a
Percent of 2003
Profits 2/
Largest Individual Bank
Maximum Risk Loss as a
Percent of 2003 Profits
2/
Assuming Typical Bank Exposure
1 1.98 2.75
2 -1.00 0.39
3 2.75 3.82
4 0.43 0.91
Assuming Worst Case Exposures
1 3.80 8.60
2 -0.70 2.80
3 6.20 14.40
4 3.60 7.10
Source: RBNZ.
1/ Negative numbers represent gains.
2/ Actual reported annual pre-tax profit for the 12-month period ending in
March 2003.
- 19 -
Table 7. Credit Risk Results
Year
Average Cumulative
Loss as a Percent of
2003 Profits
1/
Largest Individual Bank
Loss as a Percent of
2003 Profits
1/
Credit Shock 1
1 3.09 8.33
2 4.35 11.38
Credit Shock 2
1 8.31 15.84
2 18.78 32.56
3 28.39 44.11
Credit Shock 3
1 1.90 3.46
2 6.63 10.79
3 9.76 19.50
Source: RBNZ.
1/ Actual reported annual pre-tax profit for the 12-month period ending in
March 2003.
Table 8. Model Assumptions
Foot-and-Mouth Disease Scenario Assumptions
80 percent decline in meat exports
20 percent depreciation of the New Zealand dollar against all other currencies
50 basis point increase in the risk premium for New Zealand dollar denominated
assets
A decline in the long-term capital/output ratio and net foreign assets.
Increase in Offshore Funding Costs
A depreciation of the New Zealand dollar by 40 percent
An increase of short- and long-term interest rates to 18–20 percent
A permanent increase in the risk premium on New Zealand dollar-denominated
assets
Source: RBNZ.
34. The results of the funding-costs-stress scenario show greater potential for loss.
Bank profitability falls in the early quarters of this scenario as market risk and banking book
losses are generated from a rise in interest rates and the sharp depreciation of the NZD.
Eventually, higher interest rates generate greater interest revenues as credits mature and are
- 20 -
repriced, but the rate rise and the weak economy cause a rise in residential mortgage defaults,
particularly on mortgages associated with investment properties. Lending to commercial
property developers is also expected to generate losses, yet the losses to the banking sector
will be attenuated by the losses that will be absorbed by mezzanine creditors, primarily
finance companies and contributory mortgage companies. While banks suffer depressed
profits, the results do not suggest that any bank’s capital position would be endangered by
this scenario.
Figure 1. Foot and Mouth Disease Scenario
Figure 2. Funding Shock Stress Scenario
B. Nonbank Financial Institutions
35. The NBFIs are small in comparison to the banking system, but are able to offer a
wide range of financial products similar to those offered by banks. NBFIs are subject to
prospectus and investment statement requirements under the Securities Act. However, NBFIs
are not subject to quarterly disclosure and directors’ attestations as required of banks. As a
result, there is little timely quantitative information that is readily available to depositors and
market participants. Most NBFIs are only required to report their financial results on an
annual basis, and often with a substantial reporting lag, although additional disclosures are
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415
Stress Quarter
Proportion of baseline profits_
sample average
lower envelope
Source: RBNZ.
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
123456789101112131415
Stress Quarter
Proportion of baseline profits_
sample average
lower envelope
Source: RBNZ.
- 21 -
required if there have been material adverse developments since the date of the most recent
prospectus. Furthermore, the government entity largely responsible for collecting this
information, the MED, has only limited capacity to compile and aggregate the relevant data.
36. The main NBFIs are affiliates of the major banks or multinational financial
groups and benefit, to some extent, from the regulation imposed on their parents.
However, the lack of timely and comprehensive disclosure of individual and aggregate data
for the sector potentially reduces the effectiveness of market discipline. It may also hamper
effective early intervention, should significant problems in the sector develop which, given
ownership links and similar business practices, have the potential for direct or indirect
spillover effects on banks. Efforts to coordinate and strengthen data collection and disclosure
would help regulators, market participants, and depositors to have a more accurate and timely
picture of developments in the sector.
C. Foreign Currency Exposure and Functioning of Exchange Markets
37. The stability of the financial system could be sensitive to a number of foreign-
exchange-related issues, due to high dependence on international trade and capital
flows. These include the management of exchange rate risk, access to overseas funding, and
the liquidity of the foreign exchange market. Appropriate risk management and well
functioning markets indicate, however, that short-term risks related to foreign exchange at
this time seem contained.
Foreign currency exposure
38. Exchange rate risk in New Zealand is well understood and managed actively by
banks and other market participants. Markets have coped successfully with considerable
volatility in the exchange rate. From January 1997 to November 2000, the New Zealand
dollar depreciated by about 45 percent against the U.S. dollar, and it subsequently
appreciated by 73 percent by February 2004. As a result, banks require the adoption of
hedging policies when considering applications for loans by corporations. A very high
percentage of foreign-currency-denominated overseas debt is hedged: over 96 percent in the
banking sector and 78 percent in other sectors, thus greatly reducing balance sheet risks.
Approximately 70 percent of the hedging is done using financial contracts with the remainder
naturally hedged against foreign exchange assets or receipts. Operational foreign exchange
risk is also very conservatively managed with large exporters consistently hedging
receivables and forecasting receipts over their planning horizon. The public sector has no net
foreign-exchange-denominated debt.
39. There is little evidence of major residual NZD exchange rate risk remaining for
the country. Exchange rate risk is frequently intermediated separately from the credit risk
(via the derivative markets) and often passes through a number of intermediaries, with
market participants themselves unaware of the end-recipient. New Zealand institutions and
statistical services do not attempt to identify market participants in any systematic fashion,
and thus it is difficult to determine the ultimate bearer of NZD risk. However, the following
- 22 -
factors seem to mitigate any possible risk for New Zealand: (i) counterparties to hedges seem
to be varied, but all of them are nondomestic entities, including foreign households and retail
investors, overseas insurance companies and fund managers, and international currency
overlay investors and hedge funds; (ii) market participants appear to be widely dispersed
geographically and are relatively numerous, so the risk is not overly concentrated in one
country or type of investor; and (iii) the demand for New Zealand dollar risk appears to be
fairly steady over time, as evidenced by the ability to hedge New Zealand currency risk
consistently over time and in a large variety of market conditions, and the fact that almost
half of New Zealand’s international financial liabilities are denominated in domestic
currency.
Foreign exchange market
40. The foreign exchange market in New Zealand functions efficiently and provides
a reasonable degree of liquidity, commensurate with the size of the New Zealand
economy. Seven banks are currently market makers in the NZD, and most trading now takes
place outside of New Zealand—primarily in Australia, but also in London and New York. In
April 2001, average daily trading volume in Australia and New Zealand was approximately
$NZ 2.8 billion in the spot market and $NZ 13 billion in the swap market. There are
indications that trading volumes have declined, possibly substantially, since then. Trading
spreads are similar to those of other comparable currencies. Settlement risk is present but will
be greatly reduced when the New Zealand dollar becomes eligible for inclusion in the
Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) Bank, currently expected by end-2004.
41. The RBNZ maintains limited liquid reserves (approximately $NZ 4.3 billion)
and the technical capability to intervene in foreign exchange markets, although it has
not intervened since 1985. This framework provides a limited safety net, as it would allow
the bank to intervene in order to restore liquidity to a severely disrupted FX market, reducing
possible systemic risks for the New Zealand economy. The RBNZ has recently
recommended to the Minister of Finance that the RBNZ, as one of its policy implementation
tools, should have the capacity to intervene to influence the level of the exchange rate when
the rate was “exceptionally and unjustifiably” high or low.
D. Money and Bond Markets
42. The money market in New Zealand consists of a range of short-term debt
instruments, including treasury bills, bank bills, and commercial paper, together with a
variety of derivative financial instruments, such as bank bill futures, interest rate swaps
and options, and forward-rate agreements. Secondary markets for most instruments exist,
with the market for bank bills and their futures being the most liquid. The secondary market
for treasury bills and commercial paper is much less liquid because investors tend to hold
these instruments until maturity. Trading activity is dominated by five or six of the major
banks and three brokers.
- 23 -
43. New Zealand bond markets are dominated by government bonds, with around
$NZ 21.8 billion outstanding. Government bonds are the most liquid instrument, with daily
turnover in the secondary market around $NZ 3 billion, mostly in repo transactions. The
bonds are issued through the New Zealand Debt Management Office, a branch of the New
Zealand Treasury, with the RBNZ acting as agent. There are about 10 active bidders in the
regular tenders, held approximately 12 times a year. In the secondary market, there are seven
price makers and three active brokers. The larger corporates, banks, and state-owned
enterprises with investment-grade credit ratings issue corporate bonds, mostly by tender or
private placement. At present, there are around $NZ 7.2 billion outstanding for
approximately 30 issuers, mostly with maturities of three to seven years. Most issues are
illiquid. There is also a relatively large market in Eurokiwi bonds (presently around
$NZ 11.9 billion outstanding), which are denominated in NZD and offered by offshore
entities to investors outside of New Zealand.
E. Systemic Liquidity Provision
44. The RBNZ is actively involved in liquidity management through its daily open
market operations (OMO), including foreign exchange swaps. It also has a range of
standing facilities, in the context of the overnight interest rate target (the Official Cash Rate
or OCR). The interbank market for overnight funds appears to function well, with most banks
able to meet their liquidity needs either from other market participants through secured and
unsecured lending or from the daily injection of funds through OMO. Market frictions
occasionally occur when there are imbalances in holdings of government bonds (such as one
bank accumulating a large position in cash or government securities). In these circumstances,
banks prefer to pay a penalty rate (of 25 or 30 basis points above the OCR) to the RBNZ for
the use of its standing facilities. This is in preference to paying banks holding surplus
liquidity a rate at or above the OCR when secured with government securities, and depart
from the market convention of settling transactions at the OCR rate. The repeated nature of
transactions in a small market with a limited number of players seems to promote the
maintenance of this convention.
45. The RBNZ appears to have sufficient information to be able to detect and
respond to any short-term liquidity difficulties should they arise. The RBNZ has frequent
contact throughout the day with market participants and collects information on a daily basis
on interbank lending positions. The RBNZ also monitors transactions in the payment system
for signs of settlement difficulties.
2
However, the fact that the market does not always clear
because of stickiness in the price raises issues about how the market might react to
disruptions in interbank markets. The standing facilities in place provide a convenient
mechanism for banks to acquire liquidity from the central bank in the event of market
2
The mission did not undertake an assessment of the payment system. The RBNZ did
provide a detailed self-assessment of the Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment
Systems, which did not indicate any major deficiencies.
- 24 -
frictions. The RBNZ has adequate powers under the Reserve Bank Act to provide lender-of-
last-resort (LoLR) facilities, but since the revision of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act
in 1989, the RBNZ has not provided emergency liquidity support to any institution. The
RBNZ is presently reviewing its internal policies relating to LoLR facilities in connection
with efforts to formalize crisis management approaches.
IV. MEDIUM-TERM AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES
46. The ongoing changes in the financial sector landscape and ownership patterns
imply a need to reinvigorate the regulatory and operating framework to keep it up-to-
date. Adaptations may be called for in several areas. First, the regulatory approach may leave
the RBNZ and other regulators at times without the optimal level of information to make
informed judgments about systemic issues. Second, there are open questions regarding how a
financial crisis might be addressed. Finally, increased financial interdependence with
Australia and other financial centers may need to be more explicitly acknowledged in the
formulation of the regulatory framework.
A. Banking Supervision
47. New Zealand led the way in disclosure when it was first introduced, and it
achieved a high degree of financial sector stability within this framework. Since that
time, international best practices for disclosure have evolved and, in some instances, have
surpassed practices in New Zealand. Disclosure remains a valuable discipline on banks, and
New Zealand’s banking system is more transparent than many others. However, the
information disclosed in the quarterly statements could be enhanced to provide more
effective market discipline. Disclosure statements do not appear to be widely used at the
retail level, and are not sufficiently comprehensive or timely to be used by wholesale
counterparties for assessing creditworthiness, nor for some supervisory judgments. It would,
therefore, be appropriate to review the contents of the statements and supplement them with
focused, prudential information directly for the supervisor. The RBNZ might benefit from
having its own set of early-warning indicators, which should include, inter alia, information
on individual bank liquidity and large exposures.
48. There are almost no independent supervisory checks on banks’ systems and
controls, aside from external auditors’ checks. This reflects the current regulatory
philosophy, but such checks need not be overly intrusive, if properly focused. They can also
add value, both in identifying incipient weaknesses in individual banks and by enabling the
RBNZ to draw best-practice lessons for the banking system as a whole. The RBNZ might
consider commissioning third-party reports and establishing a small, specialist team in-house
to make focused, on-site visits on particular aspects of credit and operational risk.
49. Directors play a critical part in the New Zealand approach to banking
supervision. It is therefore important that the fit-and-proper criteria be kept under review and
the vetting process be sufficiently thorough. The role is demanding, and independent
- 25 -
directors might benefit from more regular communication with the RBNZ, perhaps at an
annual meeting to review developments and any issues they might have.
B. Crisis Management
50. New Zealand’s regulatory philosophy and the absence of depositor protection, in
conjunction with the almost fully foreign-owned banking system, would pose particular
challenges if a banking crisis were to emerge. Key concerns for crisis resolution include:
(i) the ability of the RBNZ to act as an LoLR; (ii) foreign bank branches being systemically
important; and (iii) subsidiaries of foreign banks, while having legal standing, being unable
to be economically viable on their own.
Lender-of-last-resort powers
51. Under the Reserve Bank Act, the RBNZ is required to act as an LoLR when
needed to ensure the soundness of the financial system. In formulating its LoLR policies,
the RBNZ has specified that it would only provide credit to an institution whose solvency is
not in material doubt, after the institution had fully exhausted market sources of liquidity, and
where it is necessary to maintain the stability of the financial system.
52. The RBNZ’s monitoring may not provide sufficient information at the onset of a
sudden crisis situation. The information that would be used by the RBNZ to independently
determine an institution’s eligibility for LoLR operations have not been formally articulated.
The RBNZ may not have access to sufficiently timely and detailed supervisory data that
could be utilized to make a speedy judgment about an institution’s solvency. The RBNZ can
request further information from a bank under Section 93, but a response may take
significant time. The present LoLR system relies heavily on directors’ or parent-banks’
attestations as to the solvency of a New Zealand bank operation. The RBNZ may wish to
consider again whether additional or more timely information might help it reach a better
judgment on solvency in a crisis situation.
Problem bank resolution policies
53. The RBNZ approach to banking supervision and the dominance of foreign
institutions in the financial system may complicate bank resolution, especially in the
case of systemically important institutions. The “hands-off” supervisory approach and
reliance on disclosure requirements may delay detection of emerging problems, thus
lengthening supervisory response time in a crisis. Furthermore, the range of remedial actions
that the RBNZ can take in response to a bank in difficulties is complicated for foreign
branches by legal uncertainties surrounding which assets and liabilities would be subject to
statutory management control. For a foreign-owned subsidiary, the dependence on the parent
bank can present difficulties in determining the true condition of the bank, and could also
give rise to cross-jurisdictional issues and other delays. These issues are particularly acute for
New Zealand, because all of the systemically important banks are foreign-owned.
- 26 -
54. To enhance financial stability, the RBNZ has been reviewing a range of
alternative policy options, including a specific open-bank resolution policy based on
recapitalization by creditors. The RBNZ has been conducting feasibility studies and is
attempting to clarify IT-related and other issues, with a view to making it operational. The
options to effect a bank resolution could include other alternatives such as a government bail-
out, a recapitalization with loss sharing between the government and depositors, orderly
liquidation, or a “lifeboat” rescue by the banking industry. The RBNZ’s bank resolution
policies are not yet fully defined and warrant further assessment, in the context of the overall
range of options available to address bank failures and resolution.
C. Cooperation with Australia
55. The recent increase in Australian ownership of banking assets has raised the
awareness of the high degree of interdependence between New Zealand and Australia’s
banking systems. Specific concerns about this interdependence include: (i) loss of control
over systems and functions; (ii) effects of Australian depositor protection on New Zealand
depositors; and (iii) regulatory harmonization between both countries. All issues are under
review by the RBNZ and are actively discussed with Australian counterparts; however, the
dialogue may need to be intensified to achieve satisfactory progress in a reasonable time
frame. In parallel with these discussions, the RBNZ is working on stand-alone policies
regarding local incorporation, director attestations, and outsourcing, in recognition of the
need for more immediate responses to certain developments.
56. Closer integration of foreign-owned banks and other financial institutions has
led to increasing outsourcing of IT and management functions to parent companies.
3
Such outsourcing has been driven by efficiency considerations and occurred both in
subsidiaries and in branches of foreign banks. The RBNZ estimates that at least half of the
banks operating in New Zealand are no longer operating as separable entities, given that
account and back-up information may not be readily available on site in New Zealand or in
an accessible back-up site. While this will not be a concern in normal times, it will be a
serious impediment to the RBNZ’s actions in case of a systemic crisis.
57. To avoid further “hollowing out” of core functionality, the RBNZ is working
with banks on assessing where core functions are being located. It plans to use the
conditions of registration to ensure that necessary management skills and back-up sites are
available in New Zealand. Preliminary discussions of the issue have taken place with the
Australian regulators, but further contact and a coordinated response to “third-party
outsourcing” might be necessary. The RBNZ might also want to consider increasing its
systematic knowledge about the core functionality of the New Zealand banks through a
targeted audit of banks.
3
Parent companies themselves have also outsourced some services, possibly beyond the full
reach of the home-country regulator.
- 27 -
58. A second concern for the New Zealand authorities relates to the possible effects
of the Australian depositor-preference scheme and its possible negative effects on New
Zealand depositors in case of a crisis. The Australian depositor-preference scheme
prescribes priority of Australian depositors over assets in Australia in the case of a bank
resolution. The issue is of particular concern in the case of one systemically important bank
operating as a branch of an Australian bank, as the parent bank may be able to shift assets
easily to Australia. However, there are also concerns that interbank-lending operations might
make it possible for banks operating as subsidiaries to concentrate assets in the home country
to the detriment of New Zealand depositors. The connected lending limits imposed by the
RBNZ may reduce the risks associated with asset shifting, and the RBNZ is also discussing
the issue with the Australian authorities, but the issue remains.
59. Banks in New Zealand are effectively subject to home- and host-country
regulations. Given the more “hands-on” approach pursued by the Australian regulators, the
additional compliance requirement for New Zealand banks arises mainly in the preparation of
quarterly rather than six-monthly disclosure statements. There are also some differences in
capital adequacy requirements, and the RBNZ also imposes additional requirements
concerning connected lending limits. Going forward, though, as the regulatory regime
changes, issues could arise; for example, with regard to Basel II where New Zealand plans to
implement the standardized approach and Australia plans to adopt the internal ratings-based
approach. The extent and possible implications of such reforms should be discussed among
regulators before a final decision on new regulation is made.
- 28 - ANNEX
OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND CODES—SUMMARY ASSESSMENTS
Summary of Assessments of International Standards and Codes
Basel Core Principles for Banking Supervision (BCP)
New Zealand has a unique regulatory system, but has nevertheless achieved a significant degree of compliance with the
BCP.
Supervision is conducted mainly through disclosure, director attestation, and more frequent external audit
requirements, but there are also key prudential requirements on capital, on connected lending, and on the
composition of bank’s boards of directors.
There is a general consensus among industry participants that director attestations have instilled a strong discipline
with respect to oversight of a bank’s risk-monitoring and management systems.
With respect to principles addressing credit (CP 7) and risk management (CPs 12 and 13), a primary reliance on
disclosure and director attestation allows information gaps that may compromise the RBNZ’s ability to detect or
anticipate incipient problems.
On other principles, including those addressing acquisitions or investments by banks (CP 5), large exposure limits
(CP 9) and onsite supervision (CP 16), there is limited RBNZ intervention; creating actual or potential gaps that
could undermine the effectiveness of its supervision program.
The RBNZ’s role in anti-money laundering (AML) needs to be clarified; its hands-off approach in the AML area
creates significant vulnerabilities in an environment where the relevant government agencies are underresourced and
their respective roles still ill-defined. Responsibilities for AML duties should be clearly assigned by mutual
agreement between the relevant agencies.
IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation
Recent changes in securities regulation and the restructuring of NZX have strengthened the regulatory framework.
Further reforms are planned.
Securities regulators and NZX are making good use of their powers. In particular, the broad inquiry and
information-sharing powers of the Securities Commission, combined with its new enforcement powers, have
enabled it to work with other authorities to deal with many of the investor protection concerns that have arisen.
However, some gaps remain in the regulatory system.
NZX exercises important regulatory functions, supervising two of the most important classes of participants in
organized markets (NZX share brokers and listed companies). It has made significant investments in regulation
since its demutualization. The Securities Commission is encouraged to develop a program for monitoring the NZX’s
continued operational capability and fitness to perform these functions.
While securities and futures dealers that are exchange members are subject to high entry standards and ongoing
oversight, most other categories of market intermediaries are subject to little or no oversight.
Minimum standards of conduct for collective investment schemes operators and better reporting mechanisms would
enhance the ability of trustees and private supervisors to monitor collective investment scheme operators.
There are some weaknesses in standards and penalties relating to market abuse; however, draft legislation to address
these matters is expected in 2004.
Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies
The RBNZ exhibits a high degree of transparency in all aspects of its conduct of monetary policy and banking
supervision. The objectives, responsibilities, accountability structures, and transparency obligations are specified in
legislation. The RBNZ issues a wide range of material on a timely basis to explain its performance, including the
quarterly Monetary Policy Statement and Bulletin, post-election briefing papers, and website. The RBNZ issues an
annual report and financial statements, which are subject to external audit and publicly disclosed.
There is a high degree of transparency in the securities regulatory framework, but its complexities could be better
explained. Each regulator should include on its website a common description of the securities regulatory regime,
outlining its respective roles, responsibilities and interrelationships, with relevant links across agencies’ sites.
Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism
A team from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) is
assessing observance of FATF’s Principles for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism
(AML/CFT). A summary assessment will be forwarded separately to the Board when completed.
- 29 - ANNEX
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF OBSERVANCE OF THE BASEL CORE PRINCIPLES
4
A. General
60. This assessment of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
(BCP) was conducted during October and November 2003 onsite in New Zealand. The
BCP assessment was undertaken within the framework of the FSAP for New Zealand.
61. The assessment is based on several sources: (i) a comprehensive self-assessment by
the New Zealand authorities; (ii) detailed interviews with staff from the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand; (iii) laws, regulations and other documentation on the supervisory framework
and on the structure and development of the New Zealand banking sector; (iv) interviews
with staff from the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority; and (v) meetings with
officers and directors of individual banking institutions as well as with members of the
auditing profession. The assessors benefited from the full cooperation of the New Zealand
authorities and received all necessary information.
62. The New Zealand financial system is dominated by the banking sector, which
comprises 18 registered banks holding assets exceeding $NZ 200 billion (about 160
percent of GDP). The banking sector is, in turn, dominated by 5 systemically important
institutions, all Australian-owned, holding nearly 90 percent of the sector’s assets and
deposits. Only two, smaller banks are New Zealand-owned, including a recently-formed
retail bank that is owned by the New Zealand Post Office which enjoys an explicit guarantee
from its parent. This is the one exception to the strong “free-market” approach generally
espoused by the authorities.
63. New Zealand’s banking sector is profitable and well-capitalized. Over the last five
years, aggregate industry return on assets has exceeded 1½ percent, and after-tax returns on
equity have consistently exceeded 20 percent. Capitalization, whether measured by
equity-asset ratios or regulatory capital measures, is above international minimum prudential
benchmarks. Impaired assets are low, comprising only slightly more than 0.5 percent of bank
assets. General and specific provisions cover about three-quarters of total impaired and
overdue assets.
64. The general preconditions are substantively met. New Zealand accounting
standards, for example, are consistent with international best practice and New Zealand has
announced its intention to adopt International Accounting Standards (IAS) with effect from
January 1, 2007. There will be scope for early adoption from January 1, 2005.
65. The legal framework for bank supervision appears robust. The RBNZ Act
provides a range of powers to address both compliance and safety and soundness concerns
4
This assessment was prepared by Michael Ainley (U.K. FSA) and Barbara Baldwin
(IMF/MFD).
- 30 - ANNEX
that may arise with respect to a bank. While the powers of day-to-day supervision fall
completely within the RBNZ’s purview, the consent of the Minister of Finance is required to
invoke certain “crisis management” powers. In theory, this could hinder the Reserve Bank’s
ability to apply its enforcement powers promptly but, in practice, there is no evidence of any
political (or industry) interference in the ongoing supervision of banks.
66. Self-discipline, in the form of clear Directors’ responsibilities (see below), and
market discipline are cornerstones of the New Zealand approach to banking
supervision and strongly reinforce regulatory discipline. Banks are subject to
comprehensive disclosure requirements. The regime requires frequent public reporting by
banks, and financial statements must be audited twice annually (though audits of mid-year
statements are limited in scope).
67. Banking supervision in New Zealand is focused on systemic goals. Unlike many
other jurisdictions, New Zealand regulators do not carry any duty to protect individual
depositors, or to safeguard individual institutions. There is no official deposit protection
scheme. The Reserve Bank is empowered to act as a lender of last resort when needed to
ensure the soundness of the financial system, but the RBNZ Act is not prescriptive in how
this responsibility is to be carried out. The Reserve Bank is currently reviewing its crisis
management arrangements.
B. Main Findings—Summary
68. Objectives, Autonomy, Powers, and Resources (CP1): The framework for the
supervision of banks is sufficiently robust. The RBNZ Act specifies that the Reserve Bank
has sole responsibility for bank registration and supervision. It sets out regulatory objectives
and principles, and provides broad rulemaking powers. Systems are in place to ensure that
the RBNZ’s activities are carried out in a transparent manner. Information on the financial
strength and performance of the banking industry is publicly available. Formal funding
arrangements are in place through five-year agreements negotiated between the Governor
and the Minister of Finance. The funding agreement has not yet acted as a constraint on the
RBNZ’s ability to carry out its functions, and it includes a clause that requires the agreement
to be reviewed in the event that there are any material changes in the nature or extent of the
work undertaken by the RBNZ in respect of any of its designated functions.
69. The RBNZ has at its disposal a broad spectrum of tools to carry out routine
supervision and corrective action as necessary. Some tools, such as the ability to
commission or conduct onsite reviews, could now be implemented, selectively, to improve
the effectiveness of the supervisory framework. As already noted, use of certain crisis
management powers must be approved by the Minister; some of the “middle range” powers
in this group, such as the giving of directions to a bank, might more appropriately be placed
directly under the Reserve Bank’s powers.
70. Licensing and Structure (CPs 2-5): There are clear restrictions surrounding the use
of the word “bank” and its derivatives. However, the business of banking is not regulated per
se, and deposit taking is not restricted to banks. Nonbank financial institutions which accept
- 31 - ANNEX
deposits are subject to much less comprehensive registration requirements than banks. This
would appear to create the potential for confusion among consumers of financial services,
though the authorities maintain that the public has been well educated about the different
categories of financial institutions. There are no laws or regulations that define permissible
types of acquisitions and investments for registered banks, and banks are not required to
obtain supervisory approval for acquisitions or even to notify the Reserve Bank of such
events. Although it would be possible to introduce a condition of registration requiring
supervisory approval for specified types of acquisitions and investments, this is viewed as
inconsistent with the RBNZ’s philosophy of supervision. The RBNZ has recently
strengthened regulations governing changes in bank ownership, and are currently considering
enhancements to the fit and proper principles applicable to bank owners.
71. Prudential Regulations and Requirements (CPs 6-15): Although the RBNZ has the
authority to set prudential regulations on a range of issues, it has done so only selectively. At
present, there are explicit rules governing capital adequacy and connected lending. For the
other risks addressed in this set of principles, the authorities underscore that management of
these matters is the responsibility of bank directors, who are best-placed to understand the
individual institution’s risk profile and appetite and to design and implement risk
management systems accordingly. The director attestations and audited disclosure
requirements have contributed to a quite extensive system of checks and balances within the
major banks. While this approach works effectively for certain of these principles, delivering
the underlying objectives (including CPs 8 and 14), it appears less effective, even when
complemented with annual consultations with bank management, in the areas of credit (CP 7)
and risk management (CPs 12 and 13). The RBNZ’s role in the area of money laundering
should be reviewed as part of the current intergovernmental examination of anti-money
laundering measures.
72. Methods of Ongoing Supervision (CPs 16-20): In keeping with its supervisory
philosophy, the Reserve Bank does not conduct onsite inspections of banks. It has the ability
to commission independent, onsite reviews under Section 95 of the RBNZ Act, but has not
yet made regular use of these powers. It is now actively considering doing so. Its offsite
supervision program is more conventional, but here too is limited essentially to receiving and
analyzing information that is available to the general public. More up-to-date “early
warning” information from banks, including liquidity, would strengthen the Reserve Bank's
day-to-day supervision. The Reserve Bank does closely monitor banks’ compliance with
disclosure requirements, and regularly requires corrective action in the form of a revised
statement or subsequent amendment in the event of errors or omissions. The Reserve Bank
also retains the right, used periodically, to request additional information or more frequent
reporting if considered necessary for supervisory purposes; this can extend to information
regarding associated persons or affiliates of the bank.
73. Information Requirements (CP 21): Quarterly public disclosure of comprehensive
financial information on registered banks is a central component of the RBNZ’s approach to
supervision. Local accounting standards are generally consistent with international best
practice, and New Zealand has announced its intention to adopt International Accounting
Standards with effect from January 1, 2007.
- 32 - ANNEX
74. Formal Powers of Supervisors (CP 22): The RBNZ has a range of supervisory tools
to effect corrective action in cases where banks fail to meet prudential requirements or where
depositors are threatened in any other way. A “hierarchy of supervisory response” has been
established, involving procedures for elevating supervisory enforcement matters within the
Reserve Bank if informal approaches prove unsuccessful. As already mentioned, the Minister
of Finance would have to approve the use of certain “crisis management” powers specified in
the Act.
75. Cross Border Banking (CP 23-25): The RBNZ is empowered to undertake globally
consolidated supervision, and the RBNZ Act facilitates the sharing of supervisory
information by providing the necessary confidentiality. Banks are supervised on a
consolidated basis, and this would apply to any overseas branches or subsidiaries, but New
Zealand-incorporated banks currently have no material international operations.
C. Recommended Action Plan and Authorities’ Response
Table 1. Recommended Action Plan to Improve Observance
of
the Basel Core Principles
Reference Principle Recommended Action
Powers to Address Safety and Soundness Concerns
and Remedial Measures (CPs 1 and 22)
Finalize a crisis-management strategy. Explore possible forms
of cooperation with the Australian authorities, as appropriate.
Permissible Activities (CP 2) The ability of nonbank institutions to accept deposits does
create a potential loophole for regulatory arbitrage, and this
matter should be kept under review in light of reputational risk
issues.
Credit Policies (CP 7) Consider selective and focused use of Section 95 powers to
verify banks’ credit procedures and controls. This could take
the form of an independent third-party report. Alternatively the
Bank could establish its own small risk review team to carry ou
t
such reviews. This would probably require the Act to be
amended to give the Bank the explicit power to carry out
routine on-site inspections.
Large Exposures (CP 9) Consider obtaining more frequent data directly from the banks.
This could form part of a set of early warning prudential
indicators, which could also include liquidity.
Market Risks (CP 12) As CP 7.
Other Risks (CP 13) As CPs 7 and 9. In these areas, the information which the
RBNZ gets from disclosures and consultations needs to be
supplemented, as it is not comprehensive or current.
Money Laundering (CP 15) The RBNZ’s role in this area should be reviewed as part of the
current intergovernmental examination of anti-money
laundering measures.
On- and Off-Site Supervision (CP 16) Off-site work could be complemented by setting up a specialist
risk-review team for themed visits to banks and by up-to-date
early-warning indicators (CPs 7 and 9 above).
- 33 - ANNEX
Authorities’ response
76. The RBNZ provided the following response to the assessment.
77. “The RBNZ believes that New Zealand has a strong banking system and a framework
of supervision which suits its circumstances well. The framework is based on some
foundations which distinguish New Zealand, to some extent at least, from many other
countries:
The primary goal of supervision is systemic stability and not depositor or creditor
protection.
The RBNZ has an explicit duty to pursue efficiency as well as soundness.
Supervisory methods are aimed as far as possible at strengthening the incentives for
prudent behavior, by encouraging strong governance within banks and market disciplines,
and as a consequence detailed and prescriptive rules are kept to a minimum.
These features inevitably lead to some differences in the way some things are done in New
Zealand compared with the situation in other countries. New Zealand generally places
relatively more emphasis on giving responsibility and accountability for risk management to
banks and their directors, and to auditors and other external reviewers, and relatively less
emphasis on direct oversight by the supervisor. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand thinks
this suits policy objectives and the New Zealand context well.
78. The compliance assessment acknowledges that the New Zealand approach has
genuine strengths, that disclosure continues to provide a discipline on banks and that
attestation requirements are taken seriously by directors, but notes that the approach adopted
leaves some potential or actual gaps.
79. The RBNZ’s view is that all of the high-level Basel Core Principles are addressed
within the New Zealand framework, but not always in a conventional manner. Our decisions
to use alternative methods have been conscious and we believe that those methods are
generally effective. Nevertheless, we acknowledge some of the potential gaps in the
supervisory framework identified by the assessors. We either already have work underway
or plan to carry out work soon on ways of addressing these gaps. For example, work on
crisis management strategies and capacity, and on increased co-operation with Australian
authorities, has been underway for some time. Over the coming year we also will be looking
at making greater use of our powers to require banks to undergo independent reports on key
matters of prudential interest, at whether policies relating to the role of directors and auditors
need to be bolstered, and at whether there is a need to supplement information in disclosure
statements with additional reporting to the supervisor. Disclosure requirements are reviewed
periodically to ensure that they continue to reflect global best practice; further reviews are
planned.
80. Overall, the RBNZ remains satisfied that our basic approach to supervision is
appropriate for New Zealand’s current circumstances, but we accept that some refinements
are needed to ensure that it would continue to be effective in a less benign economic
environment.”
- 34 - ANNEX
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF OBSERVANCE OF THE IMF’S CODE OF GOOD PRACTICES
ON TRANSPARENCY IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICIES
5
TRANSPARENCY OF MONETARY POLICY
A. General
81. The assessment of practices relating to monetary policy within the framework of
the IMF’s Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies
was based mainly on the detailed self-assessment prepared by the RBNZ. The
assessment also entailed a review of the relevant documents maintained on the RBNZ’s
website, including the Annual Report, the Bulletin, the Policy Targets Agreement, the
Monetary Policy Statement, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989, Agency Agreement,
Operational Guidelines of the RBNZ, amongst others. In addition, discussions were held with
members of the Bank staff, commercial banks and other financial market participants.
B. Main Findings—Summary
82. The RBNZ exhibits a high degree of transparency in all aspects of its conduct of
monetary policy. The broad objectives, responsibilities, accountability structures, and
transparency obligations are specified in legislation. The RBNZ issues a wide range of
material on a timely basis to explain its performance across its functions, including the
quarterly Monetary Policy Statement and Bulletin, post-election briefing papers, and website.
The RBNZ issues an annual report and financial statements, which are subject to external
audit and publicly disclosed.
83. Clarity of roles, responsibilities and objectives of monetary policy: Under the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 (the Act)—which constitutes the RBNZ and
governs monetary policy in New Zealand—the sole objective of monetary policy is the
achievement and maintenance of stability in the general level of prices. This objective is
operationalized by way of a Policy Targets Agreement (PTA) entered into between the
Minister of Finance and the Governor of the RBNZ. The PTA specifies the precise policy
target to which monetary policy is to be directed. The PTA is a public document and is
accessible on the RBNZ website. As part of the governance arrangements applicable to
monetary policy, the objectives and conduct of monetary policy are required by the Act to be
transparent.
84. In addition to its monetary policy functions, the Bank’s other functions are also
contained in the Act. These include: the power to deal in foreign exchange (Section 16); the
power to temporarily suspend foreign exchange business (Section 22); the duty to advise the
Minister of Finance/Treasurer on foreign exchange matters (Section 23); the duty to manage
foreign exchange reserves (Section 24); the sole right to issue currency in New Zealand
5
This assessment was prepared by Jodi Scarlata, (IMF/MFD).
- 35 - ANNEX
(Section 25); the power to act as lender of last resort (Section 31); the duty to give financial
sector policy advice to the Minister of Finance/Treasurer (Section 33); the power to maintain
securities registry services (Section 35); and the power to register and supervise banks
(Section 67 and various sections in Part V of the Act).
85. The procedures for appointment, terms of office, and any general criteria for
removal of the heads and members of the governing body of the central bank are
clearly specified in legislation. Overdrafts by the government are permitted by the Bank.
The details of the terms under which any overdraft is advanced are not generally disclosed,
but the Agency Agreement between the Government’s Debt Management Office and the
Reserve Bank will shortly be placed on the Bank’s website. While the amounts of advances,
credits and overdrafts to the Government are disclosed monthly on the RBNZ website, there
is no disclosure of the terms of these transactions. It is recommended that the terms of these
advances and overdrafts be disclosed.
86. Open process for formulating and reporting monetary policy: The Act requires the
RBNZ to report publicly on its performance in various ways, including via publication of an
Annual Report and in Monetary Policy Statements. In practice, the RBNZ issues a wide
range of material to explain its performance across its functions, including articles in the
Bulletin, post-election briefing papers (issued immediately after a general election has been
held) and in various publications on the RBNZ website. Section 15 of the Act requires the
RBNZ to issue a Monetary Policy Statement at least every six months to explain its monetary
policy decisions and set out its thinking on possible future economic developments relevant
to inflation. The RBNZ has had a long-standing practice of issuing these statements
approximately every quarter, rather than six monthly. The RBNZ includes comprehensive
medium-term economic forecasts in the MPS.
87. The Governor and other senior RBNZ staff generally give seminars to business
audiences immediately following the release of a Monetary Policy Statement, to explain
the RBNZ’s monetary policy decision and related issues. The Governor also makes
numerous speeches throughout the year explaining monetary policy and other issues relevant
to the RBNZ’s functions. Other senior staff also give occasional presentations to various
external audiences.
88. Public availability of information on monetary policy: While New Zealand has not
yet applied to subscribe to SDDS, for several years central bank data have complied with
SDDS standards in all significant respects. A forward release calendar is disseminated on the
Bank’s website for a range of central bank data that corresponds to the subset specified by
SDDS. All of these data are disseminated with coverage, periodicity and timeliness
parameters that meet SDDS standards.
89. A summary statement of financial position is issued on the Bank’s website at a
specified date each month. The timing of the release is publicly disclosed. The statement
discloses information on aggregate market transactions and key balance sheet items.
- 36 - ANNEX
90. The RBNZ maintains an active public information service. In addition to a
detailed website, www.rbnz.govt.nz, the following documents are also published: RBNZ
Annual Reports and Monetary Policy Statements; post-election briefing paper—the most
recent one being issued in August 2002; RBNZ Bulletin—issued quarterly; RBNZ
Discussion Papers—issued on an ad hoc basis; speeches by the Governor and other senior
staff; brochures and pamphlets issued by the RBNZ (including on the functions and structure
of the RBNZ and on issues relevant to understanding its functions).
91. Accountability and assurance of integrity by the central bank: The Governor and
other RBNZ officials can be required to appear before Parliament’s Finance and Expenditure
Committee. This generally occurs four or five times a year, typically after the release of each
Monetary Policy Statement and Annual Report. The Committee occasionally conducts fuller
enquiries into the RBNZ’s operations (as it does for many government agencies).
92. The RBNZ is required to prepare and publish comprehensive financial
statements which comply with accepted accounting practices. The financial statements,
accounting policies and systems, and internal controls are subject to annual external audit. In
addition, the Act empowers the Minister of Finance to engage an external party to review
other aspects of the RBNZ’s operations as he or she sees fit.
93. The Act contains a number of provisions relating to the conduct of personal
financial affairs of directors and staff of the Bank, including rules relating to conflicts
of interest; it provides legal protection to directors and staff of the Bank, stating that they
shall only be personally liable for exercising powers conferred by the Act in bad faith or
omitting in bad faith to exercise a power conferred by the Act; and it makes provision for the
Government to indemnify the RBNZ, officers or employees of the RBNZ, statutory managers
of registered banks, among others, for liability arising from exercising powers or omitting to
exercise a power conferred by the Act.
C. Recommended Action Plan and Authorities’ Response
Table 2. Recommended Action Plan to Improve Observance of IMF’s MFP Transparency
Code PracticesMonetary Policy
Reference Practice Recommended Action
Practice 1.2.1 The details of the terms under which any overdraft is
advanced should be disclosed.
Practice 1.2.2 Disclosure should be made of all relevant details of the
amounts and terms of credits, advances or overdrafts
provided to central government by the Bank, and the terms
and conditions of government deposits with the Bank
Authorities’ response
94. All comments by the authorities have been incorporated and they are in
agreement with the assessment.
- 37 - ANNEX
TRANSPARENCY OF BANKING SUPERVISION
D. General
95. The assessment of transparency in banking supervision was based on a detailed
self-assessment prepared by the RBNZ, a review of the relevant documents maintained on
the RBNZ’s website, and discussions with members of the RBNZ staff, commercial banks
and other market participants.
E. Main Findings—Summary
96. Clarity of roles, responsibilities and objectives: The RBNZ is the sole authority
responsible for registering and supervising banks, and has no supervisory jurisdiction over
other categories of financial institution. The RBNZ Act 1989 (the Act) sets out the RBNZ’s
functions, powers, accountability structures and transparency obligations. The RBNZ has
responsibilities in a range of financial system areas, including: the registration and
supervision of banks; responding to financial distress events affecting registered banks;
acting as lender of last resort; providing advice to the government on the operation of the
financial system; coordinating and promoting legislative change in areas that relate to
banking; and overseeing and operating the payment system. All of these functions are
disclosed and explained publicly, including in the RBNZ’s Annual Report, on the RBNZ
website, in brochures and in the RBNZ Bulletin.
97. An MOU between the domestic regulatory agencies is being developed and is
expected to be publicly disclosed. The RBNZ has publicly referred to the nature of the
financial sector regulatory framework, including the nature of cooperation between
regulatory agencies. This information is presented on the RBNZ website.
98. Open process for formulating and reporting financial policies: The Act requires the
RBNZ to explain its approach to implementing policy, which is to be done in the case of
bank registration and supervision by the issuance of a Statement of Principles. The Act
requires the RBNZ to report publicly on its performance in various ways, including via
publication of an Annual Report. In practice, the RBNZ issues a wide range of material to
explain its performance across its functions, including articles in the quarterly Bulletin, post-
election briefing papers, and in various publications on the RBNZ website.
99. The RBNZ Board is required to keep the RBNZ’s and Governor’s performance
across all the RBNZ’s functions under constant review. The Board comprises non-
executive directors appointed by the Minister of Finance (including the Governor) and is
chaired by a non-executive director. Under the Act, the Board is required to issue an annual
report on its assessment of the RBNZ’s and Governor’s performance, and the report is
publicly released. The Board periodically meets with the Minister of Finance and is required
by the Act to report to the Minister any concerns it may have in relation to the RBNZ’s or
Governor’s performance.
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100. Public availability of information on financial policies: The RBNZ publicly releases
a number of documents in the area of banking supervision, either in hard copy or on the
website. Part V of the RBNZ Act contains all of the relevant powers and responsibilities for
the RBNZ in the area of registration and supervision. The RBNZ Annual Report provides an
overview of the RBNZ’s functions and broad indicators of performance by function, while
the banking supervision handbook contains the Statement of Principles and all prudential
regulations. Regular articles published in the RBNZ Bulletin on the state of the banking
system summarize developments in banking supervision.
101. Accountability and assurance of integrity: The Governor and other RBNZ officials
can be required to appear before Parliament’s Finance and Expenditure Committee. This
generally occurs four or five times a year, typically after the release of each Monetary Policy
Statement and Annual Report. The Committee occasionally conducts fuller enquiries into the
RBNZ’s operations, but rarely discusses the RBNZ’s financial stability functions in any
detail.
102. The RBNZ is required to prepare and publish comprehensive financial
statements which comply with accepted accounting practices. The financial statements,
accounting policies and systems, and internal controls are subject to annual external audit. In
addition, the Act empowers the Minister of Finance to engage an external party to review
other aspects of the RBNZ’s operations as he or she sees fit.
F. Recommended Action Plan and Authorities’ Response
Table 3. Recommended Action Plan to Improve Observance of IMF’s MFP Transparency
Code PracticesBanking Supervision
Reference Practice Recommended Action
Practices 5.2 and 6.1.5 Details of the MOU between domestic regulatory agencies
should be made public.
Authorities’ response
103. All comments by the authorities have been incorporated and they are in
agreement with the assessment.
TRANSPARENCY OF SECURITIES REGULATION AND SUPERVISION.
G. General
104. The assessment of securities regulation transparency was based on the detailed
self-assessment prepared jointly by the Securities Commission, Takeovers Panel and
Registrar of Companies. The assessment also entailed a review of the relevant documents
maintained on the agencies’ respective websites, discussions held with members of the staff
of the aforementioned agencies, and other financial market participants.
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H. Main Findings—Summary
105. There is a high degree of transparency in the securities regulatory framework,
but the complexities of the oversight regime are not always well explained. Each
regulator should include on its website a common description of the securities regulatory
regime, outlining its respective roles, responsibilities and interrelationships, with relevant
links across agencies’ sites. In addition, it would be helpful if legislation was accessible in its
entirety, as opposed to by articles and sections only.
106. Clarity of roles, responsibilities and objectives: The financial agencies responsible
for implementing securities regulation in New Zealand are the Securities Commission (SC),
the Office of the Registrar of Companies, and the Takeovers Panel (TP). The Securities Act
establishes SC, defines its powers and functions, regulates the offer of securities to the
public, and confers on ROC the responsibility of registering prospectuses and associated
documents for the offer of securities to the public. The Securities Markets Act enacts rules
about insider trading, disclosure by public issuers, substantial security holder disclosure,
disclosure of dealings by directors and officers of public issuers, registration of exchanges,
and dealings in futures contracts. It confers on SC the power to regulate in these areas. The
Takeovers Act provides for the establishment and constitution of TP, the enactment of a
Takeovers Code, and the regulation of company takeovers. The Companies Act contains
rules of law about the incorporation, constitution and administration of companies. It
establishes the ROC and confers regulatory powers on the holder of that office.
107. The procedures for appointment, terms of office and criteria for removal of
officials are specified in the relevant legislation; however, for the ROC, the terms limits
and criteria for removal exist only insofar as ROC falls within the State Sector Act and there
are no detailed specifications for officials of the ROC. The relationship between the SC and
the TP is set out in the functions of the Commission in the Securities Act. Elements of the
relationship between the SC and NZX are publicly disclosed and there are MOUs in force
between the SC and NZX and between SC and TP which are also made available to the
public. The SC, ROC and the banking prudential regulator, the RBNZ, meet quarterly as the
Financial Regulators’ Coordination Group. The agencies all have websites in which their
operations and relationships are described. The Group comprises the RBNZ, Takeover Panel,
Securities Commission, Ministry of Economic Development, Government Actuary, Registrar
of Companies, Official Assignee for New Zealand, Serious Fraud Office, and Commerce
Commission. An MOU between the domestic regulatory agencies is being developed and is
expected to be in place before the end of 2004, at which point it will be publicly disclosed.
108. Open process for formulating and reporting financial policies: SC is empowered to
publish a report or a comment made in the exercise of its functions, and makes extensive use
of this power. The Official Information Act applies at the end of the inquiry, so that any
member of the public may request access to information held by SC. The Ombudsman acts as
appeal authority in respect of any request declined. SC regularly issues and publishes policy
and practice guidance, both on its website and in its quarterly bulletin.
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109. TP is subject to the Official Information Act. TP must give reasons for granting an
exemption and these must be published although it may defer or omit publishing in particular
cases on the ground of commercial confidentiality. Transparency is required in respect of its
inspection and inquiry work. The TP’s policies for administering key sections of the Code
are published and explained. The Panel discloses its regulatory framework, and aspects of its
operating procedures via its website, press releases, annual report and Code Word. The Panel
widely publicizes its decisions and the reasons accompanying them within a legally specified
timeframe.
110. Financial policies affecting securities regulation are subject to extensive prior
consultation with affected parties, whether contained in statutory regulations, financial
reporting standards, exchange rules or policy statements of a financial agency. The
agencies are required to act independently in formulating new policies, as expressed in the
Output Agreement with the Minister of Commerce. Policy changes are published and subject
to notice and comment requirements.
111. Public availability of information on financial policies: The TP and SC maintain
active programs of communication with the investment community and the general public,
including annual reports and quarterly bulletins. The SC uses its extensive powers of
comment to report on the application of the law. The RC, through the Companies Office
publishes an annual report detailing the activities of the Companies Office. The government
agencies report extensively on their financial and service performance and significant
regulatory action taken in their annual reports.
112. Accountability and assurance of integrity: Officials of all Crown entities are
required, when asked, to appear before the responsible Parliamentary Committee. The
primary context for a request will routinely be the entity’s annual budget or annual report but
Committee Members can be expected to ask a very wide variety of questions about policies,
objectives, activities, performance, quality of regulation and state of the markets. Select
Committees have powers to obtain information, and to request and require attendance of
persons.
113. The ROC, TP, SC must all prepare financial statements that comply with GAAP
and which are audited by independent auditors. The Auditor-General is required to audit
the financial statements prepared by the SC and TP and must express an independent opinion
on the financial statements and report that opinion to the public. The Commission’s annual
report must be presented to the House of Representatives. Internal governance procedures
and conflict of interest guidelines are described in the establishment laws and annual reports.
The legal protections for members and staff of SC and TP are stated in the establishment
laws and protects from liability those persons exercising powers of inspection under the Act.
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I. Recommended Action Plan and Authorities’ Response
Table 4. Recommended Action Plan to Improve Observance of IMF’s MFP Transparency
Code PracticesSecurities Regulation
Reference Practice Recommended Action
Practice 5.1 Provide an overall description of securities regulation (i.e.,
the responsible agencies, their roles, interrelationships, etc)
in one unified format on the websites as well as linkages
across websites of the relevant agencies.
The ROC website, embedded within that of the MED,
might be made more accessible and user friendly.
Make legislation available in its entirety (as opposed to
section by section)
Practice 5.2 The MOU should be placed on the websites of all relevant
regulatory bodies.
Practice 6.1.5 All MOUs should be made publicly available, unless
sensitivity requirements necessitate otherwise.
Authorities’ response
114. The relevant agencies have provided comments on the above assessment, which have
been duly incorporated, and they are in agreement with the overall assessment.
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF OBSERVANCE OF THE IOSCO OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF
SECURITIES REGULATION (IOSCO PRINCIPLES)
6
A. General
115. This assessment is based on the authorities’ self-assessment; a review of relevant
laws, procedures and publicly available information concerning the authorities, the New
Zealand Securities Exchange (NZX) and the New Zealand Futures and Options Exchange
(NZFOE); and interviews with the authorities and market participants. The assessment used
the Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of
Securities Regulation adopted by IOSCO in October 2003.
116. New Zealand markets have been undergoing significant change. NZX
demutualized in late 2002, self-listed in 2003, and recently launched a new, regulated market
targeted at developing and non-traditional enterprises. SFE Corporation (SFE), NZFOE’s
parent corporation, will transfer trading in NZFOE products to Australia in 2004 and has
6
This assessment was prepared by Janet Holmes (Ontario Securities Commission).
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entered into a deal with NZX for the trading on SFE of products based on NZX-listed
securities.
117. The SC is the principal statutory regulator, while the TP and RC have more
narrowly defined roles. The Ministry of Economic Development (MED) is involved in
policy development, while NZX exercises self-regulatory functions. NZX firms and their
associated brokers are the most significant class of market intermediaries operating in
organized equity markets, while most secondary market trading in New Zealand public
companies involves issuers listed on NZX (or an overseas market).
B. Main Findings—Summary
118. Recent reforms and NZX’s restructuring have strengthened the securities
regulatory framework. The authorities are aware, however, that additional reforms are
needed to fully implement the IOSCO Principles, and have committed to introduce them.
119. Principles Relating to the Regulator (1-5): Although the regulatory scheme is
complex, each regulator’s functions and powers are transparently set out in legislation, as
well as websites or other publications. Structures exist to ensure that the regulators achieve
high standards of procedural fairness and remain accountable. The SC and TP are
operationally independent, while the RC is expected to exercise decision-making powers
independently. Although the regulators do not have adequate powers to fully implement all
the IOSCO Principles, generally they are fulfilling their existing mandates and exercising
effectively the powers they have. Furthermore, the Government has shown its willingness to
provide requested funding to enable the regulators to fulfill their increasing responsibilities.
120. Principles of Self-Regulation (6-7): The regulatory system places substantial reliance
upon SRO-type functions performed by regulated exchanges. Since NZX's demutualization,
its management has been investing more in regulatory functions. The SC and Minister assess
a securities exchange’s willingness and legal capacity to carry out SRO-type functions as part
of the exchange registration process, but do not assess the adequacy of the exchange’s
resources or of its operators’ integrity and fitness. There is some ongoing oversight of
registered securities exchanges. The SC interacts regularly with NZX, both formally under a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and informally. There is, however, no formal
oversight plan for NZX.
121. Principles for Enforcement (8-10): The SC, TP, and NZX have very broad
inspection, investigation and surveillance powers. These powers enable it to exercise a
greater degree of oversight than might otherwise be the case in a regulatory scheme, like
New Zealand’s, that does not provide for comprehensive supervision of market
intermediaries. Collectively, the regulators also have a relatively wide and flexible range of
enforcement tools. The regulators have shown their willingness to respond promptly to
concerns by undertaking inquiries, taking enforcement action, or referring the matter to the
appropriate authority.
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122. Principles for Cooperation (11-13): The SC can and does share information with
other domestic authorities without the need for external approval. Each of the securities
regulators, MED, NZX and NZFOE can enter into information-sharing agreements, and
several agreements have been or are in the process of being executed. There are also close
informal ties between the SC and other securities regulators. The SC signed the IOSCO
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding in October 2003. The SC’s powers, capability
and willingness to cooperate with overseas regulators were subjected to a rigorous screening
process by a team of IOSCO experts before it was accepted as a signatory.
123. Principles for Issuers (14-17): There are comprehensive disclosure requirements for
public issuers’ offer documents, which are reviewed by the RC and in the case of NZX listed
companies, by NZX as well. The SC can prevent an offering from continuing if the offering
documents or related advertisements are misleading. The Government has provided
additional funding to the SC to develop criteria for risk-based reviews of disclosure
documents and intends to introduce legislation in 2004 to enhance the regulators’ powers to
enforce disclosure standards for offerings. The continuous disclosure requirements applicable
to listed companies provide for sufficient, timely disclosure. Unlisted issuers, however, are
required to report financial results only once a year and do not have to submit audited, annual
financial statements to the RC until almost six months after year-end.
124. Accounting standards are of a high and internationally acceptable quality.
Accounting standards are approved by the Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB), an
independent Crown entity that is accountable to Parliament through the Minister. The ASRB
has recommended that all New Zealand entities should be required to adopt International
Financial Reporting Standards commencing in January 2007. The Institute of Chartered
Accountants of New Zealand (ICANZ) is an SRO that develops and enforces auditing
standards. ICANZ decisions are subject to judicial review, but its interpretation processes are
not subject to the oversight of a regulator or other body acting in the public interest. MED’s
review of the Financial Reporting Act, however, is expected to include a review of audit
standard-setting, and the SC-led corporate governance project has now been finalized and
published (Corporate Governance in New Zealand – Principles and Guidelines).
125. Principles for Collective Investment Schemes (17-20): The marketing of collective
investment schemes (CIS) is subject to comprehensive disclosure requirements applicable to
all public offers of securities. CIS also must file audited annual financial statements. CIS are
operated within a framework of trust law, which requires CIS operators to act with due care
in the unit holders’ best interests. Since many matters are negotiated between the CIS
operator and its trustee or supervisor, there can be significant variations in investor
protections across various schemes. Although there is no program for ongoing regulatory
oversight of CIS operators or their trustees or supervisors, the SC and other regulators
exercise their inspection and enforcement powers to deal with problems arising in respect of
certain operators.
126. Principles for Market Intermediaries (21–24): Firms and brokers who participate
directly in regulated markets in New Zealand are subject to comprehensive entry standards
assessed by the relevant exchange. These market intermediaries also must comply with the
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exchange’s prudential requirements and standards for internal organization and operational
conduct. NZX has implemented a pro-active compliance program for NZX firms. Most other
market intermediaries are subject to few entry standards or ongoing standards of conduct, and
are not subject to regular supervisory oversight. The securities law reform commencing in
2004 is expected to involve a comprehensive review of the regulatory scheme for market
intermediaries.
127. Principles for Secondary Markets (25-29): A market cannot hold itself out as a
securities exchange (or futures exchange) unless it obtains registration (authorization) from
the Minister or SC, respectively. Otherwise, a market can operate without registration
(authorization) unless the Minister requires the market to obtain registration (authorization)
or cease carrying on business. The registration process does not provide for an assessment of
the market operator’s competence, sufficiency of resources or integrity. The SC has broad
powers to inquire into the affairs of regulated and unregulated markets.
128. Although general fraud and consumer protection laws can be used to address
some forms of manipulative or unfair practices relating to securities, securities
legislation does not expressly prohibit market manipulation, the dissemination of
misleading information (except in respect of offers) or front running, and provides only for a
civil cause of action and a civil penalty in respect of insider trading. NZX and NZFOE have
rules prohibiting, and systems to detect, illegal, manipulative and deceptive conduct on its
markets, and work closely with the SC to address concerns that arise. Furthermore, the
Government intends to introduce legislation in 2004 providing for reform of the securities
trading law, including the establishment of criminal and civil penalties for these activities.
129. NZX appears to have developed appropriate procedures to monitor and address
large exposures, default risk and market disruption. Formal and informal arrangements
exist to enable market operators, regulators, other relevant domestic authorities and overseas
authorities to share information on large exposures of market participants.
C. Recommended Action Plan and Authorities’ Response
Table 5. Recommended Action Plan to Improve Observance of the IOSCO Principles
Reference Principle Recommended Actions
Principles 7, 8, 25
and 26
Amend legislation to include comprehensive, high level entry and ongoing
standards for regulated exchanges’ integrity, competence, financial capacity,
internal controls, powers and duties.
The SC should develop a formalized oversight plan for regulated exchanges.
Amend legislation to enable the SC or the Minister to require a registered
exchange to amend any or all of its conduct rules.
The NZX should adopt a broader definition of “independence” (applicable to the
individuals constituting the Special Division of its disciplinary body, deciding
matters involving NZX in its capacity as a listed company), or disciplinary
functions in respect of NZX should be transferred to an independent body, such
as the SC.
Principle 9
Implement the reforms in the remedies and penalties section of the Cabinet
Paper, Investment Advisers.
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Principle 14
Devote more resources to the review of disclosure documents, so that regulators
can conduct comprehensive reviews of issuers’ disclosure records through risk-
based review systems.
NZX-listed companies should be required to notify NZX (in confidence) when
they rely on the exemption to make timely disclosure of material developments,
enabling NZX to spot-check appropriate reliance on the exemption and
facilitating surveillance.
Amend the Financial Reporting Act to provide for more timely disclosure of
annual financial information by unlisted public issuers.
Principle 15 (and 9)
Amend the companies legislation to supplement existing self-help remedies.
Amend the securities legislation to require substantial security holders, directors
and officers to file their notices of transactions in a central, public, easily
accessible electronic register.
Principle 16
ICANZ’s interpretation process should be overseen by a regulator or other body
acting in the public interest.
Amend the NZX Listing Rules to require immediate disclosure of the
resignation, removal or replacement of an external auditor.
Principles 17-20
Amend the securities legislation to provide for: (1) greater oversight of
contributory mortgage brokers; (2) high level entry and ongoing standards
concerning CIS operators' honesty and integrity, competence, financial capacity,
internal controls, powers and duties; (3) general conflict of interest standards for
CIS operators and their trustees or supervisors; (4) minimum standards for CIS
operators to provide periodic and timely reports to trustees or supervisors (or to
the appropriate regulator), (5) minimum requirements for trustees or statutory
supervisors to conduct periodic inspections of CIS operators and make timely
reports to the SC of any material contraventions by CIS operators of applicable
standards.
Principles 21-24
Enact legislation providing for more comprehensive oversight of market
intermediaries that: (1) requires minimum entry standards relating to integrity,
financial capacity, competence, operational capability, internal controls;
(2) requires periodic reports to the regulator or SRO; and (3) enables the
regulator to take effective enforcement action if these standards are not met.
Principle 24
Securities regulators and SROs should develop a comprehensive crisis
management plan for dealing with the potential failure of market intermediaries.
Principles 27-29
Amend the securities legislation to specify high level standards for regulated
exchanges’ trading systems and rules with respect to trade transparency, unfair
trading practices, management of large exposures, default risk and market
disruption.
Principles 28 (and 9)
Implement the Government’s proposed reforms to the securities trading law.
Authorities’ response
130. The New Zealand authorities consider the FSAP mission’s findings and
recommendations helpful, and note that, in many areas, work is already underway to further
improve observance of the IOSCO Principles.
131. The authorities note the FSAP team’s endorsement of the forthcoming law reforms
relating to the introduction of comprehensive prohibitions on market manipulation, insider
trading and enhanced penalties and enforcement powers. The authorities welcome the
constructive technical recommendations designed to improve New Zealand’s observance of
the IOSCO Principles, and will give consideration to them. The team’s suggestions with
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regard to regulatory oversight of market intermediaries and collective investment schemes
will be considered in the proposed reviews of the relevant legislation to be undertaken in the
near future.
132. The authorities note the recommendation that legislation be amended to specify
standards for regulated exchanges’ rules with respect to trade transparency, unfair trading
practices, management of large exposures, default risk and market disruption. The
authorities consider that the broad public interest test in the current legislation provides
flexibility for these things and others to be considered when approving exchange rules, and is
preferable to a prescriptive approach.
133. The Securities Commission has decided to develop a formal oversight plan for
regulated exchanges this year and has informed NZX. It is most likely that details of this
plan, once settled, will be published. The oversight plan will cover some of the matters
identified by FSAP as appropriate “ongoing standards” for regulated exchanges and the
Commission expects to report on its oversight actions.