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September 17, 2019
VIA Electronic Upload and Hand Delivery
Comment Intake – Debt Collection
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
1700 G Street, NW
Washington, DC 20552
Re: ACA International, the Association of Credit & Collection Professionals,
(“ACA”) Comment to Docket No. CFPB-2019-0022, RIN 3170-AA41
Dear Director Kraninger and Bureau staff:
The Association of Credit and Collection Professionals (“ACA International” or
“ACA”) appreciates the time and attention that you will spend reviewing and
considering our comments to the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection’s
(“CFPB” or “Bureau”) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to implement the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The Bureau’s proposed Regulation F
will be the first of its kind since the FDCPA was enacted in 1977. Accordingly, the
CFPB’s proposal will shape the future of the industry and the larger economy. ACA
members have long sought clarity surrounding the use of new technologies,
including several that are now decades old, that have altered how consumers
communicate from the time more than 40 years ago when the FDCPA was first
enacted.
To prepare the following comments, ACA conducted quantitative and qualitative
studies of our membership. This included interviewing dozens of small, medium,
and large collection agencies, as well as service providers. Members of the accounts
receivable management industry have provided ACA written and verbal feedback
and suggestions on all aspects of Proposed Regulation F. Further, ACA called upon
its members to collect data, which we have aggregated and anonymized to support
our observations and suggestions. At ACA’s national meeting in July 2019, ACA
convened panels, roundtables, and other discussions so that members of the
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accounts receivable management industry could express their views on the
Proposed Regulation.
1
Since the Bureau’s inception, ACA members have worked
diligently to provide it data and feedback about rulemaking proposals, collaborate
on compliance and financial education initiatives, and help it better understand the
benefits of two-way communication for consumers when facing an unpaid debt. ACA
members take their obligations to consumers when collecting debt very seriously,
and the input provided in this comment hopefully will provide a roadmap for how
the CFPB can improve its proposal, as we both work towards our shared pursuit of
improving consumer outcomes and ensuring that the accounts receivable
management industry has clear rules for operating.
Executive Summary
Overall, ACA believes that the Bureau’s efforts will resolve ambiguities in the
FDCPA and help create uniform national standards. This will address both
consumer and industry concerns by providing transparency to consumers seeking to
understand their rights under the law and decrease litigation over benign technical
errors. We appreciate the Bureau’s efforts to provide clarity to the practice of
sending electronic communications. The limited content message is also a common-
sense solution for both consumers and industry to address a statutory catch-22,
which has harmed the ability to leave voicemail messages, increased call volumes,
and has warranted regulatory guidance for several decades. The Bureau’s proposal
for a model form validation notice to address the plethora of ambiguities in FDCPA
§809 concerning the validation of debts is also a step in the right direction toward
providing some important clarifications.
Nonetheless, as outlined in our comments, in several parts of its proposal the
Bureau attempts to add new requirements that impose significant burdens on the
accounts receivable management industry without any quantitative evidence of
consumer harm in those areas, and often with razor-thin research. Moreover, many
solutions lack empirical data to support their approach. Indeed, ACA’s studies
indicate that some Bureau proposals will cause enhanced consumer harm by
increasing incentives for creditors to file collection suits because aspects of the
Proposed Rule stymie their ability to settle debts outside of court.
1
Cmt. Dempsey, ACA International, Re. Ex Parte Filing, CFPB-2019-0022-1195 (07/23/2019).
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ACA’s principal concerns fall into several broad categories:
Meaningful communication must not be discouraged through
arbitrary limitations on call frequency. The work of the accounts
receivable management industry allows consumers and creditors to settle
debts outside of litigation. Therefore, any regulation that interferes with
meaningful communication between collectors and consumers will increase
debt collection litigation.
2
Thus, we are concerned when Regulation F
provisions create arbitrary and capricious barriers to communication.
Communication barriers include, “call caps” at §1006.21, complicated E-sign
3
consents at §1006.42, vague inconvenient place and time restrictions at
§1006.6(b)(1) and (6)(b)(1)-1, and work email address restrictions at
1006.22(f)(3). ACA warns that evidence from states with overreaching
regulations proves that if collectors cannot communicate, creditors will
litigate.
Itemization in the validation notice will be impossible for many,
would cost over $ 3 billion to initially implement and will increase
litigation. Approximately three-quarters of the accounts receivable
management industry will struggle to comply with the itemization
requirement at §1006.34 because they service non-finance debt. Non-finance
debts are accounts originated by businesses such as hospitals, doctors,
dentists, health clubs, pest control and lawn maintenance services, and
telecommunications. Some non-financial creditors also include state
governments, local governments and municipalities, utilities, and even the
Internal Revenue Service. Many businesses have historically provided
sufficient documentation and itemization to prove the existence of a debt in
state courts. However, they often do not maintain account data in the fashion
contemplated under the rule. We estimate that the cost to change creditor
systems to comply with §1006.34 will be in the billions. Moreover, the Bureau
has not studied whether creditors can alter their data collection practices,
and makes questionable assumptions that creditors can (and will) make
alterations without a regulatory directive.
2
See infra, Chapter One section IV.
3
Section 104 of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN Act), 15
U.S.C. § 7004.
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The U.S. economy depends on collected debt. Debt collection returned
$67.6 billion of funds in 2016 to US businesses—that’s an average savings of
$579 for every American household. Regulations should not incentivize
consumers to shirk legal and valid debts at the expense of honest businesses
and other consumers seeking affordable credit. Small and medium-sized
business owners and their employees will stop providing services in advance
of payment if collections become less certain. Rules that could so severely
impact the U.S. economy must be tested and substantiated with econometrics
and cost-benefit analyses. The Bureau has not yet performed these studies.
New rules should not hold the accounts receivable management
industry liable for attempting to discern unclear or ambiguous
consumer information. Several Proposed Rule sections require collectors to
divine facts by holding collectors liable when they “should know”: whether an
email is a “workaddress (1006.22(f)(3)); if the consumer’s name has a suffix
(1006.34(c)(2)(ii); the consumer’s sleep, work, or school schedule
(1006.6(b)(1)); the consumers’ legal defenses to the debt (1006.26(b)); that the
consumer paid another party (1006.27.(b)); or that the consumer has recently
died (1006.42). Historically, under the FDCPA, collectors are permitted to
rely on the information provided to them by the creditor, and the standard for
holding collectors liable is information for what collectors “have a reason to
know,” or “absent knowledge to the contrary.” Regulations that attempt to
increase this standard and ask collection agencies to be mind readers as to
the consumer’s private life will drive creditors and collectors towards
litigation instead of meaningful communication.
To have a functioning credit-based economy in the United States,
consumers have some responsibility to pay their debts and to
participate in the discussions about how to pay them. Consumers
benefit when they take part in the process of resolving debt. Through open
communications, they can obtain the best results by working out payment
plans, fee waivers, identify other parties responsible for paying the debt, or
even defer payments if they are facing a hardship or are truly unable to
afford to repay the debt. If a consumer objects to contact by a certain method,
they have a plethora of rights to do so. If they have questions about payment
history, credits, or insurance payments, they should ask for more detail.
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As CFPB Deputy Director Brian Johnson recently noted in remarks,
Contrary to common mythology, consumer credit—the process of lending
money to consumers—increases opportunity and wealth in the economy. A
consumer borrows money today and spends more in the present, with the
intent on paying back the loan in the future. Put differently, rather than
save over a period of time and forgo the benefits of a particular product,
consumer credit changes the timing of the purchase. Yet, government
regulators often ignore the basic purpose behind consumer use of credit.
They can fail to recognize that market transactions are a positive-sum
game. And they can also ignore the economic reality undergirding the
pricing and types of services offered by businesses.”
4
The ability to collect on unpaid debt is an important part of this process, and
the work of collection agencies has proven to keep the price of credit more
affordable for consumers.
Clear and Plain Language Communication is Best for Consumers
and Industry. Despite the offensive rhetoric of certain interest groups, most
accounts receivable management industry professionals are fantastic people,
representing a diverse segment of the United States.
5
As part of their work,
they want to help consumers find a solution to their financial problems. But
fear of plaintiff’s litigation and the “overshadowing” doctrine force collection
agencies to use stiff and confusing statutory language that consumers deem
intimidating. Rule 1006.34 seeks to rationalize the policy behind the
overshadowing doctrine and clarify significant ambiguities in the FDCPA by
providing a single model form and a safe harbor. But some form language can
be better, and the form ought to allow flexibility for modifications
necessitated by state law or other legal requirements.
The CFPB’s Complaint Database Data Paints an Inaccurate Portrait
of the Accounts Receivable Management industry. Throughout the
4
Johnson, Brian, Toward a 21st century approach to consumer protection, (Nov. 15, 2018), available at
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/toward-21st-century-approach-consumer-protection/
5
ACA, SMALL BUSINESS IN THE COLLECTIONS INDUSTRY IN 2019, (ACA International White Paper
April 2019), available at https://www.acainternational.org/assets/advocacy-resources/aca-wp-
smallbusiness-2019-002.pdf
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comment, the Bureau refers to complaint data about the accounts receivable
management industry to justify new interventions. However, the Bureau’s
complaint data is flawed. The most troubling aspects of the complaint
database are: (1) the Bureau’s broad definition of a complaint, (2) the
Bureau’s failure to verify the accuracy of the complaints it receives, and 3)
that the number of complaints versus the number of contacts are not
standardized. Notably, debt collection complaints account for only 0.005% of
all consumer contacts made in a given year by the accounts receivable
management industry.
ABOUT ACA INTERNATIONAL
ACA International is the leading trade association for credit and collection
professionals. Founded in 1939, and with offices in Washington, D.C. and
Minneapolis, Minnesota, ACA represents approximately 2,500 members, including
credit grantors, third-party collection agencies, asset buyers, attorneys, and vendor
affiliates in an industry that employs more than 230,000 employees worldwide.
ACA members include the smallest of businesses that operate within a limited
geographic range of a single state, and the largest of publicly held, multinational
corporations that operate in every state. The majority of ACA-member debt
collection companies, however, are small businesses. According to a recent survey,
44 percent of ACA member organizations (831 companies) have fewer than nine
employees. About 85 percent of members (1,624 companies) have 49 or fewer
employees and 93 percent of members (1,784) have 99 or fewer employees.
As part of the process of attempting to recover outstanding payments, ACA
members are an extension of every community’s businesses. ACA members work
with these businesses, large and small, to obtain payment for the goods and services
already received by consumers. In years past, the combined effort of ACA members
has resulted in the annual recovery of billions of dollars dollars that are returned
to and reinvested by businesses and dollars that would otherwise constitute losses
on the financial statements of those businesses. Without an effective collection
process, the economic viability of these businesses and, by extension, the American
economy in general, is threatened. Recovering rightfully-owed consumer debt
enables organizations to survive, helps prevent job losses, keeps credit, goods, and
services available, and reduces the need for tax increases to cover governmental
budget shortfalls.
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An academic study about the impact of debt collection confirms the basic economic
reality that losses from uncollected debts are paid for by the consumers who meet
their credit obligations:
In a competitive market, losses from uncollected debts are
passed on to other consumers in the form of higher prices
and restricted access to credit; thus, excessive forbearance
from collecting debts is economically inefficient. Again, as
noted, collection activity influences on both the supply
and the demand of consumer credit. Although lax
collection efforts will increase the demand for credit by
consumers, the higher losses associated with lax collection
efforts will increase the costs of lending and thus raise the
price and reduce the supply of lending to all consumers,
especially higher-risk borrowers.
6
In short, consumer harm can result in several ways when unpaid debt is not
addressed, and ACA members work to help consumers understand their financial
situation and what can be done to address it and improve it.
The debt collection market is extremely varied in the types of debts being collected
and the nature and size of the accounts receivable management industry
encompasses a broad scope. Although the credit and collections industry comprises
a relatively small space in the entire consumer financial services arena, the client
base serviced by industry members is highly diverse, from large corporations to
local Main Street service providers all of whom have a vested interest in
customer retention, particularly in the case of small business creditors. From
medical debt to student loan debt, mortgage debt to credit card debt, unpaid check
to unpaid government fees, or a single bill from a local business, the differences
incident to each type of debt require a thoughtful and nuanced regulatory approach.
6
Todd J. Zywicki, The Law and Economics of Consumer Debt Collection and Its
Regulation, MERCATUS WORKING PAPER, MERCATUS CTR AT GEORGE MASON UNIV., at
47 (Sep. 2015), available at https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Zywicki-Debt-Collection.pdf.
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary ....................................................................................................... 2
ABOUT ACA INTERNATIONAL ................................................................................. 6
Chapter One- Overview and Studies ......................................................................... 16
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 16
A. Significant Ambiguities in the FDCPA cause Unnecessary Litigation. ....... 17
B. Courts have developed FDCPA “Policy” without the Benefit of Regulatory
Tools ......................................................................................................................... 18
C. Regulatory Overreach in Regulation F Particularly Harms Small
Businesses ................................................................................................................ 20
1. Small Business Recommendations went Unaddressed ............................. 20
II. COMMENTS ON CONSUMER FOCUS GROUP STUDIES ........................... 23
A. Consumer Impressions don’t Equate to Violations. ...................................... 23
1. The Fors Marsh Study lacks a Robust Sample Set and Data Clarity ....... 25
2. Consumer Survey Evidence is Unreliable .................................................. 26
3. Legitimate Disputes Comprise Less than ½ Percent of All Accounts ....... 28
B. Calling Data Research .................................................................................... 29
III. DATA FROM STATE REGULATION ADVISES EXTREME RULEMAKING
CAUTION .................................................................................................................... 30
A. The 2015 New York DFS Debt Collection Rules Increased Collection
Litigation by 93% ..................................................................................................... 31
1. Itemization on Validation Notices .............................................................. 31
2. Disclosures About Debts for Which the Statutes of Limitations May be
Expired .................................................................................................................. 31
3. Increased Substantiation of Consumer Debts ............................................ 32
4. Debt Payment Procedures ........................................................................... 32
5. Communication through Email Restricted ................................................ 32
B. Over-Regulation of Communications Drives Creditors to Litigation ........... 33
IV. THE CFPB’S RELIANCE ON THE COMPLAINT DATA LACKS RIGOR .... 34
Chapter Two- Comments by Section .......................................................................... 35
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I. COMMENTS ON §1006.2- DEFINITIONS ......................................................... 35
A. The Bureau’s Definitions Should Add More Certainty and Clarity ............. 35
B. Relevant Portions of Regulation F §1006.2 ................................................... 36
C. ACA’s Detailed Comments on §1006.2 Definitions ....................................... 37
D. The definition of “Attempt to Communicate” and “Communicate” .............. 37
1. These definitions may touch websites and other public displays of contact
information ........................................................................................................... 38
2. Regulation F “Communication” Should be Connected to Debt Collection 39
3. Collectors are unsure whether disconnected and wrong numbers are
“Attempts to Communicate” ................................................................................. 39
E. Inclusion of “whether living or deceased” in the definition of “consumer” is
not necessary to address the Bureau’s concerns. .................................................... 40
1. There is no evidence that supports including deceased persons in the
definition of consumer .......................................................................................... 40
2. The amendment imposes new uncertainty ................................................ 41
F. The “Limited-Content Message” is an Essential Modernization of the
FDCPA ...................................................................................................................... 41
1. When it comes to leaving messages, the FDCPA lacks clarity and is in
desperate need of interpretation. ......................................................................... 42
2. The “Limited Content Message” Resolves Ambiguity in the FDCPA Text ...
...................................................................................................................... 43
3. The Foti versus Zortman conundrum proves the need for agency
interpretation ........................................................................................................ 45
4. The Limited Content Message Definition Reconciles Conflicting
Approaches ............................................................................................................ 46
G. Additional Comments about the Limited Content Message ......................... 47
1. Limited Content Messages Should Allow Electronic Contacts ................. 47
2. Is there liability for inadvertent incomplete messages? ............................ 48
3. Provide clarification regarding consumer’s name ...................................... 48
4. More clarity is also needed surrounding the term “natural persons” ....... 49
5. Cost Concerns about Text Messages are Outdated ................................... 49
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6. Additional clarity is also needed about direct drop voicemail programs. . 50
H. “Debt Collector” Ambiguities Can be Better Addressed ............................... 50
II. COMMENTS ON §1006.6 COMMUNICATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH
DEBT COLLECTION .................................................................................................. 52
A. §1006.6(a) and Proposed Comments 6(a): The Definition of Consumer ....... 52
B. §1006.6(b)(1) and Proposed Comments (6)(b)(1)-1: Ascertaining
Inconvenience to the Consumer ............................................................................... 54
1. The CFPB Should Clarify the “Should Know” Standard Since a Collection
Firm must base it upon Limited Information from a Consumer about a Time or
Place being Inconvenient ...................................................................................... 54
2. Time and Inconvenience Restrictions Should Not Apply to Electronic
Communications ................................................................................................... 58
3. Collectors should be permitted to send email outside the presumptive
time limits ............................................................................................................. 59
4. The Accounts Receivable Management Industry should be permitted to
rely on the consumer’s address of record only for calculating timing of calls,
absent information to the contrary ...................................................................... 60
C. §1006.6(b)(2)(i): Clarifications Concerning the Length of Time an Attorney
Has to Respond to a Debt Collector ......................................................................... 61
D. §1006.6(b)(3) and Proposed Comment (6)(b)(3)-1: Prohibitions Concerning
the Consumer’s Place of Employment ..................................................................... 62
1. Clarity Is Needed Around When the Accounts Receivable Management
Industry Has Reason to Know That an Employer Prohibits the Consumer from
Receiving Debt Communications ......................................................................... 62
E. §1006.6(c)(1) and Proposed Comments 6(c)(1)-1: Notification Regarding
Refusal to Pay or Cease Communications............................................................... 62
1. The Proposed Rule Should Allow Additional Time for Processing a
Notification for Purposes of Determining When the Notice Goes into Effect .... 62
F. The Bona Fide Error Defense is only marginally referenced in § 1006.6(d)(1)
......................................................................................................................... 63
G. §1006.6(d)(3) and Proposed Comments Reasonable Procedures for Email
and Text Message Communications to Avoid Communications with Third Parties .
......................................................................................................................... 64
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1. The Bureau Should Clarify the Term “Recently” as Used in Proposed
§1006.6(d)(3)(i) ...................................................................................................... 65
2. The Accounts Receivable Management Industry Should Be Permitted to
Use Any Email Address or Phone Number That the Consumer Has Provided to
Contact the Consumer .......................................................................................... 65
3. The Time Periods Set Forth in Proposed §1006.6(d)(3)(i)(B)(1) Require
Further Clarification ............................................................................................ 66
H. Proposed §1006.6(e) – Opt-out For Electronic Communications .................. 67
1. The Bureau Should Clarify How to Differentiate Between an Opt-Out for
Electronic Communications and a Cease Communication Request Under
§1006.6(c)(1)(ii) ..................................................................................................... 67
2. Represented Party Contacts -§1006.6(b)(2) ................................................ 68
3. 1006.6(d)(1) -Limited Content Messages .................................................... 68
III. COMMENTS ON §1006.10 - ACQUISITION OF LOCATION INFORMATION
............................................................................................................................ 68
A. Acquisition of Location Information Generally ............................................. 69
B. Locating an Individual Who Can Resolve Decedent Debt ............................ 69
1. Collectors must be specific to be clear and understood ............................. 70
2. There is no reason to set stricter communication limits ........................... 71
IV. COMMENTS ON §1006.14(b)(2) – CALL FREQUENCY LIMITATIONS ...... 72
A. Positive Aspects of §1006.14(b) ...................................................................... 72
B. Proposed §1006.14(b) Exceeds the FDCPA’s Authority ................................ 72
1. FDCPA forbids calls with an “intent” to annoy, harass, or abuse ............. 73
2. §1006.14(b) bans clearly legal conduct ....................................................... 74
C. The Call Frequency Limits are Not Supported by Substantial Evidence .... 74
1. Frequency limits increase the cost and length of time to resolve debts ... 75
2. Frequency Limits fail to consider FCC actions .......................................... 75
3. The Prospect of "Unlimited Email and Text Messages" is a Chimera ...... 78
4. The One-Week Cooling Off Period is Impractical ...................................... 78
D. §1006.14(b) introduces new ambiguity to a regularly-occurring situation .. 80
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E. An Aggressive Call Cap Requires Better Evidence than Shown to Support
its Implementation ................................................................................................... 80
V. COMMENTS ON §1006.14(h)- PROHIBITED COMMUNICATION MEDIA ... 81
VI. COMMENTS ON §1006.18(g)- MEANINGFUL ATTORNEY INVOLVEMENT
............................................................................................................................ 83
A. 1006.18(g)’s requirements are old-fashioned ................................................. 85
B. Proposed Rule 1006.18(g) Invades the Attorney-Client Relationship .......... 85
VII. COMMENT ON §1006.22 –UNFAIR OR UNCONSCIONABLE MEANS ...... 86
A. Consumers’ email communication preferences should be honored without
further permissions required ................................................................................... 87
1. §1006.22(f)(3) exceeds he commands of the FDCPA, which allows contacts
at work until the consumer expresses otherwise ................................................ 88
2. The “Should Know” standard will require new technology, will cost
Millions of Dollars and Cannot Be Perfect .......................................................... 88
3. §1006.22(f)(3) Lacks Evidence of a Reasonable Need ................................ 89
4. §1006.22(f)(3) is Paternalistic and Misguided ............................................ 89
B. §1006.22(f)(3) Will Chill Email Communications ......................................... 90
VIII. COMMENTS ON §1006.26- TIME-BARRED CLAIMS ................................ 91
A. Time-Bars are Complicated Legal Questions ................................................ 92
B. Legal Analysis can be done only by Lawyers ................................................ 94
C. The Bureau Should Propose Safe-Harbor Language .................................... 95
D. The Supreme Court Permits Time-barred Proofs of Claims ......................... 95
IX. COMMENTS ON §1006.30- CREDIT INFORMATION FURNISHING ......... 96
A. The FCRA Expressly Allows Furnishing after a Negative Reporting Notice
is provided ................................................................................................................ 97
B. Requiring the Accounts Receivable Management Industry to Communicate
with a Consumer Prior to Furnishing Information Regarding a Debt to Credit
Reporting Agencies Will Significantly Affect Business .......................................... 97
1. Passive Debt Collection is not a Widespread Practice ............................... 98
2. §1006.30 risks a shift in consumer behavior and economic incentives ..... 98
C. Accurate Credit Reporting Benefits Everyone ............................................ 100
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D. The Bureau Should Clarify What is Sufficient to Establish
“Communication” and Whose Burden It Is to Establish That the Communication
Occurred ................................................................................................................. 100
1. A Safe Harbor is Necessary when Negative Notice is Provided .............. 101
2. “Attempts to Communicate” should be Sufficient .................................... 102
E. The Bureau Should Exempt Debt Collectors that Furnish Information to
Special Credit Reporting Agencies. ....................................................................... 102
X. COMMENTS ON §1006.34(c)- ITEMIZATION IN VALIDATION NOTICES . 104
A. The Bureau’s Proposal for Section 1006.34(c)(1) ......................................... 105
B. Itemization Requirements would Cost over $ 4 billion to Implement ........ 107
1. $600 million in one-time professional fees ............................................... 109
2. Over $30 million in one-time system reprogramming for agencies. ....... 109
3. Unknown $ billions annually in uncompensated medical care ............... 110
4. Costs to creditors will amount to over $ 3 billion. ................................... 111
5. On-going implementation and error-correction costs will continue. ....... 111
C. An Itemization Requirement would risk violating other federal law. ........ 112
D. Other Negative Consequences of Section 1006.34(c) .................................. 117
XI. COMMENTS ON §1006.34(C)(3)- FORM VALIDATION NOTICE. .............. 118
A. The Bureau’s Proposal for Section 1006.34 ................................................. 118
1. The CFPB’s model form must meet Chevron Step One by addressing
ambiguity in the FDCPA .................................................................................... 119
2. Ambiguities to be Addressed ..................................................................... 120
3. The Bureau’s Determination of Form Contents must be Detailed and
Reasoned ............................................................................................................. 123
C. “Clear and Conspicuous” Requirement in 1006.34(b)(1) is Not Suited to a
Conversation ........................................................................................................... 125
D. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 125
XII. COMMENTS ON 1006.38 DISPUTES AND REQUESTS FOR ORIGINAL
CREDITOR INFORMATION .................................................................................... 126
A. Duplicative Disputes .................................................................................... 126
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B. Overshadowing ............................................................................................. 128
XIII. COMMENTS ON § 1006.42 - PROVIDING REQUIRED DISCLOSURES
ELECTRONICALLY ................................................................................................. 131
A. The Bureau Proposes to Allow Electronic Disclosures but Mandate E-SIGN
Act Consent ............................................................................................................ 132
B. The Bureau Should Reconsider and Reverse its View that the E-SIGN Act
Applies to the FDCPA’s Written Notices. ............................................................. 133
1. The Bureau’s Position on E-SIGN ............................................................ 133
2. The E-SIGN Act’s Language and History Do Not Compel the Bureau’s
Conclusion that Electronic Disclosures under the FDCPA Require E-SIGN
Consent. .............................................................................................................. 134
C. The E-SIGN Act Would Impose Substantial, Unnecessary Burdens in the
Context of Debt Collection. .................................................................................... 138
D. Even if the E-SIGN Act Applies, the Bureau Should Provide an E-Sign Act
Exemption for the FDCPA’s Written Notices. ...................................................... 139
1. Consent procedures are expensive ............................................................ 139
2. Consent Procedures are Confusing ........................................................... 140
3. The Deterrent Effect of Consent Procedures is Observed ....................... 140
E. ACA Urges the Bureau to Allow Required Disclosures both in the Body of an
Electronic Communication and in a Hyperlink without Onerous Limitations ... 143
F. ACA Urges Expansion of § 1006.42(e)’s Proposed Safe harbors ................. 144
G. The Bureau Must Urge the FCC to Provide Clarity on the Definition of
What is Considered an Autodialer for Text Messaging to be a Viable Option .... 145
XIV. COMMENTS ON §1006.100- RECORD RETENTION ............................... 145
A. The Bureau Should Narrow This Requirement to a Collector’s Last
Communication or Attempted Communication with a Consumer ....................... 146
1. Communication or Attempted Communication Definition Should Be
Clarified .............................................................................................................. 147
2. The Bureau’s Proposal, In Effect, Requires That Accounts Receivable
Management Industry Retain All Call Recordings ........................................... 147
XV. COMMENTS ON §1006.104 – RELATION TO STATE LAWS ..................... 148
XVI. COMMENTS ON §1006.108 and PROPOSED APPENDIX A .................... 149
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A. State Exemption from the FDCPA and the Bureau’s Proposal .................. 149
B. The Bureau Should Clarify that State Laws that Impose Additional or
Different Requirements Cannot Replace the FDCPA or Regulation F ............... 151
2. The Bureau’s Approach to State Exemption is Broader than that Plainly
Allowed by Section 817 and, therefore, may not be entitled to deference. ....... 152
3. Allowing Inconsistent State Laws to Replace the FDCPA and Regulation
F Is Not in Line with the FDCPA’s Purpose or the Bureau’s Rulemaking
Authority. ............................................................................................................ 153
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 155
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Chapter One- Overview and Studies
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 to protect consumers from abusive,
threatening, and unfair collection practices. At the time, abuses that needed to be
curbed included intimidation by individuals claiming to be part of the debt
collection profession, threats of imprisonment, publication of debtor lists in local
newspapers, repeated harassment, the placement of hundreds of telephone calls to
consumers (often at work or in the middle of the night), as well as blatant
misrepresentations to consumers regarding their debt and the creditor’s legal
recourses.
The most outrageous actions referenced above are extreme exceptions. In today’s
world with a severely outdated FDCPA, rarely does a case involve actual damages
or serious harm to a consumer. Egregious violations are increasingly rare, and ACA
has worked with the Bureau to identify bad actors and has applauded its
enforcement actions against them.
7
7
ACA International, CFPB Alleges Large Credit Repair Companies Violated Consumer Laws (May 2,
2019), available at https://www.acainternational.org/news/cfpb-alleges-large-credit-
repair-companies-violated-consumer-laws.
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During the passage of the FDCPA in Congress, ACA was active in those discussions,
ultimately supporting it and testifying before Congress on the matter. Although the
legislative history of the FDCPA included a call for it to be revisited and
modernized as appropriate, the law has not been significantly updated or
modernized since that time more than 40 years ago. As a result, where regulatory
uncertainty exists within the statute, the judicial arm, charged with interpreting
and applying the FDCPA, has rendered a legal patchwork of federal and state case
law that is highly inconsistent among jurisdictions.
A. Significant Ambiguities in the FDCPA cause Unnecessary
Litigation.
In its discussion of the proposed rule, the Bureau recognizes that the nearly 12,000
annual plaintiff litigation filings under the FDCPA, as well as the threat of FDCPA
filings, imposes significant costs for the accounts receivable management industry
(84 FR at 23370). Most notably, given the mechanical language and requirements
under the FDCPA, self-described “consumer protection” attorneys have generated
unnecessary litigation based on technical, inconsequential, non-abusive violations.
8
Many consumer attorneys throughout the country coordinate with their clients to
call collectors with the intent of eliciting a response that will form the basis of an
FDCPA suit. These bait calls or trap calls are no different than acts of entrapment
that plague well-intended collectors.
These attorneys burden collection agencies (which as noted are often small
businesses)
9
with demands for tens of thousands of dollars to resolve claims arising
8
See, e.g., Anenkova, 201 F.Supp.3d at 636-39 (granting summary judgment against plaintiff who
sued a debt collector because a barcode was visible on the envelope); McShann v. v. Northland Grp.,
Inc., Case No. 15-00314-CV-W-GAF, 2015 WL 8097650 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 1, 2015) (granting a motion to
dismiss where a plaintiff sued because a demand letter with a “window” displayed the plaintiff’s
name, address, and account number); Simmons v. Med-I-Claims, No. 06-1155, 2007 WL 486879, at
*9 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2007) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff sued because the return
address listed in the envelope was listed for “Med-I-Claims” instead of “Med-I-Claims Services Inc.”);
Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., 759 F.Supp. 1456, 1466 (C.D. Ca. 1991) (rejecting plaintiff’s
argument that debt collector violated FDCPA by including in an envelope language like
“PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL” and “Forwarding and Address Correction Requested.”).
9
ACA, SMALL BUSINESS IN THE COLLECTIONS INDUSTRY IN 2019 (ACA International White Paper
April 2019), available at https://www.acainternational.org/assets/advocacy-resources/aca-wp-
smallbusiness-2019-002.pdf.
P a g e | 18
from hyper-technical violations of the law. Moreover, they and their clients openly
invoke the FDCPA as a pretext for avoiding the repayment of lawful debt. Some
attorneys even use the FDCPA to drive their bankruptcy law practices. Many go so
far as to search public court databases for newly filed collection actions to recruit
new clients. Most importantly, these attorneys thrive on the mere threat of
litigation, knowing that most agencies will pay $5,000 to settle a frivolous case
instead of spending $50,000 to successfully defend one.
Notably, the FDCPA does not require consumers to show that a debt collector’s
misconduct was intentional. See, e.g, Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 33 (2d
Cir. 1996) (“Because the Act imposes strict liability, a consumer need not show
intentional conduct to be entitled to damages.”); Beuter v. Canyon State Prof ’l
Servs., Inc., 261 F. App’x 14, 15 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the FDCPA imposes
strict liability on debt collectors and that they “are liable for even unintentional
violations of the FDCPA”). Likewise, the FDCPA incentivizes consumers and their
attorneys to diligently monitor the accounts receivable management industry’s
behavior by allowing the recovery of “any actual damage,” statutory damages up to
$1,000, as well as the consumers’ attorney’s fees and costs. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. The
CFPB should be studying the volume of legitimate v. non-legitimate lawsuits and
working with Congress to resolve whether this strict liability is appropriate.
ACA International impresses upon the Bureau that each proposed regulation must
be scrutinized with an eye toward whether it will invite new and creative theories
for plaintiffs’ attorneys to exploit.
Accordingly, ACA’s comments will not merely address the Bureau’s proposed rules
from a compliance and consumer protection standpoint, but with an eye toward
curtailing the dubious litigation that may ensue from their promulgation.
B. Courts have developed FDCPA “Policy” without the Benefit
of Regulatory Tools
Courts have created their own unintended consequences with their interpretations
of the FDCPA over the last 40 years of litigation. Judicial constructs like the least
P a g e | 19
sophisticated consumer are nowhere in the FDCPA text.
10
Likewise, courts made up
the doctrine of “overshadowing,” which is now being used to attack anything that
deviates from mechanical statutory language and that might be considered
“congenial.”
11
And, even when agencies utilize the FDCPA’s statutory language,
such as by including in their letters the validation notice language found in Section
1692g(a, they get penalized by courts. Indeed, courts have muddied the waters
about how to describe “in writing” dispute requirements in g notices (despite the fact
that the required language is spelled out in the FDCPA) and whether a collector
can encourage a telephone call to dispute or ask questions.
12
These and other
judicial rewrites to the FDCPA have effectively promulgated rules and regulations
with no notice, no opportunity to comment, and no coherent public policy to balance
the costs and benefits of the rulings.
ACA welcomes all clarity, safe harbors that allow collectors to use plain language,
and interpretations where ambiguity has created differences between courts and
circuits.
10
See Lait v. Medical Data Systems, Inc., No. 18-12255, 2018 WL 5881522, at *1-2 (11th Cir. Nov. 9,
2018) (noting the decisions of different courts on whether to apply the least sophisticated debtor
standard in different provisions of the FDCPA).
11
See, e.g., Gruber v. Creditors’ Prot. Servs., Inc., 742 F.3d 271 (7th Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of
the claim that the statement immediately preceding the § 1692g(a) disclosure that “[w]e believe you
want to pay your just debt” overshadowed and was otherwise inconsistent with the verification
disclosure because the statement does not contradict any of the required disclosure and instead is
merely “a congenial introduction to the verification notice and is best characterized as ‘puffing’.”)
12
Hooks v. Forman Holt Eliades & Ravin L.L.C., 717 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that a
verification notice violated the FDCPA by stating that the consumer must dispute the debt in
writing); Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that “[w]e have
previously held that a collection letter, called a ‘validation notice’ or ‘Dunning letter,’ violates §
1692g(a)(3) of the FDCPA ‘insofar as it state[s] that [the consumer’s] disputes must be made in
writing.’”) compared to Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, L.L.C., 709 F.3d 142 (3d Cir.
2013) (letter containing the § 1692g verification notice was deceptive in that it urged the consumer to
telephone the debt collector if the consumer felt he did not owe the amount claimed by the collector,
when telephoning would not entitle the consumer to the verification of the debt if the consumer
disputed the debt in writing. “More is required than the mere inclusion of the statutory debt
validation notice in the debt collection letter—the required notice must also be conveyed effectively
to the debtor. . . . More importantly for present purposes, the notice must not be overshadowed or
contradicted by accompanying messages from the debt collector.”)
P a g e | 20
Where the Bureau has added new and additional regulatory requirements, however,
ACA challenges the factual assumptions, rationale, and cost-benefit studies (or lack
thereof) that underlie the proposals.
C. Regulatory Overreach in Regulation F Particularly Harms
Small Businesses
Finally, ACA International urges the
Bureau to be mindful of the
cumulative effect of these proposed
regulations. Viewed in isolation, a
single proposed rule may seem
reasonable and suggested with the
best of intentions. However, there is a
collective “speed bump” effect to these
proposed regulations when taken
together. ACA International
maintains that there are already
plenty of speed bumps on the debt
collection road and plenty of
protections for consumers. More speed bumps and overly complex compliance
burdens will harm small businesses. These impossible speed bumps will also
decrease meaningful consumer communication, which will drive creditors to
litigation and ultimately harm the ability of consumers to access credit and services.
1. Small Business Recommendations went Unaddressed
Despite some significant improvements to its original outline, the CFPB’s proposal
continues to ignore some critical feedback provided from Small Entity
Representatives (“SERs”) during the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act (“SBREFA”) process. This is particularly worrisome, as the majority of
the accounts receivable management industry is comprised of small businesses.
One prime example that SBREFA comments were ignored is the itemization
requirement in the model validation form at § 1006.34(c). Small business creditors
were not invited to be part of the SBREFA process; but the Bureau’s proposal
assumes that such creditors will be able to provide additional documentation and
P a g e | 21
information for itemization in the model validation notice despite the proposal
ostensibly not sweeping in first parties.
13
As we outline extensively later in the
comment, this ultimately harms both the accounts receivable management industry
and small business creditors, who will not be able to easily comply with these
proposed requirements. As noted throughout our comments, it is particularly
problematic for small businesses collecting medical debt.
We disagree with the Bureau’s decision to not provide a substantive analysis as
described in footnote 58, where it states that creditors are not affected by the
proposal:
Certain proposals under consideration in the Small
Business Review Panel Outline and discussed in the
Small Business Review Panel Report are not included in
this proposed rule and are not discussed in part V. For
example, because this proposed rule would apply only to
FDCPA-covered debt collectors, the Bureau does not
include a discussion of proposals under consideration that
would have imposed information transfer requirements on
first-party creditors who generally are not FDCPA-
covered debt collectors.
The new itemization requirement clearly imposes extra burdens on all creditors (not
just those that collect their own debt). Nevertheless, the Bureau conducted no
analysis of how the new itemization requirements would impact the small
businesses who depend upon the accounts receivable management industry to
ensure their customers pay the creditors’ bills.
Another example of feedback ignored in the SBREFA process includes requiring
differentiation between work and personal emails.
14
Footnote 361 of the proposal
notes that SBREFA comments, “were similar to ANPRM comments submitted by
several industry members, who noted that debt collectors may not be able to
determine accurately whether an email address is provided by an employer because,
among other things, the domain name may not signify that it is a work email or the
13
See, ACA SBREFA Panel Rep. at 18.
14
See NPRM at 187-189.
P a g e | 22
consumer may consolidate multiple email accounts.” As outlined in greater detail in
our specific comments on this matter,
15
there is still not a vendor that can easily
make this differentiation between work and personal emails. Thus, it would make it
unduly burdensome for smaller members of the industry to be able to use email in a
way that they can guarantee compliance with the proposed requirements for work
emails.
This is particularly problematic since the Bureau acknowledges in its proposal that
collection agencies who use email may have a competitive advantage:
Debt collectors who use electronic communication may
also benefit to the extent that some consumers are more
likely to engage with debt collectors electronically than by
telephone call or letter. During the SBREFA process,
several small entity representatives said that
communication by email or text message was preferred by
some consumers and would be a more effective way to
engage with them about their debts.”
16
It seems that the Bureau is acknowledging that there is a competitive advantage for
agencies that can use email, who mostly are the largest at this point. Despite this
recognition, the Bureau is ignoring critical SBREFA feedback about the limitations
of smaller agencies to be able to differentiate between work and personal emails.
In other CFPB proposals such as the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act rule, the
Bureau acknowledged that smaller entities would need to rely on vendors to come
into compliance with complex new regulations, and has since requested more
information from financial services providers about some of the burdens financial
service providers are facing.
17
This is comparable to having a new system in place to
differentiate work and personal emails, and should serve as a lesson learned about
weighing the cost versus benefits of overly complicated new requirements. During
discussions about HMDA, previously, the Small Business Administration Office of
15
See, infra Ch. 2, Section II.F.
16
NPRM at 412.
17
Home Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation C), 84 Fed. Reg. 20972 (proposed May 13, 2019) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1003).
P a g e | 23
Advocacy found creating new computer systems to be unduly burdensome for small
businesses.
18
In its letter to the Bureau on this, SBA Office of Advocacy stated:
At Advocacy’s roundtables, the participants stated that it
will be costly to develop a computer system to collect the
information that is required. According to the
participants, it will be far more costly than the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) rulemaking. In HMDA,
small entities added to an existing system. To comply
with the requirements of section 1071, small entities will
need to build an entirely new system. Advocacy believes
that the implementation of section 1071 of the Dodd-
Frank Act will be costly for small financial institutions.
Similarly, having a compliance system in place that can ensure that all emails are
not used as work emails would be extremely burdensome, require extensive training
(and yet to be created software), and arguably may still even be impossible since
there is no way to read a consumer’s mind in how they are using a particular email
address.
II. COMMENTS ON CONSUMER FOCUS GROUP
STUDIES
A. Consumer Impressions don’t Equate to Violations.
The Bureau’s Fors Marsh Cognitive Interview research confirms that consumer
perception of debt collection as “threatening”
19
is often because collection agencies
feel they must use the formal statutory language required under the FDCPA to
avoid plaintiffs’ lawsuits. In truth, collectors themselves are relatable. Over 70
18
See, e.g., Office of Advocacy Comment on the CFPB’s Request for Information Regarding the Small
Business Lending Market (Sep. 14, 2017), available at https://www.sba.gov/advocacy/9-14-2017-
advocacy-submits-comments-cfpbs-request-information-regarding-small-business.
19
FORS MARSH GRP., Debt Collection Validation Notice Research: Summary of Focus Groups,
Cognitive Interviews, and User Experience Testing (February 2016), at 8, available at
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_debt-collection_fmg-summary-report.pdf.
P a g e | 24
percent of debt collection professionals are women; racial and ethnic minority
groups account for 40 percent of the total collections workforce.
20
Industry
employees spend more than 520,000 hours per year in volunteer activities.
21
Bureau
efforts that allow collectors to empathize early and engage in problem solving with
consumers should benefit both consumers and industry.
22
Overall, however, ACA is skeptical about the reliability of the Fors Marsh studies
for any purpose other than copy-testing. Focus groups are not the best method to
test nationwide experience with debt collection, in general.
23
And to the extent the
CFPB is relying on the focus groups to identify problematic collection issues, “focus
groups are not useful when the researcher needs to assess the magnitude of a
problem.”
24
Further, this study, in particular, has serious deficits that make it wholly
unreliable. The Fors Marsh study makes no effort to justify or explain the number
of focus groups or their composition.
25
For instance, the study does not describe the
20
Diversity in the Collections Industry: An Overview of the Collections Workforce, at 2 (January
2016), available at https://www.acainternational.org/assets/research-statistics/aca-wp-diversity.pdf.
21
ACA International Fact Sheet (January 2019), available at
https://www.acainternational.org/assets/advocacy-resources/aca-fact-sheet.pdf.
22
ACA therefore supports proposed provision § 1006.34(d)(3)(i).
23
See, e.g., R.A. Krueger & M.A. Casey, Participants in a Focus Group. Focus Groups: A practical
guide for applied research (5th ed. 2014), https://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-
binaries/24056_Chapter4.pdf (“Keep in mind that the intent of focus groups is not to infer but to
understand, not to generalize but to determine the range, and not to make statements about the
population but to provide insights about how people in the groups perceive a situation.”); Martha
Ann Carey, International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences 277 (2d ed. 2015) (“A
major concern for data quality is the potential for a ‘group think,’ the phenomenon of participants
being carried along by the group interaction and agreeing with the overall discussion.”); David
Morgan, Qualitative Research Methods: Focus groups as qualitative research 12 (1997) (“Once
participants sense that there is a distinct agenda for the discussion and that the moderator is there
to enforce that agenda, then they are likely to acquiesce in all but the most extreme circumstances.”).
24
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, supra note 24 at 274. Krueger RA.
Focus groups. A practical guide for applied research. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications,
Inc; 1994.
25
Benedicte Carlsen & Claire Glenton, What about N? A methodological study of sample-size
reporting in focus group studies, BMC Medical Research Methodolog, at 2 (2011),
P a g e | 25
efforts to recruit or select participants, does not justify the location of the focus
groups, does not describe the participants’ socioeconomic backgrounds, and
generally does not describe why the researchers chose to format the groups in the
way they did.
26
The study also does not describe whether the researchers believed
the composition of the focus groups was sufficient to reach the “point of saturation.”
“Saturation” is critical for ensuring that the depth and breadth of the participants’
responses adequately capture perceptions on debt collection.
27
Instead, ACA presents an alternative study based on measurable historical facts
from a sample of millions. This study concludes that legitimate disputes about debt
collection comprise less than ½ percent of all collected consumer accounts.
1. The Fors Marsh Study lacks a Robust Sample Set and Data Clarity
While the CFPB touts its consumer experience survey data as the “first
comprehensive and nationally representative data,”
28
its overall sample of
individuals with experience with the accounts receivable management industry is
remarkably small. Of the 2,132 survey respondents, only 682 individuals (32%)
report being contacted by the accounts receivable management industry. Despite
this, the CFPB continually couches its findings in relation to all American
consumers with debt collection experience.
29
https://bmcmedresmethodol.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1471-2288-11-26 (“[T]he number of
focus groups depends on the complexity of the research question and the composition of the groups.”)
26
What about N?, supra note 26, at 8 (“[R]esearchers should always provide correct and detailed
information about the methods used[.]”); Focus Groups as Qualitative Research, supra note 24, at 12
(“[I]nadequate recruitment efforts are the single most common source of problems in focus group
research projects.”).
27
What about N?, supra note 26, at 5-7.
28
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, Consumer Experiences with Debt Collection: Findings
From the CFPB’s Survey on Consumer Views on Debt, Jan. 12, 2017, [hereinafter Consumer
Experiences] available at https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-
reports/consumer-experiences-debt-collection-findings-cfpbs-survey-consumer-views-debt/
29
See, ACA, AN OVERVIEW OF THE ANALYTICAL FLAWS AND METHODOLOGICAL SHORTCOMINGS OF THE
CFPB’S SURVEY OF CONSUMER EXPERIENCES WITH DEBT COLLECTION, 2, 6 (ACA International White
Paper February 2017), [hereinafter ACA] available at
https://www.acainternational.org/assets/research-statistics/wp-cfpbsurvey.pdf.
P a g e | 26
Rather than report its findings with any degree of statistical certainty, the CFPB
describes the survey report as a “descriptive” exercise to “highlight patterns that
may be of policy interest” and “to sketch, from consumers’ perspectives, the broad
experience of debt collection.” The CFPB further cautions that this descriptive
sketch “does not present standard errors or statements about the statistical
significance of the differences” across groups.
30
The presentation of data lacks clarity and lends itself to overestimating the
prevalence of certain findings. By focusing almost entirely on percentages
throughout the report, coupled with a near-total absence of raw numbers or sample
sizes for individual questions, the CFPB offers only limited context for interpreting
responses or situating them within the larger sample. For example, the CFPB
reports that “three in-four consumers report that debt collectors did not honor a
request to cease contact.” A more accurate description of this finding would note
that 75% of consumers who reported continued contact after a request to cease
communication are a subset of the 42% who requested contact to cease; this 42% is
itself a subset of the 32% of the total sample that have been contacted about a debt
in collection. Thus, the “three-in-four consumers” actually represents roughly 215 of
the 2,132 consumers surveyed, or only 10% overall.
Furthermore, the report addresses consumers who ask debt collectors to stop
contact. Despite the FDCPA requiring consumers to submit a request to stop
contact in writing, the CFPB reported findings for the 87% of respondents who “said
they made the request by phone or in person only.” Thus, about 28 people of a 2,132
person sample of consumers with debts on their credit histories reported having
submitted a cease and desist request in the form required by the FDCPA yet still
had contacts continue.
31
This is 1.3 percent. Even 1.3 percent is likely overestimated
when one considers the impact of priming and memory on self-reported surveys.
2. Consumer Survey Evidence is Unreliable
Decades of consumer learning and memory research demonstrates that consumer
memory and self-reported experience is inherently unreliable. As multiple
researchers have concluded, consumer recall of past experience is subject to
30
Id. at 2 (citing Consumer Experiences, supra note 13).
31
ACA, supra note 30, at 2.
P a g e | 27
distortion and can be guided by marketing communications, researcher feedback,
and priming:
Learning from self-generated experience with a product or
service is not a simple process of discovering objective
truth. It is, to a greater extent, open to influence, and the
consumer’s confidence in the objectivity of such learning
can be illusory.
32
The multiple instances where the CFPB found that consumers misinterpreted or
were confused by the survey questions suggests that the survey itself might be a
flawed instrument, a point that ACA International stressed to the CFPB before the
survey was approved and sent to consumers.
33
Specifically, footnote 24 states that
“the survey did not specifically define disputes” and that “consumers’ perspectives
on whether they had disputed a debt may differ from the definition of dispute used
by a given creditor or collector or what may constitute disputes pursuant to the
FCRA and FDCPA.” It is quite problematic that a survey purporting to evaluate
consumer experiences with the accounts receivable management industry fails to
present questions that accurately represent the terms by which that industry is
regulated.
The report also found the consumers with more than one debt in collection were
more likely to be contacted multiple times per week. The CFPB found that these
same consumers were also more likely to report that they felt they were being
contacted too often, yet also observed that a “consumer who is contacted about
multiple debts is likely to experience a higher overall frequency of calls, and this
may make the consumer more likely to perceive any number of calls from any one
collector as ‘too often.’” Perhaps in the future the CFPB, and readers of its report,
would be better served by Bureau efforts to disentangle the relationship between
the number of debts in collection relative to the number of calls received by a
consumer.
32
Hoch, Stephen J. and John Deighton, Managing What Consumers Learn from Experience, JOURNAL
OF MARKETING, 53 (April 1989), quoted by Braun, Kathryn, Postexperience Advertising Effects on
Consumer Memory, JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH 25 (March 1999).
33
ACA, supra note 30, at 4, 27, 36, fns.32 & 34 (discussing key “caveats” that recognize that some
questions might have confused consumers).
P a g e | 28
3. Legitimate Disputes Comprise Less than ½ Percent of All Accounts
The Fors Marsh study relies on the memories of persons contacted by the accounts
receivable management industry to assess facts that ACA members can readily
track in their files. In fact, ACA conducted a macro analysis of its members’ dispute
data and determined that only 0.15% of disputed accounts have a basis in fact.
These legitimate disputes comprise less than 4.5% of all disputes submitted. And of
those legitimate disputes, 69% were valid because the borrower paid the debt in full
prior to the collection agency making its initial contact. This is a time-lag problem,
not a compliance issue.
“Legitimate” Disputes
Total
Accts.
Total
Disputes
Duplicative
Dispute
Validated Acct. or
Duplicative
Dispute
Error/No
media
Acct.
Paid in
Full
TOTAL
Total 2,263,845. 77,124 15,463 74,487 1,049 2,343 3,392
OF Total Disputes 3.41% 20.05% 96.58% 1.36% 3.04% 4.40%
OF Total Accts. . 3.41% 0.683% 99.850% 0.046% 0.103% 0.150%
Of "Legit.” Disputes 30.9% 69.1% 100.0%
* Duplicative disputes are defined somewhat consistent with NPRM §1006.38(a)(1)
as: a dispute submitted by the consumer in writing that is substantially the same as
a dispute previously submitted by the consumer in writing for which debt collectors
already has satisfied the requirements of paragraph (d)(2)(i). Many collection
agencies record and respond to disputes outside the validation period for customer
service purposes.
P a g e | 29
Conclusion
In fact, from a 2018 and 2019 sample set of over 2.2 million accounts, ACA
determined that the data supporting collections on those accounts is accurate over
99.85 percent of the time.
This study provides three key takeaways:
The numbers cited in the Fors-Marsh study that indicate
malfeasance by accounts receivable management industry are
dramatically inflated when compared to actual data.
Concerns about consumers not exercising their right to dispute
debts are unfounded, as invalid accounts are very rare.
Duplicate disputes comprise over 20 percent of all disputes.
B. Calling Data Research
The research referencing “calling data”
34
does not provide the public and
researchers enough source material for adequate inspection and analysis. Specific
failures with respect to the research provided include:
No clear reference or citation for the data set used
No sample size is provided
No methodology is described
No algorithms are provided for the simulation research
No assumptions are provided, nor the rationale behind the assumptions
Therefore, it is not possible to contextualize the results of the simulations or to
understand the real-world data they are based on.
The NPRM expands upon the details of the “calling data” findings for nearly ten
pages,
35
outlining their justification for proposed call caps. However, within those
ten pages there is almost a total absence of data and technical detail necessary to
34
See NPRM at 370.
35
NPRM at 370 – 379
P a g e | 30
support their claims. As the rationale for call caps derives almost entirely on the
simulation research and data from one collection agency, there should be clear
documentation of the research, sample, methodology, and easy access to a final
report.
The Bureau should not be given credit for providing the public the opportunity to
comment upon the “calling data” study, and the call-caps rule that is based on the
study, in light of this deficit in transparency.
III. DATA FROM STATE REGULATION ADVISES
EXTREME RULEMAKING CAUTION
The Bureau must carefully balance new collections requirements with market
incentives. For creditors, the alternative to debt collection is litigation. For many
reasons, consumers who have breached credit contracts are much better off
communicating privately with debt collectors than being sued by creditors in state
or local courts:
Consumers must often pay attorneys’ fees and costs of collections litigations,
Consumers may lose chances to settle debt for less than face value, and
When a lawsuit is filed in state or county court, the lawsuit filing, and
defaulted debt becomes a matter of public record with all the attendant
reputational harm.
Too much regulatory burden or frivolous plaintiffs’ class action risk, however,
negates the advantages of debt collection and will drive more creditors to elect
litigation sooner or more frequently, particularly for certain riskier classes of debt.
Creditors prefer out-of-court resolution through debt collection because it usually is
faster, predictable, is private, avoids attorney fees, and typically maintains the
goodwill of the consumer. But where regulatory hurdles increase capital costs, on-
going burdens, or regulatory risk, creditors and collection agencies may choose to
file collections actions where notice pleading rules and medical information privacy
rules are clear and a 100 percent recovery is more likely.
P a g e | 31
A. The 2015 New York DFS Debt Collection Rules Increased
Collection Litigation by 93%
Following the enactment of new debt collection regulations in 2015, in New York
State, collections lawsuit filings rose 32% in 2018 and 61% in 2017 from pre-2015
levels.
36
ACA believes that this is an overall bad outcome for consumers, and
advises the Bureau to avoid tipping the trend toward litigation at a national level.
The New York Department of Financial Services issued regulations that took effect
on March 3, 2015, except for certain provisions relating to itemization of the debt to
be provided in initial disclosures and relating to substantiation of consumer debts,
which were effective Aug. 3, 2015. The New York DFS rules are similar in many
respects to those proposed by the Bureau.
1. Itemization on Validation Notices
The DFS' regulations require that the validation notice or “g notice” contain a
written notification that includes: (1) disclosure that debt collectors are prohibited
from engaging in abusive, deceptive and unfair debt collection; (2) notice of the
types of income that may not be taken to satisfy a debt; and (3) itemization similar
to that proposed by the Bureau, i.e. detailed account-level information, including
the name of the original creditor and an itemization of the amount of the debt. That
itemization must include the debt due as of charge-off, total amount of interest
accrued since charge-off, total amount of noninterest fees or charges accrued since
charge-off and total amount of payments made since charge-off.
37
2. Disclosures About Debts for Which the Statutes of Limitations May be Expired
The DFS rules also require certain disclosures about statutes of limitations if the
debt collector “knows or has reason to know” that the statute of limitations has
expired. This section also mandates that collection firms maintain “reasonable
procedures” for determining whether the statute of limitations has expired.
36
Yuka Hayashi, Debt collectors wage comeback, WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 5, 2019 (crediting New
Economy Project, a consumer advocacy group).
37
23 NYCRR § 1.2(b)(2).
P a g e | 32
3. Increased Substantiation of Consumer Debts
If a consumer disputes a debt, collection firms may treat the dispute as a request for
substantiation or must provide instructions as to how to make a written request for
substantiation of the debt. Collection firms must provide substantiation within 60
days of receiving a consumer’s request and must cease collection efforts during that
time.
DFS defined documentation required for substantiation as including either a copy of
a judgment against the consumer or: (1) the signed contract or some other document
provided to the alleged consumer while the account was active demonstrating that
the debt was incurred by the consumer; (2) the charge-off account statement (or
equivalent document) issued by the original creditor; (3) a description of the
complete chain of title, including the date of each assignment, sale and transfer;
and (4) records reflecting any prior settlement agreement reached under the
regulations. Collection firms must retain all evidence of the request, including all
documents provided in response, until the debt is discharged, sold or transferred.
38
4. Debt Payment Procedures
If an agreement to a debt payment schedule or settlement is reached, the collection
firm must provide written confirmation of the agreement and notice of exempt
income. The collection firm must also provide a quarterly accounting statement
while the consumer is making scheduled payments.
5. Communication through Email Restricted
After mailing the initial required disclosures, debt collectors may communicate with
a consumer through email upon receipt of consumer consent, provided the email
account is not owned or provided by the consumer’s employer.
38
23 NYCRR § 1.4
P a g e | 33
B. Over-Regulation of Communications Drives Creditors to
Litigation
In New York City courts, account collection filings in year 2017 rose 61% from 2016
levels. In 2018, account collection filings rose another 32% from 2017 levels.
39
Prior
to the New York DFS rules, lawsuit filings to collect debts had declined for nearly a
decade due to tougher court requirements imposed on collectors.
40
ACA members explain the reasons for this:
Creditors did not want to invest the money to update systems in order to
provide the data required to meet the itemization requirements (Rule 1);
lawsuit filings shift the document preparation burden to attorneys;
The new substantiation requirements (Rule 3) were as burdensome as
litigation document preparation, so debt collection and non-litigation based
communications lost an advantage.
Collectors who formerly used email in New York stopped because the risk
was too high.
Collectors who adopted email strategies across the U.S. did not adopt them in
New York.
Most debt collection agencies give consumers a discount on the debt. In
contrast, the added cost of litigation discourages creditors from agreeing to
the amount of discounts offered by a collection agency. In addition, creditors
know they usually win judgments for the full amount further dissuading
them from offering debt reductions or payment plans as favorable as accepted
by collection agencies. As the conveniences of non-litigation based debt
collection decline, the recovery advantage of litigation will prevail.
39
Yuka Hayashi, Debt collectors wage comeback, WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 5, 2019.
40
Yuka Hayashi, Debt collectors wage comeback, WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 5, 2019.
P a g e | 34
IV. THE CFPB’S RELIANCE ON THE COMPLAINT DATA
LACKS RIGOR
In its White Paper, ACA has outlined why the CFPB’s complaint data is flawed.
41
For the reasons below, fully described in ACA’s White Paper, , the CFPB should not
be relying on its complaint data as an accurate portrayal of the industry when
formulating rules.
Debt collection complaints account for only 0.005% of all consumer contacts
made in a given year by the accounts receivable management industry.
84% of debt collection complaints are closed “with explanation.”
The Bureau’s broad definition of a complaint sweeps in mere inquiries or
unhappiness that a debt is owed.
The Bureau fails to verify the accuracy of the complaints it receives before
including the complaint in its counts.
The Bureau does not differentiate between contacts vs. complaints.
Many complaints address issues that are not fundamentally about the
collection firm. For example, a consumer may submit a complaint that his or
her insurance company should have paid a medical bill or that the debt was a
result of identity theft.
41
ACA, A REVIEW OF DEBT COLLECTION COMPLAINTS SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTIONS COMPLAINT DATABASE IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2018, 2-7 (ACA International
White Paper November 2018), available at https://www.acainternational.org/assets/research-
statistics/2018complaintsreviewquarteroneandtwo.pdf?viawrapper.
35 | P a g e
Chapter Two- Comments by Section
I. COMMENTS ON §1006.2- DEFINITIONS
ACA is pleased that the Bureau has proposed to include regulatory definitions in its
notice of proposed rulemaking. Many of the proposed definitions incorporate
statutory definitions from the FDCPA. However, the Bureau has proposed some
new definitions, including an “attempt to communicate” and a “limited-content
message.” In addition, the Bureau has proposed to amend the definition of a
“communication” subject to the FDCPA’s purview by defining a “communication” to
exclude a “limited-content message.” ACA finds that many of these proposed
definitions will resolve ambiguity. But, additional clarifications surrounding these
proposed definitions may avoid additional interpretation problems down the road.
A. The Bureau’s Definitions Should Add More Certainty and
Clarity
Oftentimes unnecessary litigation results from strict and technical interpretations
of various FDCPA provisions. For example, the FDCPA prohibits a collection firm
from “[u]sing any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on
any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or by
telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business name if such name does
not indicate that he is in the debt collection business.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8). A strict
interpretation of this language would prohibit the “debtor’s address, postage, or
other postal marks such as ‘overnight mail’ from being placed on the outside of an
envelope.” McShann v. Northland Grp., Inc., Case No. 15-00314-CV-W-GAF, 2015
WL 8097650, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 1, 2015).
As courts have noted, such construction would “yield absurd or unjust results.”
Anenkova v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 201 F.Supp.3d 631, 635-36 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
P a g e | 36
Accordingly, courts have held—although not always consistently—that the FDCPA
does not proscribe benign language from being visible on an envelope so long as that
information does not reveal that the person is a debtor.
42
Therefore, ACA recommends that the Bureau define “language or symbol” to
exclude bar or QR codes, postal markings, addresses, and other elements to aid for
efficient use of the mails:
§1006.2(_). Language or symbol for purposes of interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8)
does not include bar or QR codes, postal markings, addresses, and other elements to
aid efficient use of the mails.
B. Relevant Portions of Regulation F §1006.2
The Bureau has proposed in Regulation F Section 1006.2 to establish new
regulatory definitions:
§ 1006.2 Other Prohibited Practices. For purposes of
this part, the following definitions apply:
(e) Consumer means any natural person, whether living
or deceased, obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any
debt. For purposes of §§ 1006.6 and 1006.14(h), the term
consumer includes the persons described in § 1006.6(a).
(f) Consumer financial product or service debt means any
debt related to any consumer financial product or service,
42
See, e.g., Anenkova, 201 F.Supp.3d at 636-39 (granting summary judgment against plaintiff who
sued a debt collector because a barcode was visible on the envelope); McShann v. v. Northland Grp.,
Inc., Case No. 15-00314-CV-W-GAF, 2015 WL 8097650 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 1, 2015) (granting a motion to
dismiss where a plaintiff sued because a demand letter with a “window” displayed the plaintiff’s
name, address, and account number); Simmons v. Med-I-Claims, No. 06-1155, 2007 WL 486879, at
*9 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2007) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff sued because the return
address listed in the envelope was listed for “Med-I-Claims” instead of “Med-I-Claims Services Inc.”);
Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., 759 F.Supp. 1456, 1466 (C.D. Ca. 1991) (rejecting plaintiff’s
argument that debt collector violated FDCPA by including in an envelope language like
“PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL” and “Forwarding and Address Correction Requested.”).
P a g e | 37
as that term is defined in section 1002(5) of the Dodd-
Frank Act (12 U.S.C. 5481(5)).
C. ACA’s Detailed Comments on §1006.2 Definitions
The Bureau has requested comments on whether additional clarification is needed
for any of the proposed definitions and on whether additional definitions would be
helpful. ACA believes that the Bureau could fine tune its definitions for the terms
“attempt to communicate,” “communication,” “debt collector,” and “limited-content
message” so as to avoid subsequent interpretation problems as debt collector
continues in their practice of collecting delinquent debt.
D. The definition of “Attempt to Communicate” and
“Communicate”
The Bureau has proposed to include, in § 1006.2(b), a new term, “attempt to
communicate:”
(b) Attempt to communicate means any act to initiate a
communication or other contact with any person through
any medium, including by soliciting a response from such
person. An attempt to communicate includes providing a
limited-content message, as defined in paragraph (j) of
this section.
Further, the Bureau has proposed to include, in § 1006.2(d), the term,
“communicate:”
(d) Communicate or communication means the conveying
of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to
any person through any medium. A debt collector does not
convey information regarding a debt directly or indirectly
to any person if the debt collector provides only a limited-
content message, as defined in paragraph (j) of this
section.
P a g e | 38
1. These definitions may touch websites and other public displays of contact
information
ACA is concerned that these definitions may invite litigation over passive displays
of contact information such as website pages, building signs, printed and electronic
directories such as phonebooks, or other printed contact information on mediums
that have not yet been invented, but serve a similar general-public informational or
marketing purpose. Not only will this chill useful means by which consumers can
get information about accounts, it conflicts with controlling law.
The Supreme Court in Heintz v. Jenkins relied on a dictionary definition to
determine that an attempt to collect a debt involves an element of personal
solicitation or legal proceedings:
[T]he Act defines the “debt collector[s]” to whom it applies
as including those who “regularly collec[t] or attemp[t] to
collect, directly or indirectly, [consumer] debts owed or
due or asserted to be owed or due another.” § 1692a(6). In
ordinary English, a lawyer who regularly tries to obtain
payment of consumer debts through legal proceedings is a
lawyer who regularly “attempts” to “collect” those
consumer debts. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 263 (6th
ed. 1990) (“To collect a debt or claim is to obtain payment
or liquidation of it, either by personal solicitation or legal
proceedings”).
43
The Bureau should also consider clarifying that a portal or website hosted by the
collection firm and voluntarily sought out by a consumer is not included within the
definition of “communication.” To include website visits and other posted media as
“communication” would invite a morass of problems. When a consumer initiates a
call or email to the collection firm, debt collectors can easily track such
communication in their own records; however, if a consumer passively visits an
agency’s website, the agency would have difficulty tracking such information. ACA
believes the Bureau should take this opportunity to enhance the clarity of the
definition of “communication” so as to avoid any interpretation problems down the
road.
43
Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294 (1995).
P a g e | 39
2. Regulation F “Communication” Should be Connected to Debt Collection
Further, the Bureau should edit proposed § 1006.2(b) to clarify that an “attempt to
communicate” and “communicate” is connected to information concerning a debt. As
currently worded, an “attempt to communicate” is any act to initiate a
“communication,” which is defined in § 1006.2(d) as the conveying of information
regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium, or other
contact with any person through any medium. But not all contact with any person
should be converted to a covered act under Regulation F.
Collection agencies must communicate about a consumer’s account for a variety of
administrative and customer-service reasons that are not in connection with the
collection of a debt. For example, a collector contacting a consumer’s financial
institution to set up a consumer’s requested payment arrangement is “contact with
any person through any medium” but is administrative in nature and would adhere
to the consumer’s instruction to make payment or validate account ownership. As
another example, a consumer may make a complaint to an original creditor about
collections activity. To resolve the issue, the creditor may need to reach out to a debt
buyer, or debt buyer’s agency to make sure the consumer gets the assistance that
they need. More research and contacts might be needed if the debt was sold
downstream. This type of communication should not be a covered “communication”
under Regulation F. But under the current wording of the definition of “attempt to
communicate” it could fall within the terminology of “contact with any person
through any medium.”
Finally, many schools, charities, and financial services innovators are developing
loan and debt forgiveness and pay-off programs. Any over-broad inclusion of
communications about a debt that are not made for the purpose of collecting money
risks bringing these financial innovators into the crosshairs of the plaintiffs’ bar.
3. Collectors are unsure whether disconnected and wrong numbers are “Attempts to
Communicate”
The Bureau’s proposed commentary indicates that an attempt to communicate
includes, but is not limited to, placing a telephone call to a person, regardless of
whether someone from the collection firm speaks to any person at the called
number. The Bureau should further clarify whether a telephone call placed to a
consumer that is either disconnected or does not go through, would also be included
as an “attempt to communicate.” In addition, the Bureau should clarify whether
P a g e | 40
reassigned numbers are to be included as an “attempt to communicate.” Phone
number reassignment is when a number that has been deactivated or disconnected
is then later reassigned to another person. Collectors may unintentionally call
reassigned numbers, but these companies already take steps to avoid wasted time
and resources associated with calling reassigned phone numbers because those
phone numbers do not reach their consumers. Therefore, consumers do not need the
FDCPA to regulate these unintended phone calls because collectors are already
trying to minimize them.
E. Inclusion of “whether living or deceased” in the definition
of “consumer” is not necessary to address the Bureau’s
concerns.
The inclusion of “whether living or deceased” in the definition of consumer upends
established case law. Since the enactment of the FDCPA, the definition of
“consumer” has been widely litigated in federal courts and is, after forty years, well-
settled law. The Bureau’s proposal to amend the definition to include “whether
living or deceased” would effectively un-root that settled case law.
1. There is no evidence that supports including deceased persons in the definition of
consumer
The Bureau’s rationale for this change is unsupported. The Bureau says in support
of this change: “debt collectors may be uncertain, when collecting on a deceased
consumer’s debt, how to comply with the FDCPA provisions that refer to the debt
collector’s obligations to a consumer.”
44
But, the Bureau has no evidence that
collectors actually face this uncertainty. The Bureau does not provide or cite any
specific examples where any collectors are confused or concerned in the collection of
deceased debts. Secondly, any concerns the Bureau vaguely references are
addressed by the Bureau’s proposed changes in §1006.34(a)(1) and 1006.6.
The Bureau also mentions that the collection on debts from estates presents many
of the same consumer-protection concerns as collecting debts from living consumers.
There is no evidence that non-consumers who handle an estate, probate, trust, or
affairs of a deceased consumer have concerns about being harassed or sued for debts
4444
NPRM at 53.
P a g e | 41
that they are not responsible for—not from the Bureau’s complaint database, or not
from any consumer advocate.
In fact, collection activity against deceased consumers represents a very small
percentage. An ACA-member agency specializing in this type of debt collection
approximates that deceased collections make up a microscopic 0.6% of all collections
in the industry, based on available data. A small number of agencies specialize in
decedent debt; none of these ACA-member agree with the Bureau’s concerns. The
Bureau fails to cite to any complaints or concerns from its surveys, data, or even
consumer advocates that representatives of deceased consumer’s estates are being
harassed, or that their relatives or neighbors are being harassed on a regular,
constant enough basis to justify adding this burden to the collection industry.
2. The amendment imposes new uncertainty
The Bureau’s proposal to modify the definition of consumer to include “deceased”
individuals, would effectively create a new class of potential FDCPA plaintiffs, with
no regulatory or judicial guidance about such things as: statute of limitations, a
“discovery” rule for deceased plaintiffs, and the competing powers of authorized
representatives and designated trustees.
F. The “Limited-Content Message” is an Essential
Modernization of the FDCPA
ACA applauds the Bureau’s proposed new term as it believes that the proposed
limited-content message provides a uniform interpretation of the FDCPA that
alleviates the need for collectors to decide between different circuit court opinions.
The Bureau has proposed to include, in § 1006.2(j), a new term, “limited-content
message.”
(j) Limited-content message means a message for a
consumer that includes all of the content described in
paragraph (j)(1) of this section, that may include any of
the content described in paragraph (j)(2) of this section,
and that includes no other content.
(1) Required content. A limited-content message is a
message for a consumer that includes all of the following:
(i) The consumer’s name; (ii) A request that the consumer
P a g e | 42
reply to the message; (iii) The name or names of one or
more natural persons whom the consumer can contact to
reply to the debt collector; (iv) A telephone number that
the consumer can use to reply to the debt collector, and (v)
If applicable, the disclosure required by § 1006.6(e).
(2) Optional content. In addition to the content described
in paragraph (j)(1) of this section, a limited-content
message may include one or more of the following: (i) A
salutation; (ii) The date and time of the message; (iii) A
generic statement that the message relates to an account;
and (iv) Suggested dates and times for the consumer to
reply to the message.
1. When it comes to leaving messages, the FDCPA lacks clarity and is in desperate
need of interpretation.
The FDCPA was drafted before voicemail existed and is ambiguous about how one
can simultaneously comply with its provisions when leaving a voice message. As
currently defined in the FDCPA, a communication “means the conveying of
information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any
medium.”
45
The FDCPA is clear in Section 805(b) that a debt collector may not
communicate with a person other than the consumer in connection with the
collection of any debt, with certain exceptions. Yet, in Section 807(11) the FDCPA
requires that a debt collector identify itself as a debt collector, inform the consumer
that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt, and that any information
obtained will be used for that purpose. Since the passage of the FDCPA there has
been uncertainty surrounding the intersection of these two provisions in the FDCPA
because if a debt collector leaves such disclosures on a voicemail or other message
system, they risk violating the prohibition against revealing information about a
debt owed by a consumer to a third party. This has led to some debt collectors
deciding not to leave messages at all and instead hanging up when reaching a
voicemail.
In the NPRM, the CFPB has identified that consumers are frustrated when a
collector calls and doesn’t leave a voicemail. The CFPB’s proposed definition of a
45
15 U.S.C. § 1692b(2)
P a g e | 43
limited content message attempts to resolve both sides of this equation. It provides
a method whereby debt collectors may leave a message for a consumer and not risk
violating the statute, which would reduce the number of calls a debt collector would
need to make to reach the consumer and resolve the outstanding debt.
There currently is a split among circuits about how collectors should leave recorded
or live messages.
46
Additionally, as noted in the NPRM, the FTC and the U.S.
Government Accountability Office have previously identified the need to clarify a
debt collectors’ ability to leave voicemail messages for consumers.
47
Moreover, the
CFPB noted that the SBREFA process demonstrated overwhelming support from
small business representatives for a rule that clarified a debt collector’s ability to
leave a message for a consumer.
48
Reasonable minds differ on how to interpret the
FDCPA. This area is ripe for agency rulemaking under the Chevron factors.
49
2. The “Limited Content Message” Resolves Ambiguity in the FDCPA Text
Like any administrative agency, the CFPB must act within the scope of authority
Congress delegated to it by statute. A court may ignore a regulation promulgated
through notice and comment if it does not earn deference.
50
Issues surrounding
judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes enacted by Congress are
guided by the Chevron doctrine.
Under the Chevron analysis, first set forth by the Supreme Court in 1984, courts
review agency rules by looking at the rule in two distinct steps. First, a reviewing
court must determine whether the meaning of the statute addressing the precise
issue before the court is clear. If the statutory text is clear, that is the end of the
matter; the court and the agency must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
46
Compare Foti v. NCO Fin’l Sys’s, Inc., 424 F.Supp.2d 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that a pre-
recorded message stating “calling . . . regarding a personal business matter” was a “communication”
under the FDCPA) with Zortman v. J.C. Christensen & Associates, Inc., 870 F.Supp.2d 694 (D. Minn.
2012) (holding that voicemail stating “[t]his is a call from a debt collector” was not a third-party
communication violating the FDCPA).
47
See NPRM, at 61; see id. at 61, fns. 176 & 177.
48
See id. at 67, fn. 179.
49
See Infra Section IV.B.
50
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
P a g e | 44
intent of Congress.
51
Only when the statute is silent or unclear on the issue can a
court move on to step two.
Further, the CFPB’s rulemaking must comply with the Administrative Procedure
Act, which requires a reviewing court to set aside agency action under certain
conditions, including when agency rulemaking is arbitrary or capricious.
52
When
applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, courts generally focus on: (1)
whether the rulemaking record supports the factual conclusions upon which the
rule is based; (2) the rationality or reasonableness of the policy conclusions
underlying the rule, and (3) the extent to which the agency has adequately
articulated the basis for its conclusions.”
53
Reviewing courts’ interpretations of the
terms “arbitrary and capricious” have changed over time.
54
Any rulemaking the CFPB engages in to implement a new rule or modify an
existing rule faces two primary statutory requirements. First, the rule must
conform to the authority set forth in the Consumer Financial Protection Act
(“CFPA”). Second, there must be a “concise general statement of [the amendment’s]
basis and purpose,” reflecting rational and reasonable policy conclusions in the
rulemaking record to support the change and thus avoid being overturned as
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.”
55
An agency’s interpretation is most likely to receive deference when “the
regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a
detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting
policies.
56
The principal evidence that the FDCPA is silent on the content of live or recorded
messages is the present dichotomy caused by competing circuit court opinions.
51
Id. at 843 n.9 (Chevron instructs courts at step one to employ all of the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation first).
52
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
53
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking 164, 425 (5th ed. 2012).
54
Id. at 426.
55
5 U.S.C. § 553(c); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
56
New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing Chevron, 437 U.S. at 865).
P a g e | 45
3. The Foti versus Zortman conundrum proves the need for agency interpretation
The split among circuits regarding how collectors should leave messages is
premised upon two separate lines of court cases and are generally referred to as Foti
and Zortman.
In Foti, the debt collector left the following message:
Good day, we are calling from NCO Financial Systems
regarding a personal business matter that requires your
immediate attention. Please call back 1-866-701-1275.
Once again please call back, toll-free, 1-866-701-1275, this
is not a solicitation.
57
Courts following the Foti analysis hold that these types of messages are in fact a
communication as defined by the FDCPA and that they must include the
disclosures that the caller is attempting to collect a debt, which only increases the
likelihood that a third party hearing the message would receive information that
the message relates to debt collection in violation of the FDCPA.
In Zortman, the debt collector left the following message:
We have an important message from J.C. Christensen &
Associates. This is a call from a debt collector. Please call
866-319-8619.
58
The Zortman court found that the voice message was not a communication under
the FDCPA and therefore did not constitute a third-party disclosure or require
mini-miranda disclosures under the FDCPA.
The Zortman approach also has received some approval by the FTC. In a settlement
with GC Services, the FTC enjoined GC Services from leaving messages that
disclosed that GC Services is a debt collector only if the message also contained the
consumer’s first or last name.
59
Thus, a Zortman message, which does not contain
57
Foti, 424 F.Supp.2d at 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
58
Zortman, 870 F.Supp.2d at 696.
59
U.S. v. GC Services Limited Partnership, Civ. Action No. 17-461, Stipulated Order for Permanent
Injunction and Civil Penalty Judgment, at pp. 6-7 (S.D. Tex. March 2, 2017),.
P a g e | 46
the consumer’s first or last name, but indicates that the call is from a debt collector
is consistent with the FTC’s approach.
However, the Eleventh Circuit has pushed back on the Zortman approach. In Hart
v. Credit Control, LLC, 871 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2017), the debt collector left a
message which stated:
This is Credit Control calling with a message. This call is
from a debt collector. Please call us at 866-784-1160.
Thank you.
60
The Eleventh Circuit found this message was in fact a communication under the
FDCPA which is contrary to the holding in Zortman.
4. The Limited Content Message Definition Reconciles Conflicting Approaches
As the Supreme Court has explained in Chevron when the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, the court considers whether the agency’s
interpretation reflects a permissible and reasoned construction of the statute.
61
The CFPB, seeking to reconcile these contradictory approaches, has presented a
method, the limited-content message, whereby debt collectors can leave a message
for a consumer and not risk violating the intersecting FDCPA prohibitions found in
§805(b) and §807(11). The proposed commentary in the NPRM provides two
examples of a limited-content message:
This is Robin Smith calling for Sam Jones. Sam, please
contact me at 1-800-555-1212.
Hi, this message is for Sam Jones. Sam, this is Robin
Smith. I’m calling to discuss an account. It is 4:15 p.m. on
60
Hart, 871 F.3d at 1256.
61
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). The Supreme
Court most recently reiterated Chevron in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 1, 9 (2016).
See also JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 164, at 453 (5th ed. 2012)
(stating that “if the statutory meaning on the precise issue before the court is not clear, or if the
statute is silent on that issue, the court is required to defer to the agency’s interpretation of the
statute if that interpretation is ‘permissible.’”).
P a g e | 47
Wednesday, September 1. You can reach me or, Jordan
Johnson, at 1-800-555-1212 today until 6:00 p.m. eastern,
or weekdays from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. eastern.
A comparison of the proposed examples of a limited-content message against the
messages at issue in Foti, Zortman, and Hart demonstrates that the CFPB has
proposed a rule that is “rational, based on consideration of the relevant factors and
within the scope of the authority delegated to the agency by the [CFPA],” and
therefore not likely to be overturned as arbitrary and capricious.
62
Indeed, the NPRM sets forth the inconsistency in which courts have interpreted the
intersecting prohibitions of the FDCPA, and thus supports the conclusion that
providing a clear method whereby a collector may leave a consumer a message free
from risk of liability is necessary. The CFPB has therefore sufficiently articulated
the three factors courts focus on when applying the arbitrary and capricious
standard: (1) the rulemaking record supports the factual conclusion upon which the
limited-content message is based; (2) the limited-content message is based upon
reasonable policy conclusions that clarity is necessary; and (3) the agency has
adequately articulated the basis for proposing the limited content message.
63
G. Additional Comments about the Limited Content Message
1. Limited Content Messages Should Allow Electronic Contacts
The current definition required the limited content message to leave a telephone
number for a response. We suggest that an email address, text message number, or
other (yet unknown) type of communication method should also be available.
Particularly when the limited-content message is delivered in writing, it makes
sense that a consumer would be able to click a link in that message in order to
respond.
Official Commentary should state an example such as:
62
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc., 463 U.S. 29 at 42-43.
63
LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 164, 425 (5th ed. 2012).
P a g e | 48
This is Robin Smith calling for Sam Jones. Sam, please
contact me at 1-800-555-1212 or by email. My address is
Communications via e-mail should be included because consumers have expressed
that they can be convenient because the individual may determine the best time, for
their own personal schedule, to review and respond to any received e-mail
communication. We recommend that the limited-content message would include a
name of a real person whom the consumer could contact to reply to the collector, a
telephone number or electronic contact, and a disclosure explaining how the
consumer could opt-out of receiving such messages. As such, by allowing a collection
firm to deliver a limited-content message via e-mail, collectors would be allowed to
provide consumers with the information they need, in writing, so that they could
contact the collector to communicate about their outstanding debt. And, such
information would be provided in a convenient medium that the consumer himself
could control.
2. Is there liability for inadvertent incomplete messages?
ACA applauds the Bureau’s efforts to provide a method for the accounts receivable
management industry to reach consumers that would avoid violations of FDCPA
sections 805(b) and 807(11). Yet, ACA urges the Bureau to consider how certain
issues, such as telephone disconnection, carrier issues, hang-ups, or other
technology issues that prohibit a collector from leaving all elements of the Bureau’s
proposed limited content message will affect a collector’s attempt to leave a limited-
content message. Therefore, ACA urges the Bureau to clarify in Official
Commentary that an inadvertently incomplete limited-content message will qualify
as a limited-content message. Providing such clarification will avoid interpretation
issues.
3. Provide clarification regarding consumer’s name
ACA further urges the Bureau to clarify the name requirement in a limited-content
message. As currently proposed, a limited-content message is a message for a
consumer that includes “the consumer’s name,” in addition to other content. Neither
in the proposed regulation or the proposed commentary is “the consumer’s name”
clarified. Does this mean a consumer’s first name, last name, both first and last
name? Again, ACA urges that providing as much clarification at the outset will help
to potentially avoid subsequent interpretation problems.
P a g e | 49
4. More clarity is also needed surrounding the term “natural persons”
Under the proposal it states that a consumer should be directed to reply to, “the
name or names of one or more natural persons,” whom the consumer can contact to
reply to the collector. The proposal clarifies that an alias can be used. However, that
leaves some industry practices unclear. Currently some agencies use systems such
as using a certain alias to refer to a certain letter used. It is not entirely clear if it is
permissible if a name used, not directly linked to a natural person is permissible.
Footnote 181 notes that, “Proposed § 1006.18(f) would clarify that an accounts
receivable management industry employee does not violate § 1006.18 by using an
assumed name when communicating or attempting to communicate with a person,
provided that the employee uses the assumed name consistently and that the
employer can readily identify any employee who is using an assumed name. See the
section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.18(f).”
64
ACA urges the Bureau to
clarify whether an exact alias has to be linked to one natural person, or if it can be
used in other ways to direct callers to the person who can be most helpful in
responding. ACA suggests that the Bureau allow some flexibility in this area that
accounts for employee turnover, efficiency, and the ability to connect a consumer to
someone that can help them during all regular work hours, in which one certain
employee may not always be working.
5. Cost Concerns about Text Messages are Outdated
Organizations who dislike the clarity that the Bureau’s proposal provides—which
will reduce spurious litigation opportunities—raise issues concerning the cost to
consumers if limited content messages are allowed in text messages. This concern is
outdated. With the widespread availability of unlimited call and text plans, the
number of consumers who continue to pay for individual text massages is certainly
a small segment of the marketplace. As virtually all postpaid plans include
unlimited texting, as well as some prepaid plans, based on 2018 market data our
estimate is that 87% of consumers have unlimited texting. This finding is consistent
with other market research on the availability of unlimited texts. However, these
figures likely overestimate the number of consumers who pay for individual texts as
calling and texting are generally inexpensive for service providers and unlimited
64
NPRM at 67.
P a g e | 50
calling and texting is often extended as an incentive even for prepaid and low-cost
plans.
6. Additional clarity is also needed about direct drop voicemail programs.
Ringless voicemail has become a widely used tool in the industry for connecting
with consumers and has been found to be effective because it enables consumers to
respond when they want to, at a time that is most convenient for them. Many
agencies use this technology.
65
ACA urges the Bureau to clarify in official
commentary that ringless voicemail can be used to deliver a Limited Content
Message.
H. “Debt Collector” Ambiguities Can be Better Addressed
There has been much litigation since the inception of the FDCPA regarding the
exemptions from the statutory regime. In particular, servicers of both current and
delinquent debt require better clarity. The Bureau’s Proposed Rule provides:
(g)(2) The term debt collector excludes:
(vi) Any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt
owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due to another, to
the extent such debt collection activity: (A) is incidental to
a bona fide fiduciary obligation or a bona fide escrow
arrangement; (B) Concerns a debt that such person
originated; (C) Concerns a debt that was not in default at
the time such person obtained the debt; or (D) Concerns a
debt that such person obtained as a secured party in a
commercial credit transaction involving the creditor; and
(vii) A private entity, to the extent such private entity is
operating a bad check enforcement program that complies
with section 818 of the Act.
Given that the Bureau has raised the issue of the statutory definition of a “debt
collector” in its notice of proposed rulemaking, the Bureau should clarify that the
65
ACCOUNTS RECOVERY.NET, DIGITAL COMMUNICATION SURVEY,
https://www.accountsrecovery.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Digital-Communication-Survey-Final-
Low-Res.pdf
P a g e | 51
FDCPA and Regulation F don’t apply to affiliates, servicers and subsidiaries
collecting on originating creditor debt. Further, the rule might address how these
firms might alert plaintiff attorneys that they are collecting on behalf of first-party
creditors, and not in a third-party capacity.
Second, the Bureau should clearly define non-consumer debt and pre-default
servicing work that is not covered by the FDCPA.
Third, the Bureau should resolve the question of whether a person can sometimes
be a debt collector and sometimes not be a debt collector in instances where the
defendant obtains a mix of loans, some of which are in default and some of which
are not in default, all unbeknownst to the defendant (as often happens in mortgage
servicing).
66
Fourth, the Bureau should clarify in its proposed definition of “person” that the debt
covered by the FDCPA is debt only a natural person can incur as set forth in §
803(3) and (5).
Finally, the Bureau’s enforcement division has advanced the theory that creditors
and debt buyers can be liable under the FDCPA for the FDCPA violations of the
agencies the creditors/buyers hire to collect on accounts. Yet the Bureau has not
established the standards of conduct or when such liability will apply for owners of
charged-off accounts. The D.C. Court of Appeals in PHH Corporation v. Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 83 (2018) affirmed the panel’s unanimous
holding that the Bureau cannot employ new statutory interpretations retroactively.
Thus, debt buyers presently have a complete defense to creative FDCPA
interpretations about vicarious liability until such time as the Bureau engages in
prospective rulemaking.
The Bureau’s proposed definitions should avoid subsequent interpretation
problems; and failing to clarify now the identified murky issues would
unfortunately result in costly litigation that the Bureau is likely to lose.
66
See, e.g., Schlosser v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 323 F.3d 534, 537 (7th Cir. 2003); Bridge v. Ocwen
Federal Bank, FSB, 681 F.3d 355, 362 (6th Cir. 2012).
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II. COMMENTS ON §1006.6 – COMMUNICATIONS
IN CONNECTION WITH DEBT COLLECTION
ACA appreciates the Bureau using this rulemaking as an opportunity to bring
clarity to the accounts receivable management industry’s obligations in
communicating with consumers, particularly with respect to communications over
email and text. Enabling electronic communication regarding debt, or to acquire
location information, further balances the need for the accounts receivable
management industry to connect with the consumer, and the consumer’s ability to
have some control over the timing and volume of communications he or she receives.
That said, if the Bureau’s goal is to encourage more of the accounts receivable
management industry to communicate electronically, the rule must be easier to
understand and follow. ACA recommends further clarity in certain provisions, as
discussed in more detail below, to better guide ACA’s membership toward FDCPA
compliance in using email.
A. §1006.6(a) and Proposed Comments 6(a): The Definition of
Consumer
With proposed §1006.6(a)(4) and proposed comments 6(a)(4), the Bureau seeks to
clarify that Regulation F’s provisions regarding communications with a consumer
about a debt include communications with an administrator or executor of a
deceased consumer’s estate. Proposed comments 6(a)(4)-1 specifies that the terms
executor and administrator include the personal representative of the deceased’s
estate:
1. Personal representative. Section 1006.6(a)(4) provides
that, for purposes of § 1006.6, the term consumer includes
the executor or administrator of the consumer’s estate, if
the consumer is deceased. The terms executor or
administrator include the personal representative of the
consumer’s estate. A personal representative is any
person who is authorized to act on behalf of the deceased
consumer’s estate. Persons with such authority may
include personal representatives under the informal
probate and summary administration procedures of many
States, persons appointed as universal successors,
P a g e | 53
persons who sign declarations or affidavits to effectuate
the transfer of estate assets, and persons who dispose of
the deceased consumer’s assets extrajudicially.
But as the Bureau notes, many states have implemented procedures for resolving
estates that are more efficient and less costly than probate, and under these
procedures, “an individual with the authority to pay the decedent’s debts out of the
assets may lack the particular title of executor or administrator under State law.”
NPRM at 73.
Indeed, the Bureau vastly understates the complexities of state laws that allow
families to avoid probate. In California, for example, you can make a living trust to
avoid probate for virtually any asset. At death, the successor trustee will be able to
transfer it to the trust beneficiaries without probate court proceedings. In this
situation, there would not be a “personal representative,” but rather a “trustee.”
The Bureau should avoid proscribing specific language unless it has done the
exhausting task of including every state’s possible terminology in its definitions or
comments.
Accordingly, to facilitate better compliance with Regulation F, ACA believes that a
more efficient approach would be to incorporate the relevant state’s law and
terminology in §1006.6(a)(4) so that it would read as follows:
§1006.6(a). Definition. For purposes of this section, the
term consumer includes:
(4) The executor, administrator, or person authorized
under state or other applicable law to represent the
consumer’s estate or property securing a debt, if the
consumer is deceased.
Including reference to state or applicable (local, tribal, or foreign) laws concerning
estates in the regulatory text, rather than in the comment, ensures clarity at the
outset as to whom the debt collector may speak with regarding decedent debt, and
eliminates the potential for confusion if the individual who is responsible for the
finances of the decedent does not have the title of executor or administrator.
Moreover, if a state uses precise terminology to identify the person authorized
under state law to represent the consumer’s estate or a particular secured asset, the
P a g e | 54
collector may use the term appropriate to the decedent’s situation. This avoids
confusing consumers and avoids unwarranted liability for collectors.
B. §1006.6(b)(1) and Proposed Comments (6)(b)(1)-1:
Ascertaining Inconvenience to the Consumer
1. The CFPB Should Clarify the “Should Know” Standard Since a Collection Firm
must base it upon Limited Information from a Consumer about a Time or Place
being Inconvenient
The Bureau requested comments on whether to require the accounts receivable
management industry to ask at the outset of a debt collection communication
whether the time or place is convenient to the consumer, and what effect consumer-
initiated communications should have on the times and places the debt collector
knows or should know are inconvenient to the consumer. There are practical and
legal reasons why a “should know” standard is unnecessary—and even unfair to
collectors.
Practical Rationale for Clarifying the Should-Know Standard
First, ACA members, who have collectively listened to billions of phone calls with
consumers, have no doubt whatsoever that consumers are perfectly able to say that
the call’s time and place is inconvenient, if indeed the call is inconvenient. With
today’s call-blocking technology and ringer-silencing, consumers control when a call
interferes with their school, work, or sleep.
Second, requiring the accounts receivable management industry to add to their
opening disclosures a question about whether the time and place for the call is
convenient makes a long introduction even longer:
1- the collector must determine a right party contact by
verifying name and other pieces of information;
2- the collector must provide the mini-Miranda;
3- —we assume, because the rule doesn’t specify the
order—the agency must request whether the call is
convenient.
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By the time the agency gets to the real purpose for the call, the consumer has
already listened and responded to a full minute of pro forma information that does
not advance the important communication that must take place in order to resolve
the debt. It’s a waste of time for both collector and consumer. It will annoy
consumers, as well.
Third, the yes/no question will not always provide adequate information such that
the debt collector should know when a more convenient time and place of the
communication should occur. A yes/no response is vague because the question is
compound. It will be difficult for the collector to determine whether the time or
place is inconvenient at the moment, or in perpetuity. Moreover, a response that the
call is inconvenient is difficult to record and operationalize. For example, if a
consumer simply responds “no” to whether the call is convenient, the collector has
no further detail as to why – time of day, location, or a particular situation?
Further inquiries as to when a convenient time to call may generate vague,
noncommittal responses—particularly in the situation when the call is, in fact,
inconvenient.
If the consumer hangs up, it only becomes more complex. To avoid a regulatory
violation, the collector must assume that no time is convenient for the consumer.
This, in turn, may lead to the debt collector simply resorting to litigation or
garnishment to collect the debt if it cannot establish any meaningful communication
with the consumer.
ACA’s concerns are heightened by the idealistic scenarios posed in the Proposed
Rule examples. Proposed comment 6(b)(1)-1 is intended to provide additional clarity
to when the debt collector should know that a time or place is inconvenient for the
consumer. Example (i) illustrates the best-case scenario of a consumer providing an
exact window of time during which debt collection calls are inconvenient. That level
of specificity is the rare exception rather than the norm. More often, consumers
state that they can’t talk at that moment, and when prompted about when a good
time might be, provide a vague response such as “later” or “tomorrow,” or may just
hang up. The debt collector should not be required to intuit future inconvenience
from a single, vague interaction.
This difficulty also applies to designations by the consumer that certain places are
inconvenient. Example (iii)’s scenario where a consumer asks a collector to not
contact the consumer at school illustrates the difficulty in implementing this
P a g e | 56
request. Without further information on what days and times the consumer is at
school, a collector cannot possibly input adequate information into its systems to
ensure further contact does not happen while the consumer is at school. Given the
risk that, if the collector attempts to call the consumer again and the consumer is at
a night class, a court could find that the collector should have known the consumer
was “at school” and that the call was inconvenient.
Legal Rationale for Rejecting the Should-Know Standard
Principally, there is a risk that a court might find that a broadly-applied “should
know” standard departs from the express language of the FDCPA, which provides a
safe harbor under 805(a)(1) for the demarcated daylight hours in “the absence of
knowledge of circumstances to the contrary.” The FDCPA provides that collectors
“shall” presume it is convenient to call after 8 o'clock a.m. and before 9 o'clock p.m.,
local time at the consumer's location unless the collector has knowledge to the
contrary. (“In the absence of knowledge of circumstances to the contrary, a debt
collector shall assume that the convenient time for communicating with a consumer
is after 8 o'clock antemeridian and before 9 o'clock postmeridian, local time at the
consumer's location.”)
Any person “should know” that calling at 3:00 a.m. is inconvenient, as is calling a
person at church or the grocery store and having them paged. This “should know”
standard is coupled with a societal norm.
Holding the accounts receivable management industry to a “should know” standard
by requiring them to make assumptions beyond societal norms, however, runs
contrary to the established principle that the burden of proving something should
reside with the party who has the relevant information. “[F]airness dictates that a
litigant ought not have the burden of proof with respect to facts particularly within
the knowledge of the opposing party.” Adobe Systems v. Christenson, 809 F. 3d 1071,
1079 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Evankavitch v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 793. F. 3d
355, 365 (3
rd
Cir. 2015) (general rule of statutory construction, “that where the facts
with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of a party, that party has the
burden of proving the issue,” citing Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 9, 126 S.Ct.
2437, 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (2006)); National Communications Ass’n Inc. v. AT&T Corp.,
238 F.3d 124, 130 (2
nd
Cir. 2001) (“[A]ll else being equal, the burden [of proof] is
better placed on the party with easier access to relevant information.”); 2
McCormick on Evid. § 337 (7
th
Ed.)(“A doctrine often repeated by the courts is that
P a g e | 57
where the facts with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of a party,
that party has the burden of proving the issue.”)
The consumer, not the debt collector, has the best information on whether a time or
place is inconvenient to her for a collection call, or whether certain contact
information is appropriate to use for debt collection communications. Unless the
consumer expressly supplies this information to the original creditor or shares it
with the collector, the collector cannot be expected to “know or should know” about
the inconvenience or impropriety of the communication if it is based on highly-
personal circumstances.
Negative Ramifications of the Should-Know Standard
Of course, in the wake of vague convenience descriptions, the collector may simply
cease calls altogether. This result is not good for the consumer, who misses the
opportunity to speak to the collector and resolve the debt. And it risks litigation,
wage garnishments, negative credit reporting and other consequences that could
have been avoided had the debt collector been able to initiate contact. These actions
arguably bring far more inconvenience to the consumer than a phone call.
ACA’s Recommendation Concerning Inconvenient Call Times
Accordingly, ACA recommends clarifying that the debt collector need only assume
that the exact time when a consumer designated the call to be inconvenient is
inconvenient for future calls, absent additional specificity from the consumer. Using
the current examples in proposed comment 6(b)(1)-1, ACA accepts that the
collection firm knows or should know that the consumer in example (i) should not be
contacted between 3:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. However, ACA would request that
example (iii) be clarified to state that, unless the consumer provides further
information as to when the consumer attends school, the collection firm only knows
or should know that, at that particular time and day, the consumer is at school and
should not be contacted. Collectors should not be expected to make assumptions
about when the consumer is at work or at school, as some consumer advocates have
suggested.
Similarly, the collector should be able to rely upon the consumer affirmatively
contacting the collection firm as indicia that the time is permissible for future
contact unless the consumer expresses otherwise. Proposed 6(b)(1)-1 permits the
debt collector to only contact a consumer once at a time that the consumer had
P a g e | 58
previously designated as inconvenient, but during which the consumer had
subsequently initiated contact with the debt collector. Again, operationalizing this
restriction will prove difficult for collectors and will expand the potential for error.
Taking example 6(b)(1)-1(ii), the collector should not be assumed to know that 4:30
p.m. is only convenient for one call. Just as the consumer had the ability to initially
state when calls were inconvenient, the consumer can inform the collector that 4:30
is only convenient for that day, or has become a convenient time.
2. Time and Inconvenience Restrictions Should Not Apply to Electronic
Communications
ACA has serious concerns regarding proposed comment 6(b)(1)(i)-1, which states
that debt collectors may not communicate via text message or email at times it
knows to be inconvenient to the consumer, and that the inconvenient time is
determined from the time the communication is sent, not received.
Electronic communications do not present the same potential for disturbance as a
phone call. One of the benefits of electronic communications, email in particular, is
the consumer’s increased control over when those communications are reviewed and
addressed,
67
because the consumer has greater flexibility in when he or she reads
an electronic communication, it is not reasonable to assume that when a consumer
expresses that a particular time is inconvenient for a phone call, the consumer is
also saying that the same time would be inconvenient to receive an email or text
message. No studies or research underlies the Bureau’s assumption that consumers
would make that connection.
Proposed comment 6(e), by requiring collectors to include an opt-out notice for
electronic communications, already accounts for consumer preference as to
electronic communications. Consequently, there is no need for the debt collector to
extrapolate an inconvenience designation for phone calls to electronic
communications between choosing when to view those communications, or being
able to opt-out of receiving them at all, the consumer has plenty of control over his
or her receipt of electronic debt communications.
67
See True Accord, Debt Collection The new frontier in financial services digitization (stating that
“[c]ustomers prefer the pleasant and flexible experience and thus respond more often”), available at:
www.trueaccord.com/resources/downloads.
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Again, Regulation F should balance the consumer’s right to be free from harassing
communications with providing enough opportunity for the collector to
communicate with the consumer to address the debt and avoid litigation and
garnishment.
The Bureau ought to clarify that a consumer’s designation of a time or place for a
call as inconvenient should not apply to electronic communications by revising
proposed comment 6(b)(1)(i)-1. It should state that a consumer informing a collector
over the phone that a call has occurred at an inconvenient time or place applies to
phone calls only and not electronic communications for purposes of whether the
collector knows or should know that an electronic communication is inconvenient.
3. Collectors should be permitted to send email outside the presumptive time limits
Send-time restrictions on email do not pass a cost/benefit analysis. First, collectors
will need to reprogram email systems to comport with the requirement that
communications be made between 8 a.m. and 9 p.m. as specified in proposed
comment 6(b)(1)(i); i.e., whether an electronic communication is made during
permissible hours is determined by the time the communication is sent, not
received.
Second, it is much more cost-effective for collectors to send large batches of email at
night due to greater bandwidth, reduced system traffic, and other technological and
operational considerations. Technological glitches may prevent emails from going
out at a particular time even if the collector did try to comport with the timing
restrictions. As explained above, the chance of harassment or inconvenience is
greatly diminished with email, as consumers maintain control over when emails are
viewed.
Most importantly, consumers have complete control over whether and when they
receive emails. In addition, many emails concerning collections are sent
automatically upon the occurrence of an event: processed payment, returned
payment, response to an email question. Some of these messages benefit consumers
more if they are sent concurrently with the event—as it gives them the time to
respond and fix potential problems.
Finally, the commercial marketplace, in general, does not restrict timing on email
contacts like it does with telephone. News, advertising, billing, and shipment
notifications get sent all hours of the day. The fact that a collector could not respond
P a g e | 60
to consumer correspondence outside a 13-hour period is aberrant and more likely to
cause inconvenience and frustration because it differs so much from commercial
norms.
Accordingly, ACA requests that the Bureau amend proposed comment 6(b)(1)(i)-2 in
the final rule to reflect that electronic mail communications are not subject to the
restriction set forth in §1006.6(b)(1).
4. The Accounts Receivable Management Industry should be permitted to rely on the
consumer’s address of record only for calculating timing of calls, absent
information to the contrary
ACA appreciates the safe harbor afforded by the 8 a.m. to 9 p.m. window in
proposed §1006.6(b)(1)(i), but feels strongly that, given the portability of mobile
phone numbers and the operational burden of cross referencing area codes with
physical addresses to ascertain possible locations, collectors should be permitted to
rely on the consumer’s address of record in agency files for determining permissible
calling hours. Mobile phone area codes are increasingly unreliable as an indicator of
where a consumer resides, as many people retain the same phone number
throughout physical moves.
68
An address on file is a more reliable indicator of the
consumer’s location than a mobile area code.
If a collector is forced to cross reference a physical address with a mobile phone area
code, setting aside the additional operational costs that would entail, the end result
would be more contacts in the middle of the day, when consumers are typically at
work and more difficult to reach. Because the collector cannot readily reach the
consumer, the consumer may sustain more inconvenience lawsuits and
garnishments than if the collector had been able to reach the consumer to discuss
and resolve the debt.
68
See Robin Huebner, With Cellphones, Area Codes More About Identity Than Geography, THE
BISMARCK TRIBUNE (Mar. 2, 2017) available at: https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-
regional/with-cellphones-area-codes-more-about-identity-than-geography/article_822e86fa-240f-53c4-
8aa8-bba685414825.html.
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C. §1006.6(b)(2)(i): Clarifications Concerning the Length of
Time an Attorney Has to Respond to a Debt Collector
The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from directly contacting debtors regarding the
collection of a debt in cases where the debt collector knows that the consumer is
represented by an attorney; however, the FDCPA allows the collector to engage
with the consumer directly if the attorney fails to respond in a reasonable amount of
time.
69
The FDCPA does not define the term “reasonable time,” and only a few cases
even address this exception, though none provide a clear holding.
70
The Bureau
should take this opportunity to clarify with certainty the length of time an attorney
has to respond to a communication from the debt collector before the debt collector
may resume collections with an attorney-represented debtor. Various states have
clarified this for their residents; however, it would greatly assist the industry if this
was clarified uniformly nationwide.
71
69
15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2).
70
See e.g., Phillips v. Amana Collection Svcs., 1992WL227839, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (disregarding
defendant’s contention that failure to respond within two-weeks was unreasonable, but failing to
identify what would constitute an unreasonable amount of time). In Blum v. Fisher and Fisher, the
court found that it was a material question of fact as to whether a delay of more than 30-days
constituted a failure by the attorney to respond within a reasonable time. 961 F.Supp. 1218, 1228
(N.D. Ill. 1997); see also Phillips v. Amana Collection Servs., No. 89–C–1152S, 1992 WL 227839, at
*6 (W.D.N.Y. Aug.25, 1992) (holding that a debtor's failure to respond within two weeks to a debt
collection letter did not warrant direct communication under the FDCPA).
71
See, e.g. F.S.A. § 559.72(18) (no person can “communicate with a debtor if the person knows that
the debtor is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt…unless the debtor's attorney fails
to respond within 30 days to a communication from the person”); N.D. Admin. Code § 13-04-02-09(5)
(prohibiting a debt collector from communicating with a debtor “whenever it appears that the debtor
is represented by an attorney…unless the attorney has failed to respond to a communication within
thirty days”); S.C. § 37-5-108(5)(b)(ii) (prohibiting creditors from communicating with a debtor
represented by counsel unless the attorney fails to communicate within 10 days).
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D. §1006.6(b)(3) and Proposed Comment (6)(b)(3)-1:
Prohibitions Concerning the Consumer’s Place of
Employment
1. Clarity Is Needed Around When the Accounts Receivable Management Industry
Has Reason to Know That an Employer Prohibits the Consumer from Receiving
Debt Communications
ACA requests clarification about when the accounts receivable management
industry is presumed to know that a consumer’s employer prohibits debt collection
calls at work. It is unreasonable to assume that collectors can and should cross-
reference their files to look at the employers for various consumers and implement a
firm-wide restriction on calling any consumers employed at that particular
company.
Further, ACA requests clarification on the Proposed Rule’s applicability to
communications with consumers on their mobile phones or personal devices that 1)
the consumer may have obtained through their place of employment, but still use
for personal business, and/or 2) the consumer has with them and looks at during
work hours.
Again, ACA believes that the best way to avoid communicating with a consumer
who is not permitted to receive debt communications at work is to have the
consumer affirmatively provide that information. The modern workplace operates
such that when a consumer is working depends more upon the habits of the
consumer rather than particular set hours or days. While many consumers still
maintain a work schedule that conforms to a Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. to 5
p.m. schedule, many others do not due to increased ability to telework, shifts, and
international commerce. Consequently, a consumer may be at home, but working, or
may be working on a weekend or in the evening.
E. §1006.6(c)(1) and Proposed Comments 6(c)(1)-1: Notification
Regarding Refusal to Pay or Cease Communications
1. The Proposed Rule Should Allow Additional Time for Processing a Notification
for Purposes of Determining When the Notice Goes into Effect
System updates often take time to implement, ACA therefore proposes a mailbox
rule for §1006.6(c)(1). This subsection provides that a debt collector must cease
P a g e | 63
communications or attempts to communicate with a consumer once the consumer
has notified the collector of refusal to pay the debt or that the consumer wants the
collector to stop communications. The Bureau’s proposed comment 6(c)(1)-1 helps to
clarify that the collector is deemed to have received notice upon receipt of the
electronic or written communication from the consumer. But that receipt requires
opening, reading, and input into a system of record. Even in the best of situations,
these cannot happen instantaneously. The Bureau’s §1006.6(c)(1) should take
account of realistic processing limitations.
ACA believes that it is reasonable to assume notification has been made upon
receipt by the collector of the notice. However, particularly for notices made by mail,
it will take a few days to ensure that the notice is recorded and entered into the
collector’s account management systems. Accordingly, ACA proposes that comment
6(c)(1)-1 be amended to reflect that the collector is deemed to have notice three days
after receipt of the notice.
Note that if the Bureau insists that collection agencies procure E-sign consent
before providing written validation notices electronically, it follows that agencies
can refuse to give E-sign consent for receiving written cease and desist notices and
notices of disputes electronically.
F. The Bona Fide Error Defense is only marginally referenced
in § 1006.6(d)(1)
Even though the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, debt collectors may assert a
“bona fide error” defense, generally, to avoid liability if they can establish that the
collector (1) violated the FDCPA unintentionally; (2) the violation resulted from a
bona fide error; and (3) the collector maintained procedures reasonably adapted to
avoid the violation.
The NPRM refers to this generally available defense only on a limited basis to the
extent a debt collector can show it unintentionally violated the third-party
disclosure prohibition in proposed § 1006.6(d)(1) and, by extension, FDCPA section
805(b), as a result of a bona fide error resulting from a communication by email or
text message. The Bureau should clarify that its rule does not otherwise impact the
general availability of this affirmative defense. It should further clarify that the
defense is available, particularly with regard to the call frequency requirements
imposed by proposed §1006.6(d)(1)(i) and (ii); and proposed §1006.6(d)(2) as failure
to track call attempts and communications could occur despite the debt collector
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maintaining reasonable procedures to avoid such errors. It should also clarify the
availability of this defense in other contexts as well, including but not limited to the
behavior addressed in proposed §1006.30 where bona fide error may result in a
collector selling, transferring or placing for collection a debt that has been paid or
settled, discharged in bankruptcy, or an identity theft report, as defined in section
603(q)(4) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681a(q)(4)), was filed with
respect to the debt.
The Bureau should further clarify that, by extension, meeting of the bona fide error
defense criteria should mitigate alleged Dodd-Frank UDAAP violations for those
sections of the rule where that additional layer is proposed under proposed
§1006.14(b)(1)(ii) and 1006.30(b)(i).
G. §1006.6(d)(3) and Proposed Comments Reasonable
Procedures for Email and Text Message Communications to
Avoid Communications with Third Parties
As stated above, ACA appreciates the Bureau’s acknowledgement that consumers
prefer to use modern forms of communication, and welcomes the clarity around the
use of emails and text messages to communicate with them. As discussed,
approximately 15% of ACA’s membership surveyed in 2017 communicated through
email. The relatively low percentage of email use is primarily due to concerns about
liability. However, according to one debt collection firm that specializes in electronic
collections, “Email response rates in the debt collection process are better than the
industry average for any email communication,” finding that up to 68% of
consumers will open an email, ultimately leading to 55% clicking the link provided,
and over 32% initiating payment.
72
Email significantly expands the potential for the
debt to get resolved prior to initiating more drastic means of collection and credit
reporting. Consequently, ACA proposes modifications below to encourage the use of
electronic communications in collections.
72
True Accord, Debt Collection The new frontier in financial services digitization, available at
www.trueaccord.com/resources/downloads.
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1. The Bureau Should Clarify the Term “Recently” as Used in Proposed
§1006.6(d)(3)(i)
Proposed §1006.6(d)(3)(i) provides that a debt collector maintains procedures
reasonably adapted to avoid a bona fide error in sending an email or text message
resulting in an impermissible third-party disclosure if the debt collector:
1) communicated with the consumer using an email or phone number that
the consumer “recently” used to contact the debt collector, and 2)
communicated with the consumer using a non-work email or non-work phone
number obtained from the original creditor or prior debt collector through
which the consumer was “recently” communicated with using those means,
and the consumer did not subsequently request that the original creditor or
prior debt collector not use those means for debt communications.
Without further clarification as to what “recently” means in each context, collectors
will be hesitant to use such means for communication. Further, its practically
useless that collectors are only safe if they use an email that the consumer
addressed to the “debt collector.” The “non-work” email restriction places barriers
unsupported by evidence of need; is misguided considering that Gmail, Facebook,
and msn email accounts are obviously monitored; and adds so much cost and risk to
the use of email that only a few firms will make the investment. It also ignores
consumer preferences, who may have purposefully provided a work email.
2. The Accounts Receivable Management Industry Should Be Permitted to Use Any
Email Address or Phone Number That the Consumer Has Provided to Contact
the Consumer
As discussed more fully below in comments regarding proposed §1006.22(f), it is
unreasonable to presume a collection firm should know that a particular email
address or phone number is a work email or phone number, especially where the
consumer provided that email address and phone number to the original creditor.
The baseline assumption should be that, if a consumer has provided this
information in assuming the financial obligation underlying the debt, the consumer
knew or should have known that the information may be used to collect the debt,
and the collector may use this information unless the consumer has said not to use
the contact information provided.
The realities of today’s workplace are such that many consumers, particularly those
that are self-employed, may use the same email address and mobile phone number
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for both work and personal matters, and, as the Bureau itself recognizes, the
consumer has better information about the risk of third party disclosure with a
particular email address or phone number.
73
The consumer retains control of communication methods even without the “non-
work” email restriction. The consumer may ensure that the collector does not use a
non-preferred address or phone number for further communications through opting
out of communications using the email address or phone number after receiving the
notice in proposed §1006.6(d)(3)(i)(B)(1), or through opting out of further electronic
communications per proposed §1006.6(e). Moreover, the consumer can effectively
prevent use of a work email or phone number for debt communications by simply
not providing that information to the original creditor.
74
To that point, it is
problematic that the Bureau presumes to know the consumers’ personal business.
Perhaps he or she would prefer to deal with financial matters at work, rather than
at home (particularly if marital problems are at issue). Contact information on
credit applications is obviously provided so the consumer can be contacted about the
account. Interfering in that basic understanding will cause more harm than good.
3. The Time Periods Set Forth in Proposed §1006.6(d)(3)(i)(B)(1) Require Further
Clarification
Proposed §1006.6(d)(3)(i)(B)(1) has practical implementation problems that will
make compliance often impossible. ACA is concerned that, given the current lack of
specificity around what constitutes a “reasonable” period to opt out of further
communications with the contact information in a notice pursuant to proposed
§1006.6(d)(3)(i)(B)(1), permitting communications using that information 30 days
after notification occurred does not provide enough time for an adequate safe
harbor. While ACA appreciates the ability to request an opt-out decision during an
oral provision of the notice, as permitted by proposed comment 6(d)(3)(i)(B)(1)-2,
many of these notices will occur through the mail, as that will provide less risk of
calling a consumer at an inconvenient time or at work. Given the time needed for
the notification to reach the consumer, the “reasonable” opt-out period, and the time
73
NPRM at 100. Similarly, the consumer will have better information about whether his or her
employer permits debt communications at work. See proposed §1006.6(b)(3).
74
ACA recognizes that this may entail requiring original creditors to clearly and conspicuously
disclose that contact information may be used to communicate regarding payment.
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it may take for the consumer to provide the opt-out notice, the collector may risk
communicating with the consumer prior to receipt of the opt-out notice.
A bright-line rule that allows for communication up to 45 days after the opt-out
period ends ensures that written requests sent to the collector within the 30-day
validation period will be received, read, and input in time to comply with the rule.
Allowing more time will diminish the collectors risk in both violating proposed
§1006.6(d)(3)(i)(B)(1), and in potential overshadowing. Accordingly, ACA requests
that the Bureau define a bright-line “reasonable” opt-out period, and that it set the
time for communications to begin by the end of the opt-out period to allow for
collectors to update systems, and to ensure impermissible communications do not
occur.
H. Proposed §1006.6(e) Opt-out For Electronic
Communications
1. The Bureau Should Clarify How to Differentiate Between an Opt-Out for
Electronic Communications and a Cease Communication Request Under
§1006.6(c)(1)(ii)
Because both proposed §1006.6(e) and §1006.6(c)(1)(ii) permit the consumer to
electronically notify the collector to cease communications in some form, ACA
requests that the Bureau clarify in proposed comment 6(e)-1 that, absent actual
knowledge to the contrary, any response to an opt-out notice contained in an email
or text message communication pursuant to §1006.6(d)(3)(i)(B)(1) should be deemed
a medium-specific opt-out rather than a request to cease communication entirely.
Such interpretation is reasonable and consistent with ordinary marketplace
behavior, as consumers are accustomed to opting out of a particular mode of
communication because the consumer prefers to be contacted by phone or letter, or
there is a risk of third-party disclosure unbeknownst to the collector. Requiring
collectors to assume an opt-out of communications means all communications,
unless expressly stated, would considerably inhibit the collector’s ability to
communicate with the consumer and proactively resolve the debt without the
expense and burden of litigation.
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2. Represented Party Contacts -§1006.6(b)(2)
The Bureau should allow collectors to comply with the FDCPA and §1006.6(b)(2)
prohibition on communications with a consumer who is known to be represented by
an attorney so long as the collector also complies with any related state law. Some
states have statutory or common law regimes that specify when it is appropriate for
an attorney or collector to contact directly a “represented party” when the purported
attorney has ghosted. For example, Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, and South
Carolina have specific timeframes in which an entity may resume communications
(e.g. after 10 or 30 days of unresponsiveness).
The Bureau ought to provide agencies a safe harbor for complying with relevant
state law concerning represented party doctrines.
3. 1006.6(d)(1) -Limited Content Messages
Proposed 1006.6(d)(1) prohibits communicating with a third party about a debt and
the accompanying comment provides that leaving a limited content message with a
third party does not violate this provision, unless additional information is given
that would imply the existence of a debt. ACA members suggest that it would be
useful to have additional clarification about impermissible content—particularly in
the event of a live conversation. This might include a few examples of a limited
content message that cross the line.
III. COMMENTS ON §1006.10 - ACQUISITION OF
LOCATION INFORMATION
The Bureau highlights a few issues raised by the Proposed Rule with respect to
acquisition of location information (FDCPA Section 804). First, the Bureau notes
that there may continue to be some ambiguity around how to determine when the
accounts receivable management industry has acquired enough information about a
consumer’s whereabouts such that the purpose of the contact has been satisfied, and
states that it will continue to monitor this issue to identify areas that pose a risk of
consumer harm or require clarification. Second, the Bureau notes that proposed
1006.10(c) would clarify that a debt collector making contact to acquire a consumer’s
location information will be held to the same limitations on frequency of contact
imposed by proposed 1006.14(b).
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Finally, the Bureau notes that it has proposed two comments designed to clarify
acquisition of location information where decedent debt is involved. Proposed
comment 10(a)-1 clarifies that location information includes information about a
person authorized to act on behalf of a deceased person obligated or allegedly
obligated to pay a debt. Proposed comment 10(b)(2)-1 seeks to clarify that the
accounts receivable management industry will not run afoul of proposed section
1006.10(b)(2), and improperly communicate with a third party about a debt, by
stating that collector is seeking to identify and locate a person who is “authorized to
act on behalf of the deceased consumer’s estate.” As is acknowledged in the
Proposed Rule, this permitted language is a departure from the sanctioned
language in the Federal Trade Commission’s Policy Statement on Decedent Debt,
which allows a debt collector to state it is looking for someone, “with the authority
to pay any outstanding bills of the decedent out of the decedent’s estate.”
75
A. Acquisition of Location Information Generally
ACA supports the Bureau continuing to look at how much information the accounts
receivable management industry needs to collect before the purpose of acquiring
information about a consumer’s location has been met and offering guidance in that
regard. As in all areas, ACA welcomes increased clarity to better accommodate
compliance and avoid unnecessary litigation and enforcement. As discussed in
Section One, above, concerning the studies reported thus far, the Bureau lacks
sufficient or reliable data to support a rulemaking on this topic.
76
ACA’s comments below regarding the lack of empirical support for the proposed
limitations on frequency of contact apply equally to §1006.10(c) regarding the
acquisition of location information.
B. Locating an Individual Who Can Resolve Decedent Debt
For a number of reasons, ACA encourages the Bureau to follow the FTC Policy
Statement on Decedent Debt in proposing language the accounts receivable
management industry may use to find the appropriate party to resolve a deceased
75
Federal Trade Commission’s Statement of Policy Regarding Communications in Connection with
the Collection of Decedents’ Debts, 76 FR 44915, 44918-23 (July 27, 2011) (hereinafter “FTC
Statement on Decedent Debt”)
76
See supra, section II.A.; see also supra, section II.B.
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consumer’s debt, rather than the language currently proposed in comment 10(b)(2)-
1. The Bureau proposes that the accounts receivable management industry only be
able to reference a person who is “authorized to act on behalf of the deceased
consumer’s estate.” This approach proposes a vague question that will not be helpful
for grieving families, and the rationale does not justify the trouble it will cause. The
Bureau should avoid proscribing specific language unless it has done the exhausting
task of including every state’s possible terminology in its definitions or comments.
1. Collectors must be specific to be clear and understood
Consumers who are asked about someone who can generally act on behalf of the
decedent’s estate may not understand that the collector is asking for someone who
is responsible for resolving the finances of the estate. Further, some debts may
require locating a very specific person, such as the trustee for secured property.
As discussed above, state laws vary considerably in their mechanisms to avoid
probate.
77
For example, a relative of the deceased may be the estate’s executor for
most purposes and therefore have “authority to act on behalf of the deceased
consumer’s estate.” But this person may not have authority over certain assets,
trusts, or accounts. If the accounts receivable management industry then
communicates further with the relative about the decedent’s debt, such
communication would potentially violate Section 804(2) of the FDCPA, as this
person may not be a spouse, parent or guardian.
78
Specifying that the collector is
looking for someone with authority to pay the deceased consumer’s bills related to a
particular asset or debt better ensures that the collector obtains information for the
right individual, and better prevents improper communications.
Not permitting the accounts receivable management industry to specifically ask for
the location of someone who has authority to pay any outstanding bills of the estate
risks that collectors will not find the proper individual to address the decedent’s
77
See supra at sec. COMMENTS ON §1006.6 COMMUNICATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH
DEBT COLLECTION §1006.6(a) and Proposed Comments 6(a): The Definition of Consumer
78
Mathis v. Omnium Worldwide, No. CIV.04-1614 AA, 2006 WL 1582301, at *4 (D. Or. June 4, 2006)
(noting that the daughter of the deceased debtor could bring an FDCPA claim but holding that no
FDCPA violation occurred); cf. Todd v. Collecto, Inc., 731 F.3d 734, 737-38 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding
that § 1692b protects the consumer from third parties finding out from the debt collects about the
consumer’s debt).
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debts as quickly or at all, resulting in both the collector and the estate expending
additional resources.
2. There is no reason to set stricter communication limits
The Bureau’s rationale for setting stricter limits on the language a collector can use
elevates the technical definition of debt under FDCPA section 803(5) over the
common-sense understanding that nearly all consumers will have unpaid bills at
the time of their death.
79
The purpose underlying § 804(2) is to protect the privacy
interests of the consumer, and deceased consumers do not have the same level of
privacy concerns as when they are alive.
80
The FTC properly recognized that
allowing the collection firm to specifically request location information for someone
with authority to pay outstanding bills of the estate, rather than to vaguely
reference someone with authority to act on behalf of the estate, “balances the
legitimate needs of the collector with the privacy interests of the decedent.”
81
Many people do not know what to do with a loved-one’s financial affairs after their
death. Wrapping up a decedent’s affairs is a burden that most people would like to
do as quickly and easily as possible. Collectors’ communications with surviving
relatives ought to be as simple, clear, and straightforward as possible. The Bureau’s
suggestion here adds a layer of bureaucratic vagueness that doesn’t promote any
real consumer protection purpose and will create more problems for a class of
persons who just crave clarity.
79
See FTC Statement on Decedent Debt at 44921, fn. 56 (stating that “[n]early all individuals leave
some outstanding bills at the time they die, even if they are not delinquent on those bills. Thus, a
reference in the location communication to the decedent’s ‘outstanding bills’ is not likely to imply
that the decedent was delinquent at the time of death.”).
80
See FTC Statement on Decedent Debt at 44920 (Jul. 27, 2011) (taking into consideration, to grant
debt collectors leeway to identify the person authorized to pay a decedent’s debt, that “the deceased
generally have a reduced privacy interest as compared to the privacy rights during life”).
81
Id.
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IV. COMMENTS ON §1006.14(b)(2) CALL
FREQUENCY LIMITATIONS
Rule §1006.14(b)(2) creates a new regulatory violation and private right of action if
FDCPA-covered debt collectors exceed newly-established telephone call frequency
limits:
[A] debt collector violates paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (ii) of this section, as
applicable, by placing a telephone call to a particular person in connection
with the collection of a particular debt either:
(i) More than seven times within seven consecutive days; or
(ii) Within a period of seven consecutive days after having had a telephone
conversation with the person in connection with the collection of such debt.
The date of the telephone conversation is the first day of the seven-
consecutive-day period.
A. Positive Aspects of §1006.14(b)
ACA appreciates the safe-harbor provision of Section 1006.14(b)(4) earned from
compliance with Section 1006.14(b)(2). Per the rule, a debt collector that complies
with the frequency limits would not be in violation of the FDCPA’s prohibition
against engaging in conduct “the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress,
or abuse any person in connection with the collection of any debt….”
ACA also agrees that the limitations should be measured on a per-account, rather
than a per-consumer, basis. A sufficient number of consumers have multiple debts,
sometimes within the same agency. FDCPA compliance (and often internal software
used by the accounts receivable management industry) requires that those accounts
be collected and tracked separately. Some accounts are worked by different
collection agents. Changing this practice to look at it on a per consumer basis would
require extensive new training, costs, reprograming and other burdens that have
not been justified by any cost benefit analysis.
B. Proposed §1006.14(b) Exceeds the FDCPA’s Authority
This Proposed Rule exceeds the FDCPA’s proscription against harassment,
annoyance, or abuse by crossing into what some would consider merely persistent.
Courts have time and again held that the number of calls placed in one day or
throughout the week alone—no matter how frequent—cannot constitute a §806(5)
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violation absent “intent” because there are a number of reasons why such calls
could be made, most of which are not intended to intimidate, pressure, or force the
consumer.
82
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section I.F.2. at 42-43, the CFPB must act within the
scope of authority Congress delegated to it by statute. If the statutory text is clear,
that is the end of the matter; the court and the agency must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
83
1. FDCPA forbids calls with an “intent” to annoy, harass, or abuse
There is no way to escape the observation that §1006.14(b) departs from the clear
statutory text of the FDCPA, which requires “intent” to annoy, harass, or abuse. An
agency’s statutory interpretation can be overridden by a court’s application of a
canon of statutory construction.
84
Multiple courts across many circuits have held
that the number of calls—standing alone—do not indicate an FDCPA violation.
82
See Hinderstein v. Advanced Call Ctr. Technologies, Case No. CV 15–10017–DTB, 2017 WL
751420, at *5 (C.D. Ca. 2017 Feb. 27, 2017) (holding that debt collector’s “conduct did not constitute
harassment, oppression, or abuse in violation of the FDCPA” where collector placed forty-nine calls
in an eighteen-day period); Valle v. Nat’l Recovery Agency, No. 8:10–cv–2775–T–23MAP, 2012 WL
1831156, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 18, 2012) (finding that placing twenty-two calls in one month does not
alone constitute harassing conduct); Tucker v. CBI Grp., Inc., 710 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1305–06 (M.D.
Fla. 2010) (granting summary judgment in favor of collector who made fifty-seven collection calls in
one month (and sometimes up to seven calls in one day) because “Plaintiff has not demonstrated that
CBE engaged in oppressive conduct such as repeatedly making calls after it was asked to cease”);
Waite v. Fin. Recover Serv’s, Inc., No. 8:09–cv–02336–T–33AEP, 2010 WL 5209350, at *5 (M.D. Fla.
Dec. 16, 2010) (finding that, despite the call log showing that defendant placed up to twenty-nine
calls in one month and up to four calls in one day, nothing in the record demonstrated that the calls
were intended to be abusive or harassing); Arteaga v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, No. CV-F-09-1860 LJO
GSA, 2010 WL 3310259, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug.23 2010) (stating that daily or nearly daily phone calls
alone fail to raise an issue of fact for a jury to determine whether an FDCPA violation occurred);
Saltzman v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 09–10096, 2009 WL 3190359, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2009)
(quoting and supporting case law that states that “a debt collector does not necessarily engage in
harassment by placing one or two unanswered calls a day in an unsuccessful effort to reach the
consumer, if this effort is unaccompanied by any oppressive conduct such as threatening messages.”).
83
Id. at 843 n.9 (Chevron instructs courts at step one to employ all of the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation first).
84
Id.; see also PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1, 44 (D.C. 2016).
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Federal courts have looked at the frequency and pattern of calls to infer an intent to
“annoy, abuse, or harass” a consumer and routinely find that calls far exceeding
seven per week are permitted under the FDCPA.
85
It is exceedingly likely that a court reviewing this rule would determine that the
agency failed to meet the requirements of Chevron step one because it removes
Congress’ clear expression that intent is an element of a §806(5) violation.
2. §1006.14(b) bans clearly legal conduct
Depending on the type of debt and the specific situation, a debt collector could easily
exhaust the “7/7” frequency limit without ever dialing a current, valid telephone
number that actually reaches the consumer. Many consumers have more than one
telephone number in their collection file. Some of these numbers are stale or no
longer used by the consumer. Some consumers may have multiple numbers
assigned to them for multiple purposes. Often a debt collector does not know which
telephone number is a “good” number, particularly early in the collection process. A
significant amount of third-party debt collection files fit this profile. If it were easy
to reach the consumer, the original creditor would not have needed to hire a
collection agency.
The Bureau lacks the statutory authority to limit calls to blocked or obsolete
numbers. Calling such numbers cannot by their very nature “harass, annoy, or
abuse” the consumer.
C. The Call Frequency Limits are Not Supported by
Substantial Evidence
Limiting contact between consumers and collectors turns “early out” debt into “bad
debt” and increases the potential for litigation. Nearly 1/3 of collection contacts
resolve the debt within 90 days. Once an account ages past 90 days, it is more likely
to be considered for legal collections. As discussed in Chapter One, Section III at 30,
collection lawsuits are the least desirable outcome for the consumer. Under the APA
and the Chevron doctrine, the Bureau’s rulemaking here must consider in a
reasoned fashion the risk and likelihood that limiting constructive communications
85
See footnote 82, supra.
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to resolve debts will increase litigation
86
—a result that causes harms the FDCPA
meant to prevent and is therefore manifestly contrary to the statute.
87
1. Frequency limits increase the cost and length of time to resolve debts
The Bureau must consider the economic effects of a proposed rule.
88
Some ACA
members have noted that this Proposed Rule will decrease direct contact between
consumers and collection firms, which will cause an increase in alternative contacts
(letters, texts, emails, etc.), and ultimately increase costs and the length of time it
takes to resolve a debt. Professionals in the field and common sense predict
increased costs to the industry and reduced effectiveness in reaching consumers due
to the call limits. Moreover, the Bureau’s own Calling Data study predicted the
same impacts.
89
ACA submits that the study likely underestimates the impact
significantly—but since the study did not provide any disclosure of the method or
underlying data, ACA cannot fully comment in this regard.
2. Frequency Limits fail to consider FCC actions
Another failure is that the frequency limit rules do not consider the impacts of
smart-phone technology and recent Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
call-blocking rulings, both of which have increased blocked calls from legitimate
financial service providers.
90
A coalition representing banks, credit unions,
86
JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 164, at 449 (5th ed. 2012); See
AMERICAN BAR ASSN, SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW & REGULATORY PRACTICE, A BLACKLETTER STATEMENT
OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 34 (2d ed. 2013).
87
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“A permissible construction is one that is not “arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.”)
88
See Exec. Order 12,866 § 3(f), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (stating that agencies must
consider economic effects of proposed rule); see also LUBBERS, supra note 86, at 223, 476.
89
See generally CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, STUDY OF THIRD-PARTY DEBT
COLLECTION OPERATIONS (July 2016), available at
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/755/20160727_cfpb_Third_Party_Debt_Collection_Oper
ations_Study.pdf; see also NPRM, at 370 (noting that “the proposed frequency limits could affect
when and if [debt collectors] establish communication with consumers).
90
See In the Matter of Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, FCC 19-51,
Declaratory Ruling and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, (Federal Communications
Commission Jun. 7, 2019), available at: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-51A1.pdf; see
also Anne Cullen, Major Carriers Tell FCC They Need Flexibility in Robocall Fight, LAW 360 (Jul. 29,
P a g e | 76
mortgage lenders, the accounts receivable management industry and other financial
services providers have outlined concerns extensively to the FCC and the CFPB
that their calls are be ing blocked as a result of recent Federal Trade Commission
and FCC efforts to target illegal actors.
91
Call blocking is happening, yet the Bureau’s analysis does not address its impacts.
ACA International commissioned a member survey on the impact of the Bureau’s
proposed rules. ACA members were asked to indicate whether their calls were being
blocked or potentially mislabeled. The majority of respondents indicated that they
were experiencing call-blocking (62%) or having their calls mislabeled (64%) (see
Figures 1 and 2). Additionally, 53% of respondents reported that they were seeing a
decrease in right-party contacts (Figure 3).
2019) (detailing how major phone service providers are asking the FCC for more flexibility to
intercept fraudulent calls), available at:
https://www.law360.com/consumerprotection/articles/1182480/major-carriers-tell-fcc-they-need-
flexibility-in-robocall-fight?nl_pk=64af9aeb-8f99-4301-a268-
0199a7490f37&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=consumerprotection&
read_more=1&attachments=true.
91
See, e.g., Ex Parte Communications, available at:
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2019-0022-0048
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1072587443209/7-24-
19%20Joint%20Trades%20Letter%20to%20FCC%20on%20Third%20Further%20Notice%20of%20Pro
posed%20Rulemaking_final.pdf
https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/10601130041343
https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/10531103527849
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These concerns mirror some of the consumer harms discussed in this comment that
can result when a live call cannot be completed and a conversation cannot take
place. Without first addressing these new issues in the marketplace, it is extremely
problematic to compound the already increased difficulty to reach a consumer on a
live call, by instituting an arbitrary cap on the frequency of calls.
ACA suggests that the Bureau collaborate with the FCC to do additional research
that includes the most recent trends for call completion in the financial services
industry before moving forward with a frequency limitation regulation. Using
research that does not account for parallel efforts happening at different federal
agencies and new trends in the marketplace for call blocking and labeling paints an
inaccurate picture of any impact the proposed frequency limits will have on the
marketplace.
The fact that the Bureau has not thus far coordinated with the FCC underscores
that there is no accurate empirical evidence put forth by the Bureau to show any
benefits of a new frequency limitation that would outweigh costs and disruptions in
the marketplace.
The failure to consider in a rulemaking the impact of other important regulations
with the market has caused several courts to overturn agency rulemakings.
92
92
See, e.g. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706-07 (2015) ((finding in Chevron step two that
“under the standard set out in Chevron…EPA strayed far beyond [the] bounds when it read
§7412(n)(1) to mean that it could ignore cost when deciding whether to regulate power plants.”).
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Indeed, agency actions that fail to consider the impact of other regulations are
arbitrary and capricious because that agency “entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem[.]”
93
3. The Prospect of "Unlimited Email and Text Messages" is a Chimera
The call-frequency limitation has been justified by the thought that the Bureau is
now widening the doors to unlimited email and text messaging use. That is
nonsense. Less than 15% of collectors use email now. It will be new to most, and it
is expensive to implement, particularly for small businesses in the accounts
receivable management industry.
Digital collection software needs to integrate with existing systems and strategies.
Not every collector has the right setup, or the budget to switch technology.
Implementing fully-functional software that operates with legacy systems and
meets security requirements can be daunting. Deployments consume financial and
human capital, tying up resources that small businesses may need elsewhere.
Tasking a strategist and compliance officer to rebuild agent workflows from scratch
for a digital debt collection solution may not be an option. In addition, this assumes
that existing call center workforces can be trained to execute a digital strategy.
The cost for an email collections system is high, and may exceed $80,000 in some
cases. Since most accounts receivable management agencies are small (roughly 98
percent are small businesses as defined by the Small Business Administration), the
estimated cost to small businesses just to invest in the technology (not training,
lawyers, or compliance personnel) to create an email collections campaign is in the
millions. Thus, the Bureau should not stifle certain modes of communication with
consumers based on a hunch rather than known facts.
4. The One-Week Cooling Off Period is Impractical
Finally, the proposed “cooling off period” limitation ignores the day-to-day realities
of debt collection. When a consumer and debt collector connect, they often need to
follow up with one another. Sometimes the call is not convenient for the consumer
to take at a particular time or place. The consumer might also need to speak with a
spouse before committing to a payment plan, or might need to review records that
93
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
P a g e | 79
are not handy. One large provider notes that this could prevent them from giving
routine customer service and correcting errors or missed information following the
calls. If a payment does not go through or the information provided is not correct, a
consumer cannot be notified. Under the proposed cooling off limitation, such a call
cannot be made.
One might argue that a debt collector could satisfy the “cooling off period” simply by
obtaining consent to call back. The difficulty is the exception contained in Section
1006.14(3)(ii) does not define what constitutes “prior consent given directly to the
debt collector.” Obvious questions arise:
o Is a warning or disclosure required?
o What language effectively conveys consent?
o May consent be revoked? If so, how?
o Is consent implied when a follow-up call is made to complete or service
a transaction agreed to by the customer?
These are not merely hypothetical queries. The issue of whether a consumer has
given “prior express consent” under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA), despite the guidance by the FCC,
94
has festered in the federal court system
for nearly the last decade as many plaintiff attorneys continue to challenge whether
“prior express consent” exists, and some courts continue to entertain those
94
See In the Matter of the Joint Petition Filed by Dish Network, LLC, the United States of Am., &
the States of California, Illinois. N. Carolina, & Ohio for Declaratory Ruling Concerning the Tel.
Consumer Prot. Act (Tcpa) Rules, 28 F.C.C. Rcd. 6574, 6589 (2013) (“addressing section 227(b)
prohibitions in 2008, the Commission clarified that autodialed debt collection calls by third-party
debt collectors to wireless telephone numbers would be treated as having been made with the called
party's express consent, if the called party had provided the creditor with the wireless number
during the transaction that resulted in the debt. At the same time, we stressed that the ‘creditor on
whose behalf an autodialed or prerecorded message call is made to a wireless number bears the
responsibility for any violation of the Commission's rules. Calls placed by a third-party collector on
behalf of that creditor are treated as if the creditor itself placed the call.”).
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arguments.
95
ACA has serious concerns that without further guidance its members
will litigate the meaning of “consent” for years to come.
For these reasons, the frequency limitations proposed by the Bureau are neither
supported by substantial evidence nor do they reflect a reasoned construction of a
statute requiring intent. This is fatal to a party’s argument that it is entitled to
Chevron deference. Thus, ACA urges the Bureau to heavily weigh these critical
factors before attempting to impose unauthorized and nebulous restrictions on
communications between debt collectors and consumers.
D. §1006.14(b) introduces new ambiguity to a regularly-
occurring situation
The Proposed Rule’s use of the terms “placed” and “not connectedin the provision
excluding certain calls from the cap need clarification in the text of the rule, as they
are otherwise likely to invite litigation as to their meaning. For example, the
proposed terms do not clarify whether a call is “placed” or “not connected” under the
following circumstances:
o A call that never makes it to a consumer because it is blocked by the
consumer’s telephone or by a call-blocking application;
o A call that is routed to the consumer’s voice mailbox, but the voice
mailbox is full and no message can be left.
E. An Aggressive Call Cap Requires Better Evidence than
Shown to Support its Implementation
The proposal at §1006.14(b) to limit telephone calls to consumers is half-baked.
There is no reason that seven calls are better than ten, or that ten are better than
fifteen. There is no data that supports why a collector must wait one week after
making a contact to call again. This is the essence of arbitrary.
95
See, e.g., Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1239 (S.D. Fla. 2013)
(refusing to follow the FCC’s regulations interpreting “prior express consent” and denying
defendant’s motion that borrower gave “prior express consent” to be called), rev'd in part, 768 F.3d
1110 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that borrower did give “prior express consent”).
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The Bureau’s explanation that some consumers may have multiple debts, thus may
receive two or more calls per day, does not satisfy the APA and Chevron
requirements here. The solution to stopping calls to discuss a legitimate contractual
obligation is to answer the call and make a payment arrangement or exercise a
statutory right to cease and desist. The current statutory regime provides for both
alternatives.
The Bureau cannot show why avoiding a conversation about resolving a debt
benefits a consumer. Nor can it show the benefits to society of creditors bearing
more charged-off debt, consumers avoiding debt resolution, or increases in collection
litigations. Therefore, this rule cannot stand.
V. COMMENTS ON §1006.14(h)- PROHIBITED
COMMUNICATION MEDIA
The proposed §1006.14(h) allows consumers to opt-out of communication media:
(h) Prohibited communication media. (1) In general. In
connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector
must not communicate or attempt to communicate with a
consumer through a medium of communication if the
consumer has requested that the debt collector not use
that medium to communicate with the consumer. For
purposes of this paragraph, the term “consumer” has the
meaning given to it in § 1006.6(a).
(2) Exceptions. Notwithstanding the prohibition in
paragraph (h)(1) of this section:
(i) If a consumer opts out in writing of receiving
electronic communications from a debt collector, a debt
collector may reply once to confirm the consumer’s request
to opt out, provided that the reply contains no information
other than a statement confirming the consumer’s
request; or
(ii) If a consumer initiates contact with a debt collector
using an address or a telephone number that the
consumer previously requested the debt collector not use,
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the debt collector may respond once to that consumer-
initiated communication.
This Proposed Rule expands the scope of the FDCPA beyond its statutory text and
beyond its application in federal courts. It will most certainly reduce the amount of
debt that collectors are able to retrieve for creditors, and will likely increase
litigation. There does not appear to be any cost-benefit analysis in support of its
proposal.
In addition, the Proposed Rule is unclear as to whether a consumer must opt out in
writing. Subsection (h)(1) does not mention a writing requirement, yet Subsection
(h)(2)(i) does. The Bureau should clearly prescribe the methods for opting out and
include a reasonable time that allows collection firms to receive proper notice of a
desire to opt-out. While ACA does not have one specific approach that it believes is
the only way a consumer can opt-out, we think the CFPB needs to put more
parameters around what it considers to be reasonable. There needs to be enough
flexibility so that both parties can have a free flow of communication about the
desire to opt-out, but narrow enough that opportunistic plaintiffs’ law firms cannot
take advantage of a specific opt-out avenue.
One possibility for creating more clarity in this area is to promote the ability of
businesses and consumers to enter into a contract, which stipulates the method for
revoking consent. Furthermore, we suggest that the Bureau clarifies that there is a
safe harbor for up to seven days to allow systems to update.
Additionally, the Bureau should adopt an approach that provides flexibility and
recognizes that digital communications may fall short of what is expected even with
the clarification provided by the bright-line safe harbors within the rule. For
example, the Bureau could eliminate (or elevate) call frequency limitations if the
consumer opts out of email or text communications. It could also raise such
thresholds based on the age of the debt involved. This would benefit the holder of
the receivable as such debts lose value over time because as debts age the likelihood
of payment decreases. It would also benefit consumers to the extent heightened
collections activity by a debt collector may signal impending judicial collections or
other serious consequences.
The exception contained in Subsection (h)(2)(ii) takes the “fair” out of the FDCPA.
Communication should always be a two-way street. Yet the Proposed Rule allows a
consumer to use a certain communication medium at will while prohibiting
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collection firms from using that same medium. A consumer may send mixed signals
to collection firms by communicating from a medium that the consumer has barred
collection firms from using. If the consumer contacts an agency using a medium
that they requested should not be used, this should be counted as a waiver. We
support allowing one additional communication using that medium from the debt
collection agency to allow for clarification. However, we urge the Bureau to be
cautious that the plaintiffs’ bar is likely to abuse this by setting lawsuit traps as we
have seen in similar TCPA litigation.
96
Accordingly, the CFPB should ensure that
the final rule has specific parameters to address making opt out requests to
automated systems.
VI. COMMENTS ON §1006.18(g)- MEANINGFUL
ATTORNEY INVOLVEMENT
The Bureau at proposed §1006.18(g) established a “safe harbor” that sets a bar for
“meaningful attorney involvement” in debt collection litigation submissions:
(g) Safe harbor for meaningful attorney involvement in
debt collection litigation submissions. A debt collector
that is a law firm or who is an attorney complies with §
1006.18 when submitting a pleading, written motion, or
other paper submitted to the court during debt collection
litigation if an attorney personally:
(1) Drafts or reviews the pleading, written motion, or
other paper; and
(2) Reviews information supporting such pleading,
written motion, or other paper and determines, to the best
of the attorney’s knowledge, information, and belief, that,
as applicable:
96
Epps v. Earth Fare, Inc., No. 16-08221, 2017 WL 1424637 (C.D.Cal. Feb. 27, 2017). The U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California found, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff‘s
alleged revocation of consent to receive text messages from the defendant was not ―reasonable.
Despite being prompted to text ―STOP if she wished to revoke her consent, the plaintiff responded
instead with long sentences such as ―I would appreciate [it] if we discontinue any further texts or
―Thank you but I would like the text messages to stop can we make this happen. Noting that this
was one of several similar suits filed by the same plaintiff, the defendant moved to dismiss and
argued that her responses had been deliberately designed to frustrate its automated system for
recognizing revocations of consent.
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(A) The claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions are warranted by existing law;
(B) The factual contentions have evidentiary
support; and
(C) The denials of factual contentions are
warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so
identified, are reasonably based on belief or lack of
information.
There is no specific test under the law for what constitutes “meaningful
involvement.” Indeed, this judicially crafted violation was initially created when
collection agencies sent letters on attorney letterhead when the attorney had not
reviewed the letter or the account. This has now morphed to whether attorneys who
send letters on their own letterhead are somehow misrepresenting their
involvement and whether pleadings filed with a court somehow misrepresent the
attorney’s involvement. Collection litigation varies significantly. Some matters
involve lawsuits over a single large debt, which may raise complicated questions.
Some are for small claims with simple issues filed ten or more at a time.
Regardless, case law instructs that a spectrum of attorney involvement is sufficient
under the FDCPA. For example, an attorney has sufficient involvement in the
process if one reviews the file of the consumer to whom the letter was sent and/or
exercises some “professional judgment as to the delinquency and validity of any
individual debt” before the letter is issued.
97
Other recent courts have held that
meaningful attorney involvement is shown when attorneys design systems for non-
attorneys to run. Various states have issued ethical opinions that an attorney who
designs a system for non-attorneys to send letters and supervises the non-attorneys
does not misrepresent that a collection letter came from the attorney.
98
For certain,
meaningful involvement is determined based on the individual facts and totality of
the circumstances in each case.
99
97
See, e.g. CFPB v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assoc., P.C., 114 F.Supp. 3d 1342, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2015);
Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222,229 (7
th
Cir. 1996); Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, P.C., 650
F.3d 993, 999 (3d Cir. 2011).
98
L.A. County Bar Assoc., Prof'l Responsibility and Ethics Comm., Op. No. 522, at 4-6 (June 15,
2009).
99
See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 304 (2d Cir. 2003).
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The standards set forth in 1006.18(g) are both too wooden and too old-fashioned to
be workable.
A. 1006.18(g)’s requirements are old-fashioned
Rule 1006.18(g) references the review of information. Some CFPB enforcement
cases make it an issue when the attorney reviews electronic information in the form
of spreadsheets in order to verify assertions. This is off-base. Collection attorneys
are professionals who use tools of their trade. These experienced legal specialists in
the area of debt collection use software, algorithms, and standard testing to employ
professional judgment as to the delinquency and validity of individual debts. They
arrive at judgments using data and sample set reviews without reviewing each and
every loan contract—particularly where the underlying contracts are identical.
Proposed Rule 1006.18(g) could be interpreted to wrongly rest on the assumption
that an attorney must review an individual document in order to trust the validity,
enforceability, or ownership of a debt. In fact, digital asset management software
systems like DebtNext® and Beam® remove paper and documents entirely from the
process. For example, there is little need for sales or placement contracts when the
asset management system records when an account is “beamed” from one agency to
another. Images of underlying loan contracts are digitally matched with account
numbers. Using Optical Character Recognition, values on statements and other
documents can be populated as necessary.
And that’s just now. Soon, crypto-technology will replace chains of title. Digital
handshakes will prevent any data degradation.
While the rest of the world seeks to add automation and digitalization to improve
efficiency and the customer experience, rule 1006.184(g) would move collection
attorneys back to the 1990s, increase the need for manual and imperfect reviews,
and drive up costs for creditors. ACA suggests that the CFPB add commentary for
Rule 1006.18(g) noting that the information reviewed may be electronic, in
summary form, and does not have to be the original paper documents.
B. Proposed Rule 1006.18(g) Invades the Attorney-Client
Relationship
The client’s task is to direct attorney involvement, this rule supplants that
relationship. Collection attorneys have relationships with creditors that span years.
Armed with an in-depth understanding of client practices and their contracts, as
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well as the nuances of their files and data, these attorneys can rely on their
experience and professional judgment to assure themselves with summary material
that facts underlying legal filings are well-supported by evidence that the client
provides.
Moreover, litigation attorneys often delegate the review of information to
supervised staff. For example, personal injury attorneys delegate the intake of
clients and review of medical records to paralegals or nurses. Some bankruptcy
attorneys similarly rely on paralegals to conduct client intakes. And the state bars
and other entities that licensed and regulate attorneys have set standards for
attorneys and the ability to delegate to their staff. To add a requirement that
attorneys personally review information will not increase the accuracy of legal
filings or change outcomes for consumers.
Moreover, in defending a violation of rule 1006.18(g), collection attorneys will
probably need to disclose protected and confidential attorney-client privileged
information or attorney-work-product. This is unfair and antithetical to the
American system of justice. Moreover, it could create discipline problems for the
attorney, malpractice claims against the attorney, or require the attorney to
disclose information that may provide a basis for creating liability against their
client. Since attorneys are prohibited from disclosing client secrets, the likely
outcome would be attorneys falling on their swords because they cannot disclose the
information that would be required to defend a 1006.18(g) claim.
In every state, attorneys already have an ethical obligation to ensure their filings in
court are meritorious. They risk disbarment and sua sponte or Rule 11 (or state
equivalent) sanctions if facts in pleadings are false. The Bureau’s Proposed Rule is
unnecessary in its current form. The Bureau is seeking feedback on whether the
safe harbor proposed for meaningful attorney involvement in debt collection
litigation submissions has sufficient clarity for consumers, attorneys, and law firms.
ACA does not believe it does.
VII. COMMENT ON §1006.22 –UNFAIR OR
UNCONSCIONABLE MEANS
ACA has no comments on sections §1006.22(a)-(e), as they substantially mirror the
FDCPA text. ACA also generally supports the exception contained in subsection
(f)(4), in that it allows a debt collector to contact a consumer privately using a social
media platform (i.e., Facebook Messenger, LinkedIn, Instagram, etc.), so long as the
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message is not publicly viewable. However, a collection firm has no control over
whether a recipient’s social media account is accessible to multiple people. As a
result, the exception, which prohibits a communication to any “person other than
the persons described in § 1006.6(d)(1)(i) through (vi)” should be expanded so that a
communication does not offend the FDCPA if it is not “publicly viewable.” It should
further clarify that its intent is to limit communications if the social media account
is set to have communications viewed by others and the communication is viewable
by others through the social media platform.
ACA does not oppose the rule proposed in Subsection (f)(4), though it is not aware of
any instance in which this kind of debt collection practice has been employed
regularly. The Proposed Rule is akin to Section 806(3) of the FDCPA, which
prohibits the publication of debtor lists, and seems to serve the same legitimate
consumer protection goals.
A. Consumers’ email communication preferences should be
honored without further permissions required
The Bureau’s proposals to treat as an “unfair” practice email communications to a
work email address raise significant objections from ACA members. Many collection
firms that presently use email believe that if this rule takes effect it will disrupt
their business. There is simply no way to comply perfectly with the “should know”
provisions. And asking consumers via another communication method (e.g. U.S.
mail or telephone) for permission to use their work email address is confusing,
unwanted, and cumbersome to consumers.
Proposed §1006.22(f)(3) provides:
Restrictions on the use of certain media.
A debt collector must not: (3) Communicate or attempt to
communicate with a consumer using an email address
that the debt collector knows or should know is provided
to the consumer by the consumer’s employer, unless the
debt collector has received directly from the consumer
either prior consent to use that email address or an email
from that email address.
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Several aspects of this proposal are troubling: (1) it exceeds the commands of the
FDCPA, which allow contacts at work until the collection firm acquires a reason to
know that contacts are prohibited by the employer; (2) there is no currently existing
work email address “scrub” to enable compliance with this provision; (3)
development of a work email scrub will cost the industry millions of dollars, if it is
even possible to create; (4) there is no evidence that collection emails at work are a
problem for consumers that justify such a cost; and (5) when consumers voluntarily
provide their email address on credit applications they reasonably expect to be
contacted at that preferred address, proposed §1006.22(f)(3) interferes with
consumer expectations and preference with no prior notice and without regard for
consumer convenience.
1. §1006.22(f)(3) exceeds he commands of the FDCPA, which allows contacts at work
until the consumer expresses otherwise
The FDCPA §805 only prohibits “communication” to the consumer’s place of
employment if the debt collector “knows or has reason to know” that the consumer’s
employer prohibits the consumer from receiving such communication. Congress
formulated the “knows or reason to know” standard. And it tied the standard to
whether the employer prohibits such communications. Moreover, §805 is not limited
to only telephone calls, it would capture other forms of communication as well,
including e-mail.
Banning all email communications at a consumer’s place of employment absent
express permission given to the collector conflicts with the plain text of the FDCPA
and could welcome a host of problems including years of litigation. The Bureau
should also consider clarifying that creditors can contract with consumers to receive
emails on their chosen account, which is passed on to collectors and supersedes the
“know or has reason to know” standard or whether it was recently used.
2. The “Should Know” standard will require new technology, will cost Millions of
Dollars and Cannot Be Perfect
As noted previously, there currently is no database of “work” emails from which
collectors can divine which email addresses are work and which are home. And
what of the emails that consumers use for both work and home purposes? Will the
Bureau create a safe harbor list of permissible domains? How often must the
database be updated? Will it be publicly available? What are the privacy
implications of a national database of consumer email domains?
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The development, testing, and inevitable failure of this trial-by-error system will
cost hundreds of millions of dollars. The use of emails by collection agencies is
already low, as discussed in Chapter 2, Section IV, supra. The threat of litigation for
failing to identify a work email address will chill expansion of this communication
method.
3. §1006.22(f)(3) Lacks Evidence of a Reasonable Need
In order to justify this unfounded mandate, the Bureau must have some sort of data
indicating that collections emails to work addresses are an actual problem. It does
not. The CFPB consumer complaint database does not even have an issue category
for “work emails”. Searches of complaints about debt collection that cross reference
the terms “work” and “email” show hardly any complaints about consumers
receiving emails from a collection firm at work email addresses. The few collection
agencies that use emails in their collections rarely hear complaints about an agent
emailing somebody at work. It is simply not a problem.
The Bureau assumes with no evidence that work emails pose the risk of third-party
interception. Again, no consumer complaint data back up this assumption.
In contrast, “free” message services—like Gmail, Yahoo, and Facebook are
monitored routinely for commercial purposes. Employment-related email systems
are likely more private—at least from algorithms and content-related advertising.
The Bureau should trust and honor consumer preference, not make baseless
assumptions that will cost small businesses their livelihood and chill the use of this
valuable technology.
4. §1006.22(f)(3) is Paternalistic and Misguided
Finally, when consumers voluntarily provide their email address on credit
applications they reasonably expect to be contacted at that preferred address.
Proposed §1006.22(f)(3) interferes with consumer expectations and preference with
no prior notice and without regard for consumer convenience. A consumer very well
may have a good reason for choosing to use their work email, which cannot be
known to a creditor or a third-party collector.
It is wrong to presume that one knows the bounds of a consumer’s privacy better
than the consumer herself. Consider, for example, that more than one-half of U.S.
adults between 18 and 55 have cohabited at some point in their lives, and this
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percentage has increased steadily over the last two decades.
100
Cohabitation is
currently the most common first co-residential union among young adults. While
spouses might be “consumers” under the FDCPA, boyfriends/girlfriends remain
third parties.
As an example for co-habiting people, contacts by a collection firm at home by mail,
email, or telephone could arguably result in a third-party disclosure more easily
than an email sent to a work address. When a borrower provides the creditor a work
email address, all subsequent contacts should honor that preference.
B. §1006.22(f)(3) Will Chill Email Communications
Abundant evidence supports the benefits of increased email use in debt collection
communications. Consumers prefer email. Borrowers in all age groups, 18-24, 25-34
and 35-44, indicate that email is one of the most desired and effective method of
communication.
101
In a study by Katabat Digital Collections platform worldwide, collection firms
deploying its digital collections platform saw a 33% increase in customer
satisfaction measured by net promoter score. Email reduces telephone calls and
costs to agencies. In that same study, digital self-service and reduced outbound calls
cut telephone-related charges 7%.
These results make intuitive sense. Email is more likely to be read than U.S. mail,
which means consumers are more likely to be informed of their rights. Email is
passive and non-intrusive. Email is less likely to be opened by someone other than
the addressee. Email moves with consumers when they change residences, thus
avoiding "location" calls that increase third-party contacts. Email is superior to
regular U.S. mail in many respects.
100
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention National Center for Health Statistics, A Demographic, Attitudinal, and Behavioral
Profile of Cohabiting Adults in the United States (2011–2015), available at:
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr111.pdf.
101
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUCATION LOAN RESOURCES (NCHER), STUDENT LOAN ONLINE
SURVEY RESULTS (February 12, 2016), available at
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.ncher.us/resource/resmgr/NCHER_Poll/01_NCHER_Survey_Insights.pd
f
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But by requiring collectors to create and adopt a new filtering system to avoid
sending communications to specific domains, the Bureau will chill the expanded use
of email. In some agencies, email collections in New York State have shrunk as a
collection method since the 2015 DFS rules required collectors to refrain from
sending emails to work email accounts. There is no reason to think that a national
rule will have a different impact.
VIII. COMMENTS ON §1006.26- TIME-BARRED
CLAIMS
Whether a debt is time-barred is not always a simple question, and sometimes
requires an analysis that goes far beyond any duty that Congress has imposed on
the accounts receivable management industry under the FDCPA. Thus, ACA is very
concerned about potential negative consequences if the Bureau’s proposed section
1006.26 is not carefully considered. Strict liability is inappropriate when non-
lawyers are required to make complex legal assessments. Moreover, the Proposed
Rule is overbroad to the extent that it seeks to cover bankruptcy proofs of claim and
thus conflicts with the Supreme Court’s holding in Midland Funding, L.L.C. v.
Johnson, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 197 L. Ed. 2d 790 (2017).
102
The Bureau’s Proposal
The Bureau has proposed in Regulation F section 26 to establish a new regulatory
violation when a collection firm brings or threatens to bring a legal action to collect
a debt that the debt collector “knows or should know” is beyond the period
prescribed by applicable law for bringing a legal action against the consumer to
collect a debt:
§ 1006.26 Collection of time-barred debts.
(a) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
102
In a 5-3 decision, the majority concluded that a debt buyer filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proof of
claim that on its face indicated that the limitations period had run was not false, deceptive or
misleading where the consumer was represented by counsel and protected by a bankruptcy trustee
who is obligated to object to a time-barred claim. Alabama’s law, like the law of many States,
provides that a creditor has the right to payment of a debt even after the limitations period has
expired.
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(1) Statute of limitations means the period prescribed
by applicable law for bringing a legal action against the
consumer to collect a debt.
(2) Time-barred debt means a debt for which the
applicable statute of limitations has expired.
(b) Suits and threats of suit prohibited. A debt collector
must not bring or threaten to bring a legal action against
a consumer to collect a debt that the debt collector knows
or should know is a time-barred debt.
A. Time-Bars are Complicated Legal Questions
Whether a debt is time-barred is not a simple question that can always be easily
answered. The National Consumer Law Center publishes an entire chapter on the
topic in its Collections Actions text,
103
and says, “The determination of the statute
of limitations that applies to the collection of a consumer transaction may be a
complicated legal question.”
104
Indeed, the statute of limitations is an issue that is
often contested and litigated. And particularly in the mortgage arena, time-bars can
turn on complex questions around trusts and estates, when a loan is accelerated,
and which party had standing to sue at what time.
105
Moreover, information that
may not be immediately available to a collection firm (e.g., incapacity, choice of law,
incarceration) may toll the statute of limitations, and a debt that at first blush may
be time barred, is actually not time barred.
Determining whether a debt is time-barred involves at least these basic questions:
What law applies? Does the type of debt or creditor control which law
applies?
106
Does the applicable agreement provide a choice of law? Is the
103
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, COLLECTION ACTIONS § 3.6 (4th ed. 2017), updated at
www.nclc.org/library.
104
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION § 7.2.12.3.2, updated at
www.nclc.org/library.
105
See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. Americas v. Bernal, 59 N.Y.S.3d 267, 271 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2017) (Plaintiff argued that the debt at issue was not accelerated by the filing of the 2009 action
because Aurora, the prior plaintiff, did not have standing to bring that action).
106
In general, collections actions are governed by state statutes of limitations, but federal law can
determine the limitations, such as for debts owed to the United States, and sometimes for debts
emanating from cell phone and long-distance charges. But see Castro v. Collecto, Inc., 634 F.3d 779
P a g e | 93
statute of limitations a procedural or substantive right in the jurisdiction?
Does the law of the place where the consumer entered into the agreement
govern, or does the law of the forum where a lawsuit would be brought?
107
Under the governing law, what is the applicable statute of limitations? There
is more than one available answer in some jurisdictions. For example, Illinois
has different limitations periods for written” and “unwritten” agreements
(and “written” and “unwritten” don’t necessarily mean what they sound like
an “unwritten” agreement can mean a written agreement that isn’t
exhibited to the complaint in an action for collection.)
108
Has the statute of limitations been tolled? Has it been reset?
109
Does it apply
to all obligors?
Even in a simple case, there are often questions over which reasonable minds can
differ in good faith, hence the not-infrequent litigation over the statute of
limitations.
110
(5th Cir. 2011) (cell phone collection suits were timely because state statute of limitations applied,
not shorter FCC statute of limitations).
107
See Portfolio Recovery Assoc. v. King, 14 N.Y.3d 410 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (finding that Discover
Card’s action against New York consumer accrued in Delaware, even though consumer had never
lived in Delaware, because Discover was a Delaware corporation and suffered its economic injury in
Delaware when the credit card was not paid). But see Conway v. Porfolio Recovery Assocs., Civil No:
3:13-cv-007-GFVT, 2017 WL 3908682 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2017) (rejecting claim that Kentucky
borrowing statute applied because the payments were to be sent to Virginia and Virginia’s three-
year statute of limitations applied; instead applying Kentucky’s five-year period because that is
where the nonpayment breached the credit card agreement).
108
Ramirez v. Palisades Collection LLC, No. 07 C 3840, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48722, at *6–8 (N.D.
Ill. June 23, 2008).
109
Federal law may toll state statutes of limitations when the defendant is on active duty in the
military and during the pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding. See also Panico v. Portfolio Recovery
Assoc., 2016 WL 4820628 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2016) (plain language of Delaware’s statute of limitations
and related tolling provision made timely debt buyer’s N.J. collection suit against N.J. consumer on
credit card agreement made in Delaware adopting Delaware law; Delaware statute of limitations
never commenced, as N.J. consumer never traveled to Delaware, tolling running statute of
limitations).
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While a non-lawyer may be able to reach an informed view about whether a debt is
time-barred, that view may be mistaken in the absence of a more sophisticated legal
analysis — and as the Supreme Court recently reminded all debt collectors, a
mistaken view of the law is not an excuse and may result in significant civil
liability.
111
To impose that risk of liability on debt collectors acting in good faith
goes far beyond any duty that Congress imposed on debt collectors under the
FDCPA.
Congress recognized the effects upon interstate commerce of debt-collection
practices in the FDCPA, and stated explicitly in it that one of its purposes was “to
insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection
practices are not competitively disadvantaged.”
112
Congress did not intend to weave
a regulatory web so tangled that it snares legitimate, compliant, law-abiding actors
along with the abusive actors at whose conduct the statutes are aimed.
B. Legal Analysis can be done only by Lawyers
Section 26 risks holding laymen to the same standard as lawyers. The Bureau
should take care to clarify that the “know or should know” standard must be tied to
110
See, e.g., Avery v. First Resolution Mgmt. Corp., 568 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2009) (Ninth Circuit
considered collection suit filed in Oregon against Oregon consumer, based on contract that
prescribed New Hampshire as setting relevant period of limitations; New Hampshire had shorter
period of limitations, which under Oregon’s choice-of-law rules would apply, but Ninth Circuit
applied New Hampshire’s tolling rule for when defendants are out of state; since New Hampshire
law had tolled statute of limitations, Oregon law reverted to its own (longer) statute of limitations).
111
See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573, 527–36 (2010)
(“Our law is no stranger to the possibility that an act may be ‘intentional’ for purposes of civil
liability, even if the actor lacked actual knowledge that her conduct violated the law. . . . Congress . .
. did not confine liability under the FDCPA to ‘willful’ violations, a term more often understood in the
civil context to excuse mistakes of law.”). Cf. Pescatrice v. Robert J. Orovitz, P.A., No. 07-60653-CIV,
2007 WL 3034929 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2007) (finding applicable statute of limitations rule unsettled;
excusing resulting FDCPA violation as bona fide error of law); McCorriston v. L.W.T., Inc., 536 F.
Supp. 2d 1268 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (credit card agreement that specified that Delaware law applied to
substantive matters, including statute of limitations, controlled time frame within which debt
collector may initiate collection action; although debt collector was wrong in its choice of applicable
statute of limitations, his procedures were “reasonably adapted” to prevent legal error and
established bona fide error defense pursuant to § 1692k(c)).
112
15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (purposes).
P a g e | 95
the specific understanding and analysis of the consumers’ account at the time of the
alleged violation.
Nor is it reasonable to expect a lawyer to conduct a choice of law analysis on all
accounts prior to all collection’s communications.
C. The Bureau Should Propose Safe-Harbor Language
To reach the Bureau’s aim of preventing consumer confusion about time-barred
debt, the Bureau should develop a plain and clear statement about the possibility of
a lawsuit and that the consumer may have certain legal defenses, such as the
statute of limitations. This model disclosure would be appropriate when a collector
uses a legal collections strategy. This safe-harbor statement would ensure that the
collector adequately warns the consumer about the consequences of nonpayment
and it allows the collector and consumer to engage in legitimate communications
about resolving the account. Thus, because the Bureau standardized the language,
there would be no risk that collectors were giving legal advice or wrong advice.
D. The Supreme Court Permits Time-barred Proofs of Claims
ACA also urges the Bureau to consider refining Section 26’s language to clarify that
claims in bankruptcy courts are not under its purview. The Supreme Court in
Midland Funding v. Johnson
113
held that filing a proof of claim that on its face
indicates that the limitations period has run does not fall within the scope of an
FDCPA violation. The Court points out that when collectors file proofs of stale
claims in bankruptcy it benefits consumers because those debts are discharged and
removed from credit reports.
114
Specifically, Section 26’s current wording “legal action” might be interpreted to
include bankruptcy proofs of claim. This provision does not apply to the filing of
proofs of claim, which the Supreme Court has ruled is outside the scope of the
FDCPA in the Midland Funding v. Johnson case. We request more clarity to ensure
that the rule is not read so broadly.
113
137 S. Ct. 1407, 1411 (2017).
114
137 S. Ct. 1407, 1414 (2017) (“[D]ischarge means that the debt (even if unenforceable) will not
remain on a credit report potentially affecting an individual's ability to borrow money, buy a home,
and perhaps secure employment”).
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IX. COMMENTS ON §1006.30- CREDIT
INFORMATION FURNISHING
Requiring debt collectors to communicate with a consumer prior to furnishing
information to credit reporting agencies regarding the consumer’s debt is an
impermissible regulatory act. The FDCPA is not meant to govern credit reporting in
this manner, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which sets forth many
requirements, does not require this. In fact, the FCRA only requires one notice of
negative credit reporting from the person that extended the credit. After a consumer
receives the notice once, it is sufficient for all subsequent owners or servicers of the
account. Second, this regulation will disrupt the market without a well-studied cost-
benefit analysis to support its potential impact.
The Bureau has proposed in Regulation F Section 1006.30(a) to establish a new
regulatory requirement for collection firms to provide notice to the consumer about
credit reporting prior to furnishing information to a credit reporting agency about
the debt:
§1006.30(a) Other Prohibited Practices
Communication prior to furnishing information. A debt
collector must not furnish to a consumer reporting agency,
as defined in section 603(f) of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (15 U.S.C. 1681a(f)), information regarding a debt
before communicating with the consumer about the debt.
Although adding a notice to the initial communication may appear to be of little
consequence, this is not the case in many instances. While it is quite common for a
collection agency to communicate in some fashion with a consumer prior to credit
reporting, there are many times that this is not done. For instance, a collection firm
may not have viable contact information for a consumer, and a notice prior to credit
reporting would be impossible. Additionally, the balance of the debt may dictate
that a collection firm cannot expend the resources to send a writing to the consumer
until the consumer initiates communication with the debt collector.
As proposed, the regulation would require that a collection firm expend resources to
communicate with the consumer prior to credit reporting when the balance might
not justify the expense. It makes business sense where consumers have become
difficult to reach and delinquent dollar amounts are low on a per-account basis, but
P a g e | 97
significant to a creditor when added up across all consumers. These small dollar
accounts may each be insignificant, but when combined, they are significant to a
creditor. If these accounts cannot be managed in a cost-effective way, these debts
will not be collected, and the original creditors will stop granting credit for these
smaller debts.
A. The FCRA Expressly Allows Furnishing after a Negative
Reporting Notice is provided
Primarily, §1006.30(a) cannot stand as written because an agency by regulation
cannot overturn an Act of Congress.
115
The FCRA’s statutory text expressly allows
“subsequent submissions” of negative information furnishing so long as the
consumer received at least one written notice of negative information furnishing.
116
The Bureau is certainly welcome to clarify what that notice should say—as the
states of California and Utah have opted.
117
But §1006.30(a) turns the FCRA’s
permissive paragraph on its face.
B. Requiring the Accounts Receivable Management Industry to
Communicate with a Consumer Prior to Furnishing
Information Regarding a Debt to Credit Reporting Agencies
Will Significantly Affect Business
ACA urges the Bureau to reconsider its proposed requirement that a collection firm
must “communicate” with a consumer prior to furnishing information regarding a
debt to credit reporting agencies from a practical and policy perspective, as well.
First the Bureau has not sufficiently established that “passive” debt collection is a
widespread problem. As shown in ACA’s summary of dispute data in Chapter 1,
Section II, supra, less than ½ of one percent of studied accounts had a problem that
made the account invalid. Being surprised by an unpaid bill on one’s credit report
may be annoying or upsetting. However, the annoyance is not at credit reporting,
but rather at having unpaid bills that are now affecting the consumer’s credit
report.
115
See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 164 (5th ed. 2012) (stating
that if Congress directly addressed the question at issue, courts must “give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”) (citation omitted).
116
15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(7)(A)(ii).
117
See infra text accompanying notes 121 & 122.
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When the information is accurate, the furnishing is legal. This is not an issue that
the Bureau should be concerned with and try to address. And, a consumer could
find the debt by simply checking one’s credit report on
www.freeannualcreditreport.com and then paying it.
Federal law already protects consumers seeking to buy a home, car, or other major
purchase requiring credit from inaccurate or surprise reporting. Financial education
by schools and the Bureau is an effective remedy to the annoyance described in the
NPRM’s commentary—and it will not carry the risk of unintended consequences
concomitant with a ban on credit information furnishing
1. Passive Debt Collection is not a Widespread Practice
Most collection agencies wait a period of time after sending a written validation, in
case there is a valid dispute that could be corrected, before furnishing credit
information. But that practice is not always sensible. When a renter moves without
filing with the U.S. Postal Service a forwarding address, it is silly to send a paper
validation notice as the rule suggests is required prior to furnishing information
about the debt to the national credit reporting agencies. The expense of skip-tracing
is not justified for debts under $50 or $100.
Accurately reporting unpaid bills on a credit report and waiting for the borrower to
contact the creditor or agency is a rational and economically feasible means of
ensuring that consumers do not skip-out on their last month of services or simply
forget to tie up loose ends. As a benefit to the consumer, it also prevents costly and
disruptive location calls.
Keep in mind that utilities and telecommunications are often provided by local
governments. Consumers who do not pay their final bills and face no repercussions
will increase prices or taxes for citizens who meet their obligations.
2. §1006.30 risks a shift in consumer behavior and economic incentives
Proposed §1006.30 requires a fulsome cost-benefit analysis to support its
enactment. Significant economic issues are raised by §1006.30 and the Bureau did
not perform a study to know whether the perceived benefits are real.
Furnishing credit information prior to communication is usually done because
communication through mail or telephone with these consumers is shown already to
be impossible. The accurate reporting of consumer credit information, in a manner
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that complies with the FCRA, is both legal and a way to alert consumers about
unpaid accounts.
Costs considered to evaluate the cost to benefit ratio should include: 1) the write-off
of a substantial portion of the accounts that would have been collected by indirect
communication; and 2) how this rule would encourage some additional consumers to
not provide forwarding contact information in order to avoid debt obligations
altogether.
Consumers and businesses that extend credit will bear the cost of these “free riders”
who choose to not pay, which leads to market failure.
118
Because the private market
is profit-driven, it produces only those goods for which it can hope to earn a profit.
That is, it will not produce public goods. When a private market fails to produce a
good at the level society wants, or doesn’t produce it at all, economists call this a
market failure. When an entire segment of credit risks non-payment, this will
inevitably shift incentives.
The business segments that are most likely to see an incentive shift when small-
amount debts cannot be efficiently collected is housing rental, telecommunications,
and utilities. Most likely, people who would be granted credit for rent, telephone,
and utilities will need to provide larger payments or security deposits. Prices will
increase to defray the costs of lost collections. If people cannot make the deposits or
afford the price increases, they will be denied services. Denial of housing rental,
telecom, and utilities services may lead to unintended, and perhaps even dangerous,
consequences, such as homelessness.
119
Further, lack of credit information furnishing prevents other creditors from having
reliable credit information when making determinations about lending or housing
rentals. Proposed 1006.30 might cause a shift in consumer behavior, credit granting
118
See FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, Public Goods, THE ECONOMIC LOWDOWN PODCAST
SERIES, Episode 17, available at: https://www.stlouisfed.org/education/economic-lowdown-podcast-
series/episode-17-public-goods.
119
See Chris Glynn & Alexander Casey, Homelessness Rises Faster Where Rent Exceeds a Third of
Income (Dec. 11, 2018) (“This research demonstrates that the homeless population climbs faster
when rent affordability the share of income people spend on rent crosses certain thresholds. In
many areas beyond those thresholds, even modest rent increases can push thousands more
Americans into homelessness.”) available at https://www.zillow.com/research/homelessness-rent-
affordability-22247/
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behavior, and economic incentives to lend, merely to prevent consumer annoyance.
This is particularly unwarranted when Congress provided for this issue in the Fair
and Accurate Credit Transaction Act (FACTA) years ago by making sure that
consumers could get a free copy of their credit report.
C. Accurate Credit Reporting Benefits Everyone
The Bureau’s Proposed Rule will interfere with the accurate reporting of credit
information. The credit reporting infrastructure is an ecosystem that depends on
voluntary participation by a critical mass. Rule §1006.30(a) will damage the section
of that ecosystem that reports on the subsets of debts most affected by this rule:
housing rental, telecommunication, and utility debt.
As previously discussed, debt furnishing on small and non-finance debt meets a
niche need for certain creditors. Many consumer debts are small and sent to third
party collections specifically because the original creditor had a tough time finding
the consumer to collect the outstanding bill. The telecom, utility, and apartment
rental industries, in particular, have this problem.
To the extent that the Bureau does not heed ACA’s warning that §1006.30(a) is not
permissible and will cause more harm than good, we have further suggestions to
limit its potential damage.
D. The Bureau Should Clarify What is Sufficient to Establish
“Communication” and Whose Burden It Is to Establish That
the Communication Occurred
The Bureau’s suggestion in its commentary on what constitutes a “communication”
between the consumer and the debt collector should be the language used in the
regulation. Specifically, the Bureau seems to suggest that a communication under §
1006.30(a) only occurs if a validation notice has been sent.
120
To the extent the
Bureau intends to narrow the definition of communication to only where a
validation notice is sent, ACA respectfully disagrees with such a stringent
approach.
120
See NPRM at 391 (stating that [d]ebt collectors who furnish information to CRAs but provide
validation notices to consumers only after they have been in contact with consumers would need to
change their practices and would face increased costs as a result of the proposal.”).
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As stated above, debt collectors furnish credit information prior to establishing
contact with the debtor because communication through mail or telephone with the
debtor has already proved impossible. ACA appreciates the Bureau’s desire to
provide consumers with an opportunity (or better stated, one last opportunity) to
resolve their debts prior to debt collectors furnishing the information to credit
reporting agencies. But, to better balance the needs between (1) collecting debt and
(2) providing consumers opportunities to resolve their debt disputes, ACA proposes
that the Bureau do one of two things: either adopt a pre-notice requirement similar
to Utah’s and California’s, or include an “attempt to communicate” with the debtor
as a manner for debt collectors to satisfy the proposed pre-notice requirement under
§ 1006.30(a).
1. A Safe Harbor is Necessary when Negative Notice is Provided
The Bureau should include model language as a safe harbor for the accounts
receivable management industry that provides the required notice set forth in this
Rule. California and Utah already have similar safe harbor notice requirements in
place.
121
In both California and Utah, creditors are only allowed to submit a
negative credit report to a credit reporting agency if the creditor notifies the
consumer.
122
Both states provide in their statutory language the notice that should
be provided to the consumer that would satisfy the notification requirement. Once
notification is provided, no additional notification to the consumer is required for a
creditor to furnish additional information to a credit reporting agency.
ACA recommends that the Bureau adopt the approach of both California and Utah,
which provides the safe harbor language contained in the notification to the
consumer:
“…you are hereby notified that a negative credit report
reflecting on your credit record may be submitted to a
credit reporting agency if you fail to fulfill the terms of
your credit obligations.”
121
See Cal.Civ.Code § 1785.26; see also U.C.A. § 70C-7-107.
122
Cal.Civ.Code § 1785.26(b); U.C.A. § 70C-7-107(2); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(7).
P a g e | 102
2. “Attempts to Communicate” should be Sufficient
Alternatively, the Bureau could add the newly defined term “attempt to
communicate” into this section in place of the term “communicate” such that leaving
a limited-content message for a consumer would be sufficient for accounts receivable
management industry to begin furnishing information to a credit reporting agency.
The Bureau stated in its proposed regulation that the goal of this newly-added
section is to avoid passive” collections and to avoid consumers facing pressure to
pay debts that they otherwise would dispute, including debts that they do not owe,
in an effort to remove the debts from their consumer reports and more quickly
obtain a desired product or service (i.e. a mortgage, or job). Leaving a limited-
content message could help avoid the “passive” collection identified by the Bureau
in that the consumer would, at a minimum, receive a message from the accounts
receivable management industry requesting a call, and it would empower the
consumer to respond and make attempts at resolving the debt. It also avoids the
consumer pressure identified by the Bureau in that the consumer would at least be
provided with contact information for the accounts receivable management
industry, likely before they were seeking a new job or mortgage or other product or
service, and again it would be up to the consumer to respond and make attempts to
resolve the debt, or notify the accounts receivable management industry that the
debt is one that they do not owe.
E. The Bureau Should Exempt Debt Collectors that Furnish Information
to Special Credit Reporting Agencies.
The CFPB’s proposed pre-notification requirement in § 1006.30(a) will have
unintended consequences for check verification consumer reporting agencies (CRAs)
that provide check verification services to retailers for the purpose of preventing
fraud. If § 1006.30(a) were adopted, it would undermine the effectiveness of check
verification services, result in increased fraud in check and check conversion
transactions, and harm consumers, retailers, banks, and providers of check
verification services. This section should therefore be narrowed to exempt check
verification CRAs from its pre-notification requirement.
Some debt collectors collect checking account debt. Companies that work with these
types of debt collectors issue check acceptance advisories, which indicate potential
fraud, to its retailer customers. In doing so, these companies are considered
nationwide specialty reporting agencies providing check verification services under
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the FCRA. These companies provide a service referred to as a premium check
warranty to its retailer customers. Through this service, the check acceptance
advisories are warranted such that if a retailer were to accept a payment in reliance
on an advisory that later returns unpaid, the company that issued the advisory
would assume that loss. The main concern with the CFPB’s proposed pre-
notification requirement is that the effectiveness of the check acceptance reporting
model hinges on the immediacy with which a nationwide specialty reporting agency
is able to receive and transmit current check transaction data which indicates the
likelihood of fraud. Stated another way, the check acceptance advisory model only
works when the CRAs alert data is current and can outpace fraud. This could not be
accomplished were the pre-notification requirement to issue because the debt
collector would not be able to quickly report bad check data to check acceptance
advisory companies, therefore exposing consumers, retailers, banks, and check
advisory companies to increased financial loss. It would also result in greater
insecurity in using and accepting checks as a form of payment.
Another complicating factor is that debt collectors working to collect checking
account debt have a severe impediment to communicating with the consumer.
Placement records for paper checks typically contain full debtor contact
information. However, the vast majority of debts collected in this area are for checks
that were converted into electronic funds transfer items (EFTs) which do not
contain debtor contact information. It can take several months to locate debtor
contact information and for almost half of those EFT transactions, debtor contact
information cannot be located.
Check verification CRAs rely on timely reports from the debt collectors on the
status of the debts so that companies are protected against fraud and so that a
consumer is not wrongfully denied a service in the near future when their account
has sufficient funds. Timely and accurate reporting is therefore of the essence—both
to protect companies from fraudulent checks and to protect consumers from adverse
actions based on outdated information. Even more, through the check verification
process, consumers can timely be alerted that someone may have stolen their
identity. This check acceptance advisory system has been a mainstay in the United
States for over fifty years.
Accordingly, ACA recommends that the Bureau exempt debt collectors who report to
check verification CRAs from any requirement the Bureau adopts under §
1006.30(a). This exemption would avoid any unintended consequences of
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undermining the important fraud prevention function served by check verification
CRAs.
X. COMMENTS ON §1006.34(c)- ITEMIZATION IN
VALIDATION NOTICES
ACA’s main concern with the proposed standard notice is that the new itemization
requirements are unworkable, particularly for small agencies and for several types
of debt, particularly medical debt, merchant and service debt. While well-
intentioned and meant to be flexible, the Bureau’s one-size fits all approach to
itemization creates unnecessarily burdensome requirements for certain types of
debt, without first properly studying the impact they will have.
In fact, a large part of the accounts
receivable management industry works
to collect debt owed to medical providers
governed by the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (“HIPAA”)
123
rules or small and
mid-sized company debt. According to
ACA figures, financial services firms are
the most consistent in their billing
practices, but they make up only about
10% of total debt collections activities.
Health care related debt (from hospitals and non-hospitals) is the leading debt
category collected by debt collection professionals, accounting for nearly 47% of all
debt collected in the industry, followed by student loan debt, which makes up 21% of
all debt collected. Government-related debt makes up 16% of all debt collected,
while credit card, retail, telecom, utility, mortgage, and other debt each make up
less than 10% all of debt collected.
124
123
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 et seq., including the Security Rule, Privacy Rule, and Transaction and Code
Set Standards promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services.
124
Cf. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, MARKET SNAPSHOT: THIRD-PARTY DEBT
COLLECTIONS TRADELINE REPORTING 5 (July 2019) (stating that “[m]edical debt accounted for 58
percent of total third-party collections tradelines in Q2 2018” and “[m]ore than three out of four (78
percent) total third-party debt collections tradelines were for medical, telecommunications, or
P a g e | 105
The new itemization” components are too tough to implement for small creditors
and collectors. Most collection firms are small businesses themselves. A full 85
percent of ACA members (1,624 companies) have 49 or fewer employees and 93
percent of members (1,784) have 99 or fewer employees. Nearly half of ACA
members have client creditors that are either totally or at least 50 percent small
businesses.
The itemization burden proposed in §1006.34(c) is unwarranted and dangerous. As
discussed in Section One, the Bureau’s studies do not support its need.
125
The
negative impact of overly burdensome rules in New York also highlight why the
proposed requirements for itemization will not benefit consumers.
126
The
itemization requirement in §1006.34(c) runs the very real risk of pushing creditors
and service providers to file collections lawsuits against consumers earlier and in
greater volume. As discussed in Chapter 1, Section III, for many of the same
reasons, account collection lawsuit filings are increasing year over year in the state
of New York.
A. The Bureau’s Proposal for Section 1006.34(c)(1)
The Bureau’s increased information requirements in 1006.34(c)(1) are based on
focus group copy testing, which found that participants suggested that the inclusion
of additional information about the debt amount (e.g., fees, penalties) contributed to
their overall sense of trust.
127
The focus group’s only use should be to judge the readability of the forms placed
before it. The total set of people upon whom the Bureau based its conclusions was
682 individuals. This is not a statistically valid sample size for the purpose of
assessing tens of millions of debt collection contacts annually. Nor is the focus group
utilities debt in Q2 2018”), available at:
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201907_cfpb_third-party-debt-collections_report.pdf.
125
See supra, section II.A at 13.
126
See supra, section III.A. at 30.
127
Id.
P a g e | 106
method able to be the sole basis for drawing conclusions that will impose a $1
billion implementation cost.
Nevertheless, to address sentiments of a portion of the 682 individuals, the Bureau
proposes to require the following information in validation notices:
§ 1006.34(c) Validation information.
(1) Debt collector communication disclosure. The
statement required by §1006.18(e).
(2) Information about the debt. Except as provided in
paragraph (c)(5) of this section:
(i) The debt collector’s name and mailing address.
(ii) The consumer’s name and mailing address.
(iii) If the debt is a credit card debt, the merchant
brand, if any, associated with the debt, to the extent
available to the debt collector.
(iv) If the debt collector is collecting consumer financial
product or service debt as defined in § 1006.2(f), the name
of the creditor to whom the debt was owed on the
itemization date.
(v) The account number, if any, associated with the
debt on the itemization date, or a truncated version of
that number.
(vi) The name of the creditor to whom the debt
currently is owed.
(vii) The itemization date.
(viii) The amount of the debt on the itemization date.
(ix) An itemization of the current amount of the debt in
a tabular format reflecting interest, fees, payments, and
credits since the itemization date.
(x) The current amount of the debt.
The changes that the Bureau proposes are not based on a sufficient study and
determination of need. The Bureau’s proposal did not include an analysis of costs
and an estimation of benefits to consumers or industry by increasing the amount of
information that must, by law, be provided in an initial communication to
consumers. Notably and in most cases, consumers have already received the same
account information directly from the creditor.
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B. Itemization Requirements would Cost over $ 4 billion to
Implement
The cost in agency and creditor system changes to implement this rule will exceed
$1 billion dollars. ACA members fear that they will not be able to program their
systems to accommodate the variety of “itemization dates” that are appropriate for
every different creditor. ACA urges the Bureau to rethink its definition in
1006.34(c)(2)(v), (vii), (viii), (x), which add requirements that the initial written
communication with consumers contain an itemization of the debt.
Collectors will need to make software adaptations to comply with 1006.34(c)(2) that
match the unique billing/accounting habits of creditors and merchants. Each and
every creditor, regardless of debt type, has different billing statement habits. Most
collectors have multiple creditor clients. The itemization requirement—in its
attempt to be flexible—also increases the number of permutations that agency
computer systems must accommodate. This would be prohibitively expensive,
requiring new programming for every new client on-boarded. These costs could
result in some small businesses with small portfolios of accounts being denied
collection services.
Small business creditors will be challenged to provide collectors digitized
information to perform the mail merge necessary to fulfill the rule’s requirements.
Consider, for example, the local government debt that would be included under the
Proposed Rule. This includes parking tickets, taxes, tolls, court fees, and public
utilities.
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This Proposed Rule would require changes to each of these public record-keeping
systems and may implicate the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.
128
There is significant expense to small business to make them save and send copies of
invoices if there is not a legitimate consumer need to understand more about the
basis for a debt. Many creditors only send collectors invoices upon request. A
significant majority of small businesses (e.g., plumbers, lawn care, pest control, or
heating/cooling repair companies) never send a monthly bill. Many others still rely
on excel spreadsheets and hand-written invoices made via notebooks and carbon
copy.
The Bureau’s itemization requirements would cost well over $1 billion dollars in
expense for providers and collectors. Implementation expenses fall into four
categories: professional analysis fees, system reprogramming, ongoing error
correction, and increased litigation and legal fees.
128
P.L. 104-4; 109 Stat. 48 et seq.; and 2 U.S.C. §§602, 632, 653, 658-658(g), 1501-1504, 1511-1516,
1531-1538, 1551-1556, and 1571.
Over 45% of ACA members
indicated that between 50%-
100% of their customers are
small business clients.
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1. $600 million in one-time professional fees
ACA estimates that hospitals and other health care providers will need to conduct
significant legal analysis to understand what billing information they can legally
share with collection agencies to comply with Rule 1006.34(c) as proposed. HIPAA
requires that each “covered entity” develop and implement policies and procedures
appropriate for its own organization, reflecting the entity’s business practices and
workforce. There are about 6,000 non-federal hospitals in the United States. In
addition, there were over 827,000 doctors in patient care in 2015.
129
If only half of
these providers hire counsel to develop revised billing procedures, and each only
spent $2,000 on legal advice, the total cost of the advisory services exceeds $600
million.
2. Over $30 million in one-time system reprogramming for agencies.
Also, collection systems would require reprogramming.
130
Reprogramming would
require new fields, which creditors would need to mirror in their own software and
data. Every collector and creditor in the U.S. would need to program systems to
accommodate every difference in “itemization date” and connected information.
ACA polled its members to estimate the cost of changing computer systems to
accommodate the Proposed Rule. They advised that many computer systems will
not currently accommodate additional data fields, which would require a complete
replacement or major programming revision.
Agencies that have the capacity to reprogram systems, and who have done so
before, estimate based on prior experience that the necessary changes will require a
minimum of 3 weeks of programming time before the altered system could be
tested. Another 2-3 weeks of testing and fixing are required after the initial
programming. The process will require a senior programmer at approximately $65
129
John Elflein, Active Doctors of Medicine in Patient Care in the U.S. from 1975 to 2015, STATISTA
(Sep. 27, 2018), available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/186226/active-doctors-of-medicine-in-
patient-care-in-the-us-since-1975/
130
CFPB, Study of third-party debt collection operations, (May 2016). Available at:
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/20160727_cfpb_Third_Party_Debt_Collection_Operatio
ns_Study.pdf (“Changes to collection management systems may be required in response to changes
in the law or client requirements.”)
P a g e | 110
per hour and a system administrator at $40 per hour. Each new field will require
about 10 hours of programming time and 4 hours of admin time. Thus, the
estimated cost to make these changes are $7,290 per agency in one-time
programming costs.
About 15 percent of the approximately 4,100 collection agencies have proprietary
collection management systems (615). ACA estimates that a simple reprogramming
to add nine new fields and adjust the associated mail merge would cost each agency
about $7,290 per service in either consultant or FTE expense. Thus, technical
implementation of these requirements will cost an estimated $4,483,350 in one-time
reprogramming fees.
3. Unknown $ billions annually in uncompensated medical care
Finally, each year, hospitals provide tens of billions of dollars in uncompensated
care. In 2016, this amount totaled $38.3 billion; in 2015, hospitals provided $35.7
billion in uncompensated care.
131
The average profit margin across hospitals in a
study by the Congressional Budget Office was 6.0 percent in 2011; with about 27
percent of hospitals showing “negative profit margins (in other words, they lost
money) in that year.”
132
A key feature of the hospital industry that affects margins
is that nearly 60 percent of hospitals are nonprofit organizations and about 20
percent are publicly owned.
The Bureau’s Proposed Rule 1006.34(c) runs the risk of increasing the amount of
uncompensated care that hospitals must provide by making it harder for hospitals
to employ professional debt collection services to collect on validly owed debt. The
added burdens would apply equally to public and charitable hospitals as they would
to for-profit hospitals. Ultimately, the cost of unpaid bills for medical services is
born by patients and society and could be in the billions of dollars.
131
American Hospital Association, Uncompensated Hospital Care Cost Fact Sheet, at 3 (December
2017) (citing Health Forum, AHA Annual Survey Data, 1990-2016), available at:
https://www.aha.org/system/files/2018-01/2017-uncompensated-care-factsheet.pdf.
132
TAMARA HAYFORD ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PROJECTING HOSPITALS PROFIT
MARGINS UNDER SEVERAL ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIOS 1 (Working Paper 2016-04), available at:
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/workingpaper/51919-Hospital-
Margins_WP.pdf.
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Debt collection for many small and local companies is a method of last resort; but it
is a method that keeps their businesses afloat. For example, one ACA member
serves a handful of long-time clients who are chiropractors and dentists. These
providers place fewer than 25 accounts per year. The itemization requirement that
imposes the new burden of showing interest and prior payments could pose such a
data collection hurdle on small businesses that they might forgo collecting on bad
debt entirely.
4. Costs to creditors will amount to over $ 3 billion.
Creditors will also need to reprogram systems. Unlike collection agencies, creditors
do not use a limited selection of collection management software. Their systems
vary by the thousands. Approximately 10,000 creditors furnish data to national
credit reporting agencies.
133
This represents a fraction of the creditors in the U.S.
Also, about half of all hospitals and medical care providers equals 416,500 potential
creditors. Even if just these firms reprogrammed systems to comply with the
itemization requirements, the cost is $3,036,285,000.
As an aside- if creditors must pay the reprogramming costs to comply with
1006.34(c), this sunk cost works as a disincentive to change collectors if the creditor
is not satisfied with the service and compliance of its collector. One of the principal
drivers of collector compliance is establishing and maintaining a good reputation for
customer service in the community of creditors. The Bureau should not be watering
down creditors’ purchasing power by creating a situation where creditors have sunk
costs with collectors and reduced leverage to demand better service.
5. On-going implementation and error-correction costs will continue.
Further, by adding new data fields, the Bureau is increasing the recurring cost to
collectors of error correction and on-boarding. Continued changes after the one-time
fees will cost an estimated $1460 per creditor. This cost will be incurred because
each client/creditor will use different itemization dates, descriptions, and letter
templates. Collectors can expect to spend additional programming time for every
new client, estimated at 20 hours of programming time and 2 hours of system
133
CFPB, Credit Reporting Whitepaper (2012) at 3.
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_credit-reporting-white-paper.pdf
P a g e | 112
administration time for a total of $1460. Multiplied by each issuing creditor, the
total on-going cost of the new rule is over $ 6.5 billion.
In addition, those collecting medical debt expect that Proposed Rule 1006.34(c) will
create tens of millions of dollars of new plaintiff lawsuits per year because the rule
requires what is often impossible, as detailed above.
C. An Itemization Requirement would risk violating other
federal law.
ACA appreciates the Bureau’s intent to make consumers more aware of the exact
nature of their debt with the goal of reducing confusion and therefore the frequency
of disputes. But the proposed itemization requirement under § 1006.34(c) is unwise
because (1) it runs counter to other laws like HIPAA, (2) it is unnecessary given
already-existing disclosure requirements surrounding medical debt, (3) it risks
exposing sensitive medical information to unwanted parties, (4) it may in some
circumstances be impossible to enforce, and (5) it is unduly burdensome for small
businesses. ACA therefore proposes that the Bureau instead allow debt collectors to
disclose the multiple names of original creditors to further the Bureau’s intent to
better inform consumers about their debt.
1. Section 1006.34(c) asks for more information than HIPAA
allows.
ACA members are concerned that the proposed itemization requirement will conflict
with other laws and regulations, particularly those related to health-information
privacy.
Under HIPAA, medical debt collectors are permitted to share personal health
information (PHI) to achieve payment, but only that which is necessary to collect
payments. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(b); 164.514(d). Violators of these rules are subject to
serious penalties. State attorneys general may bring civil actions to obtain damages
on behalf of state residents and may seek to enjoin further HIPAA violations. 42
U.S.C. § 1320d-5(d).
134
Moreover, persons who knowingly obtain or disclose PHI
may be subject to fines up to $250,000 and up to ten years imprisonment where the
wrongful conduct involves the intent to sell, transfer, or use identifiable health
134
Health Information Technology for Clinical and Economic Health (HITECH) Act.
P a g e | 113
information for commercial advantage, personal gain or malicious harm. 42 U.S.C. §
1320d-6(b).
Because the Bureau lacks the authority to order HIPAA-covered entities to provide
detailed medical billing information to collectors, and because the Bureau lacks the
power to exempt HIPAA-covered entities from HIPAA rules, ACA is concerned that
some medical providers, faced with potential liability for violating HIPAA, will
refuse to provide the information required to comply with proposed § 1006.34(c);
thus forcing collectors to decide between complying with § 1006.34(c) or filing
collection lawsuits against consumers where debt collectors can rely upon notice
pleading.
2. Section 1006.34(c) risks exposing sensitive medical information to unwanted
parties.
Unauthorized disclosure of PHI could also result if medical debt must be itemized in
validation letters. As the Bureau found, consumers perceive that debt collection
notices are inadvertently sent to family members in 16% of reported cases.
Consumers may perceive this because medical collections communications are
addressed to the “responsible party” for billing, who may not be the patient. PHI is
delicate, and therefore should be confidential wherever possible, even from spouses,
children, and parents as contemplated under HIPAA’s provisions.
135
The FDCPA’s structure further jeopardizes the confidentiality of PHI: the FDCPA
requires validation notices to be the initial communication or be sent within five
days of the initial communication. Such notice may be mailed using information
from care providers and before a collection agency has determined whether the
address information provided by the care provider is correct or obsolete, further
increasing the risk of third-party disclosure of PHI.
The dissonance between HIPAA and the FDCPA is additionally illustrated by the
fact that, whereas the FDCPA expects collectors may communicate with the
consumer’s spouse, parent (if the consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or
administrator, HIPAA forbids communication without express written permission.
Using the figures from the Proposed Rule, third party disclosure of patient
135
The HITECH Act addresses the fact that “incidental” disclosure is expected. But the proposed
1006.34(c) itemization requirements would cause more than “incidental” disclosure to happen.
P a g e | 114
information will likely happen to at least 16% of consumers. That is unacceptable to
both consumers and collectors. Considering that debt collection is “commercial,”
criminal HIPAA penalties may, and likely would, attach to illegal PHI
disclosures.
136
Care providers and collectors therefore have reasonable concerns that
criminal or civil penalties could attach if PHI is included in validation notices that
third parties open.
3. Section 1006.34(c) is unnecessary to inform consumers as to the
nature of the debt being collected.
The Bureau has not clearly articulated why itemization must occur in the initial
communication or validation notice rather than through subsequent
communications. The Bureau’s proposal presumes that providing information that
is more detailed initially addresses concerns about reader trust and the potential for
mistakes. There is, however, no proof of this. In fact, for nearly half of all collected
debt, consumers receive multiple pieces of mail before collection even begins.
137
For example, under the IRS rule known as 501(r), nonprofit hospitals, to maintain
their tax-exempt status, must send three letters in the first 120 days after a health
service, which includes itemized information and a simple summary of their
financial assistance policies. Nonprofit hospitals comprise 48% of the hospital
market. Although doctors and clinics are not required to follow 501(r), many will if
they are affiliated primarily with nonprofit hospitals.
Also, health insurance companies are required to mail to “responsible persons” an
Explanation of Benefits, which provide details about coverage, payments, and
copays. Insurance companies have customer service departments to resolve
consumers’ disputes or questions about coverage or denials. Thus, consumers have
ample opportunity to seek more information about charges prior to collection
activity.
Finally, ACA members engaged in medical debt collection observe that very few
people ask for extensive detail about charges, even though they can easily do so if
they do not recognize a charge on their bills. Assuming that consumers want
detailed information about their debts, therefore, puts an unjustified burden on
136
See 42 U.S.C. 1320d-6.
137
Recall that 47% of collected amounts are medical.
P a g e | 115
medical care providers, collection agencies, and, as stated earlier, creates a
situation of violating HIPAA when it is unnecessary to do so.
4. In some cases, compliance with 1006.34(c) will be impossible.
ACA is not only concerned that HIPAA rules may make it impossible for medical
debt collectors to comply with the Bureau’s proposed itemization requirement, ACA
also knows it may be impossible to abide by this itemization requirement given the
nature of medical debt, as multiple bills from multiple providers from a single
hospital visit are common.
For example, suppose a woman undergoes a caesarian section surgery, and as a
result, she incurs a facility charge from the hospital, a surgeon charge from her
OBGYN, an anesthesiologist charge, probably a pediatrician charge and, if there
were complications, there could be more.
These bills all derive from the same general service. Sometimes they are billed
individually, and sometimes, depending on affiliations with the hospital, it is all
billed under the hospital. For individual statements, compiling the separate sources
will require substantial expense, and in some instances, hospitals do not have the
technology or capability to itemize these separate charges. Not surprisingly, neither
debt collectors nor hospitals do this now. Moreover, many doctor offices use “family
billing” when a primary insured party is the “responsible party” for payment.
Account statements may therefore reflect payments due for multiple patients with
multiple procedures. Predictably, questions will arise if amounts remain due about
which individual the overdue amount should be allocated to. There simply is no way
to identify an itemization date or itemized amounts, absent arbitrary allocations.
Practically, it does not seem like much of a problem, but with the plaintiff’s bar
waiting to use this new regulation as a profit center, such dichotomy between the
Bureau’s proposal and the industry’s practices could result in incessant litigation
and unwarranted expenses.
5. Section 1006.34(c) brings undue hardship to small businesses.
ACA is also concerned about the impact the Bureau’s proposed itemization
requirement under § 1006.34(c) will have on small businesses. Specifically, the
expenses associated with implementing this requirement will likely result in small
businesses with low account volumes being denied collection services. Furthermore,
raising barriers for essential service providers—like hospitals, pest control
P a g e | 116
companies, or car mechanics—to collect past due accounts has serious consequences
for society—e.g. uncompensated care in 2015 already represented 4.2% of annual
hospital expenses;
138
also, ACA debt collectors in 2016 returned a net of $67.6
billion in collected accounts to the U.S. economy, representing $579 in savings on
average per U.S. household.
139
In sum, collectors that work with non-singular debt obligations like medical debt or
credit sales of multiple items (e.g. several pieces of living room furniture) believe
that compliance with the itemization requirement on the validation notice is
impractical, expensive, and duplicative of multiple pieces of mail that consumers
already receive prior to commencement of third-party collections.
6. The Bureau has better options than Section 1006.34(c) to provide
consumers with adequate information about their debt.
A less costly and less burdensome alternative to achieve the same objective without
the negative unintended consequences is to provide collectors a safe harbor so they
can list multiple names of original creditors, if doing so aids consumers in
understanding the character and source of the debt.
The collective experience of ACA member debt buyers and collectors is that the
most significant source of consumer perception that the debt collected is incorrect--
and therefore disputed -- is because the consumer does not recognize the name of
the creditor.
140
Simply put, if the Bureau will allow collectors to describe the current
138
See American Hospital Association, Uncompensated Hospital Care Cost Fact Sheet, at 3
(December 2017) (citing Health Forum, AHA Annual Survey Data, 1990-2016), available at
https://www.aha.org/system/files/2018-01/2017-uncompensated-care-factsheet.pdf.
139
ERNST & YOUNG, THE IMPACT OF THIRD-PARTY DEBT COLLECTION ON THE US NATIONAL AND STATE
ECONOMIES IN 2016, at 2 (2017), prepared for ACA International, available at
https://www.acainternational.org/assets/ernst-young/ey-2017-aca-state-of-the-industry-report-final-
5.pdf
140
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, MARKET SNAPSHOT: THIRD-PARTY DEBT COLLECTIONS
TRADELINE REPORTING 5-6 (July 2019), available at:
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201907_cfpb_third-party-debt-collections_report.pdf.
P a g e | 117
and past creditors in understandable terms, consumer uncertainties and disputes
will decrease.
For example, some medical providers (and financial service companies) have
corporate names with multiple providers falling under the same umbrella.
141
While
consumers know the name of their doctors, they may not know the name of their
doctor’s hospital or clinician group. Unfortunately, collectors would deviate from the
FDCPA by providing all relevant names to trigger the consumer’s memory, thereby
creating fertile ground for vexatious litigation when collectors choose to do so.
Accordingly, the Bureau should consider providing debt collectors a safe harbor for
those collectors who list the actual name of the facility where the services were
rendered (for instance anesthesiologist office, facility for lab work, ER services
name, etc.) or who list the name of the clinic, chiropractor, dentist office, pharmacy,
etc. whose staff gave services, and which would trigger the patient’s memory and
achieve the same goals as itemization.
D. Other Negative Consequences of Section 1006.34(c)
Raising barriers for essential service providers—like hospitals, pest control
companies, or car mechanics—to collect past due accounts has serious consequences
to society. According to the American Hospital Association, uncompensated care in
2015 represented 4.2% of annual hospital expenses.
142
Section 1006.34(c) adds the
burden to itemize debt beyond what is required in the FDCPA, with little overall
value to society.
The Bureau’s Proposed Rule would create a new regulatory violation for a collector’s
failure to accurately list itemization information. Where itemization becomes too
141
For example, Tenet Healthcare Corp. owns and operates hospitals under local names, such as St.
Mary's Medical Center. In such cases, providing strictly the name of the original creditor may
confuse the least sophisticated consumer who is not aware of corporate ownership structures.
142
See American Hospital Association, Uncompensated Hospital Care Cost Fact Sheet, at 3
(December 2017) (citing Health Forum, AHA Annual Survey Data, 1990-2016), available at:
https://www.aha.org/system/files/2018-01/2017-uncompensated-care-factsheet.pdf.
P a g e | 118
difficult, collectors are more likely to file collections lawsuits that rely upon notice
pleading and discovery—rather than risk plaintiff suits and regulatory risk.
143
A validation notice for debt collection ought to be easier and less expensive than
filing a lawsuit, because the market will always opt for the cheaper and less risky
alternative to collect on defaults. As written now, section 1006.34(c) is very likely to
increase medical debt collection litigation, as well as increase litigation for other
types of debts where itemization is onerous and impractical.
XI. COMMENTS ON §1006.34(C)(3)- FORM
VALIDATION NOTICE.
ACA supports the Bureau’s current proposal at section 1006.34 and Form B–3 in
Appendix B to create a uniform validation notice. The Bureau must ensure that its
form will withstand judicial scrutiny—and be prepared to support its model form in
litigation as amicus, if necessary. It should also expressly state how it aligns with
the statutory text to create a safe harbor from litigation. Beware of those who
complain about a standard validation form, as a model form will reduce
opportunities for plaintiff lawyers to profit from frivolous FDCPA litigation.
A. The Bureau’s Proposal for Section 1006.34
The Bureau has proposed in Regulation F section 34 to create a standard form for
the validation of debts as prescribed under the FDCPA Section 809 (15 U.S.C.
1692g), a form known colloquially as the g notice or “validation notice”.
144
ACA
applauds the Bureau for recognizing that a single national standard is necessary to
resolve the many inconsistent holdings across federal district and circuit courts
regarding the contents and emphasis of disclosures on the g notice.
The Bureau’s proposed model validation notice is a single page and is written in
plain English. Further, the model validation notice was crafted after focus group
copy testing, which found that the focus group understood and trusted sample
validation forms that were written in “plain language” rather than those that used
143
See supra, section COMMENTS ON §1006.34(c)- ITEMIZATION IN VALIDATION NOTICES.
144
See NPRM, at 474 Proposed §1006.34(d)(2) (“Safe harbor. A debt collector who uses Model Form
B–3 in appendix B of this part complies with the requirements of paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and (d)(1) of
this section.”)
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“statutory language” from the FDCPA.
145
ACA noted earlier in this comment that
focus groups are not the best method to test nationwide experience with debt
collection. The research indicates; however, that while focus groups may not be the
best method for testing nationwide experience with debt collection, focus groups do
provide insight about how people in groups perceive a situation.
146
Thus, for this
limited purpose, a focus group’s conclusion about understanding certain language in
a form has weight.
1. The CFPB’s model form must meet Chevron Step One by addressing ambiguity in
the FDCPA
Decades of inconsistent rulings, circuit splits, and court-created doctrines like
“overshadowing” evidence the ambiguous construction of FDCPA § 809.
147
It is
imperative that the Bureau’s model form directly address these ambiguities.
148
ACA
recommends that the Bureau’s model form rest firmly and squarely on
interpretations of the FDCPA that have given rise to the most litigation concerning
validation notices. Also, ACA recommends that all validation notices must state the
CFPB’s official communication about consumer rights and complaint resolution.
Thus, the Bureau’s use of plain language will have a clearer nexus to the Plain
Writing Act of 2010, 5 U.S.C. 301 (Sec. 3).
An “interpretation-focused” approach will have several outcomes: (1) bolster the
Bureau’s arguments in favor of Chevron deference; (2) therefore, increase adoption
by collection agencies; and (3) limit expensive litigation for consumers, creditors,
and collectors.
145
FORS MARSH GRP., supra note 19, at 8.
146
See, supra, note 25.
147
See, e.g., Caceres v. McCalla Raymer, L.L.C., 755 F.3d 1299, 1304, fn.5 (11th Cir. 2014)
(recommending that debt collectors include the substance of § 1692g(c) (failure to dispute validity) in
their validation notice).
148
See supra, section IV.B., (Under the Chevron analysis, first set forth by the Supreme Court in
1984, courts review agency rules by looking at the rule in two distinct steps. First, a reviewing court
must determine whether the meaning of the statute addressing the precise issue before the court is
clear. If the statutory text is clear, that is the end of the matter; the court and the agency must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.)
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2. Ambiguities to be Addressed
Disclosing interest/Not disclosing interest.
The section-by-section analysis for section 1006.34(c) correctly notes that the phrase
“the amount of the debt” is ambiguous; it does not specify which debt amount is
being referred to, even though the debt amount may change over time. Courts differ
in how interest accrual is supposed to be disclosed.
149
For the suggested balance due
on the account language, ACA suggests that a dynamic balance disclosure should be
added when the account balance is dynamic, not static.
ACA specifically suggests the following language:
“As of the date of this letter, the balance due on the account is <current>. Because
interest, fees, and/or other charges may change the total owed from day to day, the
amount due on the day you pay may be greater. If you pay the amount shown
above, an adjustment may be necessary after we receive your payment, in which
event you may be informed of any other amount due.”
Addressee for Decedent Debt.
Please specify whether a collection firm complies with the statute and Regulation F
by sending the validation notice addressed to the deceased consumer, so long as it is
eventually received by the deceased person’s personal representative or estate
administrator. Or, must the debt collector send a new g notice to the name and
address of the decedent’s personal representative/estate administrator and provide
that person a new 30-day validation period? If collection had begun when the
149
See, e.g., Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872, 876
(7th Cir. 2000) (holding that amount of debt disclosed must include interest at the time the
disclosure occurs even though consumer may ultimately pay more at the time of payment because of
accrued interest); Avila v. Riexinger & Associates, LLC, 817 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that the
accounts receivable management industry will not be subject to liability under Section 1692(e) for
failing to disclose that the consumer’s balance may increase due to interest and fees if the collection
notice either accurately informs the consumer that the amount of the debt stated in the letter will
increase over time, or clearly states that the holder of the debt will accept payment of the amount set
forth in full satisfaction of the debt if payment is made by a specified date).
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consumer was alive, is a new g notice and validation period required for the estate’s
representative upon the death of the consumer?
Dispute Prompt Checkboxes
In its current form, the check box is problematic. The options “This is not my debt”
and “The amount is wrong” are not useful because the only appropriate response for
the collector is to send validation information. We suggest combining these.
By far, the most common reason for a valid dispute is that the debt was paid in full
to someone else. This should be the first option. This option should also request the
recipient of the payment and the date, which will allow the collection agency to
expediently research the dispute. While not necessary to resolve the issue,
consumers should be encouraged to attach proof of payment in order to hasten the
process and prevent additional contacts.
Thus, ACA recommends reducing the options for Dispute Prompts to the below:
I paid this debt in full to __________________________________ on [date]___________. (attach copy
of proof of payment, if available).
I do not recognize the creditor’s name, or I dispute that this debt is mine, or I dispute the
amount, or I request validation of the debt for any other reason. (check any that apply)
Other (please describe on reverse or attach additional information).
Disputes should contain evidence.
Disputes are handled most quickly if supporting evidence is provided- payment
receipts, bank account statements, etc. The Bureau’s rules should clarify that it is
not overshadowing to encourage behaviors that lead to quick resolution of
legitimate disputes. The ambiguity in the many cases concerning overshadowing
should be resolved by the Bureau.
Form Design Must Consider Mailing Practices
Some of the content on the model form is positioned incorrectly to accommodate a
tri-fold letter and glassine windows in envelopes. Below are various specifications of
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standard #10 window envelopes. As presently designed, none of these standard
envelopes will work with the model form.
Style: #10 Commercial
Size: 4-1/8 x 9-1/2
Window size: 1-1/8 x 4-1/2
Window position: 7/8 Left
x 1/2 Bottom
Style: #10 Commercial
Right Window
Size: 4-1/8 x 9-1/2
Window size: 1-1/8 x 4-1/2
Window position: 4-1/8
Left x 1/2 Bottom
Style: #10 Commercial
Fast Forward
Size: 4-1/8 x 9-1/2
Window size: 1-1/8 x 4-1/2
Window position: 7/8 Left
x 11/16 Bottom
This window is slightly higher
to be out of the clear zone for
the post office.
The cost to migrate to a letter that does not conform to standard folds and window
locations will prevent many small businesses from using the model form.
Note also that if the coupon or tear-off is more than 3-1/2 to 3 3/4 inches wide, the
standard glassine window return envelope would not be usable and either a custom
printed or configured glassine envelope would be needed.
Comments on proposed § 1006.34(c)(2)- Current practices for determining the end of
the validation period.
Consumer-specific information on g notices are populated by mail merge, usually
derived from spreadsheets of information about the debt. It is a relatively simple
task to add five days from a letter’s print date and another thirty to calculate the
end of the validation period. The Bureau should specify whether a validation period
end-date on weekend or holiday when the collection agency is closed should be
adjusted to the next business day. The Bureau should also specify that it is not a
violation to provide a longer time than 35 days—in the event a collector prefers to
be especially cautious.
Comments on proposed § 1006.34(c)(2): Method of Delivery.
A five-day delivery rule should apply to all types of written communications
whether printed or electronic. First, it is easier to implement when programming
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systems and training employees. Second, it allows for consumers who do not check
their emails regularly to take full advantage of the 30-day validation period.
Oral disclosures given live to the consumer should not have a delivery rule. The
delivery rule is designed to account for unknown and uncontrollable factors while a
message is in transit between the sender and recipient. As implied in proposed
section 1006.6, there would be no such impediments when a disclosure is given
orally directly to the consumer.
Comments on proposed § 1006.34(c)(1), which provides that the § 1006.18(e)
disclosure is validation information.
So long as use of the Bureau’s model form receives Chevron deference and collectors
will not be held to have violated the FDCPA by departing from explicit statutory
language, ACA supports this requirement. But if the Bureau’s Legal Division has
any doubt about whether the proposed language will receive deference, the Bureau
should not box in collectors by making the mini-Miranda statement an express
regulatory requirement with only one kind of safe harbor language, lest collectors
meet 1006.34(c)(1) but somehow fail to meet one court’s view of FDCPA § 809.
3. The Bureau’s Determination of Form Contents must be Detailed and Reasoned
An agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference when “the regulatory scheme is
technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned
fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.”
150
To aid the
Bureau in considering matters related to the form in a detailed and reasoned
fashion, ACA provides herein comments on several aspects of the form and delivery
of the validation notice.
B. Comments on proposed § 1006.34(c)(2): Complete Name
Requirement
ACA is very concerned that the “complete name” requirement will lead to
unnecessary technical litigation. First, its necessity seems overblown. There isn’t a
150
New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865).
P a g e | 124
parent alive who has a Jr., II or III who hasn’t been confused for their child at some
point in time. The solution to this circumstance is a phone call, not litigation.
In addition, consumers bear some responsibility for this confusion. Creditors
provide collectors the names given on applications. Nobody requires Jr.’s, II’s or III’s
to consistently use these numbers in their names on loan applications or at dentist
offices. If these persons are later confused, it is by their own doing.
Finally, by creating a regulatory violation for failing to get a consumer’s legal name
correct, the Bureau is inviting loan fraud by encouraging people to misspell,
truncate, or otherwise alter their names.
1. Proposed comments 34(c)(2)(iii)–1
The provision requiring the merchant brand for credit cards as part of the
itemization information would better serve consumers and reduce compliance costs
if it were drafted to include broader categories than merchant brand names and was
optional, rather than mandatory. ACA agrees that consumers would appreciate
knowing that their account arose from a store brand card (e.g. Gap or Conoco). That
information is usually available to collectors and can be added to validation notices.
In addition, consumers might also benefit when collectors could state other
applicable trade names when only using a finance company name to identify the
creditor might be confusing. This is often the case with hospitals, physician groups,
utilities, and retail product loans or auto loans.
2. § 1006.34(d)(3)(i)- telephone number
§ 1006.34(d)(3)(i) would permit a debt collector to include the debt collector’s
telephone contact information on the validation notice. ACA supports this provision.
The best possible outcome for a consumer with a valid debt is for her to
communicate with a collector within the first 30 days of collection to arrange to
resolve the debt. In doing so, the consumer will avoid further contacts, may avoid
credit reporting that the debt is in collections, and may be able to settle the debt for
less than face value.
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C. “Clear and Conspicuous” Requirement in 1006.34(b)(1) is
Not Suited to a Conversation
A “clear and conspicuous” requirement is unnecessary, inconsistent with the
purpose of debt collection, and will have undesirable consequences. The “clear and
conspicuous” standard in Regulation E –from which the Bureau seeks to borrow for
Regulation F—is a disclosure provision designed for situations where parties are
meant to interact once and then go about their business with a single
preauthorization establishing their future relationship. Initiating a debt collection
communication does not have the same characteristics—the best possible outcome
for the consumer is a productive two-way conversation where the debt is disputed,
forgiven, paid, or resolved in the first 30 days. If a phone agent is not speaking
clearly or there is static on the line, the consumer should simply ask the phone
agent to repeat herself or provide the information more loudly or slowly. The
purpose of debt collection is to enable a two-party communication so that parties
can arrive at a mutual agreement to resolve a debt before credit reporting or
litigation becomes a potential option.
Another negative consequence of adding the “clear and conspicuous” requirement
for oral or electronic validation of debt disclosures is that the Bureau is giving
plaintiffs’ attorneys one more arrow in their quiver with which they can extract
value from the U.S. credit system, health care providers, and merchants.
D. Conclusion
There is not a pressing need for validation notices to contain detail beyond what the
FDCPA expressly requires. Most debt is valid.
151
ACA members process and collect
upon millions of consumer accounts daily and only a small portion— less than one-
half of one percent —of these debts lack a contractual basis or are miscalculated.
For those small number of debts, the current validation process offers consumers
the chance to dispute the debt. Indeed, a vast majority of ACA members accept
verbal disputes and disputes outside the first 30 days.
Collections professionals have many disincentives that prevent them from collecting
accounts that aren’t truly owed, including personal morality, state regulatory
oversight, reputation with creditors, threat of plaintiffs’ suits, and federal oversight.
151
See supra at 19.
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The Bureau lacks reliable information supporting a need for more detail in
validation notices.
Finally, the Bureau’s Proposed Rules will not impact “zombie” debt or phony
accounts because the agents that deal in such accounts are rogues and will have no
regard for these rules in any event. Itemization requirements will burden legitimate
collectors without impacting the behavior of those who work outside the law.
One must not forget that the debts at issue in FDCPA communications arose
because the consumer received money, goods, or services for which they did not pay
according to contract terms. If collections are not successful, the cost of non-
payment is borne by the creditor, merchant, or health care provider—as well as the
U.S. Treasury when these debts are written off against taxable income. These rules
should not impede collection of legitimate debt, and they should not be designed to
line the pockets of plaintiff attorneys.
XII. COMMENTS ON 1006.38 DISPUTES AND
REQUESTS FOR ORIGINAL CREDITOR
INFORMATION
ACA appreciates the Bureau’s willingness to tackle the costly problem of duplicative
disputes under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b), and it encourages the Bureau to provide
additional clarity on the issue of overshadowing.
A. Duplicative Disputes
As the Bureau acknowledged,
152
duplicative disputes are a nagging problem for the
accounts receivable management industry. Duplicative requests are costly in time
and money, especially if there is no electronic mail address for the consumer. In
those cases, responses must be sent by U.S. mail with the attendant cost of postage.
For 20,000 duplicative disputes, a collection firm spends at least $40,000 in
duplicative paper, print-jobs, and postage alone—not counting: (1) employee time
spent in investigating, reinvestigating, and resolving the request prior to continuing
with collections; and (2) the burden on compliance staff to resolve these duplicative
requests, leaving compliance staff, as the Bureau acknowledged, with “fewer
resources to investigate and respond to non-repeat disputes.”
153
152
See NPRM at 291-92.
153
Id. at 292.
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Indeed, many consumers submit duplicative disputes hoping to fabricate an FDCPA
claim where an agency fails to reply to one of the requests. This is particularly
troublesome and needlessly expensive to deal with given that, as shown above, from
2018 to 2019, a sample of over 2.2 million accounts determined that the data
supporting collections on those accounts is accurate over 99.85 percent of the
time.
154
ACA agrees that the Bureau should define “duplicative dispute” as a dispute which
is substantially similar to a prior dispute raised by the consumer and, if possible,
adopt specific criteria for determining whether a dispute is duplicative. ACA
requests that the Bureau consider amending 1006.38(d)(2)(ii) to include calling the
consumer to notify them that their dispute is deemed duplicative and referring
them to the response to the earlier dispute. This will save paper and postage.
In addition, the Bureau should clarify that consumers are not entitled to the
protections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) after the 30-day validation period has ended.
While it should already be clear that liability cannot arise for the failure to respond
to an untimely dispute, that has not stopped many consumers from asserting claims
or filing lawsuits alleging this very wrong.
With regard to responding to a request for the identity of the name and address of
the original creditor, ACA International notes that a slew of lawsuits have been
filed by consumers alleging that the FDCPA is violated when the initial
communication does not identify the original creditor.
155
This dubious position is
belied by the plain text of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b), which allows a consumer to request
the name and address of the original creditor if it is not mentioned in the initial
communication.
154
Supra, at 28; see also NPRM at 291 (noting that industry commenters have stated that ten to
twenty percent of consumer disputes reiterate, without providing new information, earlier disputes
accounts receivable management industry have already responded, and that repeat medical debt
disputes may be as high as fifty to sixty percent of all disputes).
155
See, e.g., Johnson v. Fay Servicing, LLC, No. 1:17-CV-02513-CC-JCF, 2018 WL 5262078, at *15
(N.D. Ga. July 2, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:17-CV-2513-CC-JCF, 2018 WL
5262049 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 2018); De Amaral v. Goldsmith & Hull, No. 12-CV-03580-WHO, 2014
WL 572268, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2014); Hammett v. AllianceOne Receivables Mgmt., Inc., No.
CIV.A. 11-3172, 2011 WL 3819848, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2011); Brenker v. Creditors Interchange,
Inc., No. 03 CIV.6500 LTS DFE, 2004 WL 594502, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2004).
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Accordingly, ACA International requests that, in addition to providing the accounts
receivable management industry with permissible responses for duplicative
requests, the rule clarify that: (1) A debt collector has no legal obligation to respond
to a duplicative dispute; and (2) A debt collector has no legal obligation to respond
to a dispute made outside the 30-day validation period; and (3) The name and
address of the original creditor need not be provided in the initial communication.
B. Overshadowing
As to overshadowing, it would be duplicative for the Bureau to implement the
prohibition against overshadowing under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) by implementing a
rule that “generally restates the statute, with only minor changes for style and
clarity.”
156
Instead, the Bureau should provide meaningful guidance.
There is little uniformity among federal courts in defining the term
“overshadowing,” the Bureau should provide an interpretation that solves this
issue.
In 2019, nearly every initial communication sent by the accounts receivable
management industry contains language expressly advising a consumer of the right
to dispute the debt and to request the name and address of the original creditor.
Nevertheless, overshadowing claims are some of the most common, if not the most
common, FDCPA violations alleged under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) in federal court
lawsuits.
157
The reasons are not hard to fathom, given the hyper-aggressive
approach of consumer protection attorneys to find fault in every letter sent. The
quandary was explained well by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Bartlett v.
Heibl, 128 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1997):
156
See NPRM at 287-88.
157
See, e.g., Lerner v. Forster, 240 F.Supp.2d 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that “[w]hether a certain
debt collection letter violates § 1692 requires a fact specific analysis”) (holding that “a validation
notice contained in a collection letter is not overshadowed simply because another section of the
letter discusses alternative payment plans.”); Orenbuch v. Computer Credit, Inc., No. 01 Civ.9338
JSM, 2002 WL 1918222 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2002) (holding that the accounts receivable management
industry did not overshadow its first notice notifying debtor that debt collector was contracted to
collect on the debt through its second notice notifying debtor that debt collector was returning the
account to the hospital); Sturdevant v. Thomas E. Jolas, P.C., 942 F.Supp. 426, 429-30 (W.D. Wis.
1996) (holding that debt collector’s letter demanding payment in full or arrangement of payments
within ten days of receipt of the letter, sent twenty-one days after sending the initial validation
notice, did not overshadow the initial letter because the expiration of the second letter would be past
the thirty days plaintiff is granted to dispute the debt).
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Judges too often tell defendants what the defendants
cannot do without indicating what they can do, thus
engendering legal uncertainty that foments further
litigation. The plaintiff’s lawyer takes the extreme, indeed
the absurd, position—one that he acknowledged to us at
argument, with a certain lawyerly relish, creates an
anomaly in the statutory design—that the debt collector
cannot in any way, shape, or form allude to his right to
bring a lawsuit within thirty days. That enforced silence
would be fine if the statute forbade suing so soon. But it
does not. The debt collector is perfectly free to sue within
thirty days; he just must cease his efforts at collection
during the interval between being asked for verification of
the debt and mailing the verification to the debtor. In
effect the plaintiff is arguing that if the debt collector
wants to sue within the first thirty days he must do so
without advance warning. How this compelled surprise
could be thought either required by the statute, however
imaginatively elaborated with the aid of the concept of
“overshadowing,” or helpful to the statute’s intended
beneficiaries, eludes us.
The plaintiff’s argument is in one sense overimaginative,
and in another unimaginative—unimaginative in failing
to see that it is possible to devise a form of words that will
inform the debtor of the risk of his being sued without
detracting from the statement of his statutory rights.
Id. (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit went so far as to draft an FDCPA
compliant letter for “[d]ebt collectors who want to avoid suits by disgruntled
debtors”:
Dear Mr. Bartlett:
I have been retained by Micard Services to collect from
you the entire balance, which as of September 25, 1995,
was $1,656.90, that you owe Micard Services on your
MasterCard Account No. 5414701617068749.
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If you want to resolve this matter without a lawsuit, you
must, within one week of the date of this letter, either pay
Micard $316 against the balance that you owe (unless
you've paid it since your last statement) or call Micard at
1–800–221–5920 ext. 6130 and work out arrangements for
payment with it. If you do neither of these things, I will be
entitled to file a lawsuit against you, for the collection of
this debt, when the week is over.
Federal law gives you thirty days after you receive this
letter to dispute the validity of the debt or any part of it.
If you don't dispute it within that period, I'll assume that
it's valid. If you do dispute it—by notifying me in writing
to that effect—I will, as required by the law, obtain and
mail to you proof of the debt. And if, within the same
period, you request in writing the name and address of
your original creditor, if the original creditor is different
from the current creditor (Micard Services), I will furnish
you with that information too.
The law does not require me to wait until the end of the
thirty-day period before suing you to collect this debt. If,
however, you request proof of the debt or the name and
address of the original creditor within the thirty-day
period that begins with your receipt of this letter, the law
requires me to suspend my efforts (through litigation or
otherwise) to collect the debt until I mail the requested
information to you.
Sincerely,
John A. Heibl
The entire economy, including consumers, the accounts receivable management
industry, and creditors, will benefit if the Bureau follows in the Seventh Circuit
Court’s footsteps. More than a mere definition of overshadowing is needed because
such a definition could still be manipulated by the plaintiff’s lawyer who takes the
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“extreme, indeed absurd, position . . . with lawyerly relish.” It would be far more
helpful for the Bureau to establish a form letter similar to the one crafted by the
Seventh Circuit in Bartlett, with a safe harbor for debt collectors who use them.
For those reasons, the Bureau should not only restate the prohibition against
overshadowing, it should also define it.
XIII. COMMENTS ON § 1006.42 - PROVIDING
REQUIRED DISCLOSURES ELECTRONICALLY
One of the primary goals of proposed Regulation F is to promote and leverage
modern communication technologies to the benefit of both consumers and industry.
Consumers increasingly prefer modern electronic communications—like emails and
text messages—to mail and phone calls.
158
And these modern technologies are more
cost-effective and efficient for communicating critical information from a collection
firm to consumers. Yet, the Bureau’s proposal to overlay detailed and onerous E-
SIGN consent requirements on a collection firm’s electronic communications with
consumers will make it infeasible for collectors to use electronic methods. And it
will pose insurmountable barriers for consumers who wish to communicate “in
writing” with collectors using modern technology.
Accordingly, ACA urges the Bureau to reconsider and reverse its determination that
the E-SIGN Act applies to the FDCPA’s mandatory Written Notices when provided
to consumers electronically. To the extent that the Bureau believes that such
electronic disclosures must fall within the E-SIGN Act, ACA requests that the
Bureau create an exemption from the E-SIGN Act’s requirements that ensures
consumers will receive the mandatory disclosures in the electronic formats they
prefer without overburdening the industry.
158
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUCATION LOAN RESOURCES (NCHER), STUDENT LOAN ONLINE
SURVEY RESULTS (February 12, 2016), available at
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.ncher.us/resource/resmgr/NCHER_Poll/01_NCHER_Survey_Insights.pd
f.
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A. The Bureau Proposes to Allow Electronic Disclosures but
Mandate E-SIGN Act Consent
The FDCPA requires three disclosures be provided to consumers in writing: 1) a
validation notice sent after an initial communication; 2) the original-creditor
disclosure; and 3) the validation-information disclosure (collectively “Written
Disclosures”).
159
In addition—though not noted in the NPRM—the FDCPA requires
consumers to provide “in writing” 4) written disputes; and 5) cease and desist
notices.
The Bureau interprets the FDCPA’s writing requirement to permit these
disclosures to be provided through the mail or electronically—such as through an
email or text message. Proposed § 1006.42(a)(1) would require a debt collector who
provides such required disclosures in writing or electronically to do so: (1) in a
manner that is reasonably expected to provide actual notice to the consumer, and (2)
in a form that the consumer may keep and access later. A debt collector who
receives actual notice that the disclosure was not in fact delivered to a consumer
does not satisfy § 1006.42(a)(1).
ACA believes proposed § 1006.42(a)(1)’s delivery standard provides much needed
clarity to the accounts receivable management industry on the use of modern
technologies to provide Written Disclosures and that the proposed regulation strikes
an appropriate balance between consumer protection and industry burden.
The rule, however, is overly proscriptive and places process over results. The
directions for sending FDCPA notices to consumers inserts roadblocks that will
prevent collection firms—particularly small businesses—from adopting electronic
communications.
ACA has several recommendations to improve proposed § 1006.42(a). First and
foremost, state that any Written Disclosures actually accessed by the consumer are
presumed compliant.
159
See § 1006.34(a)(1)(i)(B); § 1006.38(c);§ 1006.38(d)(2).
P a g e | 133
(a) Providing required disclosures. (1) In general. A debt collector who provides
disclosures required by this part in writing or electronically complies with this
subsection when the consumer receives notice in a form that the consumer may
keep and access later. In all instances, a debt collector who provides disclosures
required by this part in writing or electronically must do so in a manner that is
reasonably expected to provide actual notice and in a form that the consumer may
keep and access later.
Because the goal of § 1006.42(a)(1) is to provide reasonable assurances that a
consumer received Written Disclosures, any delivery method that exceeds this goal
by providing actual, confirmed notice should be acceptable and encouraged.
B. The Bureau Should Reconsider and Reverse its View that
the E-SIGN Act Applies to the FDCPA’s Written Notices.
ACA requests that the Bureau reassess and retract its position that Written
Disclosures provided electronically must satisfy the E-SIGN Act. Neither the E-
SIGN Act’s text nor its purpose clearly supports application of the Act’s consent
requirements to the FDCPA’s Written Disclosures. Moreover, applying the E-SIGN
Act will hinder, not encourage, the accounts receivable management industry’s’
electronic communications with consumers.
The E-SIGN Act is a consent statute meant to grease the wheels of electronic
commerce. Used here, however, the proposed regulation will stifle the Bureau’s aim
of keeping consumers better informed through modern communication technologies.
At a minimum, the Bureau should create a commonsense exemption from E-SIGN’s
consent protocol that is appropriately tailored to meet § 1006.42(a)(1)’s requirement
that electronic disclosures be provided in a manner that is reasonably expected to
provide actual notice to the consumer.
1. The Bureau’s Position on E-SIGN
According to the Bureau, unless a collection firm receives a consumer’s “informed,
affirmative consent”—under E-SIGN Act section 101(c)’s detailed consent protocol—
before delivering disclosures electronically, the delivery is invalid. The Bureau
proposes that a debt collector may satisfy this requirement in two ways: by
obtaining E-SIGN consent directly from a consumer 1006.42(b)(1)) or by relying
on consent the consumer provided to the creditor or a prior debt collector
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1006.42(c)). While the Bureau states that it does not propose to interpret a
consumer’s prior consent to a creditor as an affirmative consent to receive electronic
disclosures from a debt collector, § 1006.42(c)’s proposed “exemption” from the E-
SIGN Act for electronic disclosures made in reliance on consumer’s consent to a
creditor has the same effect.
The Bureau did not address how a consumer should acquire E-SIGN consent from a
debt collector if the consumer sends a dispute or cease and desist notice
electronically.
160
By choosing to not give E-SIGN consent, a consumer can force a debt collector to use
a more expensive method of sending the notice, even if she is perfectly able to read
and keep the electronic notice provided. Thus, the Proposed Rule in this regard has
the practical effect of dissuading the use of modern technologies to provide Written
Disclosures, which leads back to the less preferred paper route.
2. The E-SIGN Act’s Language and History Do Not Compel the Bureau’s Conclusion
that Electronic Disclosures under the FDCPA Require E-SIGN Consent.
The Bureau’s interpretation of the E-SIGN Act is overbroad. According to the
Bureau, because the Written Disclosures must be provided in writing, a collection
firm must comply with the E-SIGN Act’s consumer consent requirements when
providing such disclosures electronically. But the E-SIGN Act is limited to
“transactions.” Proposed §1006.42(c) rests on the mischaracterization of the five
FDCPA written notices as “transactions” that are mutually entered into by both
parties.
The E-SIGN Act only requires consumers’ consent to the use of electronic records
when the parties are engaging in a “transaction”:
Consent is required when “a statute, regulation, or other
rule of law requires that information relating to a
transaction or transactions in or affecting interstate or
160
See, 15 U.S.C. 7001(b)(2) (“This subchapter does not— (2) require any person to agree to use or
accept electronic records or electronic signatures, other than a governmental agency with respect to a
record other than a contract to which it is a party.”)
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foreign commerce be provided or made available to a
consumer in writing.”
161
The E-SIGN defines a “transaction” with a focus on an actual exchange of
consideration between the parties:
The term “transaction” means an action or set of actions relating to the
conduct of business, consumer, or commercial affairs between two or
more persons, including any of the following types of conduct--
(A) the sale, lease, exchange, licensing, or other disposition of (i)
personal property, including goods and intangibles, (ii) services, and
(iii) any combination thereof; and
(B) the sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of any interest in real
property, or any combination thereof.
162
While the exchange that resulted in the initial credit obligation is likely a
“transaction,” a totally different party’s notice or disclosure to the consumer after
the transaction has been consummated should not by itself qualify as an additional
“transaction” subject to E-SIGN consent.
A validation notice, for example, is not a sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition
of any goods, services, or property between a consumer and a collection firm”. A
validation notice is part of an effort to provide information to a consumer to confirm
and satisfy a consumer’s already-existing obligation incurred in a prior transaction.
Unlike the transactions described in the E-SIGN Act term’s definition, the FDCPA’s
Written Disclosures do not seek a consumer’s assent to any new contractual
relationship. Thus, these notices and disclosures do not constitute the type of
“transactions” for which a party would need to get a consumer’s consent to do
business electronically pursuant to the E-SIGN Act.
The E-SIGN Act’s legislative history also supports the conclusion that the Act’s
consent requirements should not be extended to the FDCPA’s Written Disclosures.
The aim of the E-SIGN Act is to promote electronic transactions and
161
15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1)(a).
162
15 U.S.C.A. § 7006(13) (emphasis added).
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communications—not discourage them. Specifically, Congress enacted the Act “to
promote electronic commerce by providing a consistent national framework for
electronic signatures and transactions.”
163
Congress recognized that “[t]he growing
use and global reach of the Internet can reduce paperwork and ease the burdens of
conducting commercial transactions.”
164
“The legislation is narrowly drawn so as to
remove barriers to the use and acceptance of electronic signatures and records
without establishing a regulatory framework that would hinder the growth of
electronic commerce.”
165
In short, the E-SIGN Act was created out of “the need for the Federal government
and States to promote and not hinder this new market.”
166
Thus, the E-SIGN Act
focuses on facilitating and regulating additional electronic transactions and not
unnecessarily burdening existing relationships. Further, nowhere does the E-SIGN
Act reference the FDCPA or debt collection, and ACA is not aware of any debt
collection references in the Act’s legislative history. Simply put, there is no
indication that Congress was contemplating mandatory Written Disclosures under
the FDCPA when it enacted the E-SIGN Act; instead, it was attempting to ensure
that the developing electronic economy would not be hampered. And that is exactly
what the Bureau risks with its over burdensome proposal.
Critically, the plain language of the E-SIGN Act’s consent requirements
demonstrates they are a bad fit for the FDCPA’s Written Disclosures. As industry
commenters to the Bureau’s ANPRM and small entity representatives who
participated in the SBREFA process made clear “the process for obtaining E-SIGN
Act consent is particularly cumbersome in the debt collection context, where
consumers and a collection firm typically lack a pre-existing relationship.”
167
163
S. Rep. No. 106-131, at 1 (1999); see also H.R. Rep. No. 106-341, pt. 1, at 5 (1999) (“The bill adds
greater legal certainty and predictability to electronic commerce by according the same legal effect,
validity, and enforceability to electronic signatures and records as are accorded written signatures
and records.”).
164
S. REP. 106-131, 1
165
H.R. Rep. No. 106-341, pt. 1, at 5 (1999) (emphasis added).
166
S. REP. 106-131, 5.
167
NPRM at 315.
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As further proof that the E-SIGN Act is a bad fit, the statute allows companies to
impose fees on consumers and terminate agreements if the consumer withdraws his
or her consent to electronic disclosures, including “termination of the parties’
relationship[] or fees in the event of such withdrawal.”
168
Surely the Bureau does
not want to incentivize the accounts receivable management industry to punish
consumers for refusing to accept electronic disclosures. The potential material harm
to consumers of such consequences or fees—even if most debt collectors did not
require them—would outweigh any marginal benefits of E-SIGN consent.
Further, by applying the E-SIGN Act to the FDCPA, the Bureau is essentially
creating a private right of action to enforce the E-SIGN Act where none exists or
was intended. It is beyond dispute that “[t]he E-Sign Act contains no rights-creating
language and manifests no intent to create a private right or remedy, but rather
establishes that contracts and signatures cannot be denied legal effect merely
because they are in electronic form.”
169
Thus, the Bureau need not and should not
inject E-SIGN requirements and liability into the FDCPA.
The Bureau recognizes that “debt collectors and consumers may benefit from
greater flexibility as to electronic disclosures.”
170
Yet, many in the accounts
receivable management industry do not send electronic notices to consumers
because they fear violating the FDCPA. This fear was recently borne out in Lavallee
v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, where the Seventh Circuit concluded that a debt collector’s
secure email did not contain the § 1692g(a) disclosures because the debtor had to
follow the hyperlinks in order to access the information.
171
The court stated that
“[a]t best, the emails provided a digital pathway to access the required information.
And we’ve already rejected the argument that a communication ‘contains’ the
mandated disclosures when it merely provides a means to access them.”
172
The salient point is that the court, did not rest its decision on a lack of consent for
an electronic communication. Indeed, the court declined to address the CFPB’s
168
15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1)(B)(i).
169
Levy-Tatum v. Navient Sols., Inc., 183 F. Supp. 3d 701, 708 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
170
NPRM at 314.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 1056.
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argument that the E-SIGN Act should apply.
173
At this point, the Bureau retains
the leeway to reconsider its legal analysis and determine that, in fact, the E-SIGN
Act does not cover FDCPA Written Disclosures.
C. The E-SIGN Act Would Impose Substantial, Unnecessary
Burdens in the Context of Debt Collection.
The Bureau expressly recognizes that “[t]he process for obtaining consumer consent
under the E-SIGN Act may impose a substantial burden on electronic commerce in
the unique context of debt collection.”
174
Yet, the two options the Bureau proposes
for allowing a collection firm to provide electronic Written Disclosures require either
direct or indirect E-SIGN consent. The Bureau should not impose the severe burden
on consumer-preferred electronic communications.
Most collection firms do not currently acquire E-SIGN consent from consumers, and
it would be onerous for collectors to obtain such consent. Largely due to the current
legal uncertainty surrounding electronic communications, the majority of
interactions between collectors and consumers continue to occur by telephone and
postal mail. Neither method is well-suited to obtaining E-SIGN Act consent,
where—as the Bureau recognizes—the required disclosure may exceed 1,000 words.
The accounts receivable management industry wants to communicate with
consumers as economically and efficiently as possible. Thus, a collection firm will
usually prefer to communicate by telephone call rather than by mail because the
transaction costs are lower. Likewise, if capital costs were not an issue, a collection
firm will usually prefer to communicate by email rather than by telephone, since
email is not only inexpensive but does not require a live representative to be
available at the precise moment when a consumer is available to communicate.
175
Imposing E-SIGN consent requirements will make a collection firm less likely to use
email and texts for their Written Disclosures to consumers, which will drive up the
cost of collection—a cost that will ultimately be borne by each American consumer.
173
Id.
174
NPRM at 315.
175
Id. at 126.
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The more efficiently the credit-and-collection industry can operate, the more it can
recover for unpaid creditors and governmental clients, and the lower those creditors
and governments can keep costs, interest rates, and taxes.
Accordingly, for the reasons described above, ACA does not believe the E-SIGN Act
does or should apply to electronic disclosures under the FDCPA. ACA implores the
Bureau to establish that email and text messages can be “written notice” within 15
U.S.C. § 1692g(a)’s meaning, and that the statute applies to emails and texts in the
same way that it applies to postal email without the additional confines imposed by
the E-Sign Act. Without clear and practical answers on how a debt collector can
comply with the requirement that it send the consumer a written notice using
emails or texts, debt collectors will be less likely to use email for their initial
communication with a consumer, which will drive up the cost of collection a cost
that will ultimately be borne by the consuming public. Therefore, ACA encourages
the Bureau to reconsider and revise its interpretation.
D. Even if the E-SIGN Act Applies, the Bureau Should Provide
an E-Sign Act Exemption for the FDCPA’s Written Notices.
The E-SIGN Act grants federal regulatory agencies the authority to “exempt
without condition a specified category or type of record from the requirements
relating to consent in section [101(c)] if such exemption is necessary to eliminate a
substantial burden on electronic commerce and will not increase the material risk of
harm to consumers.”
176
The Bureau proposes to utilize this procedure in §1006.42(c)
to allow a collection firm to make electronic disclosures based on creditor’s or prior
collector’s E-SIGN consent. The Bureau should adopt the recent FCC E-SIGN
exemption approach and expand the exemption in §1006.42(c) so it covers
communications to validated electronic addresses.
1. Consent procedures are expensive
An exemption conditioned on prior consent would create enormous upfront expense
to implement. The cost to change contracts to include a written E-SIGN consent
176
15 U.S.C. § 7004(d)(1).
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provision is estimated at $300 million.
177
Creditor software would require
reprogramming to insert the new field to capture the permission, an estimated $100
million cost. Collection software will require reprogramming, which is estimated at
$12 million.
The Bureau thus should adopt an E-SIGN Act exemption that actually eliminates
the substantial burden on creditors and the accounts receivable management
industry while also appropriately mitigating the risk to consumers associated with
electronic collection disclosures.
2. Consent Procedures are Confusing
The requirements for consent under the E-SIGN Act as set forth by the Bureau in
the proposed regulations are so onerous, let alone confusing for the consumer, that
the likelihood of consent would be remote—even though more and more consumers
indicate that electronic communication is their preferred method of communication.
Similarly, the cost-benefit analysis of delivering electronic disclosures in compliance
with the E-SIGN Act, as contemplated under §§ 1006.42(b)(1) and (c), would
certainly discourage the accounts receivable management industry from going down
that path.
3. The Deterrent Effect of Consent Procedures is Observed
For instance, ACA surveyed members that used email to communicate with
consumers in the state of New York at any point in the period 2010 through the
present. When the New York Department of Financial Services issued its rules
requiring consumer E-SIGN consent to receive electronic g-notices, a significant
majority of ACA’s members stopped using emails to communicate with consumers
residing in New York. Relatedly, one attorney-advisor to multiple collection
agencies (who has helped agencies develop email collections programs) has reported
that, while his clients use email to communicate with consumers in many states
throughout the country, they continue to use postal mail and telephone calls in New
York. This is because the 2015 New York DFS rules are too onerous and failure to
abide by them perfectly risks litigation.
177
See Kate Berry, BCFP no more: Kraninger scraps plan to rebrand CFPB, AMERICAN BANKER (Dec.
19, 2008) (“An internal agency memo had said the cost to the financial services industry could be
roughly $300 million if the name change went forward.”)
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As proposed, §§ 1006.42(b)(1) and (c) would have the same deterrent effect on
electronic communication—but on a nationwide level. Thus, proposed § 1006.42(c) is
not necessary and insufficient to eliminate the burdens of E-SIGN consent on
industry. Because the burden on the accounts receivable management industry
would be severe, the Bureau may fashion any exemption to the consent requirement
that would eliminate the burden so long as the exemption will not increase the
material risk of harm to consumers. Here, the Bureau can do just that without
indirectly mandating E-SIGN consent under § 1006.42(c). In other words, E-SIGN
consent is not necessary to ensure compliance with § 1006.42(a)(1)’s reasonable
expectation of notice standard. Instead, the regulations should allow a collection
firm to send Written Disclosure electronically to any email address or phone
number where a collection firm has reasonable assurances that the email or number
presently belongs to and is being used by the consumer.
Specifically, ACA proposes that a collection firm should be allowed to deliver in
electronic format the FDCPA’s mandatory written disclosures to verified email
address or phone numbers, which are similar to those that satisfy the same
parameters recently adopted by the Federal Communications Commission in its E-
SIGN exemption:
(1) an email address or phone number that the consumer has provided
or confirmed to the creditor, debt collector, or another for purposes of
receiving communication concerning the account; or
(2) an email address or phone number that the consumer has used to
communicate with the debt collector concerning the account.
178
Indeed, the Bureau supports a similar exemption elsewhere in its Proposed Rule.
179
Where a disclosure is sent to a verified email address or phone number, logic and
commonsense dictate a consumer’s actual receipt of the notice can be presumed. If
no verified email address or phone number is available for a particular consumer,
then a debt collector must deliver Written Disclosures via paper copies to that
consumer.
178
See, In the Matter of Nat'l Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n & Am. Cable Ass'n, 32 F.C.C. Rcd.
5269 (2017).
179
§ 1006.6(d)(3)(i)(A) and § 1006.6(d)(3)(i)(C).
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ACA appreciates that phone numbers—especially wireless numbers—are frequently
reassigned. ACA, therefore, proposes that where the debt collector sends a
mandatory disclosure to an email address or phone number that it received from a
creditor, the consumer must have provided the phone number or used it within the
last 180 days. Such a limitation mitigates the risk that a disclosure will be provided
to an unintended third party. The same risk is not present for emails because email
addresses are generally unique to a particular consumer and are not reassigned. As
a further safeguard, ACA proposes that any electronic disclosure include a clear and
conspicuous option for a consumer to opt-out of future electronic disclosures and to
continue to receive paper notices.
180
ACA’s proposal is consistent with an E-SIGN Act exemption that the FCC recently
granted to cable operators to distribute their “annual notices via e-mail to a verified
e-mail address that includes a mechanism for customers to opt out of e-mail
delivery and continue to receive paper notices.”
181
There, the Commission found
that “[t]he benefits of permitting e-mail delivery include the positive environmental
aspects of saving substantial amounts of paper annually, increased efficiency and
enabling customers to more readily access accurate information regarding their
service options.”
182
Like cable subscribers, consumers would receive the same
benefits from receiving debt collection notices electronically. Relying on
substantially the same verification requirements ACA proposes above, the
Commission concluded that “[b]y requiring the use of a verified email address, we
will ensure that the annual notices have a high probability of being successfully
delivered electronically to an email address that the customer actually uses, so that
the written information is actually provided to the customer.” The Commission
found that such benefits were more than sufficient to satisfy the E-SIGN Act’s
exemption standard, agreeing that “it would not be workable for cable operators to
attempt to receive permission from each individual customer prior to initiating
electronic delivery for this particular notice.”
183
180
Should the Bureau adopt such an opt-out requirement, debt collectors would value clarification
from the Bureau on what constitutes a clear and conspicuous disclosure.
181
In the Matter of Nat'l Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n & Am. Cable Ass'n, 32 F.C.C. Rcd. 5269
(2017).
182
Id.
183
Id. at n.40.
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ACA’s proposed safeguards would not materially increase the risk that consumers
would not receive, identify, open, read, or understand the disclosures, and would not
materially increase the likelihood of an unintended third-party disclosure.
Significantly, the proposed safeguards would also ensure that a collection firm
satisfies §1006.42(a)(1)’s requirement that collection firms that provide required
disclosures in writing or electronically do so in a manner that is reasonably expected
to provide actual notice to the consumer. The Bureau is not proposing to impose an
actual receipt standard under §1006.42(a)(1) and should not indirectly do so by
mandating E-SIGN consent under §1006.42(c). Therefore, should the Bureau
determine that the E-SIGN Act applies to the FDCPA’s mandatory written
disclosures, ACA urges the Bureau to adopt ACA’s proposed exemption, as follows:
(d) Exemption from the E-Sign Act for certain messages. Messages, including
those under FDCPA § 1692g, to the following are exempt without condition from the
requirements relating to section 101(c) of the E-SIGN Act, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §
7004(d)(1): (1) an email address that the consumer has provided or confirmed to the
creditor, debt collector, or another for purposes of receiving communication
concerning the account; or (2) an email address that the consumer has used to
communicate with the debt collector or creditor concerning the account; or (3) a
wireless or virtual telephone number that the consumer has provided or confirmed
to the creditor, debt collector, or another for purposes of receiving communication
concerning the account within the last 180 days; or (4) a wireless or virtual phone
number that the consumer has used to communicate with a creditor or the debt
collector concerning the account within the last 180 days.
E. ACA Urges the Bureau to Allow Required Disclosures both
in the Body of an Electronic Communication and in a
Hyperlink without Onerous Limitations
ACA agrees with the Bureau that providing a disclosure in the body of an email
likely poses no more risk of third-party reception than delivery by mail. Therefore,
collection firms should be able to discuss debts in the body of emails. ACA, however,
would urge the Bureau to clarify that a collector can also include mandatory written
disclosures in the body of a text message where feasible.
While ACA urges the Bureau also to allow the accounts receivable management
industry to include required disclosures in a hyperlink in an email or text message,
the limitation and requirements that the Bureau seeks to impose on hyperlinked
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disclosures will make them infeasible to collectors. Specifically, proposed
§1006.42(d) requiring notice and opportunity to opt out of hyperlinked disclosures
suffers from the same infirmity as the Bureau’s proposal to require direct or indirect
E-SIGN consent for the email or text message containing the hyperlinked
disclosures. The accounts receivable management industry will not be able to
effectively satisfy §1006.42(d)’s requirement that a consumer receive notice from the
accounts receivable management industry or creditor regarding the hyperlinked
disclosure before receiving the actual disclosure. ACA, therefore, urges the Bureau
to allow a collector to send hyperlinked disclosures to any email address or phone
number for a consumer that is “verified” pursuant to ACA’s proposed E-SIGN
exemption.
F. ACA Urges Expansion of § 1006.42(e)’s Proposed Safe
harbors
ACA applauds the Bureau’s proposal to create safe harbors for satisfying
§1006.42(a)(1)’s notice and retention requirements but encourages the Bureau to
expand the safe harbors.
First, ACA urges the Bureau to extend the mailing safe harbor to include post office
boxes in addition to residential addresses. In many rural areas, consumers cannot
receive mail at their residences and must utilize a post office box. These consumers,
and collection firms, should not be disadvantaged because of this limitation.
Second, any validation notice in the body of an email that is an initial
communication with a consumer should qualify for the safe harbor as long as the
email is sent to an email address that is “verified” pursuant to ACA’s proposed E-
SIGN exemption.
184
184
The verification procedures described in proposed § 1006.6(d)(3) are unnecessarily onerous and
will not encourage or allow most in the accounts receivable management industry to avail
themselves of the safe harbor.
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G. The Bureau Must Urge the FCC to Provide Clarity on the
Definition of What is Considered an Autodialer for Text
Messaging to be a Viable Option
Congress provided the CFPB, not the FCC, with rulemaking and supervisory
authority over the accounts receivable management industry. Yet the FCC is
making policy decisions impacting debt collection without consulting with or
working closely with the Bureau. The FCC’s refusal to clarify onerous
interpretations under the TCPA, will have a direct impact on whether debt
collection agencies can develop compliance programs for sending text messages.
The FCC’s refusal to act is despite the fact that the D.C. Circuit recently struck
down the FCC’s 2015 Order and remanded key questions to it including asking it to
define what is considered an autodialer.
185
ACA has outlined the FCC’s need to act
extensively in coordination with many other financial services industry
participants.
186
ACA urges the Bureau to work more collaboratively with the FCC to
ensure that the many industries under the CFPB’s jurisdiction seeking answers
from the FCC, are provided with them. This is the only way that the industry will
be able to fully assess its compliance abilities and risks for sending text messages.
XIV. COMMENTS ON §1006.100- RECORD
RETENTION
Calculating the time frame for record retention requirements is not as easy as it
may seem. ACA strongly encourages the Bureau to consider the interplay of the
proposed three-year record retention requirement with other laws or legal
requirements imposed on the accounts receivable management industry. In
addition, ACA urges the Bureau to narrow the proposed record retention
requirements to communications or attempted communications with a consumer as
opposed to any person. Narrowing the record retention requirement in this manner
is in line with the purpose of the FDCPA.
185
Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau Seeks Comment on Interpretation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act in Light of the D.C. Circuit‘s ACA International Decision, CG Docket Nos. 18-152, 02-278 (rel. May
14, 2018).
186
See e.g., ACA International Continues Fight for Clarity Under TCPA by Joining Petition to FCC
(May 4, 2018), available at https://www.acainternational.org/news/aca-international-continues-fight-
for-clarity-under-tcpa-by-joining-petition-to-fcc.
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Finally, ACA urges the Bureau to consider that its record retention requirements
may implicitly require a collector to retain call recordings and that for smaller
agencies this would be a disproportional cost. To counter this disparity, the Bureau
should provide some safeguard measures for smaller agencies in the accounts
receivable management industry that would exempt them from retaining call
recordings if the cost exceeds a specified proportional sum of their annual net
worth.
The Bureau has proposed in Regulation F Section 1006.100 to establish a new
regulatory requirement for the accounts receivable management industry to
maintain records that demonstrate they are in compliance with the requirements
contained within the Regulation:
§ 1006.26 Record Retention. A debt collector must retain
evidence of compliance with this part starting on the date
that the debt collector begins collection activity on a debt
until three years after: The debt collector’s last
communication or attempted communication in
connection with the collection of the debt; or the debt is
settled, discharged, or transferred to the debt owner or to
another debt collector.
As drafted, the Bureau’s proposed record retention requirements are too broad and
should be narrowed. In addition, the Bureau should take this opportunity to further
clarify the proposed end dates, including the terms “communicate” and “attempt to
communicate.” The Bureau should consider tiered or proportionality requirements
that would apply to smaller agencies.
A. The Bureau Should Narrow This Requirement to a
Collector’s Last Communication or Attempted
Communication with a Consumer
The Bureau should narrow the proposed record retention requirements to
communications or attempted communications “with a consumer” as currently
defined in §803(3).
187
The purpose of the FDCPA is to protect consumers from
187
Any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3).
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abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by debt collectors.
188
With
that purpose in mind, it seems that maintaining records that demonstrate a
collector’s compliance with the FDCPA should be limited to consumers as opposed to
any person.
“Any person” under the FDCPA could mean credit reporting agencies, of course.
But record retention requirements for the FCRA would be covered by its own
statute of limitations rules.
Collector systems are able to currently record the date of last communication with a
consumer. Employing an “any person” approach could be expensive, unpredictable,
and arbitrary.
1. Communication or Attempted Communication Definition Should Be Clarified
ACA has previously discussed definitions contained in proposed Section 1006.2,
which includes definitions for the terms “communication” and “attempted
communication.” ACA urges the Bureau to clarify the definitions of these terms to
better enable the accounts receivable management industry to calculate the start
and end dates of the proposed retention requirements.
2. The Bureau’s Proposal, In Effect, Requires That Accounts Receivable
Management Industry Retain All Call Recordings
Smaller agencies would likely be detrimentally and disproportionately impacted by
the proposed record retention requirement. As noted by the Small Business Review
Panel, the costs of record retention, particularly for retention of recorded telephone
calls, is likely to cause high costs for smaller accounts receivable management
industry participants. As noted in the SBREFA report, some smaller accounts
receivable management industry participants retain certain information, such as
recorded phone calls, for a short amount of time, such as a year, because storing
additional data could be cost-prohibitive. In addition, at least one accounts
receivable management industry participant reported that the record retention
requirement may result in it ceasing to record calls in order to eliminate high
recordkeeping costs.
188
15 U.S.C. § 1692.
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In the proposed comments to Section 1006.100, the Bureau states that the proposed
record retention requirements do not impose a requirement on any accounts
receivable management industry to record telephone calls. However, if a collector
does record telephone calls, they must retain those recordings “if the recordings are
evidence of compliance.” It is very difficult to imagine an instance where a recorded
telephone call would not be “evidence of compliance.” The FDCPA imposes a
number of requirements on the accounts receivable management industry, for
example, the prohibition of engaging in any conduct that is harassing, oppressive,
or abusive in connection with the collection of a debt. It is clear that any recorded
telephone call would demonstrate a debt collector’s compliance with this
prohibition.
For many smaller accounts receivable management industry participants, the
answer will likely be to cease recording calls so as to avoid high recordkeeping costs.
Ultimately, this could negatively impact consumers as it would impose increased
difficulty in monitoring internal compliance.
The Bureau should perhaps impose a tiered requirement specific to call recordings
that takes into account the higher proportional costs of maintaining recorded calls
for small accounts receivable management industry participants.
XV. COMMENTS ON §1006.104 RELATION TO
STATE LAWS
Overall, ACA generally agrees with the approach the Bureau has taken with §
1006.104 and proposed comment 104-1. In particular, ACA appreciates the further
clarification afforded by proposed comment 104-1 by specifying that disclosures
describing additional protections under State law do not contradict the
requirements of the FDCPA or the corresponding provisions of Regulation F.
Many states require disclosures regarding time-barred debt, and ACA understands
that the Bureau may also ultimately require a disclosure about time-barred debt
pending additional testing. ACA would request that the Bureau make efforts to
ensure that any required disclosure on time-barred debt be uniform across
jurisdictions. In the Debt Collection Quantitative Disclosure Testing notice the
Bureau published on February 2, 2019, the Bureau provided several sample
validation notices that included proposed disclosures about time-barred debt.
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Overall, the required disclosures are becoming very long and risk providing too
much irrelevant information to consumers.
XVI. COMMENTS ON §1006.108 and PROPOSED
APPENDIX A
With proposed § 1006.108 and Proposed Appendix A the Bureau seemingly will
allow States to supplant the FDCPA and Regulation F with stricter and
inconsistent state laws. This approach violates the FDCPA.
While the FDCPA generally allows States to enforce their own debt collection laws,
the Bureau has spent years developing Regulation F in an effort to provide a
uniform approach to debt collection that appropriately balances consumer
protection with industry burdens, and the Bureau should not through the FDCPA’s
exemption process invite States to disrupt this balance. For the credit-and-collection
industry to best comply with the FDCPA, the Act must be consistently and
predictably applied.
Patchwork state collection laws serving in place of the Act and Regulation F would
hinder this effort, hurting both consumers and industry. The Bureau apparently
recognizes this risk, but the lone statement in Appendix A that State law following
an exemption will constitute the requirements of Federal law “except to the extent
such State law imposes requirements not imposed by the Act” does not resolve the
ambiguity around the scope of a state law exemption created by the rest of proposed
§ 1006.108 and Appendix A. Accordingly, ACA asks the Bureau to clarify that only
state laws with “requirements substantially similar to” the FDCPA and Regulation
F can replace the federal collection regime.
A. State Exemption from the FDCPA and the Bureau’s
Proposal
FDCPA section 817 provides that the Bureau shall by regulation exempt from the
requirements of the Act “any class of debt collection practices within any State if the
Bureau determines that under the law of that State that class of debt collection
practices is subject to requirements substantially similar to those imposed by [the
FDCPA], and that there is adequate provision for enforcement.”
189
Current
189
15 U.S.C. § 1692o (emphasis added).
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Regulation F implements section 817, setting forth procedures and criteria that
enable states to apply to the Bureau for exemption of debt collection practices
within the applying state.
190
However, while section 817 requires that the applying
state’s requirements be substantially similar,” proposed Regulation F seemingly
takes a more liberal approach, exempting not only those state laws that are
“substantially similar” but also those that “provide greater protection for
consumers” than the FDCPA.
191
Through §1006.108 and Appendix A, the Bureau
proposes to substantially retain these exemption procedures and criteria with
certain clarifications.
Proposed §1006.108(a) and Appendix A would contradict the express intent of
Congress. Whereas, existing § 1006.4(a)(1)(i) requires that defined terms and rules
of construction must be “the same” as the FDCPA, the Bureau proposes to interpret
section 817’s substantial similarity standard to also apply to defined terms and
rules of construction—and further interprets that standard to “permit[] variation
from FDCPA defined terms and rules of construction, as long as the State law
definitions and rules of construction are substantially similar to or more protective
of consumers than the FDCPA.” The Bureau, accordingly, proposes that Appendix A
use the phrase “substantially similar” rather than “the same.” Additionally, the
Bureau proposes to retain in Appendix A the limitation that “[a]fter an exemption is
granted, the requirements of the applicable State law constitute the requirements of
relevant Federal law, except to the extent such State law imposes requirements not
imposed by the Act or this part.”
192
Under the new rules, to be eligible for an exemption, the debt collection practices
within an applying state would need to be subject to requirements that are
substantially similar to, or provide greater protection for consumers than, the
provisions of the proposed Regulation F corresponding to FDCPA sections 803
through 812. The Bureau further proposes to clarify in Appendix A that section
817’s “substantially similar” standard applies to the Bureau’s consideration of all
aspects of the State law for which the exemption is sought, including defined terms
and rules of construction.
190
12 C.F.R. §§ 1006.1 through 1006.8.
191
12 C.F.R. § 1006.2.
192
See 12 C.F.R. § 1006.6(d).
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B. The Bureau Should Clarify that State Laws that Impose
Additional or Different Requirements Cannot Replace the
FDCPA or Regulation F
Congress passed the FDCPA not only to eliminate abusive debt collection practices
by debt collectors but also to ensure that those accounts receivable management
industry participants who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are
not competitively disadvantaged and to promote consistent State action.
193
As the
Bureau recognizes, regulation of debt collection imposes costs on the accounts
receivable management industry, which—when passed on to creditors—can
ultimately reduce consumers access to credit. It is with these purposes and
considerations in mind that the Bureau has undertaken years of industry and
consumer outreach, testing, and research to develop the scope and substance of
proposed Regulation F. The Bureau’s Proposed Rule seeks to maintain an
appropriate balance between protecting consumers and not unnecessarily
burdening the collection industry, as such overregulation can negatively impact
credit markets and consumers. (e.g. New York’s 2015 regulations).
The Bureau’s protocol for enabling states to obtain an exemption from the FDCPA
and Regulation F, however, risks upsetting this balance by seemingly allowing
different, more stringent state law to displace Federal law. Such a regime is not
supported by the FDCPA’s plain language and is inconsistent with the Act’s purpose
and, therefore, may not be entitled to deference from courts. ACA requests the
Bureau clarify that states only may receive an exemption from the FDCPA and
Regulation F for laws that are “substantially similar” to Federal law, and not those
that impose added or different obligations.
ACA is concerned that the Bureau’s proposed state exemption protocol departs from
FDCPA section 817’s clear statutory language so that courts may not give the
Bureau’s rule Chevron deference.
194
193
15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
194
See, Chapter 2, Section I.F.2. at 42, supra (“First, a reviewing court must determine whether the
meaning of the statute addressing the precise issue before the court is clear. If the statute is clear,
that is the end of the inquiry, and the court and the agency must give effect to Congress’s
unambiguously expressed intent.)
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2. The Bureau’s Approach to State Exemption is Broader than that Plainly Allowed
by Section 817 and, therefore, may not be entitled to deference.
Section 817 directs the Bureau to develop regulations to exempt from the FDCPA’s
requirements “any class of debt collection practices within any State if the Bureau
determines” such practices are subject to State law “requirements substantially
similar to those imposed by [the FDCPA], and that there is adequate provision for
enforcement.”
195
Although the Act does not define “substantially similar”
requirements, State debt collection laws that require additional or different
obligations or timing—or that apply to additional or different actors—do not fit the
plain meaning of the phrase. Yet, the Bureau’s regulations appear to sweep in such
dissimilar State laws. While existing Regulation F recognizes that the Bureau must
establish procedures and criteria for exemption “as provided in section 817,” the
rules provide that the State laws may be exempt if they “are substantially similar
to, or provide greater protection for consumers than, those imposed under sections
803 through 812 of the Act,” thereby grafting on a much broader and unsupported
standard.
196
With the proposed § 1006.108 and Appendix A, the Bureau seeks to
maintain this same criteria and allow stricter State laws to provide the basis for an
exemption.
The Bureau’s interpretation of section 817’s substantial similarity standard to
include State laws that “provide greater protection for consumers than” Federal law
is premised on FDCPA section 816. That section does not address State exemptions
but instead describes the Act’s preemptive scope, providing that the FDCPA
preempts only “inconsistent” State laws and “only to the extent of the
inconsistency.”
197
Section 816 expressly clarifies that “a State law is not
inconsistent with [the FDCPA] if the protection such law affords any consumer is
greater than the protection provided by this subchapter.” No such language appears
in section 817. Unlike section 816, section 817 does not speak in terms of whether
the State law is consistent or inconsistent with Federal law but rather whether the
State law is “substantially similar” to Federal law.
195
15 U.S.C. § 1692o (emphasis added)
196
12 C.F.R. §§ 1006.2; 1006.3; 1006.4
197
15 U.S.C. § 1692n.
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Moreover, whether a State law can stand in addition to a Federal law is a different
issue than whether State law and State enforcement should completely displace
Federal law and the Bureau’s enforcement thereof. It thus makes sense that
Congress would use different language to describe preemption limits than to
provide criteria for State exemption and that the different language used would not
be coextensive. State laws that are “substantially similar” to the FDCPA and
Regulation F are those that reflect the same balance between consumer protections
and industry obligations as Federal laws, and not those that impose any infinite
range of stricter consumer protection.
Had Congress intended section 816’s preemption test to be the same as section 817’s
exemption test, it would have used the same language. But it did not, and the
Bureau should not disregard the sections’ clear differences by grafting section 816’s
preemption test onto section 817. By doing so, the Bureau would risk a reviewing
court invalidating its proposed exemption procedures and criteria.
3. Allowing Inconsistent State Laws to Replace the FDCPA and
Regulation F Is Not in Line with the FDCPA’s Purpose or the
Bureau’s Rulemaking Authority.
The FDCPA is not a one-sided statute. While the Act is intended to protect
consumers, it is also focused on ensuring that those in the accounts receivable
management industry who avoid abusive collection practices are not competitively
disadvantaged.
198
To accomplish this balancing, the FDCPA—and the Bureau—
should “promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection
abuses.”
199
Thus, it is the role of the FDCPA and the Bureau to define what is and is
not a covered debt collection abuse, and not the role of individual States to do so.
To that end, ACA opposes the Bureau’s proposal to “permit[] variation from FDCPA
defined terms and rules of construction, as long as the State law definitions and
rules of construction are substantially similar to or more protective of consumers
than the FDCPA.” As described above, the plain language of section 817’s
substantial similarity standard does not encompass State laws that are more
stringent than the FDCPA. Further, allowing States to redefine the FDCPA’s
198
15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
199
Id.
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defined terms threatens to disturb proposed Regulation F’s updated collection
regime. For instance, under the Bureau’s proposed construction a State could
redefine new terms like “communication” to include—as opposed to exclude—a
“limited-content message.” Or the State could redefine “debt collector” to include
first-party creditor, greatly broadening the scope of the FDCPA beyond Congress’s
intentions.
In prescribing a rule under consumer financial laws, the Bureau must consider “the
potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered persons, including the
potential reduction of access by consumers to consumer financial products or
services resulting from such rule[.]”
200
Adopting proposed § 1006.108 and Appendix
A to allow stricter and different State law to supplant the relevant Federal law—
and thereby disregard the years spent formulating balanced rules under proposed
Regulation F—would not result in a balancing of the benefits and costs and would
not carry out the purposes of the FDCPA.
201
By allowing States with “more
protective debt collection laws to define the scope of FDCPA, the Bureau risks
disregarding the extensive efforts it has undertaken to reshape the FDCPA for
modern technology and its attendant challenges and opportunities.
ACA accordingly urges the Bureau to remove from § 1006.108 and Appendix A any
exemption for State laws that provide greater protection for consumers than
Federal law and, instead require that to qualify for the exemption the State law
must be the same as or “substantially similar to” the FDCPA and Regulation F.
Such a clarification is consistent with existing § 1006.6(d) and the language in
Appendix A that “[a]fter an exemption is granted, the requirements of the
applicable State law constitute the requirements of relevant Federal law, except to
the extent such State law imposes requirements not imposed by the Act or this
part.” In other words, State law is not “substantially similar to” Federal law where
it imposes stricter, different, or additional debt collection requirements and such
inconsistent State law does not displace the FDCPA and Regulation F. Leaving the
proposed § 1006.108 and Appendix A as written will lead to uncertainty to the
detriment of consumers and industry.
200
12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(i).
201
12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(1) (“The Director may prescribe rules and issue orders and guidance, as may
be necessary or appropriate to enable the Bureau to administer and carry out the purposes and
objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent evasions thereof.”).
P a g e
ACA appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the NPRM to implement
the FDCPA. If you have any questions concerning our letter, please contact Leah
Dempsey at the
Sincerely,
Sarah J. Auchterlonie
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck
Sincerely,
Mark Neeb
Chief Executive Officer
Leah Dempsey
Vice President and Senior Counsel, Federal Advocacy
Phone: 202
| 155
CONCLUSION
ACA appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the NPRM to implement
the FDCPA. If you have any questions concerning our letter, please contact Leah
Dempsey at the
contact information
Sincerely,
Sarah J. Auchterlonie
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck
Sincerely,
Mark Neeb
Chief Executive Officer
Leah Dempsey
,
esq.
Vice President and Senior Counsel, Federal Advocacy
Phone: 202
-810-
8901
CONCLUSION
ACA appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the NPRM to implement
the FDCPA. If you have any questions concerning our letter, please contact Leah
contact information
Sarah J. Auchterlonie
, esq.
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck
Mark Neeb
Chief Executive Officer
esq.
Vice President and Senior Counsel, Federal Advocacy
8901
CONCLUSION
ACA appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the NPRM to implement
the FDCPA. If you have any questions concerning our letter, please contact Leah
contact information
below.
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck
Mark Neeb
Vice President and Senior Counsel, Federal Advocacy
ACA appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the NPRM to implement
the FDCPA. If you have any questions concerning our letter, please contact Leah
below.
Mark Neeb
Vice President and Senior Counsel, Federal Advocacy
ACA appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the NPRM to implement
the FDCPA. If you have any questions concerning our letter, please contact Leah
Mark Neeb
Vice President and Senior Counsel, Federal Advocacy
ACA appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the NPRM to implement
the FDCPA. If you have any questions concerning our letter, please contact Leah
Mark Neeb
Vice President and Senior Counsel, Federal Advocacy
ACA appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the NPRM to implement
the FDCPA. If you have any questions concerning our letter, please contact Leah
Mark Neeb
Vice President and Senior Counsel, Federal Advocacy
ACA appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the NPRM to implement
the FDCPA. If you have any questions concerning our letter, please contact Leah
Mark Neeb
Vice President and Senior Counsel, Federal Advocacy