Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain
Explanatory Note No. 1/2019 1
GLMM - EN - No. 1/2019
Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population
EXPLANATORY NOTE
MIGRATION
POLICY CENTRE
Demography, Migration, and the
Labour Market in Bahrain
Françoise De Bel-Air
Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population2
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Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain
Explanatory Note No. 1/2019 3
Abstract: Mid-2017, Bahrain’s population was estimated at 1,501,116, of whom 823,610 (55 per cent)
were foreign nationals. Most were from Asia (85 per cent) and especially from India (half of all foreign
residents). Seventy-four per cent of expatriates were employed in 2018. ey accounted for 79 per cent of
the employed population and 83 per cent of the private sector’s workforce. Asians were overwhelmingly
involved in services and blue-collar occupations, while Arabs more often lled managerial posts.
Immigration ows to the Kingdom expanded signicantly over the 2000s, fuelled by high oil prices
and the ensuing boom in the construction and services sectors. During the 2010s, the foreign resident
population increased again. In order to accelerate the Bahrainisation of the workforce, while maximising
economic productivity and exibility of the labour market, a string of reforms were enacted starting 2004,
among which were a partial loosening of the kafala system, measures to protect domestic workers and
the introduction of a “exi-permit” designed to incorporate some foreign workers in irregular situation
in the labour market.
Demography, Migration,
and the Labour Market in Bahrain*
Françoise De Bel-Air
* is is a fully revised and updated version of a previous paper with the same title by the author (GLMM - EN -
No.6/2015).
Keywords: Bahrain, Politics, Policy, Sponsorship, Foreign and National Populations, Foreign Population,
Labour Market, National and Foreign Labour, Naturalisation.
Introduction
T
he rst discovery of oil in the Arab Peninsula was made in Bahrain, in 1932. Previous seasonal
migration linked to pearl exploitation was rapidly replaced by inows of workers from Western
countries, Iran, British India, and other Gulf States such as Oman. In spite of such a long
history of labour migration to the country, foreign residents did not outnumber Bahraini citizens until
the end of the 2000s. By then, oil reserves had considerably reduced, and the Kingdom was one of the
three least wealthy GCC countries.
1
From the start of Bahrain’s oil exploitation, migration ows of workers to the country took on
particular political stakes. Unemployed Bahraini nationals were to be hired in priority for vacant posts in
Françoise De Bel-Air
Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population4
the nascent oil industry;
2
but their lack of experience in the eld enticed Bahrain Petroleum Company
(BAPCO) to resort instead to employing skilled and cheap Iranian labourers.
3
However, for fear that
these labour migration patterns would encourage Iran’s claims over Bahrain, the British Protectorate
authorities and the Al-Khalifa ruling family supported the recruitment of Indian skilled and semi-skilled
professionals. An economic rationale thus confronted political concerns in the management of foreign
labour.
4
Additionally, Bahraini workers who were lling the lowest paid positions at the bottom of the
occupational ladder
5
launched labour protests as early as 1938 and 1954-56. ey also formed labour
unions, excluding from it the foreign labourers who were viewed as “adjuncts of the Western powers at
work in the country.”
6
From the rst population census conducted in 1941 to Bahrain’s independence in
1971, the share of non-nationals remained constant at around 20 per cent.
From the mid-1970s and the oil boom to the early 2000s, the number of foreign nationals surged
to a third of the total population. Arab labourers were progressively replaced by Asians, and semi-skilled
and skilled expatriates from earlier waves (among whom were many Indians) were outnumbered by
low-skilled, manual workers. e fragmentation of the workforce also increased with the segmentation
of the labour market between a Bahraini-(over)staed governmental sector – including industrial joint
ventures such as BAPCO and ALBA, the aluminium company – and a private sector employing foreign
workers in detrimental conditions. e oil slump of the 1980s and 1990s and the ensuing contraction of
the public sector led to mounting levels of unemployment among young Bahrainis.
In such a dire situation, and also due to its limited oil resources, Bahrain embarked on a strong
and fast economic liberalisation process. Its economy also diversied and expanded into banking and
nance, heavy industries, manufacturing, retail, and tourism. Fuelled by the hike in oil prices after 2003,
development policies followed “a blueprint that envisions Bahrain as the progressive hub of finance and
service industries in the Gulf, a beacon of modernity in the region, and a tourist attraction constructed
around the city as a site of consumption.”
7
Mega-real estate projects directed at expatriates,
8
especially,
contributed to the construction boom in the country. In 2018, Bahrain was displaying good economic
indicators, among which a successful economic diversication, high growth rates in the non-oil sector,
and foreign direct investment (FDI), added to new oil discoveries.
9
Such economic achievements were
also facilitated by increasing ows of foreign workers. e decade of the 2000s witnessed a doubling of
the total resident population in the Kingdom and almost a trebling of the number of foreign residents.
e hike was sustained during the 2010s.
In Bahrain, immigration and the “natives” vs “foreigners” issue have two ranges of political
implications. First, since British rule, foreigners were hired in the Army and police in order to avoid risks
of collusion with locals.
10
Contrary to other GCC states, Bahrain also resorted to the naturalisation of
some foreign Sunni Muslims ( Jordanians, Syrians, Yemenis, and Pakistanis, for instance), in order to tilt
the communal makeup of the Bahraini population. One of the demands of the demonstrators during the
uprisings in February 2011 was to put an end to these naturalisations.
Second, growing unemployment among the local population spurred the government’s attempts
to overhaul the decades-old “Bahrainisation” policies. A major reform of Bahrain’s labour market was
launched in 2004. e policy was based on erasing the segmentation of labour between nationals and
expatriates by fully liberalising the labour market and on curbing immigration by equalising the cost of
Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain
Explanatory Note No. 1/2019 5
employing nationals and expatriates. e Labour Market Regulation Authority (LMRA) was established
in May 2006 and mandated with regulating and controlling work permits for expatriate employees and
the self-employed, in addition to issuing licenses for the recruitment agencies. Fees were introduced for
every foreigner hired (Bahraini Dinar (BD) 200, or $531), among many other expenditures introduced
over the years.
11
In the hope of enforcing real competition between nationals and expatriates and thus improving
work conditions and wages in the private sector, Bahrain loosened the kafala (sponsorship) system in
August 2009 by abolishing the mandatory No-Objection Certicate hampering expatriates’ professional
mobility.
12
However, employers opposed this move, and since mid-2011, a new law
13
restricts the
switching of kafeel without his consent to those having spent one full year with their sponsor, eectively
limiting the scope of kafala reforms.
As of 2018, Bahrain has no minimum wage for foreign workers in the private sector,
14
and foreign
nationals’ living and working conditions, as well as wages, are negotiated with sending countries through
bilateral agreements, which can be easily circumvented.
15
e country was also the last in the GCC to
announce the enactment of a Wage Protection System,
16
set for May 2018.
17
Yet, Bahrain was also the
rst country in the region to extend to domestic workers some provisions of 2012’s new Labour Law,
such as access to Ministry of Labour’s mediation in case of conict and the requirement that a domestic
worker have a contract as well as annual vacation and severance pay. However, “the new law does not
set maximum daily and weekly work hours for domestic workers or mandate that employers give them
weekly days o or overtime pay. In this regard, the law fails to address the most common abusive practice
of excessive work hours that domestic workers face.”
18
Nonetheless, LMRA introduced a mandatory
standardised labour contract for domestic labourers, enacted from October 2017 onwards. Under the
new contract to be assessed by prospective workers in their country of origin, employers must indicate
clearly the nature of the job proposed, work and rest hours, and weekly days o.
19
e LMRA recently
announced other guarantees for domestic workers, among which is their incorporation under the new
Wage Protection System.
20
e Bahraini parliament also voted to extend free healthcare to all domestic
workers, granting them the same access to medical services as Bahrainis, with no charges either to them
or their employers.
21
e last of the major reforms implemented recently in Bahrain’s labour migration system is the
introduction of the exible work permit (Flexi Permit) since April 2017. Bahrain’s general amnesty
for workers and residents in irregular administrative situation conducted in 2015
22
spurred a change
in policies applied to irregular labourers.
23
e LMRA conceived the Flexi Permit scheme to promote
“economic exibility,” i.e., increase competition for jobs between locals and foreign labourers, as well as
to limit irregular migration. e Flexi Permit is “a renewable two-year permit which allows the eligible
person to work and live in the Kingdom of Bahrain without an employer (sponsor) where he can work
in any job with any number of employers on full or part-time basis.”
24
ere are two types of Flexi
Permit. One enables the holder to work in any non-specialised job, but outside the accommodation and
restaurants sector, while the Flexi Hospitality Permit enables the holder to work in any non-specialised
job within the accommodation sector. A maximum of 2,000 Flexi Permits is to be delivered monthly.
Although in theory, the Flexi Permit opens the door to consultants and freelancers eectively sponsoring
themselves and able to choose their employers and projects,
25
the project was hailed at the international
Françoise De Bel-Air
Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population6
level as an innovative solution to curb irregular, hence abusive employment.
26
e scheme indeed
incorporates some undocumented workers who would then become legal.
However, many of these would remain in illegality due to the strict eligibility criteria and conditions
set to be granted a Flexi Permit. First, domestic workers, irregular migrants who entered Bahrain on a
visit visa, those with “runaway” complaints against them, with travel bans or court cases and those with
expired passports or with passports that are valid for less than six months are not eligible to claim a
Flexi Permit, despite their de facto vulnerability. Regular migrants who are employed cannot leave their
employer and apply for the scheme, either.
27
Family reunion is forbidden for beneciaries of the new
scheme. e high cost of the Flexi Permit is another obstacle to x one’s situation. Permit holders must
pay an initial BD449 ($1,200) to the LMRA, including health coverage and other fees, as well as a
monthly BD30 ($80) fee.
28
As suggested by Migrant Rights, “the Flexi Permit appears to be designed
primarily to lower the cost of hiring migrant workers and to boost government coers, rather than to
genuinely reform the structural deciencies of the sponsorship system that render workers vulnerable to
exploitation and pushes them into irregularity.”
29
INWARD MIGRATION
Stocks
Mid-2017, Bahrain’s population was estimated at 1,501,116, of whom 823,610 (55 per cent) were foreign
nationals.
30
e number of foreign residents rose rapidly during the 2000s and non-nationals accounted
for up to 54 per cent of the total population in 2010. Foreign population declined by 7 per cent in 2011,
probably due to the eruption of civil conict in the country but has been rising again since 2013.
Figure 1: Bahrainis and non-Bahrainis in total resident population
(mid-year estimates, 1995-2017)
Source: Central Informatics Organisation (CIO) and Information & E-Government Authority, Bahrain.
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
% of non-Bahrainis in total population
Population (in thousands)
Bahrainis Non Bahrainis % of non-Bahrainis in total pop.
Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain
Explanatory Note No. 1/2019 7
e prole of the foreign population is that of a predominantly male (74 per cent, or 282 men for
100 women) and relatively young population (mean age is 33.5 years), distorted in its age structure: those
in the working age group (15-64 years age group) formed 89.3 per cent of all non-nationals in 2017.
31
Foreign residents were also little educated on average (82.5 per cent of the total as well as employed
foreign populations have below secondary level education).
32
In Bahrain, the vast majority of foreign nationals have always been from Asia (84.4 per cent in
2010).
33
In 2018, certain Asian nationalities, such as Indian nationals, made up a half of all resident
expatriates (49 per cent), and 47.4 per cent of all foreign workers.
34
Four Asian nationalities together
made up 84 per cent of all foreign residents.
35
e Egyptians numbered 24,033, which made them the
fth most numerous national group and rst among the Arabs residing in Bahrain.
Table 1: Bahrain’s foreign resident population by main countries of origin,
migration status and sex ratio (2018)
e foreign resident population in Bahrain displays great demographic and socio-economic
diversity. e sex ratio in Arab populations is less imbalanced than among Asians. Filipinos are the
only national group made up of a majority of women, probably due to the high share of these nationals
employed as female domestic workers in the GCC region.
Asian populations (Bangladeshis especially) are mostly made up of workers, while Arab populations
comprise mainly family dependents. e high share of family dependents among Yemenis and Syrians
in 2018 is especially worth noting. Four years earlier, in 2014, Yemeni and Syrian nationals comprised
a signicantly lower share of family dependents (46 and 52 per cent, respectively).
36
e change in the
prole of the two communities may indicate that Bahrain accepted some degree of family reunion among
these nationals and received some de facto refugees from the two conicts. More generally, the share
of family dependents among Arabs also suggests that these expatriates, on average, occupy more skilled
Selected countries of
citizenship
Number % Worker
Family
member
India 310,105 48.8 77.8 22.2 420
Bangladesh 128,390 20.2 96.2 3.8 3,464
Pakistan 58,062 9.1 81.4 18.6 609
Philippines 35,596 5.6 89.3 10.7 74
Sri Lanka 5,734 0.9 71.5 28.5 234
Egypt 24,033 3.8 45.4 54.6 145
Jordan 7,773 1.2 41.4 58.6 137
Yemen 6,313 1.0 42.4 57.6 176
Syria 3,717 0.6 39.9 60.1 149
UK 4,150 0.7 58.7 41.3 140
Other nationalities 51,032 8.0 78.2 21.8 208
Total 634,905 100 80.1 19.9 393
Total expatriates Migration status
Sex ratio
(men/100
women)
Source: Authors’ processing of data from the LMRA Expat Management System (EMS), June-July 2018.
Françoise De Bel-Air
Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population8
positions than Asian nationals: like in other Gulf countries, the income level of the expatriate conditions
his/her right to sponsor family members for residency in Bahrain. Of the 126,412 family dependents
recorded in 2018 by the Expat Management System, 68 per cent were females. Spouses made up 38 per
cent of the family dependents, almost all of them (99.5 per cent) female spouses.
In mid-2017, 606,357 persons or 74 per cent of the foreign residents were employed,
37
making up
79 per cent of the total employed population in the Kingdom. Unlike in other GCC states, Bahraini
nationals are mostly enrolled in the private sector (66 per cent of the employed Bahraini population as
of mid-2018). Most of the foreign labourers are also employed in the private as well as in the domestic
sectors: respectively, 83 and 15 per cent of the non-Bahraini employed population.
Foreign labourers accounted for 83 per cent of the private sector’s workforce mid-2018.
38
As regards
their activity, the bulk of the foreign labourers employed in the private sector worked in construction
(34 per cent, and 36 per cent of foreign male labourers), in sales-related activities (22 per cent, and 30
per cent of foreign females in the sector), in manufacturing (12 per cent) and in the accommodation
and food services sector (10.6 per cent). Interestingly, a sizeable share of Bahraini nationals also worked
in these activities, which suggests that the Bahraini labour market is less segmented by nationality than
other Gulf labour markets. Bahrainis working in the manufacturing sector made up 15.4 per cent of
nationals in the private sector, while the construction and trade sectors employed, respectively, 15 and 25
per cent of them, among men as well as women. Another 11 per cent worked in nancial and insurance
activities.
39
e dominance of low-skilled activities among expatriates, especially in labour-intensive sectors
such as construction, explains the rapid turnover of foreign labourers: 43 per cent of recorded private
sector’s foreign employees had been working for less than one year and 59 per cent had stayed for less
than two years. Long-term residents (ten years and more) made up only 8.7 per cent of labourers.
40
Indeed, a half (49 per cent) of all foreign workers were conned to the lowest categories of
occupation
41
and 29 per cent worked in services-related, low-skilled professions in 2010 (Figure 2, last
available data as of 2018).
42
Fifteen per cent of expatriates held managerial and highly-skilled posts that
year.
43
Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain
Explanatory Note No. 1/2019 9
Figure 2: Employed non-Bahrainis by occupation and nationality group
(Arabs, Asians, total) (all sectors, 2010)
Figure 2 also indicates that among foreign labourers, Asian workers were most often conned to services
and blue collar occupations (80 per cent of them as of 2010).
44
Arab expatriates, by contrast, displayed
more diversity in their occupations: 40 per cent of them were in manual low-skilled sectors but almost
a half of these workers were in managerial and higher technical occupations, as opposed to only 12 per
cent of Asians. is illustrates why Arab nationals had a more balanced sex ratio on average and were
often able to benet from family reunion more than Asian nationals, as noted earlier. Mostly low-skilled,
low-paid Asian workers could not meet the required nancial conditions allowing them to bring their
families over to Bahrain, in contrary to the bulk of Arab employees. Nonetheless, as we have seen,
nationals from Asian countries largely outnumber other nationals, up until now. erefore, employees
originating from Asian countries in 2010 were signicantly more numerous in highly-skilled positions
(56,342) than Arab nationals (12,631), and almost as many as Bahraini nationals (73,362). Managerial
and highly-skilled professions were thus mostly staed by locals and by Asians. Given the persistence
of the numeric domination of Asian nationalities in 2018 (Table 1), it is likely that these nationals still
vastly outnumber Arabs and Westerners in the lowest and highest categories of occupations.
Among the 91,852 domestic labourers recorded in the second quarter of 2018, females numbered
69,374, making up 76 per cent of all foreign workers in the sector. Indian, Ethiopian and Filipino
nationals each made up 22 to 23 per cent of domestic labourers, the latter two nationalities being
overwhelmingly females (respectively, 0.2 and 2.7 per cent). e majority of women domestics were
employed as housemaids (97 per cent), while men were private drivers (54 per cent of them), servants
(22 per cent), private gardeners (12 per cent), and cooks (8 per cent).
45
11
47
43
5
7
6
23
27
29
9
4
4
19
21
4
4
5
6
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Arabs Asians Total non-
Bahrainis
% in category
Legislators, senior
officials and managers
Scientific, technical and
human matters
specialists
Scientific, technical and
human matters
technicians
Clerical workers
Sales workers
Services workers
Agricultural and fishery
workers
Industrial, chemical and
food industries workers
Principal and auxiliary
engineering workers
Source: Census 2010, CIO.
Françoise De Bel-Air
Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population10
Flows
As emphasised earlier, Bahrain’s national and non-national resident populations both rose notably
during the 2000s. As of the late 1990s, demographic growth rates in Bahrain had remained relatively
constant at around 2.4 per cent annually for several years. Yet, between 2000 and 2009, a marked increase
in nationals’ growth rates (from 2.4 to 4.2 per cent annually) can be noticed.
e registration of vital events in Bahrain is considered excellent by international standards
46
and
the country publishes vital statistics disaggregated by nationality. is allows for drawing a simulation
scenario of the growth of the Bahraini population, had it been based on natural increase (births minus
deaths) only. As indicated in Figure 3, the actual, observed size of the Bahraini population starts rising
much faster than the simulated national population (that growing through natural increase only) after
2001. An estimate of the unexplained “surplus” within Bahraini population as of 2016
47
is therefore:
B. pop. (2016) - B. pop. (2000) - [(sum of B. births (2000-2016) – sum of B. deaths (2000-2016)]
= 79,290
If we introduce in the calculation the other component of the population increase, the Bahraini
citizens’ migration movements (during the period of 2001-2012),
48
the “surplus” expands:
B. pop. (2016) - B. pop. (2000) - [(sum of B. births (2000-2016) – sum of B. deaths (2000-2016)]-
[sum of B. arrivals (2001-2012)-sum of B. departures (2001-2012)] = 105,366.
is “surplus” of Bahraini nationals, in the range of 79,000 (based on natural increase only) and
105,000 residents (based on natural increase between 2000 and 2016, and migration between 2001 and
2012), thus represented between 12 and 16 per cent of the Bahraini citizens recorded in 2016.
49
Some
of these persons were probably naturalised foreign nationals.
50
Figure 3: e possible eect of naturalisations on the growth of the
Bahraini national population (1995-2016)
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
Annual rate of growth (in %)
Bahraini population (in thousands)
Observed Bahraini population Bahraini population, based on natural increase
Bahraini population, based on natural increase+migration
Annual growth rate of observed B. population
79,000
%
Source: Author’s calculations, based on births, deaths and population gures for Bahraini nationals published by
the Central Informatics Organisation (CIO) and Information & E-Government Authority, Bahrain.
Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain
Explanatory Note No. 1/2019 11
As regards foreign workers, during the 2000s, the number of those granted regular work visas (new and
renewed) alone more than doubled, from 104,000 in 2002 to 217,236 in 2009, despite a moderate decline
in 2008 due to the nancial crisis (Figure 4). Over the 2010s, after initially stagnating between 2009 and
2013, the numbers of “regular” labour permits issued went up and doubled again, to peak at 441,128 in
2016.
51
At rst sight, the upward trend of the number of permits issued thus seems unaected by the
variations in oil prices, especially the sharp drop which occurred after 2013-2014.
However, since that date, some changes occurred in the status of permits issued, with rst-time
permits being outnumbered by renewals of documents: this suggests a decrease in foreign workers’
turnover. In 2007, before the nancial crisis, for instance, rst-time hires made up more than a half (57
per cent) of all permits issued that year. e ratio began falling after 2013, to reach below 40 per cent in
2017.
Figure 4: Flows of foreign labourers to Bahrain by status of permits issued (2007-2017)
e drop in the share of new permits suggests two types of possible changes in the hiring patterns
over the late 2010s. First, business owners may be retaining previously trained labourers in Bahrain,
while increasingly postponing new recruitments. Such a “labour-hoarding” strategy may be indicative
of investors’ lack of condence in long-term economic prospects.
52
Second, the lower rates of workers’
turnover could also signal adjustments of the labour market performed during the decade. e number
of workers’ transfers between sponsors/employers indeed expanded since 2015, from 11,810 during Q1
2015 to 20,000 early 2018. By then, 65 per cent of transfers followed the termination or expiry of
the labourer’s permit.
53
Figure 4 also indicates that the number of work visas’ terminations has been
increasing since 2013, reaching beyond 105,000 for the year 2017.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Terminations of permits (in 1000s)
Work permits issued (in 1000s)
New permits Renewed permits Terminations of permits
Source: MoL (2007) and EMS, LMRA (2008-2017). ese visa gures do not include domestic workers,
business people and temporary workers.
Françoise De Bel-Air
Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population12
at year, the number of all permits issued showed a decrease. From an 11 per cent growth during
the fourth quarter of 2016, foreigners’ employment growth rates sank during 2017 and even became
negative (-1 and -4 per cent) in Q3 and Q4 2017. Early 2018 (Q1 and Q2), the growth rates of foreign
employment were stalling around 0 per cent.
54
Until the end of 2016, certain economic activities had been steadily attracting and retaining foreign
workers as witnessed in the movement of permit issuances by economic activity sector (Figure 5).
55
Most
visas were granted to expatriates bound for the construction sector, especially since early 2014, when
Bahrain’s economy started recovering from the 2008 global economic recession and the 2011 political
crisis. irty-three per cent of all regular worker permits were issued in this category as of Q2 2018.
e retail trade sector, too, has been a magnet for ows of foreign workers, in line with the Kingdom’s
consumption- and service-oriented economy as noted earlier. Hiring in these sectors, however, has been
uctuating since 2016 and could soon be put on hold. In construction, for instance, new contracts have
been declining since 2016 and more labourers are now employed on renewed permits.
56
Figure 5: Number of employment visas issued by major economic sector (Q3 2009 to Q2 2018)
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total number of permits issued
Manufacturing
Construction
Sales and trading
activities
Accommodation and
food service activities
Source: Expatriates Management System (EMS), LMRA. Permit gures are the sum of new
and renewed permits for the year.
Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain
Explanatory Note No. 1/2019 13
As for the inows of foreign residents, in all categories of permits including family dependents,
57
they increased markedly starting 2014, from 329,200 in 2009 to 575,113 in 2017 (Figure 6). Moreover,
the relative distribution between these categories of permits shows a slight change across recent years,
with the share of “regular labourers” gaining in importance, from 66 to 75 per cent of the total. Although
data on permits granted by occupation category are missing to conrm such an assertion, this suggests
that no qualitative change in the skill prole of foreign labourers in Bahrain occurred during the period.
e situation is not likely to change as recent legal measures may not encourage family reunion in
Bahrain. e Bahraini government indeed raised the minimum salary required for foreigners to obtain
family visas from BD250 ($660) to BD400 ($1,060) early 2018.
58
However, 89 per cent of foreign
workers in the private sector, and 86 per cent of those in the public sector, received monthly wages below
this threshold, as of 2018.
59
Figure 6: Flows of foreign residents by type of permit granted (2009-2017)
As noted earlier, the share of family dependents within expatriate populations is an indication of
the skill and occupation prole of the foreign workers: the higher the latter, the more likely they are
to be nancially able to sponsor their next-of-kin for family reunion in the Gulf. In spite of the lower
worker turnover and recent, marked slowdown of recruitments noted previously, the combination of all
permit-related indicators thus reects the continued reliance of Bahrain’s economy on large numbers of
low-wage expatriate workers.
16%
14%
66%
75%
16%
10%
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Number of permits (in thousands)
Family dependent Regular worker Investor Temporary worker Domestic worker
Source: EMS, LMRA and MoL. Permit gures are the sum of new and renewed permits for the year.
Françoise De Bel-Air
Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population14
e upward trend in permit terminations since 2012, growing levels of permit renewals and
sponsorship transfers suggested ongoing adjustments to the labour market, as mentioned earlier (Figure
4). Figures seem consistent with regularisation and/or expulsions of some undocumented workers.
Fighting irregularity and enhancing government control over the labour market is a key concern in
Bahrain like in other GCC countries.
Figure 7: Net migration ows to Bahrain (selected countries of origin, 2000-2012)
As shown in Figure 7, the several campaigns organised by LMRA since its inception, aiming
to regularise or facilitate the exit of foreign workers in irregular situation, did entice some expatriates
to leave Bahrain. In 2010, for instance, LMRA ocials claimed they were planning to send home or
legalise more than 40,000 irregular workers by the end of the year.
60
Indeed, the global net migration
ows (inward minus outward movements of persons across national borders)
61
went down notably
over the period 2009-2011. Among some national communities such as the Indians, as well as among
nationals from African countries, more exits than entries were recorded in 2010. is suggests that some
expulsions of irregulars did take place. A general amnesty period in 2015 permitted 42,000 residents
in irregular situation to x their situation. Seventy-six per cent of them remained in the kingdom after
moving to new employers, while 24 per cent, or 10,125, left Bahrain. Bangladeshi, Indian and Pakistani
workers, respectively, were said to have beneted most from the amnesty.
62
Figures of entries and exits at
Bahrain’s borders, disaggregated by traveller’s country of citizenship, ceased being published after 2012,
but estimates released by LMRA pointed to the presence of some 60,000 illegal workers in Bahrain in
2018, most of them from Bangladesh.
63
In this context, the outcomes of the implementation of the new “Flexi permits” to alleviate irregular
employment is yet to be studied. In April 2018, the LMRA claimed it was issuing “a daily average of
more than 20 exi-work permits,”
64
which shows that the monthly target of 2,000 such permits is
-15,000
-10,000
-5,000
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
net migration flows (persons)
Egypt Bangladesh India Nepal Philippines African countries
Source: Ministry of Interior, gures of entries and exits by country of citizenship (not available after 2012).
Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain
Explanatory Note No. 1/2019 15
still far from reach. Between July and December 2017, 2,600 such permits were granted to previously
irregular labourers.
65
Due to its high costs for workers, as suggested in the introduction, the new measure may not
succeed in decreasing irregular employment and in making Bahrain’s labour market more exible and
fairer for most workers. Enhancing the professional mobility of foreign workers, as well as protecting
them from employers’ abuses, were also the initial goals of the abolition of the “no-objection certicate”
(NOC) in 2009, which prevented labourers from switching kafeel without the latter’s permission. Yet,
most recent data indicate that of the 18,063 workers’ transfers performed during the second quarter of
2018, only 0.3 per cent happened without the employer’s consent.
66
Françoise De Bel-Air
Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population16
References:
AlShehabi, Omar. “Demography and Bahrain’s Unrest.” March 16, 2011. http://carnegieendowment.
org/2011/03/16/demography-and-bahrain-s-unrest/gbpy.
—. “Rootless Hubs: Migration, Urban Commodication and the ‘Right to the City’ in the GCC.” In
Transit States: Labour, Migration and Citizenship in the Gulf, edited byAbdulhadi Khalaf, Omar
AlShehabi, and Adam Hanieh. London: Pluto Press, 2015.
Birks, John S., Ian Seccombe, and C.A. Sinclair. “Migrant Workers in the Arab Gulf: e Impact of
Declining Oil Revenues.” International Migration Review 20, no. 4 (1986): 799-814.
Dito, Mohamed. “Kafala: Foundation of Migrants’ Exclusion in GCC Labour Markets.” In Transit States:
Labour, Migration and Citizenship in the Gulf, edited by Abdulhadi Khalaf, Omar AlShehabi,
and Adam Hanieh.. London: Pluto Press, 2015.
Garner, Andrew. “Strategic Transnationalism: e Indian Diasporic Elite in Contemporary Bahrain.”
City & Society 20, Issue 1 (2008): 54-78.
Gengler, Justin. “Bahrain Drain. Why the King’s Sunni Supporters are Moving Abroad.” Foreign Aairs,
September 5, 2014. http://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/141963/justin-gengler/bahrain-
drain.
Haidar, Sleiman. “Addressing the Demographic Imbalance in the GCC States. Implications for Labour
Markets, Migration, and National Identity,” Workshop Report. LSE Middle East Center,
June 2014, London. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/58121/1/Sleiman-Haidar_Addressing_%20
demographic_%20imbalance_2014.pdf.
Hertog, Steen. “Arab Gulf States: an Assessment of Nationalization Policies.” Research paper No.
1/2014, Gulf Labour Market and Migration (GLMM) Programme of the Migration Policy
Center (MPC) and the Gulf Research Center (GRC), http:// gulfmigration.eu.
Human Rights Watch. “For a Better Life. Migrant Worker Abuse in Bahrain and the Government
Reform Agenda.” HRW, September 30, 2012. https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/09/30/better-
life/migrant-worker-abuse-bahrain-and-government-reform-agenda.
ICG. “Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (III): e Bahrain Revolt.” Crisis Group
Middle East/ North Africa Report no. 105, April 6, 2011. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/
media/Files/105-%20Popular%20Protests%20in%20North%20Africa%20and%20the%20
Middle%20East%20-III-e%20Bahrain%20Revolt.ashx.
Jureidini, Ray. “Wage Protection Systems and Programmes in the GCC.” Research Report No. 01/2017,
Gulf Labour Market and Migration (GLMM) programme of the Migration Policy Center
(MPC) and the Gulf Research Center (GRC), http:// gulfmigration.org.
Kafai, Nazgol and Ala’a Shehabi. “e Struggle for Information: Revelations on Mercenaries, Sectarian
Agitation, and Demographic Engineering in Bahrain.” Jadaliyya, May 29, 2014. http://www.
jadaliyya.com/pages/index/17912/the-struggle-for-information_revelations-on-mercen.
Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain
Explanatory Note No. 1/2019 17
Louër, Laurence. “e Political Impact of Labour Migration in Bahrain.” City & Society 20, Issue 1
(2008): 32-53.
Oxford Business Group. Bahrain: Year in Review 2018, January 2, 2019 https://oxfordbusinessgroup.
com/news/bahrain-year-review-2018.
Seccombe, Ian, and Richard Lawless. “Foreign Worker Dependence in the Gulf and the International
Oil Companies: 1910-50.” International Migration Review 20, no. 3 (Autumn 1986): 548-574.
Zahra, Maysa. “Bahrain’s Legal Framework of Migration.” Explanatory Note No. 2/2018, Gulf Labour
Market and Migration (GLMM) Programme of the Migration Policy Center (MPC) and the
Gulf Research Center (GRC), http:// gulfmigration.org.
Endnotes
1. GDP per capita around $23,000 for 2017, a level similar to that of Saudi Arabia ($21,000), https://databank.
worldbank.org/data/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/14a498/Popular-Indicators.
2. Agreements made between the Al-Khalifa, rulers of Bahrain, and the American and British oil companies.
See Louër 2008: 34.
3. Seccombe and Lawless 1986: 551.
4. Louër 2008: 34
5. e Westerners lled most managerial posts, while clerical and technical workers were predominantly from
the Indian subcontinent as well as Iran and the Arab Middle East. As for the locals, they occupied the lowest
positions, had comparatively mediocre working and living conditions in the industrial sector, and received
lower wages than foreign workers: in 1948, Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) Bahraini employees’
salaries were half that of Indian employees (Lawless and Seccombe 1986: 568).
6. Louër 2008: 35.
7. Gardner 2008.
8. AlShehabi 2015.
9. Oxford Business Group, 2019.
10. AlShehabi 2011.
11. https://lmra.bh/portal/en/page/show/133.
12. Decision No. 79 of 2009, or “Mobility Law.”
13. Art. 1, Decision No. 15 of 2011 Amending Paragraph A of Article 25 of Law No. 19 of 2006 Regulating
the Labour Market, Ocial Journal, Issue No. 3005 ( June 23, 2011), p. 5, Legislation & Legal Opinion
Commission, Kingdom of Bahrain, http://www.legalaairs.gov.bh/Media/LegalPDF/K1511.pdf.
14. https://www.albawaba.com/business/bahrain-minimum-wage-545787.
Françoise De Bel-Air
Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population18
15. Human Rights Watch, 2012.
16. Which requires employers to pay all salaries by bank transfer. See Jureidini 2017.
17. https://www.cipd.ae/people-management/news/bahrain-private-sector-pension; https://www.zawya.com/
mena/en/business/story/Banks_in_Bahrain_gear_up_for_new_wage_system-SNG_113185089/.
18. Human Rights Watch 2012.
19. http://blog.lmra.bh/en/2017/09/19/new-contracts-for-domestic-workers-to-be-enforced-from-october-1/.
20. https://www.migrant-rights.org/2018/03/assessing-bahrains-new-standard-contract-for-domestic-
workers/.
21. https://www.migrant-rights.org/2018/04/bahrain-may-provide-free-healthcare-for-domestic-workers/.
22. http://blog.lmra.bh/en/2016/01/04/lmra-stresses-amnesty-period-success/.
23. https://www.alayam.com/alayam/rst/667133/News.html.
24. http://lmra.bh/portal/en/page/show/325.
25. https://www.cipd.ae/people-management/news/bahrain-exible-work-permit.
26. http://blog.lmra.bh/en/2017/10/15/bahrains-exible-work-permit-model-adopted-by-un/.
27. https://www.migrant-rights.org/2018/08/one-year-since-launch-has-bahrains-exi-permit-lived-up-to-
its-hype/.
28. http://lmra.bh/portal/en/page/show/325.
29. https://www.migrant-rights.org/2018/08/one-year-since-launch-has-bahrains-exi-permit-lived-up-to-
its-hype/.
30. Bahrain Information & E-Government Authority, Statistical Yearbook 2017, “Population Section” (http://
www.data.gov.bh/en/ResourceCenter). e estimates of population growth are based on the results of 2010
census and on the population register’s records.
31. Bahrain Information & E-Government Authority, Statistical Yearbook 2017, “Population Section” (http://
www.data.gov.bh/en/ResourceCenter).
32. e gures refer to census 2010 data (last available data as of November 2018): http://gulfmigration.eu/
population-aged-15-years-old-by-nationality-group-sex-and-highest-education-level-2010/ and http://
gulfmigration.eu/bahrain-employed-population-15-years-old-by-nationality-bahraininon-bahraini-sex-
and-highest-educational-level-2010/.
33. Census data, http://gulfmigration.eu/population-by-nationality-group-and-sex-2010/.
34. Quarterly data taken from the expatriate management system (EMS) of LMRA, http://blmi.lmra.
bh/2018/06/data/ems/Table_07a.xls (workers) and http://blmi.lmra.bh/2018/06/data/ems/Table_60.xls
(family dependents). ese estimates of foreign residents are inferred from gures of expat visa issuances
(GCC workers are not included). erefore, the gures dier slightly from the data released by the Bahrain
Information & E-Government Authority, or data published by the private and public employment’s insurance
schemes GOSI and PFC. EMS data include domestic workers but exclude work visas for artists and certain
other categories of workers in non-civilian organisations (Armed Forces, for instance).
35. Nepalese residents are not included in Table 1, since Nepalese family dependents are only a few. ey are the
sixth most numerous national group with 16,397 residents in Bahrain (workers).
Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain
Explanatory Note No. 1/2019 19
36. See the previous version of this report, http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/35882.
37. Includes all civilian employed persons in the private and public sectors (insured, uninsured, and self-
employed) as well as domestic workers. Mid-2018 (end of Q2 2018, last available data at the time of writing),
employed Bahrainis numbered 158,814 and foreign labourers were 600,857 (LMRA, Bahrain Labour Market
Indicators, Issue 42, Q2, 2018, http://blmi.lmra.bh/2018/06/newsletter_en.pdf ). http://lmra.bh/portal/les/
cms/shared/le/Newsletter/NewsletterQ3(En).pdf.
38. Data extracted from les submitted by the Expatriate Management System (LMRA-EMS), the General
Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI), the Pension Fund Commission (PFC), and the Civil Service
Bureau (CSB) monthly data les to LMRA (source: Table A. Estimated total employment by citizenship and
sector: 2007–2018, http://blmi.lmra.bh/2018/06/data/lmr/Table_A.pdf ).
39. Data is taken from the Expat Management System (EMS) (source: LMRA, Kingdom of Bahrain, based on
data from Bahrain Labour Market Indicators. http://blmi.lmra.bh/2018/06/data/ems/Table_06.xls.
40. LMRA, Kingdom of Bahrain, based on data from Bahrain Labour Market Indicators website http://www.
lmra.bh/blmi, Q2 2018, table 10.
41. “Principal and Auxiliary Engineering Workers” and “Industrial, Chemical and Food Industries Workers.”
42. See http://gulfmigration.org/bahrain-employed-population-by-nationality-bahraininon-bahraini-sex-
and-occupation-2010/. Last available data allowing to measure accurately the distribution of occupations
by nationality. More recent data published by LMRA are not comparable to these data and use dierent
classications for occupations. Data on the occupational distribution of labourers published in Statistical
Yearbooks (Chapter “Labour”) only classify a small share of foreign workers.
43. Scientic, technical and human matters technicians; Scientic, technical and human matters specialists;
Legislators, senior ocials and managers.
44. Last available data on the distribution of occupations by nationality group.
45. Holders of domestic work visas, LMRA Domestic Workers System (DMS). Source: LMRA website’s
dashboard, Q2 2018, http://blmi.lmra.bh/2018/06/mi_dashboard.xml, section “Domestic Visas.” Figures
decreased from 2017, due to the cleansing of more than 13,000 domestic workers’ records during the second
quarter of 2018 (http://blmi.lmra.bh/2018/06/mi_dashboard.xml).
46. As stated in an assessment of Bahrain’s Civil Registration and Vital Statistics System by the UN: “e most
recent quality assessment was in 2006 and the completeness for the registration of all ve vital events was
found to be close to 100%” (UN Technical Report on the Status of Civil Registration and Vital Statistics in
ESCWA Region, United Nations, ESA/STAT/2009/9, p. 4 (§15)), http://unstats.un.org/unsd/vitalstatkb/
Attachment26.aspx.
47. Last data available as of November 2018.
48. e data on arrivals and departures by citizenship are available only for this period.
Françoise De Bel-Air
Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population20
49. Population estimates and vital statistics (births, deaths) disaggregated by nationality are published on the
website of the Bahrain Open Data Portal, and in Bahrain’s Statistical Yearbooks, http://www.data.gov.bh/.
50. is hike in population growth rates during the period could also be due to the following fact: between
2001 (the year of census) and 2007 (the year the Central Population Register (CPR) became operational),
population could only be estimated. In such a case, a share of the population increase would come from the
inclusion of unregistered citizens into the CPR throughout the period.
51. Figures of “regular work visas,” which do not include domestic labourers, temporary workers and business
people. Source: Ministry of Labour records (2002-2007) and Expatriate Management System of LMRA
(2008-2014), Labour Market Indicators, tables 32 and 33, http://blmi.lmra.bh/2018/06/mi_data.xml.
52. As pointed out by Birks, Seccombe, and Sinclair (1986: 810) in a study on Kuwait, a drop in new work
permits issued rapidly followed cuts in government expenditures in the early 1980s, while renewals of permits
simultaneously increased. e authors labelled this process a “labour-hoarding strategy” used by employers at
times of economic uncertainties.
B. pop.
observed
(mid-year)
B. births
(mid-year)*
B. deaths
(mid-year)*
B. pop.
based on
natural
increase
(mid-year)
B. arrivals
(mid-year)*
B.
departures
(mid-year)*
B. pop.
based on
natural
increase +
migration
(mid-year)
Population
growth
rate
(1) (2) (3)
1994 344,479
1995 352,900 10,384 1,477 353,387** 2.42
1996 361,530 10,347 1,521 362,213 2.42
1997 370,377 10,566 1,473 371,306 2.42
1998 379,435 10,810 1,565 380,550 2.42
1999 388,714 11,039 1,601 389,988 2.42
2000 398,221 11,113 1,565 399,536 2.42
2001 409,623 10,700 1,583 408,652 1,220,900 1,216,638 412,914 2.82
2002 427,245 10,491 1,633 417,510 1,307,439 1,299,409 425,540 4.21
2003 445,631 10,929 1,705 426,734 1,406,016 1,400,162 432,589 4.21
2004 464,807 11,512 1,770 436,476 1,548,277 1,544,400 440,354 4.21
2005 484,811 11,846 1,804 446,519 1,722,822 1,723,369 445,972 4.21
2006 505,671 11,847 1,805 456,561 1,885,442 1,895,642 446,360 4.21
2007 527,434 11,986 1,790 466,757 2,024,222 2,025,865 465,114 4.21
2008 541,587 12,601 1,840 477,518 2,269,846 2,266,136 481,228 2.65
2009 558,011 13,213 1,897 488,834 2,438,324 2,445,862 481,296 2.99
2010 570,687 13,543 1,899 500,478 2,219,851 2,227,199 493,130 2.25
2011 584,688 13,518 1,993 512,003 1,124,010 1,133,531 502,481 2.42
2012 599,629 14,121 2,068 524,056 1,531,073 1,546,085 509,010 2.52
2013 614,830 15,007 2,032 537,030 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.50
2014 630,744 15,527 2,105 550,452 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.56
2015 647,835 15,734 2,174 564,012 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.67
2016 664,707 15,376 2,204 577,184 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.57
Source of data: births, deaths, arrivals, departures and population gures (col. (1)) for Bahraini
nationals published by the Central Informatics Organisation (CIO) and Information & E-Government
Authority, Bahrain.
Population gures in columns (2) and (3) are author’s calculations, based on CIO published data.
* Published gures were end-of-the-year gures.
Mid-year gures for year n were obtained the following way: [x (year n) + x (year n - 1)] / 2.
** Pop (2) (1995) = pop (1) (1994)+births (1995)-deaths (1995)
Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain
Explanatory Note No. 1/2019 21
53. Expat Management System (EMS), local transfers of workers holding permits for “regular employment.”
Source: LMRA, Kingdom of Bahrain, based on data from Bahrain Labour Market Indicators website, http://
www.lmra.bh/blmi, table 38a.
54. Source: LMRA, Bahrain Labour Market Indicators’ dashboard for Q2 2018 (last available data as of December
2018), http://blmi.lmra.bh/2018/06/mi_dashboard.xml. Per cent employment growth rates by nationality.
55. Only concerns the permits delivered for the category of “regular employment,” new and renewed (tables 35a
and 36a, Labour Market Indicators, quarterly dashboard, Q3 2009 to Q2 2018, LMRA, http://blmi.lmra.
bh/2018/06/mi_dashboard.xml).
56. Source: tables 35a (new permits) and 36a (renewed permits), Labour Market Indicators, quarterly dashboard,
Q3 2009 to Q2 2018, LMRA, http://blmi.lmra.bh/2018/06/mi_dashboard.xml).
57. Includes all categories of visas processed by the Expat Management System (EMS) of the LMRA: family
dependents, temporary workers, investors and business people, regular workers and domestic labourers.
58. http://www.alayam.com/online/local/702960/News.html.
59. Source: LMRA, Kingdom of Bahrain, based on data from Bahrain Labour Market Indicators website, http://
www.lmra.bh/blmi., table 18.
60. http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=279526.
61. As recorded by the Ministry of Interior at border crossings and published in Statistical Yearbooks under the
“Arrivals and Departures” section.
62. http://blog.lmra.bh/en/2016/01/04/lmra-stresses-amnesty-period-success/.
63. http://blog.lmra.bh/en/2018/04/17/dhaka-delegation-in-talks-over-clamp-on-illegal-workers/#more-3571.
64. http://blog.lmra.bh/en/2018/04/17/dhaka-delegation-in-talks-over-clamp-on-illegal-workers/#more-3571.
65. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:_hdZpqLk0rkJ:www.gulf-insider.com/bahrain-
exi-work-permit-sees-big-response/+&cd=18&hl=fr&ct=clnk&gl=fr.
66. LMRA, Bahrain Labour Market Indicators, Issue 42, Q2 2018. http://blmi.lmra.bh/2018/06/newsletter_
en.pdf. e low turnover of expatriate workers, especially without the sponsor’s consent, was also pointed out
by Steen Hertog (2014: 13).
Françoise De Bel-Air
Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population22
About the Author
Françoise De Bel-Air (PhD) is a researcher and consultant based in Paris, France. A
socio-demographer by training, she specializes in the demography of Arab countries,
especially in the Middle East and the Gulf region. She has been a research fellow at
the French Institute for the Near East (IFPO) in Amman, Jordan for several years
and a part-time Professor at the Migration Policy Centre, EUI. Her research focusses
on political demography, as well as on the demographic and socio-political dynamics
in the region: youth, intergenerational and gender relationships, family structures,
labour and forced migration, migration and population policies. Her recent publications include Chapter
7 “Exclusion, Mobility and Migration” in the Arab Human Development Report 2016 on Youth
and “’Blocked Youth’: e Politics of Migration from the SEM Countries before and after the Arab
Uprisings.” e International Spectator (53): 2018.
Publication Reference: Citations and quotations should always include either the long or the short
reference provided here. Generally the long reference should be used but in exceptional cases (e.g., not
enough room), the short reference may be used.
Long Reference: Françoise De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain,”
Explanatory Note No. 1/2019, Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population (GLMM) programme
of the Migration Policy Center (MPC) and the Gulf Research Center (GRC), http://gulfmigration.org.
Short Reference: F. De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain,”
Explanatory Note No. 1/2019, GLMM, http://gulfmigration.org.
GLMM Mission: e Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population (GLMM) programme is an
international independent, non-partisan, non-prot joint programme of a major Gulf think tank, the Gulf
Research Center (GRC - Jeddah, Geneva, Cambridge), and a globally renowned academic migration
centre, the Migration Policy Centre (MPC - Florence). e GLMM programme provides data, analyses,
and recommendations contributing to the improvement of understanding and management of Gulf
labour markets and migration, engaging with and respecting the viewpoints of all stakeholders.
GLMM Activities: e Gulf Labour Markets and Migration programme will have a wide range of
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GLMM Publications: e e Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population Programme (GLMM)
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Downloading and Further Information: e e paper can be downloaded from the Gulf Labour
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Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain
Explanatory Note No. 1/2019 23
MIGRATION
POLICY CENTRE
