IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 18-1771 (TSC)
Oral Argument Requested
PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, Plaintiff Campaign Legal Center
(“CLC”) hereby opposes the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) and respectfully files this Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment in the above-
captioned matter. Relief in favor of CLC is appropriate because DOJ has failed to conduct a
reasonable search for responsive records and is withholding responsive materials not subject to
the claimed exemptions. This motion is accompanied by and supported by a memorandum of
law, statements of disputed and undisputed material facts, supporting declaration, exhibits, and a
proposed order.
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 1 of 36
ii
Respectfully submitted,
__/s/ Nadav Ariel________________
BUCKLEY LLP
Adam Miller (DC Bar # 496339)
Nadav Ariel (DC Bar # 1023141)
2001 M Street NW, Suite 500
Washington, DC 20036
202-349-7958
amiller@buckleyfirm.com
nariel@buckleyfirm.com
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER
Danielle M. Lang (DC Bar # 1500218)
1411 K Street NW, Suite 1400
Washington, DC 20005
202-736-2200
dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org
Counsel for Plaintiff Campaign Legal
Center
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 2 of 36
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 18-1771 (TSC)
Oral Argument Requested
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 3 of 36
iv
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
FACTUAL BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 2
LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................................................... 9
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................ 10
I. DOJ Has Not Satisfied its Burden to Show that Exemption 5 Applies ............................ 10
A. DOJ Has Failed To Provide Sufficiently Detailed Vaughn Indices ........................... 10
B. DOJ Has Not Satisfied its Burden to Show That the Deliberative Process Privilege
Applies .................................................................................................................................. 12
1. The Withheld Materials Are Not Pre-Decisional .................................................... 13
2. The Withheld Materials Are Not Deliberative ........................................................ 16
3. Withholding Does Not Advance the Purposes of Exemption 5 .............................. 17
C. The Presidential Communication Privilege Does Not Apply ..................................... 20
D. The Attorney Work-Product Privilege Is Inapplicable ............................................... 21
E. The Court May Determine the Applicability of the Claimed Exemptions Via In-
Camera Review ..................................................................................................................... 23
II. DOJ Has Not Shown that it Conducted a Search Reasonably Calculated to Uncover all
Relevant Records. ..................................................................................................................... 23
A. DOJ Has Not Demonstrated the Reasonableness of its Search Process ..................... 23
1. Inadequate Description of Search Process .............................................................. 24
B. DOJ’s Search Was Substantively Deficient ............................................................... 25
1. JMD Ignored CLC’s Well-Defined Reasonable Search Request ........................... 25
2. JMD’s Search Disclosures Indicate It Overlooked Substantial Materials .............. 26
3. CRD’s Search Disclosures Indicate It Overlooked Substantial Material ............... 26
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 27
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 4 of 36
1
INTRODUCTION
In March 2018, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross announced his decision to add a
“citizenship question” to the upcoming 2020 census survey. Widely expected to depress response
rates among certain minority groups, this decision has become a major ongoing national
controversy. This lawsuit is not about the merits of the administration’s decision, but rather about
whether the public has a right to know what information led to that decision and whether the
administration’s public statements and justifications for its decision were truthful. Congress
passed the Freedom of Information Act to “open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.”
Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372, 96 S. Ct. 1592, 1604, 48 L. Ed. 2d 11 (1976); see
also N.L.R.B. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S. Ct. 2311, 2327, 57 L. Ed.
2d 159 (1978) (“The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the
functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors
accountable to the governed.”).
Secretary Ross claimed that he decided to add the citizenship question in response to a
request from the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). That request, memorialized in a letter dated
December 12, 2017 from Assistant Attorney General Arthur Gary to the Census Bureau, stated
that DOJ was requesting to add a question regarding citizenship to the census in order to obtain
data to aid the department’s enforcement of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Shortly thereafter,
on February 1, 2018, Campaign Legal Center (“CLC”) submitted the FOIA requests to DOJ now
at issue seeking documents relating to DOJ’s request. In response, DOJ initially failed to produce
any responsive records despite granting the request expedited processing due to the recognition of
the urgent public interest in the materials at issue. CLC then filed this lawsuit, challenging DOJ’s
failure to timely respond to the FOIA requests. Thanks to pressure from this Court, DOJ has since
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 5 of 36
2
commenced production of responsive materials but has disclosed only a small number of
documents, with many others improperly withheld under overbroad claims of exemption.
CLC respectfully requests that the Court deny DOJ’s motion for summary judgment and
instead grant its cross-motion for summary judgment. First, with respect to the documents that
DOJ is withholding, none of the claimed privileges apply. DOJ’s proffered Vaughn indices are
deficient and fail to provide the court with sufficient information to apply the claimed privileges.
Moreover, the documents are not subject to the deliberative process privilege because they post-
date the agency decisions at issue and therefore are neither pre-decisional nor deliberative; they
are not subject to the presidential communications privilege because DOJ has not established that
they were authored or solicited by the President or his immediate White House advisors on a matter
of presidential decision-making; and they are not subject to the attorney work product doctrine
because they were not prepared in anticipation of litigation. Second, with respect to its searches,
DOJ failed to meet its burden to sufficiently describe the records searched, why only those records
were selected for search and not others, and the search processes. And the limited information that
DOJ did provide revealed substantive deficiencies, raising doubt about the adequacy of the search
due to its limitation to only certain types of records, custodians, and an insufficient use of search
term searches.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 26, 2018, Department of Commerce (“Commerce” or the Commerce
Department”) Secretary Wilbur Ross announced his decision to add a question regarding
citizenship status to the 2020 Census Questionnaire.
1
Secretary Ross claimed that his decision
1
Ex. 1 (Mar. 26, 2018 Memorandum from Sec’y of Commerce Wilbur Ross to Under Sec’y of
Commerce for Econ. Affairs Karen Dunn Kelley on Reinstatement of a Citizenship Question on
the 2020 Decennial Census Questionnaire).
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 6 of 36
3
arose due to a December 12, 2017 request from Arthur Gary, the General Counsel of DOJ’s Justice
Management Division (“JMD”), to add the citizenship question to the 2020 Census Questionnaire
(the “December 12, 2017 letter”).
2
The purported reason for the request was to allow DOJ to better
enforce Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
3
However, as clearly shown by numerous documents
subsequently released by Commerce and DOJ and as concluded by three United States District
Courts, that justification was a pretext.
4
The decision to add the question was made months before
DOJ sent its letter.
5
In a supplemental memorandum, issued months later, Secretary Ross was
forced to acknowledge that the deliberative process for the decision occurred before the December
12, 2017 request.
6
Internal documents recently released by the Commerce Department’s Census Bureau
(“Census”) and DOJ confirm that the decision to add the citizenship question was made well before
DOJ’s December 12, 2017 letter. Likewise, the decision by DOJ to issue the December 12, 2017
letter, providing a rationale for the addition, was also made well before the letter was drafted. On
May 2, 2017 Secretary Ross wrote, I am mystified as to why nothing have [sp] been done in
response to my months old request that we include the citizenship question. Why not?” Earl
Comstock, a commerce official, responded,
“I agree Mr. Secretary. On the citizenship question we will get that
in place.… We need to work with Justice to get them to request
2
Ex. 2 (Dec. 12, 2017 Letter from A. Gary to Dr. R. Jarmin).
3
See Ex. 2 (Dec. 12, 2017 Letter from A. Gary to Dr. R. Jarmin).
4
New York v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 567-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2019);
State v. Wilbur Ross, 358 F. Supp.3d 965, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Kravitz v. U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, 366 F. Supp.3d 681, 694 (D. Md. 2019).
5
Id.
6
Ex. 3 (Jun. 21, 2018 Supplemental Memorandum by Sec’y of Commerce Wilbur Ross Regarding
the Administrative Record in Census Litigation).
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 7 of 36
4
that citizenship be added back as a census question, and we have
the court cases to illustrate that DoJ has a legitimate need for the
question to be included. I will arrange a meeting with DoJ staff this
week to discuss.”
7
Given that Secretary Ross was only sworn in on February 28, 2017, the request to add the
citizenship question must have been one of his earliest actions. What followed, according to
another federal court was “a cynical search to find some reason, any reason, or an agency request
to justify that preordained result.”
8
Specifically, Secretary Ross sought to have DOJ provide a post-hoc justification for the
decision. On August 8, 2017, Secretary Ross inquired “where is the DoJ in their analysis? If they
still have not come to a conclusion please let me know your contact person and I will call the AG.”
9
On September 8, 2017, Mr. Comstock responded that: “I spoke several times with James McHenry
[DOJ] by phone, and after considering the matter further James said that Justice staff did not want
to raise the question… James directed me to the Department of Homeland Securityafter
discussion DHS really felt it was best handled by the Department of Justice. At that pointI asked
James Uthmeier [OGC at Commerce] to look into the legal issues and how Commerce could add
the question to the Census itself.”
10
After DOJ staff initially balked at issuing the request, cabinet-level officials got involved.
A call was set up for September 18, 2017 between Secretary Ross and Attorney General Sessions,
who was “eager to assist” on the request for the citizenship question and ready to “do whatever
7
Ex. 4 (May 2, 2017 email correspondence between E. Comstock and Sec’y W. Ross).
8
State v. Ross, No. 18-cv-01865, 2019 WL 1052434 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019).
9
Ex. 5 (August 8, 2017 email from Sec’y W. Ross to E. Comstock).
10
Ex. 6 (Sept. 8, 2017 memo from E. Comstock to Sec’y W. Ross)
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 8 of 36
5
[Secretary Ross] need[s] us to do” on the issue.
11
With DOJ’s agreement to request the citizenship
question apparently in hand, Census pressed ahead with finalizing the questionnaire and the
printing process. In the meantime, DOJ began drafting the letter, relying on the Commerce
Department’s proposed rationale and work product, and a draft letter provided to it by a Trump
Transition Official.
12
Two months later, on November 27, Secretary Ross contacted DOJ again to
ensure that the request would be timely made, and shortly thereafter DOJ’s Arthur Gary issued the
December 12 letter.
13
Despite this record demonstrating that the DOJ letter was a post-hoc rationalization of an
already made decision, Census continues to claim that the reason it plans to ask the citizenship
question is to enable DOJ to enforce Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”).
14
This
explanation is highly dubious and three separate federal courts have held that it is false and
misleading.
15
The government’s non-political experts have concluded that adding the citizenship
question will result in “substantially less accurate citizenship status data than are available from
11
Ex. 7 (Sept. 18, 2017 email from D. Cutrona to W. Teramoto).
12
Ex. 8 (draft letter requesting reinstatement of the citizenship question); Ex. 9 (Memorandum
from the House Committee on Oversight and Reform Majority Staff to Committee Members
(March 14, 2019)); see also New York v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502,
555 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
13
Ex. 10 (Nov. 27, 2017 email from Sec’y W. Ross to P. Davidson re: Census Questions).
14
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHY WE ASK (2018)
(https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/newsroom/press-kits/2018/why-we-ask-fact-
sheet.pdf) (last accessed May 21, 2019).
15
New York v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 567-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2019);
State v. Wilbur Ross, 358 F. Supp.3d 965, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Kravitz v. U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, 366 F. Supp.3d 681, 694 (D. Md. 2019).
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 9 of 36
6
administrative sources.”
16
DOJ has never previously suggested that ACS data is insufficient to
support their Voting Rights Act claims and the administration has never articulated any reasonable
basis to believe that adding the citizenship question will result in any changes in VRA enforcement.
Independent experts have echoed Census’ internal conclusion and found that “adding a citizenship
question is very likely to undermine the census.”
17
Moreover, the groups that regularly enforce
the VRA in court as well as VRA experts agree that the move will harm, not help, Latino
communities’ voting power and representation.
18
16
Ex. 11, Memorandum from John M. Abowd, Chief Scientist and Associate Director for
Research and Methodology, U.S. Census Bureau, Technical Review of the Department of Justice
Request to Add Citizenship Question to the 2020 Census (Jan. 19, 2018).
17
See American Statistical Association, The American Statistical Association Strongly Cautions
against Addition of a Citizenship Question on the 2020 Census (August 2, 2018)
(https://www.amstat.org/asa/files/pdfs/POL-2020CensusCallForComments.pdf) (last accessed
May 21, 2019); Jan. 26, 2018 letter from six former directors of the Census Bureau to Secretary
Ross (https://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2018/03/27/Editorial-
Opinion/Graphics/DOJ_census_ques_request_Former_Directors_ltr_to_Ross.pdf) (last accessed
May 21, 2019); see also See, e.g., DOJ-MSJ Ex. E, p. 55 (12/22/2017 email from Ron Jarmin to
Arthur Gary explaining that “the best way to provide … block level data with citizenship voting
population … would be through utilizing [data] the Census Bureau already possesses.”)
18
See, e.g., Letter from Chiraag Bains, Dir. of Legal Strategies, and Brenda Wright, Demos, to
Jennifer Jessup, Dep’tl Paperwork Clearance Officer, Dep’t of Com. (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://www.demos.org/publication/demos-sends-letter-urging-department-commerce-reject-last-
minute-addition-citizenship-qu (last accessed May 21, 2019)(“[E]nforcement of voting rights and
other key civil rights laws will be dramatically undermined by adding a question to the census
that is certain to drive down the response rates of communities that already feel under siege from
the current Administration’s constant vilification and targeting of immigrants.”); Letter from
Faiz Shakir, Nat’l Pol. Dir., and Jennifer Bellamy, Senior Legis. Couns., Am. C.L. Union, to
Jennifer Jessup, Dep’tl Paperwork Clearance Officer, Dep’t of Com. (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-comments-opposing-inclusion-citizenship-question-2020-census
(last accessed May 21, 2019) Brief for the Leadership Conf. on Civ. and Hum. Rts. et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, California v. Ross, No. 3:18-cv-01865-RS (N.D. Cal. Jul.
24, 2018) (“Even setting aside the adequacy of current citizenship data for Section 2
enforcement, adding a citizenship question would not help the communities that amici represent
to vindicate their rights under the Voting Rights Act. Indeed, it would have precisely the
opposite effect.”); Letter from Eric Schneiderman, Atty. Gen. of N.Y., et al. to Wilbur Ross,
Sec’y, Dep’t of Com. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-
work/Multi-State-Attorney-General-Letter-re-2020-Census.pdf (last accessed May 21, 2019)
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 10 of 36
7
But the question in this case is not whether the administration’s policy is permissible, but
rather whether the public has a right to know the truth.
19
Public release of documents is particularly
important where other avenues to accountability have failed. In sworn congressional testimony,
Secretary Ross stated that the addition of the citizenship question was added “solely” in response
to DOJ’s request.
20
The glaring inconsistency of Secretary Ross’ statements to Congress with the
available record has been of immense public and media interest.
21
The effects of the decennial
census directly implicate bedrock features of our system of representative government, including
Congressional apportionment. The people have a right to review for themselves all DOJ records
subject to FOIA on this topic.
On February 1, 2018, CLC submitted a FOIA request to the Civil Rights Division, the
Justice Management Division, and the Office of the Attorney General at the Department of Justice
seeking all records pertaining to Mr. Gary’s December 12, 2017 letter to the Census Bureau.
22
In
(“[R]equesting citizenship data would undermine the purposes of the Voting Rights Act and
weaken voting rights enforcement across the board.”).
19
To deny DOJ’s motion for summary judgment, the Court does not need to find that Secretary
Ross’ explanation was false, only that DOJ has not met its burden to establish that withheld
materials are predecisional and deliberative. See infra. Legal Standard.
20
FY19 Budget Hearing Department of Commerce: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 115th
Cong. (2018) (statement of Sec. Wilbur Ross, Commerce Sec.)
21
See, e.g., Salvador Rizzo, Wilbur Ross’s false claim to Congress that the census citizenship
question was DOJ’s idea, WASH. POST, July 30, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/07/30/wilbur-rosss-false-claim-to-
congress-that-the-census-citizenship-question-was-dojs-idea/?utm_term=.b14d19800e60 (last
accessed May 21, 2019); Michael Wines, Census Bureau’s Own Expert Panel Rebukes Decision
to Add Citizenship Question, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 2018, http://www.
nytimes.com/2018/03/30/us/census-bureau-citizenship.html (last accessed May 21, 2019)
22
DOJ Motion Ex. A (FOIA Request). The response of the Civil Rights Division is the subject
of separate litigation for which motions for summary judgment are fully briefed before this
Court. Campaign Legal Ctr. v. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil No. 18-1187 (TSC) (D.D.C.).
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 11 of 36
8
particular, CLC sought (1) documents to, from, or mentioning Dr. Ron Jarmin or Dr. Enrique
Lamas; and (2) documents containing the phrases “2020 census,” “long form,” “citizenship
question,” “questions regarding citizenship,” “ACS,” “American Community Survey,” “citizen
voting age population,” or “CVAP,” dating from January 20, 2017 to the present. This request was
reasonable and narrowly tailored because CLC specified the relevant time period and provided a
detailed list of search terms that were targeted to the addition of the citizenship question and
unlikely to be present in unrelated DOJ records. For instance, Dr. Jarmin and Dr. Lamas are
Commerce Department employees unlikely to have interacted with DOJ in other contexts.
23
CLC’s FOIA request sought expedited processing because there is an “urgency to inform
the public” about the “actual or alleged government activity” covered by the request and because
the requested records involve “a matter of widespread and exceptional media interest in which
there exist possible questions about the government’s integrity that affect public confidence.” 28
C.F.R. § 16.5(e)(1)(iv). CLC addressed its request to three DOJ components. All of them
acknowledged the urgency of the request and granted expedited processing. The Civil Rights
Division and the Office of the Attorney General did so February 9, 2018 and the Justice
Management did so on March 14, 2018.
24
However, only after CLC initiated this and related
litigation against the components did DOJ begin a drawn out process of producing documents.
25
23
See DOJ Motion Ex. A (FOIA Request).
24
CRD Decl. Ex. B (CRD Feb. 9, 2018 Response to FOIA); Exhibit 12 (OIP Division (on behalf
of OAG) Feb. 9, 2018 Response to FOIA). JMD granted expedited processing in a March 14,
2018 phone call with Danielle Lang. CLC confirmed this in a follow up letter on June 22, 2018
letter to JMD. Exhibit 13 (June 22, 2018 Letter from CLC to JMD).
25
Ex. 14 (October 5, 2018 DOJ Letter from M. Posner to D. Lang), (May 7, 2019 DOJ Letter
from M. Posner to D. Lang).
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 12 of 36
9
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where, viewing the record in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dept.
of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In FOIA cases, when an agency claims an
exemption, the burden is on the agency to show that requested material is covered by a statutory
exemption. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 976 F.2d
1429, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1992). “In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view
the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986). To meet its burden, a defendant agency must
“describe the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail,
demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are
not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith.”
Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
When the adequacy of an agency’s search process is at issue, the agency “must demonstrate
beyond material doubt that its search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant
documents.” Palmieri v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 3d 12, 17 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Valencia-
Lucerna v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To make this showing, the agency must submit an affidavit “describ[ing] what records were
searched, by whom, and through what process.” Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. Central Intelligence
Agency, 849 F. Supp. 2d 6, 11 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Steinberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 23 F.3d
548 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment cannot be granted
if “a review of the record raises substantial doubt as to the search’s adequacy, particularly in view
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 13 of 36
10
of well defined requests and positive indications of overlooked materials.” Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of Press v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 877 F.3d 399, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting
Valencia-Lucerna v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
ARGUMENT
I. DOJ HAS NOT SATISFIED ITS BURDEN TO SHOW THAT EXEMPTION 5
APPLIES
DOJ has withheld documents and portions of documents under various separate claimed
categories of Exemption 5 but has failed to sufficiently justified the subject withholding under: the
deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege, and the attorney work-
product privilege. “The strong presumption in favor of disclosure places the burden on the agency
to justify the withholding of any requested documents.” U.S. Dept. of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164,
173 (1991).
Further, “[i]n light of the FOIA’s strong policy in favor of disclosure, … Exemption
5 is to be construed ‘as narrowly as consistent with efficient Government operation.’” Petroleum
Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Ginsburg, J.) (quoting
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87, 93 (1973)).
A. DOJ Has Failed To Provide Sufficiently Detailed Vaughn Indices
An agency may meet its burden of establishing an exemption applies by “formulating a
system itemizing and indexing that would correlate statements made in the [agency’s] refusal
justification with the actual portions of the document,” commonly referred to as a Vaughn Index.
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The index “must be specific enough to
permit a reviewing court to engage in a meaningful review of the agency’s decision.” Hall v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 552 F.Supp.2d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2008). Further, “the need for a detailed
description ‘is of particular importance … where the agency is claiming that the documents are
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 14 of 36
11
protected by the deliberative process privilege under Exemption 5.’” People for the Am. Way
Foundation v. Natl Park Service, 503 F. Supp. 2d 284, 295 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Edmonds
Institute v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 383 F. Supp. 2d 105, 108 n.1.).
However, DOJ’s Vaughn indices contain numerous deficiencies that prevent the Court
from engaging in a meaningful review of whether the exemption is proper. Indeed, OIP’s and
CRD’s Vaughn indices appear intentionally obfuscatory, especially compared to JMD’s more
detailed and clear Vaughn index. For instance:
All three indices fail to set forth the particular “deliberative process” that underlies the
claim of exemption.
OIP’s Vaughn index fails to identify the author(s), dates, or general subject matter of the
materials fully withheld pursuant to the deliberative process privilege.
CRD’s Vaughn index does not provide any bates numbers for documents withheld in
part, leaving this Court and CLC to guess which descriptions correspond to which
documents.
Group 2 of CRD’s Vaughn index identifies that the description applies to “a majority” of
the documents contained in the group but fails to describe the minority of documents
categories in the same group.
Groups 5 and 6 of CRD’s Vaughn index only identify the year the document was created
but do not specify a date while Group 7 does not include any date information.
Given these deficiencies, the Court lacks sufficient information to determine that specific
documents fall within the alleged privileges and whether portions of the withheld documents can
be segregated from those portions which are allegedly exempted from disclosure.
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 15 of 36
12
B. DOJ Has Not Satisfied its Burden to Show That the Deliberative Process
Privilege Applies
DOJ has not met its burden with respect to materials it claims are protected by the
deliberative process privilege because it has not shown that the withheld materials are
predecisional and deliberative in nature. See Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 976
F.2d 1429, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“To qualify for withholding under Exemption 5’s executive
privilege, information must be both ‘predecisional’ and ‘deliberative.’”).
26
Neither OIP nor JMD identify a deliberative process. Instead, both components assert that
documents are shielded by the deliberative process privilege due to their nature as non-final drafts.
Declaration of Vanessa R. Brinkman (OIP Decl.) at 25-27; Declaration of Michael H. Allen
(JMD Decl.) at 17-20. However, as this Circuit has made clear, an agency must identify a
decision-making process. See Access Reports v. Dep't of Justice, 926 F.2d 1192, 1196 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (agency has burden of identifying the decisionmaking process”). Further, drafts are not
automatically exempt. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 297 F.Supp.2d 252, 260
(D.D.C. 2004) (“[D]rafts are not presumptively privileged.”).
CRD erroneously identifies the deliberative process as determining the final contents of
the Dec. 12 letter. Declaration of Tink Cooper (“CRD Decl.”) at 30. However, the relevant
agency decision at issue was the decision by Census to add the citizenship question. Failing that,
the relevant agency decision would be whether DOJ would request the addition and on what basis.
Both of these decisions had been made prior to the creation of the withheld material.
Shielding the drafts wordsmithing the content of the request cannot promote effective
agency decision making because DOJ was not engaging in policy making when it was drafting the
26
The majority of material withheld by DOJ is claimed to fall under Exemption 5; CLC does not
challenge DOJ’s Exemption 6 redactions.
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13
request. It was, instead, drafting an already determined post-hoc rationale for an already decided
policy. DOJ should not be able to use Exemption 5 to shield its deliberations on how to most
effectively obscure the rationale for critical public policy decisions.
As explained by the Supreme Court, “[t]he ultimate purpose of this long-recognized
privilege is to prevent injury to the quality of agency decisions…However, it is difficult to see how
the quality of a decision will be affected by communications with respect to the decision occurring
after the decision is finally reached, and therefore equally difficult to see how the quality of the
decision will be affected by the forced disclosure of such communications[.]” N.L.R.B. v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975).
1. The Withheld Materials Are Not Pre-Decisional
DOJ has not met its burden of demonstrating that the withheld materials were generated
prior to the relevant agency decision being made. “A document is predecisional [only] if it was
‘prepared in order to assist an agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision,’ rather than to
support a decision already made.” Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429,
1434 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Ginsburg, J.) (quoting Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft, 421 U.S.
168, 184(1975)). “The most basic requirement of the [deliberative process] privilege is that a
document be antecedent to the adoption of an agency policy. A post-decisional document, draft or
no, by definition cannot be ‘predecisional.’” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 297
F.Supp.2d 252, 260 (D.D.C. 2004). Here, the evidence shows that the ultimate agency
decisionmaker, Secretary Ross, had decided to add the citizenship question long before the creation
of the withheld materials.
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14
a) The Withheld Materials Were Created After the Decision to
Add the Citizenship Question
The relevant inquiry in determining if a document is predecisional is “whether it was
generated before the adoption of an agency policy.” See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of
Energy, 617, F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Here, the only adoption of an agency policy was the
decision to add the citizenship question to the 2020 Census by the Commerce Department.
On May 2, 2017, Secretary Ross emailed Earl Comstock “I am mystified as to why nothing
have [sp] been done in response to my months old request that we include the citizenship question.”
Comstock responded I agree Mr. Secretary. On the citizenship question we will get that in
place.… We need to work with Justice to get them to request that citizenship be added back as a
census question[.]” See Ex. 4 (May 2, 2017 email exchange between Secretary Ross and Earl
Comstock). Three courts have reviewed these materials and concluded that Secretary Ross made
the decision to add the question months before DOJ agreed to request it and began drafting a letter.
New York v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 567-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2019);
State v. Wilbur Ross, 358 F. Supp.3d 965, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Kravitz v. U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, 366 F. Supp.3d 681, 694 (D. Md. 2019).
27
Everything following Secretary Ross’s
decision was an exercise to manufacture a false justification. See Wilbur Ross, 358 F. Supp.3d at
973. Therefore, DOJ has not met its burden to show that the materials it is now withholding
pursuant to the deliberative proves privilege were “prepared in order to assist an agency
decisionmaker in arriving at his decision.” See Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng’g
Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184 (1975).
27
While the Supreme Court has granted Cetriorari in the New York and California federal
district court opinions while the government has appealed the Maryland federal district court
opinion has been appealed to the 4th Circuit, CLC submits that factual findings by the lower
courts, as opposed to legal conclusions, are unlikely to be reversed.
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15
b) The Withheld Materials Were Created After DOJ’s Decision to
Request the Citizenship Question
Even if DOJ’s decision to request the addition of the citizenship question was an
independent deliberative process (as opposed to a non-deliberative post-hoc effort to provide the
appearance of a purported justification for Secretary Ross’s decision), DOJ has not demonstrated
that these materials were generated prior to that decision. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t
of Energy, 617, F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Notably, some of the withheld material is dated
after the December 12, 2017 letter was sent to the Commerce Department and does not appear to
be part of any separate deliberative process. See e.g. Ex. 15 (Email from S. Flores to I. Prior on
Dec. 19, 2017 (included in OIP’s Mar. 29, 2019 response)); see also OIP Vaughn index entries for
documents OIP-0101 to OIP-0102, OIP-0103, and OIP-0105. DOJ has not put forth any
explanation of what deliberative process was ongoing after the Dec. 12 letter was sent and therefore
has failed to meet its burden with respect to that material.
With respect to materials generated prior to finalization of the December 12 letter,
documents released by the Department of Commerce indicate that DOJ had decided to make the
request by September 18, 2017 at the latest. On that date, Secretary Ross spoke with Attorney
General Sessions who was “eager to assist” in supporting the citizenship question decision and
DOJ was ready to “do whatever [Commerce] need us to do” on the issue.
28
Consistent with that,
on November 27, 2018 Secretary Ross sent an email indicating that Commerce had already
committed itself to adding the question by taking significant steps towards implementing the
addition and was anxious to receive the finalized request it was expecting from DOJ.
29
28
Ex. 7 (Sept. 18, 2017 email from D. Cutrona to W. Teramoto).
29
See Ex. 10 (November 27-28, 2017 email exchange between Secretary Ross and Peter
Davison).
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16
Thus, even if DOJ’s “decision” to issue the December 12 letter is the relevant decision, its
motion and declarations do not meet its burden to show that the withheld materials were “prepared
in order to assist an agency decision maker in arriving at his decision.” See Renegotiation Bd. v.
Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184 (1975). Rather, these documents suggest that
the decision to issue the request for the citizenship question was made well in advance of the
creation of the withheld materials and therefore are not pre-decisional.
2. The Withheld Materials Are Not Deliberative
DOJ has not met its burden to show that the withheld materials are deliberative. Documents
are deliberative if they are “a part of the agency give-and-take of the deliberative process by which
the decision itself is made.” Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.3d 1136, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (A deliberative
document “reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process.”). When determining whether a
document is deliberative, the Court must “must examine the information requested in light of the
policies and goals that underlie the deliberative process privilege.” See Wolfe v. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 839 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Here, documents released by the Commerce
Department and DOJ indicate that the decision to add the citizenship question to the census and
DOJ’s decision to request the addition were both decided at the cabinet level prior to the creation
of the documents at issue. Therefore, the materials do not reflect the give-and-take of the
consultative process.”
The available evidence indicates that Commerce made the decision to add the citizenship
question on its own and later shopped for assistance from other agencies to justify the addition. In
a September 8, 2017 memo to Secretary Ross, Commerce’s Earl Comstock wrote that he discussed
the citizenship question with a DOJ official, but “after considering the matter further [the official]
said that Justice staff did not want to raise the question given the difficulties Justice was
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17
experiencing in the press at the time (the whole Comey matter). [The official] directed me to
the Department of Homeland Security... after discussion DHS really felt that it was best handled
by the Department of Justice. At that point the conversation ceased and I asked … [an official in]
the Department of Commerce Office of General Counsel, to look into the legal issues and how
Commerce could add the question to the Census itself.” See Ex. 6. Similarly, the decision by
Justice to issue the request then appears to have been made during a September 18, 2017 call
between Secretary Ross and Attorney General Sessions. See Ex. 7.
Post-hoc documents providing justifications for a pre-decided policy do not reflect the
“give-and-take of the consultative process.” See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617
F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enft Agency, 811 F. Supp. 2d 713, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Nevertheless, a draft is only
privileged if it contains discussions that reflect the policy-making process. It is not privileged if it
reflects the personal opinions of a writer with respect to how to explain an existing agency policy
or decision.” (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted)). Therefore, DOJ has not met its burden to
show the withheld material is deliberative.
3. Withholding Does Not Advance the Purposes of Exemption 5
Finally, a recently released decision in the Southern District of New York that found that
draft versions of the December 12, 2017 letter were protected by the deliberative process privilege
for “messaging communications” should not control here. See State of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, 2018 WL 4853891 at *2 (18-cv-2921, S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2018) (citing Access Reports
v. Dep’t of Justice, 926 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In that case, the court opined whether
documents deliberating about “messaging” to explain an already made decision to the public can
be protected under the privilege. The court found that they could, but did not provide any analysis
of how the drafts of the December 12, 2017 letter constitute such documents. The letter is not
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18
addressed to Congress, the public, or the press. Id. at *3 (noting that such messaging
communications may involve substantive policymaking). Rather, it is styled as a policy document
from one agency to another requesting a policy change. Indeed, as the court there recognized a
“messaging” communication is not protected under the privilege if it is “little more than
deliberations over how to spin a prior decision.” Id. at *4. If any agency document that may
become public can be categorized as a “messaging” document, then virtually any draft would be
privileged. Cf. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 297 297 F.Supp.2d 252, 260 (D.D.C.
2004) (“[D]rafts are not presumptively privileged.”). Regardless, for the “messaging” deliberative
privilege to apply, the posture of this action places the burden on DOJ to establish that the
documents are messaging documents and were created primarily for that purpose. DOJ has made
no such claim, let alone put forward any admissible facts that would meet this burden.
Meanwhile, DOJ has not met its burden to show that release of the materials would hinder
agency decision-making. “Manifestly, the ultimate purpose of this long-recognized privilege is to
prevent injury to the quality of agency decisions. N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S.
132, 151 (1975). DOJ states that release of the withheld materials would cause harm, but “[a]n
agency cannot meet its statutory burden of justification by conclusory allegations of possible harm.
It must show by specific and detailed proof that the disclosure would defeat, rather than further,
the purposes of the FOIA.” See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242,
258 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also Formaldehyde Inst. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 889
F.2d 1118, 1123-24 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (overruled on other grounds) (“The pertinent issue here is
what harm, if any, the [withheld material’s] release would do to [the agency’s] deliberative
process.”); Lee v. FDIC, 923 F. Supp. 451, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[T] the exemption should only
be invoked when the dangers which motivated the enactment of the exemption are present[.]”).
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19
It is true that Exemption 5 typically protects “recommendations, draft documents,
proposals, suggestions, and other subjective documents,” but “the privilege does not protect a
document which is merely peripheral to actual policy formation; the record must bear on the
formulation or exercise of policy-oriented judgment.” See Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc. v. Cuomo, 166
F.3d 473, 482 (2nd Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, “[t]he mere fact that a document
is a draft is not a sufficient reason to automatically exempt it from disclosure... [T]he policy
reasons for the existence of the privilege must be implicated in order for the Court to find
withholding of information necessary.” Lee v. F.D.I.C., 923 F. Supp. 451, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
See also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 297 297 F.Supp.2d 252, 260 (D.D.C. 2004)
(“[D]rafts are not presumptively privileged.”).
In a case such as this, where the decisions to add the question and make the request had
already been made, withholding these materials cannot encourage open, frank discussion on
matters of policy, because the materials were not generated as part of a process by which policies
are formulated. See New York v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 567-68
(S.D.N.Y. 2019); State v. Wilbur Ross, 358 F. Supp.3d 965, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Kravitz v. U.S.
Dep’t of Commerce, 366 F. Supp.3d 681, 694 (D. Md. 2019). The documents would have been
created regardless of the specter of future publication because they were created as part of an effort
to provide a false justification for an agency decision that had already been made. “Deliberations
about how to present an already decided policy to the public, or documents designed to explain
that policy toor obscure it fromthe public, including in draft form, are at the heart of what
should be released under FOIA… The concern of the privilege is to prevent the chilling of internal
agency discussions that are necessary to the operation of good government; it is not concerned
with chilling agency efforts to obfuscate, which are anathema to the operation of democratic
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20
government.” See Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enft
Agency, 811 F. Supp. 2d 713, 741-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (footnotes omitted).
Accordingly, DOJ has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the withheld
materials qualify under the deliberative process privilege.
C. The Presidential Communication Privilege Does Not Apply
DOJ has not met its burden to show that the presidential communication privilege applies
to the material at issue, communications between DOJ attorneys and an unidentified individual in
the White House seeking advice as to congressional notification of the Department’s request for
a citizenship question. The presidential communications applies only for the narrow purpose of
ensuring that the President receives the best and most candid advice. “The presidential
communications privilege …‘protects ‘communications directly involving and documents
actually viewed by the President,’ as well as documents ‘solicited and received’ by the President
or his ‘immediate White House advisers [with] ... broad and significant responsibility for
investigating and formulating the advice to be given the President.’” Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
United States Dep't of Def., 245 F. Supp. 3d 19, 28 (D.D.C. 2017), aff'd, 913 F.3d 1106 (D.C.
Cir. 2019). The Presidential Communications privilege, like all FOIA exemptions, should be
read as narrowly as possible. Judicial Watch, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 27. The presidential
communications privilege should never serve as a means of shielding information regarding
governmental operations that do not call ultimately for direct decisionmaking by the President.
In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
DOJ has not provided sufficient information for the court to determine whether the
communications were with “immediate advisors in the Office of the President.” See Judicial
Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 245 F. Supp. 3d 19, 28 (D.D.C. 2017) (citations omitted).
DOJ identifies no authors or dates for the subject communications. See Am. Center for Law &
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21
Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 293 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding insufficient
information to apply the presidential communications privilege where the claimant agency
provided only a “bare-bones description of the contents of the withheld materials”). Moreover,
while DOJ states that some communications were with the White House Counsel’s Office, it
describes others as being only with members of the Executive Office of the President, which
suggests that the privilege is inapplicable. See OIP Decl. at ¶ 40; see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
Dept. of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108 at fn1 (drawing a distinction between the Office of the President,
which is not subject to FOIA, and the Executive Office of the President, which is subject to
FOIA.). Moreover, DOJ has not established that the communications at issue concern a
“quintessential and non-delegable Presidential power,or an issue that calls for direct decision-
making by the President as opposed to operational decision-making. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d
at 752-53.
To the extent DOJ argues that materials they claim are protected by the presidential
communications privilege are also protected by the deliberative process privilege, DOJ has failed
also to meet its burden to show that the deliberative process privilege for the same reasons as
described supra at Section I.A.
D. The Attorney Work-Product Privilege Is Inapplicable
DOJ’s claim of work product protection for draft responses to interrogatories issued by
the United States Commission on Civil Rights is misplaced because the documents were not
created in anticipation of an adversarial proceeding. “[A] proceeding, including an
administrative proceeding, should be considered ‘adversarial’ only if the proceeding has
adversaries, i.e., opposing parties. Thus, a proceeding should be considered ‘adversarial’ only if
it is a proceeding in which one party has a claim against another party.” Adair v. EQT Prod. Co.,
294 F.R.D. 1, 5 (W.D. Va. 2013) (citing United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 628
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 25 of 36
22
(D.D.C.1979) in support and explaining that the case stands for the proposition that an
administrative proceeding should be considered adversarial when an opposing party has a
right of cross-examination or to present proof.) (emphasis added).
DOJ has failed to identify an adversarial proceeding for which the documents were
created. Id. (“An assertion that a document is protected by the work-product doctrine must be
established by specific facts and not conclusory statements.”) Its claim that the documents were
prepared in order to draft responses to interrogatories issued by United States Commission on
Civil Rights is insufficient to establish work product protection. See Nat’l Cong. for Puerto
Rican Rights v. City of New York, 194 F.R.D. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting work product claim
over documents created in anticipation of hearings before the City Council’s Committee on
Public Safety and the United States Commission on Civil Rights because the “request for
information does not itself constitute litigation nor does it support a claim of anticipated
litigation.”). Indeed, the United States Civil Rights Commission lacks statutory authority and
historically has only had the power to issue subpoenas and interrogators, hold informational
hearings and make recommendations in reports. See 42 USC 1975b, d. Therefore, it appears that
the interrogatories were not part of an “adversarial proceeding” as required to establish work
product protection. Adair, 294 F.R.D. at 6 (rejecting work product claim where “the party
provided no evidence that the Board proceeding for which the withheld documents were
prepared were adversarial.”); Cf. Kentucky Comm’n on Human Rights v. Inco Alloys Int’l, 161
F.R.D. 671, 672 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (holding that commission investigation documents are not
protected by the work product doctrine because the “Commission is adverse to no one, as they
are not a party to the underlying litigation.”). In addition, DOJ has failed to identify the dates of
the documents, the authors, or subject matter, details required by courts to be included on
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 26 of 36
23
privilege logs to sustain a claim of work product. See e.g. Hill v. McHenry,2002 WL 598331, at
*2-3 (D. Kan. Apr. 10, 2002) (listing requirements of a privilege log). Accordingly, this Court
should reject DOJ’s claim of work product protection and order the production of the withheld
documents.
E. The Court May Determine the Applicability of the Claimed Exemptions Via
In-Camera Review
[The Court “may examine the contents of agency records in camera to determine
whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions[.]” 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(B). In camera review is necessary where: 1) the agency affidavits are insufficiently
detailed to permit meaningful review of exemption claims; 2) there is evidence of bad faith on the
part of the agency; 3) when the number of withheld documents is relatively small; and 4) when the
dispute turns on the contents of the withheld documents, and not the parties' interpretations of
those documents. See Spirko v. U.S. Postal Service, 147 F.3d 992, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
If the Court is unconvinced to overrule Exception 5 and order the disclosure of the
withheld materials, it has discretion to review the withheld materials in camera to satisfy itself
before making a de novo determination as to the applicability of the exemption and whether the
documents are both predecisional and deliberative. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Larson v. Dep’t
of State, 565 F.3d 857, 869-70 (D.C. Cir. 2009).]
II. DOJ HAS NOT SHOWN THAT IT CONDUCTED A SEARCH REASONABLY
CALCULATED TO UNCOVER ALL RELEVANT RECORDS.
A. DOJ Has Not Demonstrated the Reasonableness of its Search Process
DOJ’s declarations fail to provide sufficient information for the Court to conclude that its
searches were reasonable. Agency declarations must “describe what records were searched, by
whom, and through what processes.” Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y v. Internal Revenue Serv.,
208 F.Supp.3d 58, 69 (D.D.C. 2016). An agency’s declaration is inadequate where it fails “to
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 27 of 36
24
describe the records [components] normally maintain, why they were selected for the search, or
why others were excluded.” Palmieri v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 3d 12, 18 (D.D.C. 2016).
DOJ’s declarations are deficient because they fail to provide a sufficient description of DOJ’s
search processes.
1. Inadequate Description of Search Process
JMD fails to meet its burden to adequately describe how it conducted its searches. See
Palmieri v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 3d 12, 17 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting DeBrew v. Atwood, 792
F.3d 118 (D.C.Cir.2015)) (Agency must submit “[a] reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the
search terms and the type of search performed.”). The Allen declaration does not meet this
standard because it does not describe how records were searched beyond a conclusory statement
that a single official “conducted a manual search of his emails for responsive records. JMD Decl.
at ¶ 7. It does not set forth “the search terms used” or “the type of search performed.” Palmieri,
194 F. Supp. 3d 12, 17 (D.D.C. 2016).JMD failed to describe “by what process” its records were
searched. It does not explain what search terms were used, what is entailed by a “manual search”
of an email, or which inbox files were searched.
OIP also fails to meet its burden to adequately describe its search. See Sea Shepherd
Conservation Soc’y v. Internal Revenue Serv., 208 F. Supp. 3d 58, 69 (D.D.C. 2016) (agency
declarations must “describe what records were searched, by whom, and through what process.”)
OIP did not describe what records it searched because it did not identify the custodians whose
records were searched. It only declares that searches “were performed for a total of ten records
custodians,” identifying just two, and then only by position. See OIP. Decl. at ¶ 15.
Thus, DOJ has not met its burden of proving that its “search was reasonably calculated to
uncover all relevant documents” because it did not provided sufficient information for the Court
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 28 of 36
25
or CLC to understand the extent of its search. Palmieri, 194 F. Supp. 3d at 17 (D.D.C. 2016).
Summary judgment for DOJ must therefore be denied.
B. DOJ’s Search Was Substantively Deficient
To the extent DOJ did disclose information about its search, the disclosure raises
substantial doubt as to the adequacy of the search and indicates multiple deficiencies. Substantial
doubt precluding summary judgment exists when (i) the plaintiffs have set out well-defined
requests, and (ii) there are positive indications of overlooked materials. See Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of Press v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 877 F.3d 399, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting
Valencia-Lucerna v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Both of those factors are present here.
1. JMD Ignored CLC’s Well-Defined Reasonable Search Request
Regarding the first factor, CLC provided a well-defined and narrow request in which it
carefully detailed the objective of its request, the types of materials it believed would satisfy its
request, and seven particular search terms that would help locate responsive material. CLC sought
documents containing the phrases “2020 census,” “long form,” “citizenship question,” “questions
regarding citizenship,” “ACS,” “American Community Survey,” “citizen voting age population,”
or “CVAP.” In contrast to the specificity of CLC’s request, JMD’s performed a “manual search”
of a single email account without explaining what search terms or parameters it used. Presumably
JMD did not employ any of CLC’s requested search terms. See Wiesner v. Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, 577 F. Supp. 2d 450, 458 (D.D.C. 2008) (court harbored “substantial doubt” as to
adequacy of search because of FBI’s “failure to explain adequately why it did not search its files
using the additional search terms supplied by the plaintiff in his February 28, 2006 letter to the
FBI.”).
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26
2. JMD’s Search Disclosures Indicate It Overlooked Substantial
Materials
Regarding the second factor, JMD’s statements indicate that its search overlooked
responsive material. JMD appears to have failed to search any paper records or any electronic
records beyond a single email account. Such a limited search undoubtedly failed to account for
responsive paper records and non-email electronic files (e.g. Word documents). See Cause of
Action v. Internal Revenue Serv., 253 F. Supp. 3d 149, 157–158 (D.D.C. 2017) (agency’s initial
declaration was inadequate because agency was required, in part, “to explain why it looked where
it did and used the search terms it selected,” but had failed to do so.).
3. CRD’s Search Disclosures Indicate It Overlooked Substantial
Material
CRD only searched the electronic records of two custodians, Chris Herren and John Gore.
See CRD Decl. at 6, 9. This is despite DOJ producing emails, apparently produced in that search,
with other CRD employees. See, e.g., DOJ MSJ Ex. E (Doc. # 22-6 p. 76) (Nov. 1, 2017 email
between John Gore, Chris Herren, and Ben Aguiñaga). DOJ has also, in other litigation, released
email correspondence between Ben Aguiñaga and John Gore related to the citizenship question
that it has not mentioned in any of its responses to CLC. See Ex. 16 (June 12, 2018 email from
Ben Aguiñaga to John Gore). These omissions indicate that its search was not reasonably
calculated to uncover all relevant documents.
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27
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff Campaign Legal Center respectfully requests that
the Court deny summary judgment in favor of Defendant DOJ, grant summary judgment in favor
of CLC, and order DOJ to (i) supplement its search for responsive materials to address its
deficiencies and (ii) produce all responsive materials that are not properly exempt. Alternatively,
CLC respectfully requests that the Court review the withheld materials in camera to determine the
applicability of Exemption 5.
Respectfully submitted,
__/s/ Nadav Ariel________________
BUCKLEY LLP
Adam Miller (DC Bar # 496339)
Nadav Ariel (DC Bar # 1023141)
2001 M Street NW, Suite 500
Washington, DC 20036
202-349-7958
amiller@buckleysandler.com
nariel@buckleysandler.com
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER
Danielle M. Lang (DC Bar # 1500218)
1411 K Street NW, Suite 1400
Washington, DC 20005
202-736-2200
dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org
Counsel for Plaintiff Campaign Legal
Center
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 18-1771 (TSC)
Oral Argument Requested
PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
NOT IN GENUINE DISPUTE AND STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
UNDISPUTED FACTS
Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(h), Plaintiff Campaign Legal Center (“CLC”) hereby sets
forth its response to Defendant DOJ’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and further submits
its statement of additional material facts as to which there is no genuine issue.
CLC has no basis on which to dispute or accept paragraphs 4-9 of Defendant’s statement.
CLC disputes paragraph 10 of Defendant’s statement to the extent it states “JMD
determined that some limited information could be withheld as exempt from disclosure under
FOIA Exemptions (b)(5) and (b)(6).” There are legal conclusions which CLC strongly contests.
CLC has no basis on which to dispute or accept paragraphs 18-32 of Defendant’s statement.
CLC has no basis on which to dispute or accept paragraph 34 of Defendant’s statement.
CLC has no basis on which to dispute or accept paragraphs 45-58 of Defendant’s statement.
CLC has no basis on which to dispute or accept paragraphs 60-61 of Defendant’s statement.
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 32 of 36
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CLC disputes paragraph 62 of Defendant’s statement to the extent it states that “the Civil
Rights Division searched for records responsive to the request using the most comprehensive
search term and by reviewing emails involving relevant personnel.” The statement is a legal
conclusion which CLC strongly contests.
CLC disputes the entirety of paragraph 63 of Defendant’s statement. The paragraph is a
legal conclusion which CLC strongly contests.
CLC has no basis on which to dispute or accept paragraph 64 of Defendant’s statement.
CLC disputes the entirety of paragraphs 71-73 of Defendant’s statement. The paragraph is
a legal conclusion CLC strongly contests.
In addition, there is no genuine dispute with respect to the following additional material
facts:
1. On May 2, 2017 Secretary Ross wrote in an email to Earl Comstock, a Commerce
official, “I am mystified as to why nothing have [sp] been done in response to my months old
request that we include the citizenship question. Why not?” On the same day, Earl Comstock
responded, “I agree Mr. Secretary. On the citizenship question we will get that in place.… We
need to work with Justice to get them to request that citizenship be added back as a census
question, and we have the court cases to illustrate that DoJ has a legitimate need for the question
to be included. I will arrange a meeting with DoJ staff this week to discuss.” Ex. 4.
2. On August 8, 2017, Secretary Ross wrote in an email to Earl Comstock “where is the DoJ
in their analysis? If they still have not come to a conclusion please let me know your contact
person and I will call the AG.” Ex. 5.
3. On September 8, 2017, Earl Comstock responded, “I spoke several times with James
McHenry [DOJ] by phone, and after considering the matter further James said that Justice staff
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did not want to raise the question… James directed me to … the Department of Homeland
Security… after discussion DHS really felt it was best handled by the Department of Justice. At
that point… I asked James Uthmeier [OGC at Commerce] to look into the legal issues and how
Commerce could add the question to the Census itself.” Ex. 6.
4. On September 17, 2017, Danielle Cutrona, a DOJ official, wrote in an email to Wendy
Teramoto, a Commerce official, “The Attorney General is available on his cell… [I]t sounds like
we can do whatever you all need us to do and the delay was due to a miscommunication. The AG
is eager to assist.” Ex. 7.
5. In October, 2017, a Trump transition official provided John Gore, the DOJ official who
was the principal drafter of the Dec. 12, 2017 letter, with “a draft letter that would request the
reinstatement of the citizenship question on the census questionnaire” using the Voting Rights
Act as the basis for the request. Ex. 8; Ex. 9.
6. On November 27, 2017, Wilbur Ross wrote in an email to Peter Davidson, a DOJ
official, “Census is about to begin translating the questions into multiple languages and has let
the printing contract. We are out of time. Please set up a call for me tomorrow with whoever is
the responsible person at Justice. We must have this resolved.” Ex. 10.
7. On December 12, 2017, Arthur E. Gary sent a letter to the Census Bureau requesting that
a citizenship question be added to the 2020 Census Questionnaire. Ex. 2.
8. On March 26, 2018, Secretary Ross issued a memorandum regarding the reinstatement of
a citizenship question on the census. Ex. 1.
9. On June 21, 2018, Secretary Ross caused the Census Bureau to file a supplemental
memorandum to the administrative record regarding the deliberative process for adding the
citizenship question to the census. Ex. 3.
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Respectfully submitted,
__/s/ Nadav Ariel________________
BUCKLEY LLP
Adam Miller (DC Bar # 496339)
Nadav Ariel (DC Bar # 1023141)
2001 M Street NW, Suite 500
Washington, DC 20037
202-349-7958
amiller@buckleyfirm.com
nariel@buckleyfirm.com
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER
Danielle M. Lang (DC Bar # 1500218)
1411 K Street NW, Suite 1400
Washington, DC 20005
202-736-2200
dlang@campaignlegalcenter.org
Counsel for Plaintiff Campaign Legal
Center
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 35 of 36
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this 22th day of May, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing document
with the Clerk of Court via ECF, which will send electronic notification of such filing to all counsel
of record.
__/s/ Nadav Ariel_________
Nadav Ariel
Counsel for Plaintiff Campaign Legal
Center
Case 1:18-cv-01771-TSC Document 23 Filed 05/22/19 Page 36 of 36