The 1964 Civil Rights Act: The Crucial Role of Social Movements in the Enactment and Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Law

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The 1964 Civil Rights Act: The Crucial Role of Social Movements The 1964 Civil Rights Act: The Crucial Role of Social Movements

in the Enactment and Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Law in the Enactment and Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Law

Gerald Rosenberg

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Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Law," 49 Saint Louis University Law Journal 1147 (2004).

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THE

1964

CIVIL

RIGHTS

ACT:

THE

CRUCIAL

ROLE

OF

SOCIAL

MOVEMENTS

IN

THE

ENACTMENT

AND

IMPLEMENTATION

OF

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

LAW

GERALD

N.

ROSENBERG*

The

1964

Civil

Rights Act'

is

the

most

important

and

potentially

powerful

anti-discrimination

law

ever

enacted

by

the

U.S.

Congress.

Although

the

majestic

guarantee

of

equal

protection

was

enshrined

in

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

in

1868,

it

took

nearly

another

century

before

all

three

branches

of

government

were

willing

to

act in

a

meaningful

way

to

enforce

it.

What

led

the

Congress

to

act?

Why

has

the

implementation

of

the

Act ebbed

and

flowed?

What

do

the

answers

to

these

questions

suggest about

its

future

implementation

and

the

future

of

anti-discrimination

law

more

generally?

1.

THE

CONVENTIONAL

STORY

Most

lawyers

will say,

as

an

article

of

faith,

that

the

1964

Civil Rights

Act

was

largely

the

result

of

the

1954

Brown

decision.

2

In

Brown,

the

Court

held

that

race-based

segregation

of

elementary

and

secondary

public

schools

violated

the

Fourteenth

Amendment.

3

The

conventional

story

is

that

the

principle

announced

in

Brown,

that

"separate

but

equal"

was

inherently

unequal,

quickly

spread

from

schools

to

all

walks

of

life,

leading

Congress

to

act.

Indeed,

most

commentators

(and

I

assume

most

readers)

have

"little

doubt'

4

about

the compelling

nature

of

this

story.

As C.

Herman

Pritchett

put

it

in

1964,

"[I]f

the

Court

had

not

taken

that

first

giant

step

in

1954,

does

anyone

think

there

would

now

be

a

Civil

Rights

Act

of

1964T,

5

The conventional

story

also

suggests

that

after passage

of

the

Act

the

interplay

between

legislation and

adjudication

has

been

the

determining

factor

of

its

efficacy.

In

particular,

judicial

interpretation

and

enforcement

of

the

Act

*

Associate

Professor

of

Political

Science

and

Lecturer

in

law,

University

of

Chicago.

1. Pub.

L. No.

88-352,

78

Stat.

241

(1964).

2.

Brown

v.

Bd.

of

Educ., 347

U.S.

483

(1954).

3.

Id.

at

493.

4.

See

Charles

Lawrence,

"One

More

River

to

Cross

"-Recognizing

the

Real

Injury

in

Brown:

A

Prerequisite

to

Shaping

New

Remedies,

in

SHADES

OF BROWN:

NEW

PERSPECTIVES

ON

SCHOOL

DESEGREGATION

49

(Derrick

Bell

ed.,

1980).

5.

C.

Herman

Pritchett,

Equal Protection

and

the

Urban

Majority,

58

AM.

POL.

SCI.

REV.

869,

869

(1964).

1147

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has

determined

its

strength

in

combating discrimination.

In

other

words,

continuing implementation

of

the

Act depends

to

a

large

extent

on

the

reception

it

receives

in the

courts.

To

fight

discrimination,

then,

the

battle

must be waged

in the

courts.

This,

too,

is

the

conventional

wisdom.

In

this

short

article

I

suggest

that the conventional

story

is

both

wrong

and

misleading.

It is

wrong

because

it

misses

the

underlying

structure

of

the

battle

against

discrimination.

The

battle

is,

and

has

always

been, political.

Thus,

the

conventional

story

is

off

base

on

two key

points. First,

it

under-appreciates

the

role

of

the

civil

rights

movement

in

the

creation

of

the

1964

Act. Second,

it

gives

insufficient

attention

to

the

role

of

social

movements in

its

implementation.

It

abstracts

courts

and law

from

the

broader

society

in

which

they

operate.

Thus

the conventional

story

is

misleading

because

it

suggests

implementation

is

possible without

political mobilization.

In

the

rest

of

this

article

I

elaborate

on

these

points.

In

the

final

section,

I

illustrate the argument

by

considering

how

women

mobilized

to

put teeth

into

the

prohibition

of

discrimination

on

the

basis

of

sex

contained

in

Title

VII

of

the

Act.

H.

THE

ENACTMENT

OF THE

1964

CIvIL

RIGHTS

ACT

Contrary

to

the

conventional

story,

there

is

scant

evidence

that

Brown

6

contributed

much

to the

passage

of

the

1964

Civil

Rights

Act.

The

Act

owes

its

existence

to the

civil

rights

movement

of

the early

1960s

that

created

a

political

and

moral

force

that

moved

Congress

and

the

courts.

Consider,

for

example,

how

presidents

reacted

to

the

Brown

decision.

President

Eisenhower

refused to endorse

the

decision.

Although

he

did

send

the

101st

Airborne to

Little

Rock,

Arkansas,

in

response

to

violence

and

the

violation

of

federal

court orders,

he made

no

major

effort

to

end discrimination.

As

Roy

Wilkins,

the

Executive

Secretary

of

the

National Association

for

the

Advancement

of

Colored People

(NAACP),

put

it,

"[I]f

he

had

fought

World

War

1

the

way

he

fought

for

civil

rights,

we

would

all

be

speaking

German

today."

7

President Kennedy

was

little

better.

During

the

1960

campaign

he

stated

that the

President could

end

discrimination

in

federally

assisted housing

with

the

stroke

of

a

pen,

but

it

took

over

a

year-and-a-half

and

an

"Ink

for Jack"

campaign

that flooded the White

House

With

ink bottles before

a

"watered-

down,

non-retroactive

order"

was

issued.

8

The

Kennedy

administration

offered

no civil

rights bill

until

February

1963,

and

the

bill

it

offered

then

was

"a

collection

of

minor

changes

far

more

modest

than

the

1956

Eisenhower

6.

See

GERALD

N.

ROSENBERG,

THE

HOLLOW

HOPE:

CAN

COURTS

BRING

ABOUT

SOCIAL

CHANGE?

107-56

(1991).

7.

ROY

WILKINS

&

TOM

MATHEWS, STANDING FAST:

THE

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

OF

ROY

WILKINS

222

(1982).

8. VICTOR

S.

NAVASKY.

KENNEDY JUSTICE

97

(1971).

[Vol.

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THE

1964 CIVIL

RIGHTS

ACT

program."

9

When

a

House subcommittee

modified

and

strengthened the

bill,

Attorney

General Robert Kennedy met

with

the

members

of

the full

Judiciary

Committee

in

executive

session

and

"criticized

the

subcommittee

draft

in

almost

every

detail."'

0

The

President

specifically

objected

to the

prohibition

of

job

discrimination

that

became

Title

VII,

the

provision

making

the

Civil

Rights

Commission

a

permanent

agency,

the

provision

empowering

the attorney

general

to

sue

on

behalf

of

individuals

alleging

racial

discrimination,

and

the

provisions

mandating

no

discrimination

in

federally funded

programs

and

allowing

fund

cut-offs."

The conventional story

finds

no

support

in the

tepid

efforts

of

both Eisenhower

and Kennedy

in

reaction

to

Brown.

President

Johnson

was

supportive

of

civil

rights.

He

lobbied

hard for

the

Civil Rights

Act.

He gave several

moving speeches

to

Congress

and

the

nation

in

support

of

the

1964

Civil

Rights

Act

(and

the

1965

Voting

Rights

Act).

In

those

speeches,

however,

he

focused

on

the

violence that

peaceful

black

protesters

were

subjected

to,

the

unfairness

of

racial

discrimination,

and

the

desire

to

honor

the

memory

of

President

Kennedy,

not

Court

decisions.'

2

The

legislative

history

of

the

Act

also

provides

no

evidence

for

the

conventional

story.

If

the

conventional

story

is

correct,

one

would

have

expected

at

least

some

Senators

to

talk about

the

constitutional

mandate

in

Brown

as

an

argument

for passing

the

bill

during

the

Senate debate,

but

this

is

not

the

case.

In

the

lengthy

Senate debates

there

was

hardly

a

mention

of

Brown.

Among

the

approximately

four

million

words spoken

in

the

Senate,

references

to

Brown

can

be

found

on

only

a

few

dozen

out

of

many

thousands

of

pages

of

debate.'

3

While

much

of

the

focus

of

the

debate

was

on

the

constitutionality

of

the

proposed

legislation,

and

on

the

Fourteenth

Amendment,

the

concern

was

not

with how

Brown

mandated

legislative

action,

or

even

how

Brown

made

such

a

bill

possible. This

is

surprising

because

it

would

have been

very

easy

for

pressured

and

uncertain

members

of

Congress

to

shield

their

actions

behind

the

constitutional

mandate

announced

by

the

Court.

That

they

did

not credit

the

Court

with

affecting

their

decisions

prevents

the debates

from providing

evidence

for

the

conventional

story. Thus,

there does not

appear

to

be

evidence

for

the

influence

of

Brown

on

legislative

action.

9.

GARY ORFIELD,

THE

RECONSTRUCTION OF

SOUTHERN EDUCATION:

THE

SCHOOLS

AND

THE

1964

CIVIL

RIGHTS

ACT

24

(1969).

10.

DANIEL

M.

BERMAN,

A

BILL

BECOMES

A

LAW:

CONGRESS

ENACTS

CIVIL RIGHTS

LEGISLATION

21-22

(2d

ed.

1966);

see

also

CHARLES

WHALEN

&

BARBARA

WHALEN,

THE

LONGEST

DEBATE:

A

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

OF

THE

1964

CIVIL

RIGHTS

ACT

44-45

(1985).

11.

BERMAN,

supra

note

11,

at

22-23;

Jack

Greenberg,

Preface

to

Blacks

and

the

Law,

407

ANNALS

AM.

ACAD. POL.

&

SOC.

SCI.

ix,

ix (1973).

12.

ROSENBERG,

supra

note

6,

at

121.

13.

Id..

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What,

then, led

to

congressional

action

and

the

passage

of

the

Act?

The

answer

is

the

civil

rights

movement

and

the political

pressure

it

created. From

the

Montgomery

bus

boycott

to

the

sit-ins

to

the

Freedom

Rides

to

the

Birmingham

demonstrations

of

1963

to

the March

on

Washington,

the

civil

rights movement

raised

the

issue

of

racial

discrimination

in

a

way

that

was

impossible

to

ignore.

This

was

especially

the

case

when

peaceful

protestors

were

met with violence

from

local

whites

and

from

local

police,

and

when

the

press covered

it.

When Birmingham,

Alabama

Police Commissioner

Bull

Connor's

police

unleashed

vicious

attack

dogs

and

sprayed

high-power

water

cannons

on

unarmed,

peaceful

protestors,

some

of

whom

were

children,

and

the national

media

recorded

it,

the

nation

was

aghast.

It was the

courage

of

the

protestors,

and

the national

unmasking

of

the

viciousness

of

racial

segregation,

that

created

the

pressure

for civil

rights.

Civil rights

action,

especially

in

the

1960s,

was

based

in

large

part

on

the

elite

belief

that,

unless

there

was

federal

action

on

civil

rights,

mass

bloodshed would

occur.

As

Berman

notes,

"First

President

Kennedy

and then

President

Johnson,

as

well

as

the

bipartisan

leadership

in

Congress,

came

to

the

conclusion

that only

a

strong

civil

rights

bill

could possibly

prevent

widespread

racial

bloodshed

and

utter

catastrophe

for

the

nation."'

4

The

fear

of

violence,

not

the

inspiration

of

Court

action, was

most clearly

a

major impetus

for federal

action.

The

lesson

to

be

drawn

from

this

brief

history

is

that

enacting

powerful

anti-discrimination

law

requires

political

mobilization.

Members

of

Congress

are

unlikely

to

take

courageous

positions

unless

they

are

pressured

to

do

so.

Brown

was

decided

in

1954,

but

the Congress

did

not

act

for

a

decade. What

was

missing

was

powerful

political

mobilization,

When

that

mobilization

occurred, Congress

responded.,

III.

IMPLEMENTATION

If

the

enactment

of

the

1964

Civil

Rights

Act

was

the

result

of

political

mobilization,

what

about

its

implementation?

Here,

too,

the

evidence

points

to

political

mobilization

as

key.

The conventional

story

abstracts

courts

and

judges

from

the social

and

political world

in

which

they

live.

Judges

do

not

come

out

of

thin

air;

they

are

appointed

through

a

decidedly

political

process.

The

more

political

mobilization

there

is

around

anti-discrimination

law,

the

more

likely

it

is

that

judges

will be appointed

who

are

sympathetic

to

its aims.

This suggests

that

the

future

of

anti-discrimination

law

largely depends

on

political mobilization.

The

movement

that

pressured

Congress

to

act

in

1964

has

never

again

reached

the

same

level

of

power

and

thus

influence.

The

result

has been

a

fluctuation

in

the

Act's

implementation.

The point

is

simple:

without

the

kind

of

political

14.

BERMAN,

supra

note

11,

at

139.

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ACT

mobilization

that

led

to

passage

of

the

Act,

the

battle

to

end

discrimination

is

unlikely

to

make

major

strides.

The

crucial

role

of

political

mobilization

is

well illustrated

by

the

treatment

of

sex

discrimination

in

Title

VII.

I5

Interestingly,

although

the

Act

was

designed

to

end

discrimination

against

African-Americans,

women

have

greatly

benefited.

This

is

largely

because

of

the

political

mobilization

of

women

that

occurred

in

the

late

1960s

and

early

1970s.

The

inclusion

of

the

prohibition

of

sex

discrimination

in

Title

VII

appears

to

have resulted

in

large

part

from

the

failure

of

a

tactical

move

by

opponents

of

the

civil

rights

bill.'

6

The thinking

was

that

prohibiting

sex

discrimination

in

hiring

was such

a

silly

idea

that

its

inclusion

in

the

bill

would

doom

it.

The

amendment

was

introduced

as

"my

little amendment"

by

Representative

Howard

W.

Smith,

chairman

of

the

House

Rules

Committee

and

an

implacable

opponent

of

civil

rights.1

7

In

support

of

his

amendment,

Smith

read

a

letter

to

the

House

from

a

woman

complaining

that

there

were

2,661,000

more

women

than

men and

asking Congress

to

do something

about it.'

8

"I

read

that

letter,"

Smith

said

on

the

floor

of

the

House,

"just

to

illustrate

that

women

have

some

real

grievances."'

19

After

this

action

that,

Caroline

Bird

reports,

"brought

down

the

house,"

20

Smith

opposed

transferring

the amendment

to

Title

X,

Miscellaneous,

because,

as he

put

it,

"women

are

entitled

to

more

dignity

than

that.",

2

1

The

sex

amendment

was

supported

by

a

host

of

Southern

members

distinguished

by

their

historic

opposition

to

civil

rights

and

was

opposed

by

strong

liberal

supporters

of

the

bill such

as

Representatives

John

Lindsay,

22

Frank Thompson,

and

Edith

Green,

author

of

the

Equal

Pay

Act.

Unions

supportive

of

making

racial

discrimination

illegal opposed

the

amendment,

as

did Esther

Peterson,

Director

of

the

Women's

Bureau

and

Assistant

Secretary

of

Labor.

23

Yale

law

professor

Alexander

Bickel

criticized

the

amendment

in

the

New

Republic

as

likely

to

lead

to

the

bill's

defeat."

Given

this

background,

it

is

perhaps

not

surprising

that

although

the

amendment

passed,

the

newly

created

Equal

Employment

Opportunity

15.

42

U.S.C.

§§

2000e-2000e-17

(2000).

16.

For

a

fascinating

study

of

the

passage

of

the sex

amendment,

see

generally

Carl

M.

Brauer,

Women

Activists,

Southern

Conservatives,

and

the

Prohibition

of

Sex

Discrimination

in

Title

VIl

ofthe

1964

Civil

Rights

Act, 49

J.

S. HIST.

37

(1983).

17.

CAROLINE

BIRD

&

SARA

WELLES

BRILLER,

BORN

FEMALE:

THE

HIGH

COST

OF

KEEPING

WOMEN

DOWN 3

(1968).

18.

Id.

at4-5.

19.

Id.

at 5.

20.

Id.

21.

88

CONG. REC.

2578

(1964)

(statement

of

Rep.

Smith);.see

also

Brauer,

supra

note

19,

at

45

(arguing

fairly

convincingly

that

Smith's

motives

were

"mixed").

22.

Brauer,

supra

note

19,

at

50-51.

23.

See

id.

at

51-52.

24. Id.

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Commission (EEOC)

decided

to

treat

the

prohibition

on

sex

discriminations

as

a

joke.

Herman

Edelsberg,

its

first

executive

director,

publicly

stated that

the

sex

amendment

was

a

"fluke"

that

was

"conceived

out

of

wedlock.

25

He

stated

that

he and

others

at

the

EEOC

believed

that

men

were

"entitled"

to

26

female secretaries

.

An

EEOC

member

attending

a

White

House conference

on

equal

opportunity

in

August

1965

trivialized

sex

discrimination,

saying it

was

unclear

if

the

law

would require

Playboy

clubs

to

hire

male

bunnies.

The

New

York

Times

got into

the

act,

labeling

a

Commission

official

the

"Deputy

Counsel

on

Bunnies.'

27

The

Times editorialized:

"[Bletter

if

Congress

had

just

abolished

sex

itself

....

A

maid

can

now become

a

man.

Girl

Friday

is

an

intolerable offense

....

The classic

beginning

of

many

wondrous

careers

in

the

Horatio

Alger

fashion-Boy

Wanted-has

reached

its

last

chapter."

2

8

Summing up the

first

few

years

of

EEOC

action

on

sex

discrimination,

Representative

Martha

Griffiths,

speaking

on

the

floor

of

the

House,

said

that

the

EEOC had

"started

out by casting

disrespect

and

ridicule

on

the

law"

but

that

its

"unprofessional"

and

"wholly

negative

attitude"

had

"changed

for

the

worse."

2

9

The

result

of

this

attitude

was

inaction

on

the

part

of

the

federal

government. For

the next

four

years,

the Justice

Department

did not

file

a

single

sex

discrimination

suit.

The

reason for this

inaction,

a

Justice

Department

lawyer

told

the

President's

Task

Force

on

the

Status

of

Women,

was

that

the

Justice

Department responds

to

"social

turmoil"

and

"[t]he

fact

that

women

have

not

gone

into

the streets

is

indicative

that they

do not

take

employment

discrimination

too

seriously."

30

That

was soon

to

change.

Less

than

a

decade

later,

however,

"legal

experts

on

women's

rights

could

aptly characterize

Title

VII

'the

most

comprehensive

and

important

of

all

federal and

state

laws

prohibiting employment

discrimination.'

3

How

did

this

happen?

It

happened

because the

women's

movement

exploded

in the

years

following

the

passage

of

the

Act,

creating

pressure

for

change

to

which

judges

and

elected

officials responded.

The

National Organization

for

Women

(NOW),

for

example,

was

founded

in

1966,

in

large

part

in

reaction

to this

negative

response

to

Title

VII.

Other

groups

were

created

as

well, ranging

from

organizations

of

professional

women

to

consciousness-raising

groups

of

mostly

younger

women.

Through

mass

demonstrations, protests,

and

25.

89

CONG.

REC.

13,689

(1966)

(statement

of

Rep.

Griffiths).

26.

Id.

27.

BIRD

&

BRILLER,

supra

note 20,

at

13.

28.

Editorial,

De-Sexing

the

Job

Market,

N.Y.

TIMES,

Aug.

21,

1965,

at

20.

29.

89

CONG.

REC.

13,689

(1966)

(statement

of

Rep.

Griffiths).

30.

Jo

FREEMAN,

THE

POLITICS OF

WOMEN'S

LIBERATION:

A

CASE

STUDY

OF

AN

EMERGING

SOCIAL MOVEMENT

AND

ITS

RELATION

TO

THE

POLICY PROCESS

79

(1975).

31.

Brauer,

supra

note

19,

at

37.

[Vol.

49:1147

HeinOnline -- 49 St. Louis U. L.J. 1152 2004-2005

THE

1964

CIVIL

RIGHTS

ACT

lobbying,

these groups

brought

the

issue

of

sex

discrimination

squarely

into

public

debate.

Both

Congress

and

the

courts

responded.

In

1972,

for

the

first

time

and

with

large

majorities,

the

Congress

passed

and

sent

to

the

states

for ratification

the

Equal

Rights

Amendment

to

the

Constitution.

The

Ninety-second

Congress

(1971-1973)

"passed

a

bumper

crop

of women's

rights

legislation-

considerably

more

than

the

sum

total

of

all

relevant

legislation

that had

been

previously

passed

in

the

history

of

this

country."

3

2

Included

among

this

legislation,

for

example,

was

Title

IX

of

the

Education

Amendments

Act

of

1972,

which

prohibits

educational

institutions

that

receive

federal

funds

from

discriminating

on

the

basis

of

sex.

33

The

courts,

too,

responded

to

the

political

mobilization,

as

the

Supreme

Court

began

the

process

of

raising

the

bar

over

which

gender-based

classifications

had

to

jump

to

survive

scrutiny

under

the

Equal

Protection

Clause

of

the

Fourteenth

Amendment.

3

4

The

necessity

as

well

as

the

success

of

this

political

pressure

is

illustrated

by

the

treatment

of

pregnancy

under

disability

plans.

In

General

Electric

Company

v.

Gilbert,

the

Supreme

Court

faced

the

question

of

whether

a

disability

plan

that

excludes

coverage

for

pregnancy

and

childbirth

violates

Title

VII;

the

Court

held

that

it

did

not.

35

In

response,

Congress

enacted

the

Pregnancy

Discrimination

Act

in

October

1978,

amending

Title

VII

to

make

pregnancy

discrimination

a

type

of

forbidden

sex

discrimination.

36

Women

won

protection

against

a

form

of

sex

discrimination

not

because

of

judges

but

rather

in

spite

of

them.

They

won

because

they

were

able

to

exert

sufficient

political

pressure

on

Congress

to

override

the

Court.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Overcoming

discrimination

is

a

good

news/bad

news

story.

The

bad

news

is

that

discrimination

is

deeply

enmeshed

in

the fabric

of

American

life;

it

is

hard

to

change.

But

there

is

good

news.

The

good

news

is

that

change

is

possible.

The

enactment

of

the

1964

Civil

Rights

Act

was

a

milestone,

far

more

important

than

the

Brown

decision

of

1954,

in

the

battle

against

discrimination.

It

was

made

possible

by

widespread

political

mobilization.

Similarly,

the

implementation

of

the

Act

has

ebbed

and

flowed

with

the

strength

of

the

political

pressure

its

supporters

have

been

able

to

muster.

This

32.

FREEMAN,

supra

note

33,

at

202.

33.

20

U.S.C.

§

1681

(2000);

see

also

FREEMAN,

supra

note

33,

at

203.

34.

The

Court

started

with

Reed

v.

Reed,

404

U.S.

71

(1971),

which

invalidated

an

Idaho

law

that

preferred

men to

women

as

executors.

Although

the

Court

purported

to

employ

a

rational-

relations

test,

the

decision

could

only

be

explained

by

some

sort

of

heightened

scrutiny. See

id.

at

76.

This

was

soon

followed

by

Craig

v.

Boren,

429

U.S.

190

(1976),

in

which

the

Court adopted

intermediate

scrutiny

as

the

constitutional

test

for

gender-based

classifications.

Id.

at

197.

35.

429

U.S.

125,

127-28

(1976).

36.

42

U.S.C.

§

2000e(k)

(2000).

20051

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1154

SAINT

LOUIS

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LAW

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[Vol.

49:1147

is

most

clearly

illustrated

by

the

effectiveness

of

the

women's

movement.

When

women

organized,

implementation

occurred.

If

what

I

have

argued

is

right,

then

the

future

of

anti-discrimination

law

largely

depends

on

political

mobilization.

Looking

to

courts

to

fight

discrimination

without

the

support

of

a

political

movement

will

work

only

sporadically,

at

best.

There

will

be

few supportive

decisions,

and

those

that

are

supportive

are

unlikely

to

be

fully

implemented.

The

challenge

that

advocates

of

anti-discrimination

face today

is

that

the

political

movement

that

pressured

Congress

to

act

in

1964

has

never

again

reached

the

same

level

of

power.

Without

the

kind

of

political

mobilization

that led

to

passage

of

the

Act,

the

battle

to

end

discrimination

is

unlikely

to

make

major

strides.

With

that

political

mobilization,

change

is

possible.

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