X
The role of social protection in
the elimination of child labour
Evidence review and policy implications
X
The role of social protection in
the elimination of child labour
Evidence review and policy implications
Copyright © International Labour Organization 2022
First published 2022
This is an open access work distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0). Users can reuse, share, adapt and build upon the original work,
as detailed in the License. The ILO must be clearly credited as the owner of the original work. The use of the
emblem of the ILO is not permitted in connection with users’ work.
Attribution – The work must be cited as follows: ILO and UNICEF Office of Research – Innocenti, The role of
social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications. Geneva and Florence:
International Labour Organization and UNICEF Office of Research – Innocenti, 2022.
Translations – In case of a translation of this work, the following disclaimer must be added along with the
attribution: This translation was not created by the International Labour Office (ILO) and should not be considered
an official ILO translation. The ILO is not responsible for the content or accuracy of this translation.
Adaptations – In case of an adaptation of this work, the following disclaimer must be added along with the
attribution: This is an adaptation of an original work by the International Labour Office (ILO). Responsibility for
the views and opinions expressed in the adaptation rests solely with the author or authors of the adaptation
and are not endorsed by the ILO.
All queries on rights and licensing should be addressed to ILO Publishing (Rights and Licensing), CH-1211 Geneva
22, Switzerland, or by email to right[email protected]rg.
ISBN: 978-92-2-036952-4 (Web PDF)
Also available in French: Le rôle de la protection sociale dans l’élimination du travail des enfants: Examen des
données probantes et implications politiques, ISBN 978-92-2- 036959-3, Geneva, 2022; and Spanish: El papel de
la protección social en la eliminación del trabajo infantil: Examen de datos empíricos y repercusiones políticas,
ISBN 978-92-2- 036960-9, Geneva, 2022.
The designations employed in ILO publications, which are in conformity with United Nations practice, and the
presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the ILO
or UNICEF concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the
delimitation of its frontiers.
The responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles, studies and other contributions rests solely with
their authors, and publication does not constitute an endorsement by the ILO or UNICEF of the opinions
expressed in them.
Reference to names of firms and commercial products and processes does not imply their endorsement by
the ILO or UNICEF and any failure to mention a particular firm, commercial product or process is not a sign of
disapproval.
Information on ILO publications and digital products can be found at: www.ilo.org/publns.
Funding for this publication is partially provided by the “8.7 Accelerator Lab Multi-Partner Fund” (GLO/20/41/
MUL) funded by the governments of Canada, Germany and Norway; and by the United States Department of
Labor (USDOL) under cooperative agreement number IL-37950-21-75-K of the Project “Intensify action against
forced labour and child labour through innovation” (GLO/21/21/USA). One hundred per cent of the total costs
of the GLO/21/21/USA project is financed with federal funds, for a total of USD 10,000,000.
This publication does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of Canada, Germany and Norway Governments
or the United States Department of Labor, nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or
organizations imply endorsement by Canada, Germany, Norway or United States Governments.
ilo.org/childlabour
Cover and inside photos © ILO except photo at page 26 © pexels
Designed by Bip-Bip, Geneva, Switzerland
Foreword
Child labour is a violation of every child’s right to a childhood – and a breach of every government’s most
fundamental duty to protect its children.
For nearly two decades, beginning in 2000, the world was making steady progress in reducing child labour.
But over the last few years, conflicts, crises, and since 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic have plunged more
families into poverty – and forced millions more children into labour.
Today, 160 million children still engaged in child labour – some as young as 5. That’s almost one in ten
children, worldwide. Nearly half of these children are engaged in hazardous work likely to cause physical
and emotional harm.
This is both morally unconscionable – and strategically short-sighted. Children who stay in school and out
of work have a better chance to fulfil their own potential, in turn helping break intergenerational cycles
of poverty and supporting sustainable economic growth.
This new report provides a rigorous review of what the latest research says about the power of social
protection to combat child labour. Providing families with direct assistance to help them weather crises
can help reduce negative coping strategies like child labour and child marriage.
The report also shows that the impact of social protection measures is even greater if countries also put
in place integrated systems that provide social protection benefits across the lifecycle.
Unfortunately, too little progress has been made in expanding social protection services to reach the
families in greatest need – and the children at greatest risk. Worldwide, the families of approximately 1.5
billion children 14 and under receive no family or child cash benefits at all.
We can and must change this.
Authored jointly by the ILO and UNICEF, this report is intended to inform discussion at the 5th Global
Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour, in South Africa in May 2022 – and to spur urgent action
by governments to build comprehensive, child-sensitive social protection systems. The joint endeavour
of Alliance 8.7 and the Global Partnership for Universal Social Protection (USP2030) could also be an
important vehicle to advance this effort and support Member States.
We cannot emphasize strongly enough that the choices made by countries now will affect millions of
children alive today and millions yet to be born. We urge decisionmakers to live up to their commitments
– and to implement the recommendations contained in this report.
Investing more in universal social protection will help millions of children realize their right to be children
– and to reach their full potential, free from the scourge of child labour.
Guy Ryder
Director General
International Labour Organization
Catherine Russell
Executive Director
United Nations Children’s Fund
3
X
Contents
Foreword ....................................................................................... 3
Acknowledgements ............................................................................ 6
Acronyms and abbreviations ................................................................... 7
Executive Summary ............................................................................. 9
Child labour is at a crossroads .................................................................... 9
Strong social protection systems are necessary for the reduction and eventual elimination
of child labour .................................................................................. 10
Design features of social protection policies matter .............................................. 12
What’s in this report? ........................................................................... 13
1. Trends in child labour and social protection .................................................. 15
1.1 Child labour ................................................................................. 15
Prevalence of child labour in the recent past .................................................. 15
Prevalence of child labour since the COVID-19 pandemic ....................................... 18
1.2 Social protection ............................................................................ 19
The state of social protection worldwide ...................................................... 19
Social protection during the COVID-19 pandemic ............................................. 23
1.3 Social protection and child labour across countries ........................................... 25
2.  Social protection as a policy response to child labour: What does the evidence say?  ........... 27
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................ 27
2.2 Overview of the evidence base .............................................................. 28
2.3 Transfer programmes directed at families with children ..................................... 32
Maternity protection ........................................................................ 32
Unconditional and conditional cash transfers ................................................. 33
In-kind transfers ............................................................................ 38
Integrated social protection programmes (“Cash plus”) ....................................... 40
2.4 Public employment programmes ........................................................... 42
2.5 Unemployment protection .................................................................. 43
2.6 Income security in old age ................................................................... 44
2.7 Social protection for people with disabilities ................................................. 45
2.8 Social health protection ..................................................................... 46
3. Where next for social protection and child labour? ...........................................49
3.1 Building social protection systems for children: Turning promises and plans
into reality and action, now .................................................................. 49
3.2 Designing social protection programmes that prevent and reduce child labour:
What does the evidence say? ................................................................ 52
Bibliography ................................................................................... 55
4
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
Boxes
1.1 Defining child labour ....................................................................... 16
1.2. The numbers at a glance: The absence of social protection
for different population groups and selected benefits ...................................... 19
1.3. Conceptualizing universal social protection ................................................. 22
1.4. Utilizing existing child benefits for a child-focused pandemic response ....................... 24
2.1. The policy choice of conditionality versus unconditionality ................................... 35
2.2. The promise of universal basic income: expected impacts and challenges .................... 38
Figures
1.1 Percentage and number of children aged 5 to 17 in child labour and hazardous work,
global estimates, 2000-2020 ................................................................ 15
1.2 Percentage and number (in million) of children aged 5 to 17 in child labour,
by region, 2020 ............................................................................. 17
1.3 Effective social protection coverage (SDG indicator 1.3.1),
global and regional estimates, by population group, 2020 or latest available year ............. 20
1.4 Public social protection and health expenditure as a percentage of GDP,
by social protection floor guarantee, 2020 or latest available year ............................ 21
1.5 Scatterplot of social protection coverage and prevalence of child labour, 2017-2019 ........... 25
2.1 Geographical distribution of studies (2010 to present) ....................................... 30
2.2 Distribution of studies and programmes by category, 2010 to present ........................ 31
3.1 Elements of an integrated social protection system for addressing child labour ............... 51
Tables
1.1 COVID-19 response: Expenditure on social protection and labour measures spending,
by income group, 2020-21 .................................................................. 23
2.1 Summary of study findings (2010 to present) ................................................ 28
5
X
Contents
Acknowledgements
This report has been jointly prepared by the ILO and UNICEF Office of Research – Innocenti. Members of
the core team included Christina Behrendt (ILO), Federico Blanco (ILO), Valeria Groppo (UNICEF), Nathalie
Guilbert (UNICEF), Scott Lyon (ILO), Clotilde Mahe (UNICEF), Ian Orton (ILO), Dominic Richardson (UNICEF),
Benjamin Smith (ILO), Lou Tessier (ILO) and Nyasha Tirivayi (UNICEF).
Contributions and comments were also received from Greta Cartoceti, Ursula Kulke, Henrik Moller, Victor
Hugo Ricco (ILO) and Natalia Winder-Rossi (UNICEF).
6
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
Acronyms and abbreviations
AP Asia and the Pacific region
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (United Nations)
GDP Gross domestic product
HIC High-income countries
ICI International Cocoa Initiative
ILO International Labour Office/Organization
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean region
LIC Low-income countries
LMIC Lower-middle-income countries
NGO Non-governmental organization
ODI Overseas Development Institute (United Kingdom)
PEP Public employment programme
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
UBI Universal basic income
UBOS Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UCB Universal child benefits
UMIC Upper-middle-income countries
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
USP Universal social protection
7
X
X
Child labour is at a crossroads
At the beginning of 2020 1 in 10 children aged 5 and over were involved in child labour
worldwide – equating to an estimated 160 million children, or 63 million girls and 97 million
boys. Despite significant progress in reducing child labour in the past two decades, most
recent data shows that global progress on this measure has stalled since 2016 (ILO and
UNICEF 2021).
Global estimates hide uneven progress by region in the past 20 years, with Asia and the
Pacific (AP), and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) showing steady reductions overall,
while rates actually increased in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from 2012 onwards. Although
there is much variation across countries within each region, today, there are more children
in child labour in SSA than in the rest of the world combined.
Evidence by age groups shows that there has been a greater toll on children aged 5-11
years, whose rates of child labour actually increased in contrast to a steady reduction for
those aged 12 years or above. Girls are faring better than boys, whose trend decreased
more slowly over time, and indeed reversed to register an overall increase in recent years
(ILO and UNICEF 2021).
The above trends undermine children’s rights, well-being, and development, as well as the
efforts being made through the Sustainable Development Goals and other mechanisms
to eradicate child labour.
And what is more, these trends were observed prior to the onset of the COVID-19 crisis,
which has put millions more children at risk of child labour. It is estimated that without
mitigation strategies, the number of children in child labour could rise by 8.9 million by
the end of 2022, due to higher poverty and increased vulnerability (ILO and UNICEF 2021).
X
Executive Summary
X
Strong social protection systems
are necessary for the reduction and
eventual elimination of child labour
By reducing family poverty risks and vulnerability, supporting livelihoods and school enrol-
ment amongst other things, government social protection systems are essential in the fight
to eradicate and prevent child labour (ILO 2013; ILO and UNICEF 2019 and 2021; Dammert
et al. 2018; De Hoop and Rosati 2014a).
The good news is that in recent years many countries have significantly improved social
protection coverage, by strengthening their social protection systems, and establishing
effective social protection floors (ILO 2021d).
1
However, global coverage is still too low:
as of 2020, less than half of the global population were effectively covered by at least
one social protection benefit, leaving more than four billion people wholly unprotected.
2
Social protection coverage varies widely by region, broadly aligned with income levels (see
Section 1.3).
Importantly, for child labour concerns at the global level, the vast majority of children under
15s – 73.6 per cent or 1.5 billion children in total – receive no child or family cash benefits
(ILO 2021d). In many cases, programmes are not designed with the objective of benefiting
children directly or to address child labour risk specifically. And, where other benefits are
available, they are often not sufficiently adequate, comprehensive
3
and child-sensitive and
in many cases the quality of services is far from satisfactory.
Coverage and quality limitations are associated with underinvestment in social protection.
Prior to the pandemic, low-income countries (LIC) and lower-middle-income countries
(LMIC) spent respectively 1.1 and 2.5 per cent of GDP on social protection (excluding
healthcare), compared to 8 per cent in upper-middle-income countries (UMIC) and 16.4 per
cent in high-income countries (HIC). Countries spend on average 12.9 per cent of GDP on
social protection, and child-specific spending was a mere 1.1 per cent (ILO 2021d). With
children making up around 28 per cent of the global population, it is clear that this level of
child-specific social protection spending is too low. Filling this “financing gap” for children,
to ensure at least minimum provision for all, should be a priority, and an action which is
likely to have significant implications for child labour too.
The need to access healthcare, sickness and unemployment benefits, care and family
friendly-policies, became especially acute after the outbreak of COVID-19, and 2020 saw the
largest mobilization of government social protection measures ever (Gentilini et al. 2022;
ILO 2021c and 2021d). The ILO estimated that expanding social protection to adequately
respond to the COVID-19 crisis could reduce the number of children in child labour by
15.1 million between 2020 and 2022 (ILO and UNICEF 2021).
1 Manylow-andmiddle-incomecountrieshaveachieveduniversalornear-universalsocialprotectioncoveragefordierenttypes
ofbenets,forexampleforchildbenets(Argentina,Brazil);maternityprotection(Mongolia);disabilitybenets(Brazil)andold-age
pensions (Argentina, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Botswana, Cabo Verde, China, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mongolia, Namibia, Thailand,
Timor-Leste, and Trinidad and Tobago) (ILO 2021d).
2 Excludinghealthcareandsicknessbenets.
3 Comprehensivenessreferstotherangeoflife-cyclerisksandcontingenciescovered,whileadequacyreferstothebenetamount
of social protection programmes.
10
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
However, the sensitivity of the overall social protection response to COVID-19 to the needs
of families with children has been limited. Government stimuli in high-income countries
and middle-income countries made little use of child-specific social protection measures,
and instead focused on business supports and job protection schemes – often excluding
households without secure and formal employment (Richardson et al. 2020a and 2020b).
Indeed, support for vulnerable groups in the COVID-19 response in general was criticized by
the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty as being “maladapted, short-term, reactive,
and inattentive to the realities of people in poverty” (De Schutter 2020).
To strengthen social protection systems for the reduction and elimination of child
labour, this report recommends:
X
Close the yawning gap in the coverage of social protection for children by promoting
inclusivesocialprotectionsystems,anddevelopsustainableandequitablenancing
forthis,asamatterofpriority.Thiscouldtranslateintoprioritizingchildbenetsaswell
as extending social protection to the two billion informal economy workers. The latter
will support their transition to the formal economy. Formalization is a critical step in
sustainable tax and transfer systems.
X
Don’t wait for development to build social protection systems – these systems are key
to development.Howspecicsocialprotectionprogrammescomplementoneanother
within a systemwilldetermineoveralleortsinaddressingthedeterminantsofhouse-
holds’ vulnerability to child labour across the life course. This is true also for integrated
cross-sectoral social provision for children. No single programme will do the job.
X
Insupportofsystembuildingeorts,policymakerscanutilizeexistinginternational
policy commitments to universal social protection in building political consensus
for action. Pre-existing commitments and frameworks, including the Sustainable
Development Agenda and Goals (SDGs) and the strong tripartite policy consensus
agreedbytheInternationalLabourConference,oerthisopportunity.
11
X
Executive summary
X
Design features of social protection policies matter
While social protection can be a powerful tool to combat child labour, it is not guaranteed
that it reduces child labour in all cases. For instance, access to cash benefits can reduce the
demand for child labour and increase household investment in children’s education, yet, at
the same time, such transfers can lead to households investing in productive assets such
as livestock or agricultural inputs that can potentially increase the demand for child labour.
It is through the expansion of household economic activities that children can be drawn
into child labour, sometimes in hazardous conditions,
4
pparticularly if households cannot
afford to access labour-saving technologies or engage adult workers.
To help ensure that productive investments by families do not increase child labour, the
design features of social protection programmes matter. The transfer amounts, regularity
and predictability, and duration of payments can all determine the child labour impacts
of social protection. Moreover, as child labour is also influenced by national child labour
legislation and enforcement capacity, social norms, local markets and infrastructure, as
well as schooling access and quality, programme design features need to account for
contexts to be effective in reducing it. Overall, it is a combination of economic, social, and
educational policies (underpinned by appropriate national legislation and enforcement)
that is needed to provide families and children with viable and sustained alternatives to
child labour (Thévenon and Edmonds 2019).
To strengthen the design of social protection programmes for the reduction and
elimination of child labour, including its worst forms, this report recommends:
X
Make use of inclusive universal social protection programmes which can increase the
coverageandtake-upofbenetsbylimitingexclusionerrors,reducingstigmaand
shame, and procedural complexity, and therefore lower transaction and opportunity
cost barriers.
X
Apply child-sensitive designs that consider the potential implications in terms of child
labour,inthedierentsectorswherechildrenwork.Thiscanincludesensitizationon
children’s rights, or provision of information on the hazards related to child labour. In
combination, positive “messaging” on the relevance of promoting education over labour
canmakethedierence.
X
Ensurebothadequacyandpredictabilityofsocialprotectionbenets.Thisiscriticalfor
generatingprotectiveimpactsonchildlabour.Settingadequatebenetlevelsmeans
taking into account household size and number of children, and adapting transfer
amounts according to contexts such as local prices and wages, and revising transfer
amountstoaccountforination.Regularpaymentsmakeforpredictableincomes,and
longer-term decision making, including productive investments, that secure futures
including for children at risk of child labour.
X
Combine social protection programmes with complementary and resourced interven-
tions in the education and health sectors – this is particularly relevant in humanitarian
settings, or settings where services might be weak or where supply struggles to meet
demand. For instance, where education facilities are missing or of low quality, house-
holdsmaylacksucientincentivestoinvestcashbenetsineducationopportunities.
4 Similar mechanisms are at play for any interventions that incentivize adults to start economic activities or new businesses.
12
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
X
What’s in this report?
This report explores the mechanisms by which social protection can impact child labour,
and assesses the role of programme design features and contextual characteristics. To
do this, it updates and expands previous ILO work in this area (ILO 2013), builds on recent
systematic reviews (Bastagli et al 2019; Dammert et al. 2018), and conducts new searches
for impact evaluations on the child labour impact of social protection in the period 2010-22.
Because all forms of social protection can impact child labour (even when not designed
with an explicit child labour reduction objective) this report considers programmes beyond
child and family benefits to include social protection available to caregivers of children
(working-age adults and older persons) such as unemployment benefits or pensions. To
learn more about the importance of design features, the report examines and compares
different types of social protection programmes from non-contributory tax-financed
schemes, contributory schemes, labour market policies for caregivers of children, social
services, and integrated social protection programmes that combine cash benefits and
services (“cash plus”).
Section 1 follows with a closer look at child labour trends and social protection policies
globally. Section 2 summarizes the evidence on social protection policies by type, and
their impacts on child labour. Section 3 concludes with policy implications and research
recommendations.
13
X
Executive summary
X
1.1 Child labour
Prevalence of child labour in the recent past
Globally, significant progress has been made in reducing child labour in the past two decades (ILO and
UNICEF 2021). The number of children in child labour declined by 85.5 million between 2000 and 2020,
before the onset of COVID-19. The prevalence of child labour also declined substantially, from 16 to 9.6 per
cent. Similar progress was observed for children working in hazardous conditions (figure 1.1).
However, the decline in the prevalence of child labour has slowed over time and has stalled since 2016.
Between 2016 and 2020, the absolute number of children in child labour increased by more than eight
million, from 152 to 160 million children, of which 79 million were working under conditions directly
endangering their health and safety. Some definitions of what constitutes child labour are given in box 1.1.
X Figure 1.1 Percentage and number of children aged 5 to 17 in child labour and hazardous work,
global estimates, 2000-2020
X
1.
Trends in
child labour and
social protection
2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0
5
10
15
20
25
245.5
222.3
215.2
168.0
151.6
160.0
16.0
14.2
13.6
10.6
9.6
9.6
170.5 128.4 115.3 85.3 72.5 79.0
11.1
8.2
7.3
5.4
4.6
4.7
Million
Percentage
Number of children in hazardous work
Prevalence of child labour
Number of children in child labour
Prevalence of hazardous work
Source: ILO and UNICEF (2021).
15
By age, child labour is increasing among children 5 to 11 years old, with the latest estimates registering
an increase of 16.8 million younger children in child labour between 2016 and 2020. Of particular concern
is that about 40 per cent of these additional children were performing hazardous work. Over 75 per cent
of younger children in child labour work in agriculture and about 83 per cent of them work within family
(farms or non-farm) microenterprises.
Since 2016, the share of children that worked within the family increased, a trend that has been linked to
the growth in the number of younger children in child labour overall (ILO and UNICEF 2021).
X Box 1.1. Defining child labour
Three main international human and labour rights instruments – the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, the ILO Minimum Age for Admission to Employment Convention
(No. 138) and the universally ratified ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (No. 182)
– set legal boundaries for child labour and provide grounds for national and international
actions to end it. Child labour comprises work that children are too young to perform, that
is, below the minimum age for work, which is usually 15 years (developing countries may
set it at 14), and 13 years for light work that does not interfere with schooling. In all cases,
the minimum age for work should be the same as the age of completion of compulsory
education. The minimum age for hazardous work, which is work that by its nature or
circumstances is likely to harm children’s health, safety or moral development, is 18.
Hazardous work is one of the worst forms of child labour, which also include slavery and
similar practices, commercial sexual exploitation, and the use of children in illicit activities
such as drug trafficking. Child labour can encompass work in both the formal and informal
economy, inside and outside family settings, for pay or profit (cash or in-kind, part-time or
full-time) and domestic work outside the child’s own household for an employer (paid
or unpaid).
Source: ILO (2018a).
Moreover, the prevalence of child labour is increasingly unequal across regions. Figure 1.2 shows the
number of children in child labour and the prevalence of child labour across regions. Both are highly
unequal, with Africa standing out both in terms of absolute numbers and prevalence. In early 2020, the
prevalence of child labour was 21.6 per cent in Africa, more than twice the global average.
16
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
X Figure 1.2 Percentage and number (in million) of children aged 5 to 17 in child labour,
by region, 2020
Within each region there are similar disparities by country. For example, in South Asia the child labour rate
is 11 per cent on average, ranging from 0.9 per cent in Sri Lanka to 23.6 per cent in Afghanistan (ILOSTAT).
5
Several factors can explain cross-regional variation in child labour:
X
Monetary and multidimensional povertyinuenceschildlabourprevalence,asitisoneway
for families to manage poverty and deprivation risks. In sub-Saharan Africa higher rates of child
labourareseenalongsidelevelsofextremepovertythataecttwoinvepeople(WorldBank
2022). Of further concern are estimates suggesting that as many as nine out of ten children in
sub-Saharan Africa will live in extreme poverty by 2030 (UNICEF 2016b).
X
Informality is experienced by an estimated two billion workers worldwide leading to lower
and irregular incomes, unsafe working conditions, and extreme job precarity. Moreover, labour
informality means less access to contributory social protection schemes and narrowly targeted
social assistance. Africa, where child labour increased in the latest examined period, was the
region with the highest prevalence of informal employment (85.6 per cent) in 2016 (ILO 2018b).
X
Social protection, by providing additional sources of regular income and access to health care,
orcompensatinghouseholdsinthefaceofeconomicorhealthshocks,caneectivelyreduce
the need for households to resort to child labour as a precautionary or coping strategy. Despite
progress in extending social protection, coverage still falls short and remains unequal across
regions, as detailed in Section 2.2.
5 For South Asia, data are available for six countries: Afghanistan (2014), Bangladesh (2019), Bhutan (2010), Myanmar (2015), Nepal
(2014), Sri Lanka (2016) (ILOSTAT).
World Africa Asia and the Pacific Latin America and
the Caribbean
0
40
80
120
160
200
0
5
10
15
20
25
160.0
92.2
48.7
8.2
9.6
21.6
5.6
6.0
Million
Percentage
Number of children in child labour Prevalence of child labour
Source: ILO and UNICEF (2021).
17
X
1. Why look at social protection and child labour now?
X
Education, or children being out of school, is frequently linked to child labour. To reduce child
labour,itisessentialthatfamiliescanaordtosendchildrentoschool,andthathouseholds’
perceived returns to schooling are greater than those associated with child labour. Globally,
although the share of children out of primary school has markedly declined in recent years,
large regional disparities in both educational expenditures and access to schools remain
(Al-Samarrai et al. 2021).
X
Population growth differences by region are likely to be associated with child labour
trends. In LAC, the number of children engaged in child labour dropped by six million
from 2008 to 2020 as the child population fell by 4.8 million; whereas, over the same period,
AP experienced a decline in the number of children in child labour of 64.9 million, while
the child population increased by 12.8 million. In contrast, in SSA the number of children
engaged in child labour rose by 21.5 million and, simultaneously, the child population increased
by 104.8 million.
6
A range of other factors related to countries in crisis are likely to be contributing factors. For instance,
both conflict and displacement are higher in Africa than elsewhere (World Bank 2020; United Nations
General Assembly 2020) – leading to vulnerabilities to which child labour may be one mechanism for
coping. In addition, in fragile States social protection coverage is also very low and poverty rates are
disproportionately high (Silwal et al. 2020).
Prevalence of child labour since the COVID-19 pandemic
Following the outbreak of COVID-19, the economic losses and health shocks experienced by households
significantly increased the risk of child labour. Protracted school closures represented another risk factor.
7
Survey data showed an immediate decrease in children’s participation in economic activity at the start of
the pandemic (ILO and UNICEF forthcoming) – suggesting that the overall decline in economic activities
associated with lockdowns had affected children’s work too. However, in some household where lockdowns
led to falls in earned income, children started to work more. Testimonies from 81 children across Ghana,
Nepal, and Uganda revealed that they had to work to eat, as their families no longer had enough food.
Those already working before the crisis started working longer hours after school closures (Human
Rights Watch 2021).
The testimonies of children are consistent with recent statistics from Uganda, showing that the prevalence
of child labour rose from 21 to 36 per cent during COVID-19 (UBOS 2021).
8
In Côte d’Ivoire an assessment
of 263 communities also found a major increase in child labour in cocoa businesses between July and
September 2020, compared to the same period 12 months earlier (ICI 2020). In Egypt, children were sent
to work in cotton cultivation and other agricultural work (ILO 2020c). And in both Ecuador and Brazil (São
Paulo) the prevalence of child participation in economic activities also increased once the pandemic had
started (UNICEF Ecuador and Inclusión SAS 2020; UNICEF Brazil 2020).
Results reported above, and in a recent global simulation of child labour trends by ILO and UNICEF (2021)
suggest that any decline in child labour due to COVID-19 is likely to be outweighed by a rebound in child
labour prevalence due to increased poverty risks over time.
6 Figures for 2008 are from Diallo et al. (2010). Figures for 2020 are from UNDESA (2019).
7 Across eight West African countries, children consistently reported working because there was no school, so their parents ex-
pected that they should work (World Vision 2020), or were not willing to leave them at home alone, unsupervised (Franceinfo Afrique
2020).Schoolclosuresalsoresultedinsignicantlearninglosses(PatrinosandDonnelly2021),which,inturn,mayincreaseschool
dropout and child labour.
8 The 2019/20 Uganda National Household Survey was conducted in two phases, each covering about half of the sample. Phase I
lasted from September 2019 to February 2020, and Phase II from July to November 2020 (UBOS 2021).
18
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
X
1.2 Social protection
The state of social protection worldwide
Despite progress made in the coverage of social protection in recent years, it has not been enough. As
of 2020 and prior to COVID-19, only 46.9 per cent of the global population were effectively covered by at
least one social protection benefit, while the remaining portion – as many as 4.1 billion people – were left
wholly unprotected (see figure 1.3 and the stark absolute numbers in box 1.2). Behind this global average,
there are significant inequalities across and within regions, with coverage rates equalling 56.3 per cent
in LAC, 44.1 per cent in AP and 17.4 per cent in Africa.
Only 26.4 per cent of children worldwide receive social protection benefits. Despite some important
progress in the extension of social protection to children in recent decades, the vast majority of children
– 73.6 per cent of children aged 0-14, a significant number of whom must labour – receive no child or
family cash benefits. Effective coverage is particularly low in Asia and Pacific (18 per cent) and Africa (12.6
per cent) (ILO 2021d).
X Box 1.2.
The numbers at a glance: The absence of social protection
for different population groups and selected benefits
X
1.5 billion children aged 0-14
receive no child or family cash benefits
X
71 million mothers with newborns
do not receive cash maternity benefits
X
One third of the working-age population
is legally entitled to sickness cash benefits
X
179 million unemployed persons
do not have access to unemployment cash benefits
X
150 million persons with disabilities
do not receive a disability cash benefit
X
164 million older persons
do not receive a pension
X
2.7 billion people
are not protected by any kind of health protection scheme
Source: ILO (2021d); World Social Protection Data Dashboards.
19
X
1. Why look at social protection and child labour now?
X Figure 1.3 Effective social protection coverage (SDG indicator 1.3.1),
global and regional estimates, by population group, 2020 or latest available year
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
56.3
41.5
75.4
12.5
57.7
30.5
40.8
36.0
17.4
12.6
27.1
5.3
9.3
14.9
18.4
9.3
44.1
18.0
73.5
14.0
21.6
45.9
24.8
25.3
46.9
26.4
77.5
18.6
33.5
44.9
34.4
28.9
Vulnerable persons covered
by social assistance
Work injury
Mothers with newborns
Severe disabilities
Unemployed
Older persons
Children
Covered by at least one
social protection benefit
Vulnerable persons covered
by social assistance
Work injury
Mothers with newborns
Severe disabilities
Unemployed
Older persons
Children
Covered by at least one
social protection benefit
Vulnerable persons covered
by social assistance
Work injury
Mothers with newborns
Severe disabilities
Unemployed
Older persons
Children
Covered by at least one
social protection benefit
Vulnerable persons covered
by social assistance
Work injury
Mothers with newborns
Severe disabilities
Unemployed
Older persons
Children
Covered by at least one
social protection benefit
% of the population group
Latin America and the Caribbean
Africa
Asia and the Pacific
World
Notes: See Annex 2 of ILO (2021d) for a methodological
explanation. Global and regional aggregates are weighted by
relevant population groups.
Sources: ILO (2021d); World Social Protection Database,
based on the SSI; ILOSTAT; national sources.
20
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
These gaps in coverage, adequacy and comprehensiveness are associated with significant underin-
vestment in social protection systems for all groups and especially children. At the global level, national
expenditure on social protection for children reaches only 1.1 per cent of GDP, compared to 12.9 per cent
of GDP spent overall on social protection (see figure 1.4). In Africa, the region with the largest share of
children in the population and the greatest need for social protection, an equivalent of 0.4 per cent of
GDP is spent on social protection for children (ILO 2021d).
It is high time that adequate and sustainable financing is found to close these protection gaps by achieving
universal social protection for all, especially children. To guarantee at least a basic level of social security
through a nationally defined social protection floor, LMIC countries would need to invest an additional
US$362.9 billion and UMIC countries a further US$750.8 billion per year, equivalent to 5.1 and 3.1 per cent
of GDP respectively. LIC countries would need to invest an additional US$77.9 billion, equivalent to 15.9
per cent of their GDP (ILO 2020b; Durán et al. 2020).
X Figure 1.4 Public social protection and health expenditure as a percentage of GDP,
by social protection floor guarantee, 2020 or latest available year
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 16 1814 20
12.9
1.1
3.6
7.0
5.8
Health expenditure
Old age
Working-age population
Children
Total expenditure on social protection
(excluding health)
Public social protection expenditures, by guarantee (% of GDP)
World
7.5
1.1
1.7
5.1
4.0
Health expenditure
Old age
Working-age population
Children
Total expenditure on social protection
(excluding health)
Asia and the Pacific
3.8
0.4
1.1
2.2
2.0
Health expenditure
Old age
Working-age population
Children
Total expenditure on social protection
(excluding health)
Africa
10.1
0.5
2.0
5.9
3.9
Health expenditure
Old age
Working-age population
Children
Total expenditure on social protection
(excluding health)
Latin America and the Caribbean
Notes: See Annex 2 of ILO (2021d) for a methodological
explanation.
Sources: ILO (2021d); World Social Protection Database,
based on the SSI; ILOSTAT; national sources.
21
X
1. Why look at social protection and child labour now?
Importantly, the ILO’s June 2021 International Labour Conference – comprising governments, workers, and
employers – called for universal social protection systems for all (see box 1.3) (ILO 2021b). This represents
an emphatic reaffirmation of political and tripartite commitment to close gaps in social protection.
UNICEF’s new strategic plan also prioritizes efforts to achieve inclusive social protection for all children,
in the organization’s work between 2022 and 2025 (UNICEF 2022b).
X Box 1.3. Conceptualizing universal social protection
This report employs the definition agreed upon by governments, employers, and workers
at the 2021 International Labour Conference. Here it was agreed that “universal social
protection entails actions and measures to realize the human right to social security by
progressively building and maintaining nationally appropriate social protection systems,
so that everyone has access to comprehensive, adequate and sustainable protection over
the life cycle, in line with ILO standards” (ILO 2021b, para. 3).
This commitment to universal social protection sends a clear signal to policymakers.
In contrast to a patchy, minimalist social safety net approach, building universal social
protection systems anchored in a rights-based approach can progressively guarantee more
comprehensive and adequate provision for all, which is sustainably and equitably financed.
The Global Partnership for Universal Social Protection (USP2030) also emphasizes that
universal social protection is achieved through a nationally-defined system of policies and
programmes that provide equitable access to all people and protect them throughout their
lives against poverty and risks to their livelihoods and well-being. It emphasizes five core
principles: protection throughout the life cycle, universal coverage, national ownership,
sustainable and equitable financing, and participation and social dialogue (USP2030 2019).
Despite the promise of these recent international developments and the large social protection response
to the pandemic, now is not the time for complacency, and policymakers must redouble their efforts to
close these protection gaps identify and implement those types of social protection that best address
child labour.
22
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
Social protection during the COVID-19 pandemic
Social protection was a critical pillar of the COVID-19 response. Governments were effectively able to
use existing systems to channel urgent and emergency support. The response was commendable given
existing fiscal constraints and multiple priorities. At the same time, the pandemic also brought to light
the large gaps in social protection provision, and highlighted the difficulties of the two billion informal
economy workers and their families, women, care givers, migrants and others. However, an important
development has been the crucial role that social protection has played in an unprecedented policy
response worldwide.
Between February 2020 and March 2022, 1,730 social protection responses have been announced or
implemented in over 200 countries and territories (ILO 2022). Undoubtedly, without this massive and
rapid expansion of social protection through the pre-existing provision, and introducing emergency
measures, the human and socioeconomic toll of the crisis would have been much greater – demonstrating
the indispensability of social protection as a cornerstone of all well-functioning and responsive societies.
During COVID-19, countries that already had strong social protection systems were able to use them to
guarantee better protection. However, countries without such strong systems developed parallel systems
to support many households, and although these were critical and lifesaving for particular groups (such as
migrants, caregivers, informal workers) on many occasions these could not take advantage of pre-existing
infrastructure, were temporary, or lacked an adequate protective response.
However, the quality of response depended not only on the quality of pre-existing social protection
systems, but also on the fiscal response that could be mobilized. Expenditure on the social protection
response varied across low- and middle-income countries, with the average expenditure per capita
ranging from US$8 in LIC countries to US$145 in UMIC countries (see table 1.1). Whilst recognizing the
fiscal constraints in many countries, this is insufficient to be deemed adequate for people to ride out the
pandemic with enough protection against poverty and falling living standards.
X Table 1.1 COVID-19 response: Expenditure on social protection and labour measures spending,
by income group, 2020-21
Income group Spending (billion US $) Average US $ per capita % of GDP
HIC 2,575 716 2.1
LIC 5.7 8 1.3
LMIC 94.6 45 1.7
UMIC 324.3 145 2.5
Source: Gentilini et al. (2022).
Many countries provided benefits to previously unprotected workers, such as workers in the informal
economy in some cases, at least temporarily, and in doing so opened policy windows to extend social
protection coverage to informal workers in a more sustained way (ILO 2020a, 2021a and 2021d). Provisions
for unprotected workers have potential to positively impact child labour when concentrated in informal
family-based agriculture or where families have previously been excluded from work-related protection
and tax-financed social assistance (ILO and FAO 2021).
Nevertheless, the sheer size of the COVID-19 response was deceptive, as in many cases the social protection
responses were constrained by limited child sensitivity. Children were among certain more-vulnerable
population groups that were underserved by the response: of the social protection response measures
announced between February and December 2020, only 7.6 per cent were directed at children and families
(ILO 2021d). This is troubling given the evidence for child-sensitive social protection being an effective
response to crises in all contexts (Tirivayi et al. 2020). While some good practice examples were observed,
23
X
1. Why look at social protection and child labour now?
these were exceptions to the rule, and would have done little to arrest the increase in child labour (see
box 1.4). To compound the issues of a lack of child-focus in response, most emergency cash transfer
support was short-lived (4.5 months on average) (Gentilini et al. 2022).
Given the ongoing pandemic, fiscal consolidation, inflation, fuel and food prices hikes and the pervasive
challenges posed by climate change, there is clear potential for the further exacerbation of child poverty
and inequality, and this has significant implications for child labour if left unaddressed.
The jury is still out as to whether the multitude of pandemic response measures might result in the
long-term and sustainable extension of social protection in some contexts. However, the ruling is clearer
from a child-sensitivity perspective. Despite its promise, an opportunity was lost during the response.
The immediate and long-term needs of children could have been far better addressed programmatically
and in the fiscal allocation for child-focused responses – a goal more likely to be achieved if policymakers
build stronger, child-sensitive social protection systems now, and beyond the pandemic.
XBox 1.4. Utilizing existing child benefits for a child-focused pandemic response
Outlined below are examples of some lower-income countries with established child
benefits that were able to scale up or appropriately modify protection quickly when the
pandemic struck. This emphatically underlines the importance of having systems and
provisions in place to contend not only with ordinary life-cycle challenges but also those
that are primed and can be easily bolstered to respond to shocks. They continue to support
children and their caregivers during the crisis response and recovery phases. It is precisely
for this reason that ILO and UNICEF have been advocating for universal child benefits
(UCBs) to protect all children in crises or times of non-crisis (ILO and UNICEF 2019; ODI and
UNICEF 2020; ILO 2021d).
X
Mongolia: increased its Child Money Programme monthly benefit by five times from MNT
20,000 per month to MNT 100,000 for one year.
X
Guatemala and the Philippines: dropped the behavioral conditions assigned to their child
benefits to removed impediments to benefit take-up.
X
South Africa: increased the amount of the Child Support Grant, usually R450, by R300 in
May and R500 (US$27) June-October 2020 and provided it to every caregiver each month.
Source: Bastagli et al. (2022).
24
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
X
1.3 Social protection and child labour
across countries
Higher social protection coverage is associated with lower child labour prevalence. Figure 1.5 shows data
on child labour prevalence and the proportion of households covered by any type of social protection
transfer, across 23 countries. The four quadrants are distinguished by the average child labour rate (14.5
per cent) and average share of households covered by social assistance (26.6 per cent).
9
Among the ten
countries in the sample with high social assistance coverage, eight have below-average child labour
rates – data from the two outlier countries suggests that higher social protection coverage does not
automatically guarantee lower than average child labour rates.
However, more efforts are needed to simultaneously collect data on social protection and child labour
across countries.
X Figure 1.5 Scatterplot of social protection coverage and prevalence of child labour, 2017-2019
That countries are also populating the lower left quadrant of figure 1.5, where both social protection
coverage and child labour rates are low, underlines the evidence that social protection coverage is not
the only factor that might simultaneously determine child labour. Factors such as laws, social norms and
school attendance may also be at play. Building on this basic association, and to correctly identify the
impact of social protection on child labour, Section 2 looks at the recent evidence of child labour impacts
of social protection based on studies applying experimental or quasi-experimental methods.
9 Asimilarpatternisobservedforhazardouswork(gurenotreported).
Percentage of households receiving any type of social protection transfer
Prevalence of child labour for age 5-17 (SGD 8.7.1)
40
35
45
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
0 0 20 30 40 50 60 70
GUY
KOS
KYR
SAO
SER
ALG
BAN
BEL
CAR
CHA
CR
IRA
KIR
LAO
MAD
MAC
SAM
SL
SUR
TON
TUV
OPT
ZIM
Note: 23 low- and middle-income countries (Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Central African Republic, Chad, Costa Rica, Guyana,
Iraq, Kiribati, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Madagascar, North Macedonia, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Samoa, São Tomé
and Principe, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Zimbabwe).
Source: UNICEF MICS 6.
25
X
1. Why look at social protection and child labour now?
26
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
X
2.1 Introduction
10
This review aims to answer the following questions, in the context of low- and middle-income countries:
X
What is known about the impacts of social protection systems, schemes and programmes on child
labour outcomes?
X
Whatisknownaboutthecontextualfactorsthatinuencetheseimpacts?
X
Whatdesignfeaturesofsocialprotectionprogrammesincreaseorreducetheireectivenessin
addressingchildlabour,andhowcanprogrammesbeadaptedtostrengthenbenecialimpacts?
X
What are the evidence gaps and priorities for future research?
To answer these questions, this report synthesizes findings from rigorous impact evaluations of social
protection programmes.
11
Following both UNICEF’s and the ILO’s life-cycle approach to social protection
(UNICEF 2019; ILO 2021d), the report reviews programmes that address the diverse needs and vulnera-
bilities of families with children, working-age populations and older persons. Programmes are classified
in the following categories: programmes for families with children including maternity protection, cash
or in-kind transfers, and integrated social protection programmes (“cash plus”); public employment
programmes; unemployment protection; income security in old age. Two categories cross-cutting the
life course are also considered: social protection for people with disabilities, and social health protection.
For each programme area, the report reviews interventions that can potentially influence child labour
outcomes, even if that is not an explicit objective of the intervention.
12
The review primarily focuses on social protection programmes anchored in law and implemented by
government agencies. However, considering the limited evidence available on social protection and
child labour for interventions other than cash transfers, as well as the learning potential from any social
protection intervention, the search was broadened to interventions by market-based actors, third sector
organizations (such as NGOs), or multilateral organizations.
13
The evidence base covers the period 2010-22.
10 A considerable portion of this section draws on, and further develops, arguments and an earlier evidence base contained in an
earlier report (ILO 2013).
11 See Guilbert et al. (forthcoming), for details on the methodology used for the studies’ search and synthesis.
12 This review focuses on the following outcomes: (i) child labour, including work below the minimum age, the worst forms of child
labour, and hazardous household chores (see box 1.1); (ii) child participation or time spent in economic activities (such as agricultural
work, livestock herding, fishing, or participation in non-agricultural business -within or outside the household); and (iii) child
participation or time spent in household chores undertaken within children’s own homes, such as taking care of other children, elderly
orsickhouseholdmembers,cooking,cleaning.Thedescriptionofstudyndings(sections2.3-2.9)distinguishesbetweengeneral
engagement in economic activities and engagement in child labour for elimination if this was analysed in the respective study.
13 This deviates from the common understanding that “programmes implemented solely by private organisations or non-
governmentalorganisationswithoutgovernmentaliationarenotconsideredpartofsocialprotection”(UNICEF2019).
X
2.
Social protection
as a policy response
to child labour: What
does the evidence say?
11
27
X
2.2 Overview of the evidence base
Considering the period 2010 to the present, this review identified 62 studies covering 47 different pro-
grammes. Of these studies, 37 (60 per cent) found unambiguous reductions in children’s engagement in
productive activities (economic activities and/or household chores); 11 (18 per cent) reported increases
in children’s engagement in productive activities; seven (11 per cent) reported mixed effects, with pro-
grammes increasing some types of child labour activities and decreasing others; and the remaining seven
(11 per cent) reported no significant changes in children’s time allocation.
Fourteen of the studies identified included impacts on child labour as defined by ILO standards (such
as work under hazardous conditions or for long hours; see box 1.1 for details). Of these 14 studies, nine
(64 per cent) found unambiguous reductions in child labour, one found mixed effects, another study
found no impact, and the remaining three found increases in child labour.
X Table 2.1 Summary of study findings (2010 to present)
Social protection
instrument or
branch
Evidence
base
Child focus Evidence on impact on child
labour outcomes
Cash transfers Extensive
(26 studies, 21
programmes)
• Most cash transfers set benefit
levels depending on the number
of children in the household.
• A few programmes encourage
recipients to spend (part of) the
transfer on children’s wellbeing.
Cash transfers help to reduce
children’s engagement in work or
household chores when amounts
are adequate, and payments are
regular.
• Consistent reductions in paid
work.
• Evidence on child labour in
household farms or businesses
is mixed, particularly when
households expand productive
activities.
In-kind transfers Limited
(4 studies,
4 programmes)
• School feeding programmes are
specifically designed to address
children’s needs.
• Other in-kind programmes (food
subsidy, food distribution) can be
directed at families with children.
Limited evidence found mixed
effects, depending on the
modality of distribution.
• In-kind transfers are less
effective at reducing child labour
than cash transfers of similar
amount.
• School feeding is associated with
lower participation in economic
activities.
Integrated social
protection (cash
plus)
Good
(11 studies, 7
programmes)
• Several programmes provide
households with information
on child protection issues and
linkages to child protection
services.
• Other programmes are not
focused on children, but
rather on household livelihood
opportunities, with potentially
harmful consequences for
children if they are requested
to support new productive
activities.
The evidence is mixed, but this
covers diverse programmes.
• Combining cash with intense
sensitization on child labour has
proven effective in reducing it.
• Programmes promoting
livelihood activities tend to
increase child labour, an issue
that can be mitigated with
sensitization sessions.
28
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
Social protection
instrument or
branch
Evidence
base
Child focus Evidence on impact on child
labour outcomes
Public
employment
programmes
Good
(10 studies, 4
programmes)
The programmes covered by this
review did not have a focus on
children.
The evidence to date is mixed.
• Children may take over the
activities of other household
members participating in public
works.
• Adverse effects on child labour
are less likely when these
programmes pay more regular
and higher amounts.
Unemployment
protection
None
identified on
child labour
No direct focus on children or
households raising children.
Although no studies were found
on child labour, there is evidence
that unemployment benefits
reduce poverty and vulnerability.
Maternity
protection
None
identified on
child labour
Programmes are designed to
support primary caregivers of
infant children allowing parents
to spend time with the child, these
programmes are directly linked to
children’s well-being.
Evidence linking maternity
protection with long-term
educational participation
outcomes is mixed and
predominantly from high-income
countries.
Disability
protection
None
identified on
child labour
Adult and child disability benefits,
common in high-income
countries, are an obvious way to
protect persons with disabilities.
Although no studies were found
on child labour, there is evidence
that disability benefits reduce
poverty and vulnerability.
Social health
protection
Limited
(five
studies, four
programmes)
Most health protection
programmes favour a family
rather than an individual
approach for service provision.
Consistent evidence that social
health protection can reduce child
labour.
• Protective effects for children
observed after health shocks.
• Social health insurance also
reduces child labour in absence
of health shocks.
Old-age pensions Limited (five
studies, five
programmes)
No direct focus on children. Most studies showed that old-age
pensions reduce child work.
• Old-age pensions also increase
school enrolment.
Universal basic
income
Limited (one
study)
UBI is, in principle, an
individualized payment to children
and adults. Whether children
should get a smaller or larger sum
is a source of debate.
Prevalence and time spent in
casual wage labour declined,
but time spent working for the
household increased.
• Other related evidence (from
simulations) suggests that
UBI would reduce poverty and
vulnerability and facilitate the
working-age population’s access
to work.
Note: The extent of the evidence base is defined as “limited” when fewer than 10 studies are available,
“good” when between 10 and 20 studies are available, and “extensive” when over 20 studies are available.
29
X
2. Social protection as a policy response to child labour: What does the evidence say?
The selected 62 studies cover 28 low- and middle-income countries. The map in figure 2 .1 shows the
distribution of the studies.
14
Latin America and the Caribbean and Eastern and Southern Africa are the
regions with the highest number of studies (15 each), followed by South Asia (11 studies), Western and
Central Africa (nine studies), East Asia and Pacific (eight studies), and Middle East and Norther Africa
(four studies).
X Figure 2.1 Geographical distribution of studies (2010 to present)
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of studies (and programmes examined) by programme type. Cash
transfers are the most studied type of social protection, as pertains to child labour outcomes. A second
group of commonly studied programmes includes integrated social protection programmes (cash plus).
In-kind transfers, social health protection and old-age pensions are studied relatively less frequently with
respect to their impacts on child labour.
14 A similar map is obtained when showing the number of programmes studied.
4 or more 2-3 1 0 High income countries
Source: Elaboration based on the studies selected as part of the review.
30
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
X Figure 2.2 Distribution of studies and programmes by category, 2010 to present
0 5 3025201510
8
10
4
5
5
6
4
26
22
4
4
11
Cash transfers
In-kind transfers
Cash plus
Public works
Old-age pension
Social health protection
Number of studies Number of programmes
Source: Elaboration based on the studies selected as part of the review.
31
X
2. Social protection as a policy response to child labour: What does the evidence say?
X
2.3 Transfer programmes directed
at families with children
Maternity protection
X
Key findings
No recent studies were found detailing the impacts of maternity protection on
child labour.
There is evidence linking maternity protection with the long-term educational
outcomes of children covered by such protection (maternity benefits, paid
parental and maternity leave). This evidence is mixed and mostly from high-
income countries.
More research is needed to fill the knowledge gap on the effects of maternity
protection, including access to free maternity care, on child labour, particularly
from low- and middle-income countries.
Future research should also investigate the impacts of maternity protection on
the education and labour of older (already existing) children within the family,
and in particular in the case of teenage pregnancies.
Working women and their families are vulnerable during pregnancy and after child-birth, which can
influence decisions on children’s education and child labour (ILO 2013). Adequate maternity protection
ensures the income security and access to health care that they need to prepare for childbirth and recover
and care for new children; preventing their premature return to work while safeguarding their jobs and
earnings.
15
Theoretically, maternity protection can improve family well-being through the following pathways: less
stress during pregnancy; mothers and parents spending more of their time caring for their children during
early life; guaranteed income for the family and resources for nurturing the newborn(s) (Rossin-Slater 2017;
Carneiro et al. 2015); and access to good maternal healthcare without hardship (ILO 2021d). The second
and third pathways have implications on the wellbeing of all family members and their participation in
work including care and household chores. Without adequate maternity protection, poor families may
resort to child labour to cope with any deprivations, including with the high cost of delivery if maternity
care is not provided for free (ILO 2013).
To date, there is no robust evidence on the impacts of maternity protection on child labour. However,
there are studies that have examined the long-term educational outcomes of children covered by paid
parental and maternity leave, which can be used to infer greater investment in, and engagement with,
the education system.
15 See also https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/equality-and-discrimination/maternity-protection/lang--en/index.htm.
32
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
Evidence from high-income countries – focusing on school access and attainment – reports mixed
results:
X
Extensions of maternity leave duration was associated with lower drop-out rates in Norway (Carneiro
et al. 2015).
X
A recent review of extensions of parental/maternity leave duration showed little or no impact on
children’s graduation rates and education attainment in Denmark, Germany and Norway (Rossin-
Slater 2017).
This area is under-investigated and more attention should be paid to it considering the pathways
highlighted above. Future research should also investigate the impacts of maternity protection on
the education and labour of older children within the family, and in particular in the case of adolescent
pregnancies. Indeed, adolescent pregnancies in contexts where there is no social protection, maternity
care or cash benefits are at risk of both poverty and reproducing a cycle of early school drop out and
early labour market participation, especially for girls (WHO 2014).
Unconditional and conditional cash transfers
X
Key findings
Family and child cash benefits represent an important source of income security
for households with children, and tend to reduce child labour.
Cash transfers consistently reduced children’s participation in paid work outside
the household.
As households partly invest cash transfers in productive activities, this may
determine an increase in children’s work within the household, including cases of
hazardous work.
Conditionality is not a prerequisite for the effectiveness of social protection in
terms of child labour.
Rather, the effectiveness of cash transfers in reducing child labour is related to
transfer size, duration, and regularity of payments.
Limited evidence on the worst forms of child labour suggests that if transfer size
is adequate and transfers are delivered sustainably over time, cash transfers can
also reduce the worst forms of child labour.
Cash transfers are generally implemented with the objectives to ensure income security and improve
living standards and food security, as well as to limit the risk of harmful coping strategies that may lock
households into intergenerational poverty cycles. In addition, they have been also used to reduce access
barriers to critical services, including education, health and nutrition. Cash transfers are expected to
reduce the demand for child labour through the additional resources they provide to households. However,
as the programmes also allow poor households to expand their investment in productive assets, the
demand for child labour may increase if this investment is not matched by adult labour supply, increases
in productivity or technological solutions.
33
X
2. Social protection as a policy response to child labour: What does the evidence say?
In some contexts, when conditioning cash receipt to specific outcomes, conditional cash transfers aim to
change household behaviours and promote investment in human capabilities. However, evidence is clear
on the role that unconditional transfers also play to change household behaviours through higher income
security and better access to services, without making the receipt of benefits conditional upon specific
behaviours, and enhancing choice and planning capacities for programme participants. For instance, while
both conditional and unconditional transfers allow households to invest more in education, conditions
on attendance may provide a further incentive to attend school, and crowd out children’s time allocation
to labour. The debate whether to condition or not is a recurrent one (see box 2.1).
Evidence of conditional cash transfers is extensive and documents protective impacts on child labour
outcomes, although the magnitude of the effects was found to vary greatly across programmes and
contexts (ILO 2013). Early evidence on the effects of unconditional cash transfers was more limited and
produced mixed results.
The review completed for this report identified 26 studies on cash transfers, of which 12 were on uncon-
ditional cash transfers and 12 on conditional cash transfers; one study by Fenton et al. (2016) examined
the separate impacts of each transfer type, while another study by De Hoop et al. (2020a) focused on a
programme combining conditional and unconditional transfers (plus public employment).
Out of these 26 studies, 16 found that cash transfers caused a reduction in children’s participation in, or
time spent on, economic activities. Of the remaining studies, three found an increase, four found mixed
effects and the remaining three found no impact.
Two of the four studies reporting mixed evidence document the reallocation of children’s time within the
household. In Malawi and the United Republic of Tanzania, cash transfers reduced participation in paid
work outside the household, but increased participation in economic activities for the household (De
Hoop et al. 2020; De Hoop, Groppo and Handa 2020). In Zambia, children also increased their work within
the household farm, although without a corresponding reduction in work for pay outside the household,
possibly due to the relatively low prevalence of this activity among children at baseline (De Hoop, Groppo,
and Handa 2020). While generally safer compared to work outside the household, work within the
household can be hazardous. Indeed, in both Malawi and Zambia children’s engagement in hazardous
work increased following cash transfers (De Hoop, Groppo, and Handa 2020). Hazardous work remained
unchanged in the United Republic of Tanzania (De Hoop et al. 2020).
Four studies found that cash transfers reduced children’s participation or time spent in household chores
(Sebastian et al. 2019, Hiziroglu Aygün et al. 2021; De Hoop et al. 2018a; Cahyadi et al. 2020). This effect was
specific to girls in households receiving the Lesotho Child Grant Programme and the Indonesia Programme
Keluarga Harapan. Two studies reported that cash transfers were effective in fighting the worst forms of
child labour specifically among girls in the carpet weaving sector in Nepal (Edmonds and Shrestha 2014)
and among (supposedly boys) combatants in Colombia (Pena, Urrego, and Villa 2017).
34
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
X Box 2.1. The policy choice of conditionality versus unconditionality
Yet, such conditions have been questioned for a number of reasons, including increased
administration and operational cost of setting and monitoring conditions (potentially
lowering transfer amounts); the risk of failure to meet conditions – particularly when
binding – and how this can accentuate inequalities in certain populations (Standing and
Orton 2018); assumptions that the main deterrent for not accessing a specific services
is economic and not linked to quality, access or adequacy; and the risk of reinforcing
traditional gender roles while adding to women’s unpaid workloads (see for instance
Bastagli et al. 2019; Cookson 2018; Fultz and Francis 2013; Molyneux 2007).
Is the conditionality necessary for cash transfers to have the positive effects they seem to
have, or are unconditional transfers similarly effective?
The answer partly depends on the outcomes of interest. Both types of transfers are found
to yield positive impacts on schooling, health, and nutrition outcomes. Baird et al. (2014)
found that both conditional and unconditional programmes similarly improve enrolment
and attendance, compared to no programme. However, when the set of conditional
transfers is restricted to those that monitor and enforce conditions (as opposed to “soft
conditionalities’’), conditional programmes in some case can contribute to enrolment and
attendance.
The review conducted for this report only identified one study, Fenton et al. (2016), that
compared the effectiveness of conditional and unconditional transfers with respect to
children’s paid employment. Both reduced the time spent by children in paid employment,
with the difference in impact being only marginally statistically significant in favour of
conditions. Considering that school attendance and health monitoring conditions were
soft (after six months of not meeting the conditions households would lose 10 per cent
of the transfers), it is plausible that the same result could have been achieved by simply
integrating messaging in the unconditional transfer without the risks and costs outlined
above.
With this evidence in mind, necessarily, the decision to introduce conditions linked to
human development outcomes (such as health and education) depends on context-specific
considerations and should carefully balance potential advantages and costs, understanding
of drivers and access barriers, in in line with national priorities and should be decided by
local authorities, guided by the set of principles contained in ILO Recommendation No. 202
(see ILO 2013 and 2021d; UNICEF 2016a).
35
X
2. Social protection as a policy response to child labour: What does the evidence say?
From the review of unconditional and conditional cash transfers a number of design and imple-
mentation findings are evident:
X
Adequate transfer amounts are essential to reduce child labour. High transfer size can be associ-
ated with stronger improvements in children’s time allocation (Hiziroglu Aygün et al. 2021). Conversely,
small transfers may yield no impact (Ambler and De Brauw 2019; Canelas and Niño-Zarazúa 2019;
Churchill et al. 2021; Vera Cossio 2019); or only reduce labour intensity but not prevalence (Costa et
al. 2020); or only reduce paid employment, maintaining other key indicators, such as household ex-
penditure on education, unchanged (Dias et al. 2021). Low transfer size may even lead to increases in
childlabour,iftransfersareinsucienttocoverthefullcostofschooling(DeHoopetal.2019),orto
osettheimpactofadverseeconomicshocks(Cepalunietal.2022).Ensuringanadequateamountof
benetscommensuratewiththespeciccontextcanvarybetweenruralandurbanareaswithinthe
same country (Prifti et al. 2020). See also the ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention,
1952 (No. 102).
16
X
Longer programme duration is associated with stronger reduction in child labour.Whenbenets
weredeliveredoverlongerperiods,protectiveeectswerestronger(Cahyadietal.2020;Churchill
et al. 2021; Moussa et al. 2022; Salti et al. 2022). This is related to households consolidating poverty
reduction and reaping the returns from productive investments over time, which can further reduce
child labour. Economic security helps families to diminish the pull of child labour as a preventive or
copingstrategy.Sustainedsocialprotectioneortsappearparticularlyimportanttoaddresstheworst
forms of child labour and keep children out of hazardous work (Edmonds and Shrestha 2014). However,
itisimportanttomonitorprogrammeeectsonchildren’stimeallocationalsointheshortterm,to
ensure that long-term gains are not obtained at the cost of higher child labour in the short term.
X
Conditionality is not a prerequisite for eectiveness in terms of child labour. The proportion of
studiesshowingprotectiveeectsissimilarforconditionalandunconditionaltransferprogrammes.
The evidence also shows that associating messaging or labelling to unconditional cash transfers can
improvetheireectivenesswithrespecttochildlabouroutcomes(DeHoopetal.2018a;Pellerano,
Porreca, and Rosati 2020; Sebastian et al. 2019). Nevertheless, when income shocks occur, condition-
ality may provide an additional incentive to keep children in school and limit their involvement in
economic activities (Fitz and League 2021). The consideration of the potential child labour reduction
eectsofanunconditionaluniversalbasicincomeisdiscussedinbox 2.2.
X
Programmes designed with a focus on children’s outcomes are more eective in addressing
child labour. As mentioned above, programmes which included messages in support of children’s
educationweremoreeectivewithrespecttochildlabouroutcomes.Moreover,programmeswhere
the transfer size varied according to the number of children in the household also showed relatively
strongerprotectiveeects.Inhouseholdsreceivingcashtransfers,evenineligiblechildrenexperi-
encereductionineconomicactivities(LincoveandParker2016).Cashtransfersprovedbenecialfor
particularly vulnerable children, including refugees and indigenous children, even when not tailored
specicallyforthem(HizirogluAygünetal.2021;Lopez-CalvaandPatrinos2015).
X
Service access and quality, as well as comprehensive and eective regulations can boost the
positive eects of cash transfers on child labour.Community-levelfactorsalsoaectprogramme
eectivenessincombattingchildlabour.Cashtransferscannotreachtheirfullimpactpotentialif
public education or health infrastructures are lacking or inadequate. This was for instance the case in
Lebanon,wheretheincreaseinschoolparticipationfollowingthetransferswaslimitedbyinsucient
schoolcapacity(DeHoopetal.2018b).Insucientserviceavailabilitymayalsodiscriminatemargin-
alized or more vulnerable populations if they have to travel long distances to satisfy programme con-
ditionalities. The national legal framework regulating child labour (such as the age at which children
are legally allowed to work), and necessarily its enforcement, is likely to be an important moderator of
16 https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C102.
36
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
programmeeects,andshouldbeconsideredinthedesignofsocialprotectionprogrammes(Canelas
and Niño-Zarazúa 2019).
Finally, the review showed that the effects of cash transfers depend on child, household and
contextual characteristics, including:
X
LargedierencesineectsbygenderandageofthechildinthecontextsofEthiopia,Lesotho,andthe
United Republic of Tanzania (De Hoop et al. 2020; Prifti et al. 2020; Sebastian et al. 2019). For example,
intheUnitedRepublicofTanzaniareductionsinpaidworkoutsidethehouseholdwerespecicto
older boys, while paid work remained unchanged for younger children and girls (De Hoop et al. 2020).
X
Dierencesinimpactsbyhouseholdcomposition,suchasthenumberofadultswhoareabletowork,
with children more likely to start working or working longer hours when households include fewer
adults who are able to work (see, for instance, Cepaluni et al. 2022; De Hoop et al. 2020; Edmonds and
Theoharides2020),andnumbersofbrothersandsisters,andtheirages,witholderchildrenbenet-
ting from cash transfers targeted at younger children (Lincove and Parker 2016). The gender of the
householdheadmayalsomoderateimpacts.InLesotho,girlsbenetedmoreintermsofimproved
schoolingandreducedworkinmale-headedhouseholds,whileboysbenetedmoreinfemale-headed
households (Sebastian et al. 2019).
X
Eectsalsodependontraditionalnormsonchildlabourandotherharmfulpractices,suchaschild
marriage. As described in section on integrated social protection programmes (“Cash plus”) below,
programmescombiningcashwithsensitizationchallengingthesenormswerefoundtobeeective
in reducing child labour, including in its worst forms (see, for example, ICI 2022; Karimli, Rost, and
Ismayilova 2018).
37
X
2. Social protection as a policy response to child labour: What does the evidence say?
X Box 2.2. The promise of universal basic income: expected impacts and challenges
Recent interest in universal basic income (UBI) has grown in prominence, especially with
calls for an emergency UBI to be implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic (ECLAC 2020;
Gray Molina and Ortiz-Juarez 2020). However, aside from numerous pilot experiments –
and a short-lived UBI in Mongolia and a quasi-UBI in Iran – the UBI has not yet made any
permanent breakthroughs in national policy. Necessarily, evidence of child labour impacts
of UBIs are limited.
A UBI reaching all children and paying adequate benefits could contribute to reducing child
labour by reducing monetary and multidimensional poverty and more – as would also be the
case for comprehensive life-cycle social protection. On the other hand, a modest UBI benefit
may risk spreading resources too thinly across the population, but adequacy brings concerns
about the significant financing requirements of a UBI that is set at an adequate level.
Three pilot UBI programmes conducted in Madhya Pradesh, India (2011 and 2013) shed some
light. The largest of these pilots disbursed a modest UBI for 18 months to approximately
6,000 men, women and children in eight villages, and the results were compared with
12 otherwise similar “control” villages (Davala et al. 2015). After a year of UBI having been
paid, the proportion of children in economic activity was only marginally down. On closer
inspection, it became clear that fewer children were engaged in casual wage labour, and
that they allocated less time to these activities. However, in line with findings elsewhere,
the amount of time devoted to work on family plots or helping out around the home had
increased, yet parents reported, that this type of work was less likely to interfere with
schooling (Standing and Orton 2018).
In-kind transfers
X
Key findings
The evidence base on in-kind transfers is limited.
School feeding or take-home rations have meaningful impacts on school enrol-
ment and attendance, hence potentially generating reductions in children’s work.
In difficult times, the conditionality intrinsically attached to school feeding
programmes may be meaningful to keep children in school and away from labour.
The value of the in-kind transfer is an important parameter for programme
effectiveness in reducing and preventing child labour.
In-kind transfers seem to be less effective in fighting child labour compared to
cash transfers of similar amounts, which allow more flexible expenditure.
Operational and logistical difficulties associated with the delivery and monitoring
of in-kind transfers are common and raise concerns about their efficiency.
This review did not identify any study assessing the impact of in-kind transfers
on hazardous labour.
38
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
In-kind transfers cover part of household consumption costs, hence limiting the need to resort to child
labour to afford certain goods, and offer a more limited set of consumption choices. They do not provide
income security to beneficiary households compared to cash transfers. However, they may restrict the
usage of the transfer to the consumption of goods that potentially are complements to (or inputs for)
human development outcomes.
Globally, as cash transfers became easier and less costly to implement through rapid digitalization, they
have gradually supplanted in-kind transfers. They also provide participants with choice to use cash to
meet multiple needs, in addition to food or specific supplies. Nevertheless, in-kind transfers in the form
of school feeding or support to educational costs remain widely implemented and are still expanding in
low- and middle-income countries.
For instance, earlier evidence on in-kind transfers focused on school feeding and take-home rations
programmes in Bangladesh and Burkina Faso, finding modest reductions of children’s involvement in
economic activities and no effect on household chores (ILO 2013).
This review identified four recent studies assessing the impact of in-kind transfers on children’s time
use and schooling, with one study (Tang, Zhao, and Zhao 2020) specifically analysing impacts on child
labour for elimination, and one looking at conflict-affected regions of Mali (Aurino et al. 2019). Results
were mixed and showed that:
X
ProtectiveeectsoftheFreeCompulsoryEducationReforminChinareducedtheprevalenceofchild
labourforelimination(denedinthestudyasworkbelowtheminimumage),althoughonlyforboys
(Tang, Zhao, and Zhao 2020). And, in Mexico, the Programa de Apoyo Alimentario reduced the preva-
lence and intensity of children’s participation in economic activities for children in the middle-income
distribution (Tagliati 2019); however, it was the cash transfers (of similar amount) that enabled the
poorest households to reduce children’s participation in economic activities, rather than the food
baskets. The “Rice for the Poor” programme in Indonesia found no impact of the food subsidy on
children’s participation in economic activities (Jayawardana, Baryshnikova, and Pham 2021).
X
Inconict-aectedregionsofMali,Aurinoetal.(2019)foundthatschoolfeedingwaseectivein
reducing months spent in farm labour, while generalized food distribution increased participation in
farmwork.Eectsongirls’participationinfarmworkwereweakerforgeneralizedfooddistribution,
while school feeding, on the other hand, led to a large decrease in the time spent on farming and
animal-rearing by girls.
An important consideration with in-kind benefits is the transaction costs that households have to face
when accessing the service. In the case of food subsidies, constraints such as getting to specific stores
on specific days were shown to lead to certain eligible households failing to collect their benefits. Failure
to monitor causes of, and address, low take-up can undermine the efficacy of the benefit, and ultimately
result in children being trapped in or drawn into child labour.
39
X
2. Social protection as a policy response to child labour: What does the evidence say?
Integrated social protection programmes (“Cash plus”)
X
Key findings
Available studies reported mixed effects, depending on the specific
complementary interventions considered.
Combining cash transfers with social health insurance slightly reduced children’s
participation in productive activities.
Combining cash transfers with information campaign on child labour appears a
promising strategy to reduce child labour, including hazardous labour.
Programmes combining cash with livelihood promotion interventions (such
as training and asset transfers) pose risks for children, who may be drawn
into productive activities for the household, including hazardous work. Such
programmes can still reduce child labour, if further combined with sensitization
on children’s rights and the hazards related to child labour.
The amount of the cash transfer, and the intensity of sensitization components,
are key to ensuring protective effects.
Integrated social protection programmes – also referred to as “cash plus” – combine cash transfers with
complementary interventions to simultaneously promote households’ and children’s well-being, including
information on the detrimental effects of child labour or access to services such as health or education.
Acknowledging the mixed evidence on conditionality, service take-up and risk related to household
investment in economic activities, complementary interventions are expected to generate synergies
particularly relevant to address child labour.
Integrated social protection programmes are rapidly expanding in low- and middle-income countries,
including for instance Burkina Faso (Child Sensitive Social Protection Programme, combining cash with
water and sanitation and nutrition services), Ghana (Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty, LEAP,
combining cash with social health insurance), and Mozambique (Child Grant Programme, combining cash
with nutrition behavioural change communication). However, studies examining the child labour impacts
of cash plus programmes are rare.
This review identified 11 studies on integrated social protection programmes. Of these, five were under-
taken in Ghana, and focused on combining cash transfers with social health insurance, and combining
cash with an information campaign on child labour. The other six studies assessed combinations of cash
transfers with livelihood promotion – for instance, productive asset transfers and training on business
activities – which in some cases were also associated with sensitization on child labour. This evidence
shows that:
X
Programmes combining cash transfers with social health insurance have the potential to reduce
households’ reliance on child labour as a coping strategy in the face of adverse health needs – including
as a precautionary strategy. However, regularity and adequacy of the cash component remain impor-
tantdeterminantsofprogrammeeectivenessincashplusapproaches.Short-termevaluationsof
Ghana’s LEAP programme and its extension (LEAP1000, which also covers households with pregnant
women and children up to two years) and its link with the National Health Insurance, showed limited
impacts on children’s productive activities (Aborigo et al. 2021; Angeles et al. 2017; Handa et al. 2014;
OseiandLambon-Quayeo2019).Theauthorsmostlyexplainedthelimitedimpactsbasedonthe
irregularity and small amount of the cash payments (Handa et al. 2014; Angeles et al. 2017; Aborigo
et al. 2018).
40
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
X
Programmes combining cash with campaigns or sensitization against child labourspecically
address the risk of children participating in the household expanded productive activities. Such
programmes indeed inform caregivers on the hazards associated with child labour, thus supporting
transfer expenditure on education, and deterring children’s engagement in hazardous work. In Ghana,
International Cocoa Initiative (2022) found that a programme combining unconditional cash transfers
withaninformationcampaignwaseectiveinreducingtheprevalenceofhazardousworkamong
children.
X
Programmes combining cash with livelihood promotion can help households increase their income
and reduce demand for child labour, but may also increase child labour if additional support is needed
in the newly created businesses. Building on early evidence on this type of programme – which showed
thatassettransfersmaysignicantlyreducetheprotectiveeectsofsocialprotection(ILO2013)–this
reviewidentiedsixstudies,veofwhichprovidednullornegativeresults.Twostudiesshowthat
these programmes did not change children’s participation in economic activities in Brazil and India
(Banerjee et al. 2011; Costa, Helfand, and Souza 2018), three found that children’s participation in
economic activities increased in Bangladesh and the Philippines (Bandiera et al. 2013; Edmonds and
Theoharides 2020; Sulaiman 2015).
17
Of the three studies that found increase in general participation
in economic activities, one study also assessed impacts on child labour (see box 1.1) and found that the
programme in the Philippines even increased the prevalence of child labour, despite being designed
with the objective of reducing it (Edmonds and Theoharides 2020). Karimli, Rost, and Ismayilova
2018 study in Burkina Faso was the only positive example, with the authors recording uniquely pro-
tectiveeectswhenthecash-pluslivelihoodpromotionprogrammealsoincludedsensitizationon
child labour. In this programme, the sensitization component had relatively high intensity (including
monthlysessionsforsixtoeightfamilymembers),whichlikelyincreasedprogrammeeectiveness.
What is clear from the cash-plus evidence is that family context and effective implementation of the “plus”
components matter. The strong and negative effects found in the Philippines by Edmonds and Theoharides
(2020) study were explained by a scarcity of adult labour in recipient households, and potentially by a
lack of awareness of the hazards associated with child labour despite the programme including child
labour orientation sessions (covering the legal definition and explaining how the Government is engaging
communities to reduce child labour). However, in qualitative interviews recipients reported little value
in these sessions and were unaware of the programme objective. In contrast, in Karimli, Rost, and
Ismayilova (2018) study in Burkina Faso, the child labour sensitization component had a higher intensity
and coverage in the family.
17 Bandiera et al. (2013) considers all children in the household, so presumably these includes a mix of younger and older children;
Edmonds and Theoharides (2020) focus on children 12 to 17 years old; and Sulaiman (2015) considers children 6 to 15 years old.
41
X
2. Social protection as a policy response to child labour: What does the evidence say?
X
2.4 Public employment programmes
X
Key findings
Studies found mixed impacts of public employment programmes on children’s
participation in economic activities.
Public employment programmes certainly present risks in terms of child labour,
with older children being likely to increase their participation in productive
activities, to substitute for adults who engage in public employments.
Impacts differ by sex, with girls substituting their mothers in household chores
and boys being more likely to work outside the household, like male adults.
Improving the amount and regularity of payments from public employments can
avoid potential detrimental effects on children’s work.
This review did not identify any study assessing the impact of public employment
programmes on hazardous labour.
Public employment programmes (PEPs) provide a source of employment for adults from poor or chronically
food insecure households, especially during lean seasons, thus (hypothetically) reducing household
demand for child labour as an alternative income source. PEPs can also help to build public infrastructure
and expand basic services, including health and education services, which can further reduce child
labour. However, such programmes may increase children’s engagement in productive activities for the
household, if they take on work at home for adults who engage in PEPs outside the household. Evidence
also suggest that, in some instances, children may also directly participate in PEPs.
Public employment programmes can be key elements of social protection systems, and are common in the
form of active labour market policies, in the most developed systems worldwide. In low- and middle-income
countries, programmes such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(NREGS) in India, the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia or the Expanded Public Works
Programme in South Africa have been implemented over long periods, becoming flagship schemes in
their respective countries. Yet despite PEPs being an important component of social protection systems,
the evidence on these programmes is rather limited, mostly covering NREGS and PSNP.
Building on early evidence, which showed mixed effects of PEPs for child labour reduction by sex, favouring
girls (ILO 2013), this review covers 10 recent studies from Argentina, Ethiopia, India, and Sierra Leone. The
new evidence is also mixed, with four studies showing protective effects, four reporting adverse impacts,
one reporting mixed effects, and one study reporting no impacts. In summary:
X
Three studies of Ethiopia’s PSNP showed reduced children’s participation in economic activities, espe-
cially for older children (Dinku 2019; Behrane et al. 2017; Porter and Goyal 2016). A similar pattern was
found for Argentina’s Programa Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (Juras 2014). Another PSNP study
by Belete (2021) reported mixed results, explained by changes made to indicators used by the study
(see Guilbert et al. forthcoming).
X
Three studies of India’s NREGS all reported increased children’s participation in economic activities
(Ajefu and Abiona 2019; Li and Sekhri 2020; Shah and Steinberg 2021). Shah and Steinberg (2021) found
that among adolescents, girls were more likely to substitute for their mothers in household chores,
while boys were more likely to work outside the home for pay.
42
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
X
Rosas and Sabarwal (2016) found that Sierra Leone’s Youth Employment Support Project (YESP) did not
aectchildren’sinvolvementinpaidactivities,butincreasedschoolabsenteeism,whichmayindicate
child labour substituting for the household chores previously managed by adults before their partici-
pation in the programme (Dammert et al. 2018).
Importantly for the implementation of future programmes, the evidence suggests that the timing of
PEPs – together with the amount and regularity of payments – are important determinants of child labour
impacts. For instance, when PEPs offer employment during the high agricultural season, children are
more likely to substitute for adult farm work, both within and outside the household (Ajefu and Abiona
2019). Moreover, larger and more regular payments can improve programme impacts, further reducing
the prevalence of working children, school attendance, and highest grade completed (Berhane et al. 2017).
X
2.5 Unemployment protection
X
Key findings
No recent studies were found detailing the impact of unemployment protection
on child labour.
In households without unemployment protection, when adults lose their job they
can be forced to rely on children’s labour as an alternative income source.
Having the income replacement function that unemployment protection provides
would in all likelihood diminish the need for households to resort to child labour.
Research is required to gauge a potential relationship between unemployment
protection and child labour.
The link between unemployment and child labour risk is clear, as are the implications of low levels of labour
market formalization. When an adult member of the household loses his or her job, in the absence of
unemployment protection the household can be forced to rely on children’s labour as a coping strategy.
This review did not identify any study investigating direct links between unemployment protection
schemes or related statutory income support programmes and child labour. However, previous evidence
from the ILO (2013) report regarding Argentina, Brazil, the United Republic of Tanzania and Togo suggests
that, where unemployment protection is absent, households can be forced to rely on children’s labour
to cover lost employment income. The clear implication is that unemployment protection has a role to
play in efforts against child labour, by providing at least partial income replacement and enabling the
beneficiary to maintain a certain level of household consumption until new employment is available and
thereby removing the need to rely on the income of working children.
43
X
2. Social protection as a policy response to child labour: What does the evidence say?
X
2.6 Income security in old age
X
Key findings
Generally, most of the evidence shows that children living in households with an
old-age pension recipient are less likely to work.
These positive impacts appear to be age-sensitive (older children), with the sex
of the pension recipient (female) influential in some contexts.
Old age pensions also improve child literacy and school enrolment, and proved
to reduce hazardous work, although there is evidence on this form of child labour
only from one study.
The evidence is predominantly from Latin America and rural populations. Hence,
more research is needed from diverse low- and middle-income countries and
urban settings.
Old age is a source of vulnerability as people lose their income-earning ability, experience deteriorated
health and are at greater risk of poverty. In multigenerational households,
18
or split-generation households,
income security in old age can play a key role in the economic security of the household as a whole,
including its youngest members. Old-age pensions can provide this income security and potentially
affect child labour.
Building on early evidence from South Africa that showed that old-age pensions can reduce child labour
overall and improve school enrolment among girls (Edmonds 2006), the review uncovered examples from
both means-tested/targeted and universal approaches:
X
In Brazil, a non-contributory means-tested pension reduced the labour force participation of children
aged 10 to 15 years (De Oliveira, Kassouf, and de Aquino 2017). Another study in Brazil found that an
old-age pension scheme for rural workers reduced participation in work for pay and hours worked
amonggirlslivingwithafemalebeneciary(DeCarvalhoFilho2012).
19
In Mexico, a non-contributory
rural pension scheme (now discontinued) decreased the labour force participation of adolescent boys
aged12to17fromthepooresthouseholds,whowerelivingwithafemalebeneciary(Juarezand
Pfutze 2015).
X
Evidence from universal schemes is inconclusive. In Thailand, a universal old-age pension scheme
reduced informal agricultural work (girls) and in formal non-agricultural work (boys) among children
aged 12 to 18 years (Herrmann, Leckcivilize, and Zenker 2021). In Bolivia, a universal pension reduced
the likelihood of work among boys in rural households (Chong and Yáñez-Pagans 2019).
18 As of 2010, the prevalence of households including both children under 15 and an older person aged 60 years or above amounted
to 13 and 14 per cent in Asia and Africa, respectively, while it was lower at 8 per cent in Latin America. At the country level, the
prevalence of such intergenerational households ranged from 5 per cent in Argentina to 37 percent in Senegal (UNDESA 2017).
19 Only hours above 15 per week are recorded, so results indicate that the programme reduced hazardous work in the form of long
hours.
44
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
X
2.7 Social protection for people with disabilities
X
Key findings
No recent studies were found detailing the impact of disability protection on child
labour.
Research is required to gauge a potential relationship between disability
protection and child labour.
Cross-country evidence shows that the socio-economic vulnerabilities associated
with disabilities can increase household reliance on child labour.
Nonetheless, a wide array of social protection measures can be taken to address
the vulnerabilities accompanying both short-term and long-term disabilities.
Households with people with disabilities are among the most economically and socially vulnerable, and
many of them are among the poorest of the poor. Disability can compromise the ability to work and
earn income; and at the same time people with disabilities face added costs for medical expenses and
equipment. Other household members may also have to forgo paid work in order to care for the disabled
person. In addition to economic vulnerability, people with disabilities suffer other “hidden” challenges,
among them discrimination and various forms of social exclusion. For children with disabilities, social
exclusion can take the form of denied education and seclusion within the home. Not surprisingly, in
developing countries, the multidimensional poverty rate for households with disabled children is much
higher than for other households (UNICEF 2021).
All in all, increased risks of poverty and vulnerability in households with a person with a disability can
push children into work, which is reflected in substantial literature associating disability and child labour.
The ILO (2013) report containing studies from Bangladesh, Nepal and Gansu Province, China, have found
that children in households where adults are sick or disabled or have missed work are more likely to be in
child labour within or outside the household. Another study from Nepal found evidence suggesting that
parental disability was strongly associated with the likelihood of children ending up working as porters
and ragpickers – both among worst forms of child labour entailing significant physical and psycho-social
risks (Edmonds 2010). Children with disabilities may be engaged in some of the worst forms of child labour,
such as begging (Groce, Loeb and Murray 2014; UNICEF 2022a).
There is a wide array of social protection measures that can be taken to address the vulnerabilities
accompanying both short-term and long-term disabilities. These include contributory and non-contrib-
utory disability benefits; wage replacement for disabling injuries and illnesses; and free or subsidized
access to assistive devices, public transport, housing, and other provisions; as well as support services
complemented by a range of high-quality public services (ILO 2021d). Research is, however, lacking, and
efforts need to be made to identify the specific impact of such measures against child labour among
disabled children or children in households with disabled members.
45
X
2. Social protection as a policy response to child labour: What does the evidence say?
X
2.8 Social health protection
X
Key findings
The evidence review focused on social health insurance. There is a need to
investigate further the impact of broader social health protection policies, in
particular social assistance programmes that guarantee free or affordable health
interventions for maternity and early childhood development and programmes
guaranteeing free health care for children.
The new studies generally confirmed earlier findings showing that children living
in households covered by social health insurance are less likely to experience
child labour and positive effects on schooling were also found.
Social health protection was found to have ex-ante impacts, reducing child labour
among protected households even when they do not experience health shocks.
Catastrophic health expenses can compel households to sell assets and rely on
children’s labour to cope.
Social health protection can shield households from resorting to child labour by
eliminating or reducing out of pocket expenses on health and improving health
outcomes.
Social health protection also proved to be effective in reducing hazardous child
labour.
Universal health coverage and universal social protection can sometimes, erroneously, be thought of as
separate entities undermining the obvious interlinkages. In reality, effective health systems distribute
and redistribute resources forming a key part of the social protection floor, while other dimensions of
social protection systems can impact on the social determinants of health, which in turn can influence
the drivers of child labour (ILO 2020d).
Social health protection is a necessary form of social protection against poverty and vulnerability. Without
social health protection, injuries, diseases, premature death or even pregnancy and child birth can place
economic pressure on households in two ways: by reducing the earning capacity of individuals for some
time and by imposing added, unforeseen, health-care costs on the household budget. Universal social
health protection is not yet a reality for all. While over 60 per cent of the global population is protected
by a scheme, this proportion is only 34 and 16 per cent in middle-income countries and low-income
countries, respectively (ILO 2021d).
As with other in-kind services, additional barriers to accessing healthcare also remain in the form of
informal payments on health services, physical distance, limitations in the range, quality and acceptability
of health services, and long waiting times, as well as opportunity costs such as lost working time (ILO
2021d). In 2015, 930 million people worldwide incurred catastrophic health spending (defined as OOP
expenditures exceeding 10 per cent of total yearly household consumption or income), creating a major
poverty risk (WHO and World Bank 2020) and raising the risk of coping through child labour. There is an
increasing body of evidence confirming that even relatively small health spending periodically required on
a regular basis have impoverishing impacts, and not only big health shocks. This calls for comprehensive
social health protection with a strong focus on primary health care (ILO 2021d).
46
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
There is earlier evidence of a lower reliance on child labour in households with social health insurance
in Guatemala and Pakistan (ILO 2013), and in Kenyan households accessing essential health services for
antiretroviral treatment for HIV-positive household members (Thirumurthy, Graff Zivin, and Goldstein
2008). New evidence from China, Ghana, Pakistan and Rwanda shows that social health insurance has
contributed to reduced child labour and increased schooling. More specifically:
X
AccesstoChina’sNewCooperativeMedicalScheme(NCMS)completelyosetstheadverseeectsof
health shocks in terms of decreased school enrolment and increased child work prevalence (Liu 2016).
X
Ghana’sNationalHealthInsuranceScheme(NHIS)signicantlyreducedtheincidenceofchildlabour
(by 8 percentage points or 22 per cent) among households with more episodes of illness, and reduced
hours of weekly household chores overall. In households experiencing more episodes of illness, there
was a greater positive impact on boys’ school attendance and a greater reduction in girls’ engagement
in child labour and household chores (Garcia-Mandico, Reichert, and Strupat 2021).
X
Throughprovidingmicronanceservicesandmandatorysocialhealthinsurancetocoveraccident
andhealthrisksofallaliatedpersonsandtheirdependants,Pakistan’sNationalRuralSupport
Programme (NRSP) is associated with decreased children’s engagement in hazardous work by 4 per-
centage points, and child labour earnings by about 125 rupees/month. Impacts were larger for boys
and fewer days of schooling missed were overall (Landmann and Frölich 2015).
X
Rwanda’s Community-Based Health Insurance (CBHI) social health insurance scheme is associated
with children working less (on average one hour less per week) and better educational outcomes for
children. While work intensity declined only for boys, schooling outcomes improved for both boys and
girls, with stronger impacts for girls. The authors suggest that the social health insurance scheme
reduced the need for precautionary savings to cover expenses on health, and consequently encour-
aged investments in education and discouraged child labour (Strobl 2017). Altogether, the CBHI social
health insurance scheme was found to protect children from increasing their participation in market
work and family businesses when their parents are experiencing a health shock (Woode, Bousmah,
and Boucekkine 2017).
This review of evidence focused on social health insurance and there is a need to investigate further the
impact of a wider breadth of social health protection policies. In particular, social assistance programmes
that guarantee free or affordable maternity and new-born care and/or access to health care without
hardship for children under a certain age threshold may have impacts on child labour within concerned
households. Those programmes are increasingly being developed in sub-Saharan Africa. However, it is
unclear the extent to which the impact would be as significant as social health protection programmes
covering the entire household. Indeed, in some of those programmes the age threshold for health care
without hardship is as low as 5 years old, leaving most of childhood out of the scope of such protection.
47
X
2. Social protection as a policy response to child labour: What does the evidence say?
48
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
X
3.1 Building social protection systems
for children: Turning promises and plans
into reality and action, now
The evidence underscores the inextricable link between social protection and children’s right to freedom
from child labour. While social protection instruments directed at families with children appear especially
pertinent to combatting child labour, the evidence also points to a clear role of other social protection
instruments across the lifecycle, and their combined power to reduce the drivers of child labour through
a system-wide approach. In essence, the eradication of child labour now relies on effective schemes to
withdraw children from child labour, while at the same time strengthening social protection systems,
education, and decent work opportunities for parents and caregivers to address the conditions that drive
child labour risks in the future. Moreover, a systemic approach has the added benefit of achieving multiple
rights and well-being goals for all children, including their rights to social security, health, education, and
an adequate standard of living.
Accelerating progress in strengthening social protection systems, in particular by extending coverage
and improving the comprehensiveness and adequacy of benefits and services, means moving beyond
promises and commitments to immediate action. In that vein, several policy actions stand out as priorities
for eliminating child labour, so that all children have access to social protection.
Close the yawning gap in the coverage of social protection for children. That in the third decade of
the twenty-first century the vast majority of children – 1.5 billion children aged 0-14, many of whom are
children in child labour – still receive no child and family cash benefits at all is a moral, social, and economic
catastrophe. Under these conditions, children must labour, or go hungry and miss out on schooling,
and communities and countries suffer from the unrealised potential in the form of squandered lives and
enormous social costs (lost capabilities, productivity, and prosperity, among others). Increasing coverage
of inclusive child and family benefits, means at the very least formalization and adequate finance, and
to accomplish this, policymakers can:
X
Harness synergies to make a concerted eort to extend social protection to the two billion
informal economy workers to contribute to a reduction of child labour and to facilitate their
transition to the formal economy. This is critical given that child labour is concentrated in in-
formal economy settings where adult workers – the children’s caregivers – have little or no access
tosocialprotection,andarelargelyexcludedfromwork-relatedprotectionandtax-nancedsocial
assistance. Extending social protection to workers in the informal economy, especially in informal
agricultural contexts, is key to realizing decent work, facilitating workers’ transition to the formal
economy, and reducing vulnerabilities that create the need to turn to child labour. Formalization is
a critical step in sustainable tax and transfer systems.
X
3.
Where next
for social protection
and child labour?
49
X
Closing the protection gap requires lling the “nancing gap”, by considering a diversity of
mechanisms and ensuring that sustainable and equitable nancing is a matter of priority.
Protectiongapsareassociatedwithsignicantunderinvestmentinsocialprotection.Currently,
low- and middle-income countries spend a woefully low amount of GDP on social protection for
children. This must, and can, increase. Approximately US$19 trillion was mobilized in the global
fiscal stimulus-response to the pandemic, while in comparison US$77.9 billion per year would
berequiredtoensureasocialprotectionoorinLICcountries(ILO2020b;DuranValverdeetal.
2020).Thiswillrequirecountriestoreinforceexistingsourcesofnancingandidentifynewand
innovative ones too. International experience shows that countries can draw on various strategies
tocreatescalspace(BierbaumandSchmitt2022),andthepandemichasshownthatincreasing
theeectivecoverage,comprehensivenessandadequacyofprovisionispossible,bothpractically,
andscally.Doingthiswillhaveasubstantialimpactonchildlabourandchildwell-being,andisinline
with international obligations (ODI and UNICEF 2020; Ortiz et al. 2017 and 2019). The 2021 International
Labour Conference called for investment in social protection to help eliminate child labour (ILO 2021b,
para.13(h)).Eortstoclosethenancinggapshouldprogressivelysecuredomesticnancing,if
necessary supplemented by international support. This would also require closer coordination in
internationalandnationalpublicnancinganddebtmanagement.
X
As social protection systems are expanded, it is crucial to ensure adequacy, inclusion and
gendertransformation,andthattheyaddressclimate-relatedandconict-relatedrisks.Thepandemic
has highlighted the fact that, while the poorest and most vulnerable groups and communities experi-
ence the worst impacts of such shocks, they are the least adequately covered by social protection. To
remedy this situation, inclusive policies and programmes must be developed, with particular attention
being paid to the needs of children in child labour, girls and women, children with disabilities, migrant
childrenandthoseinothermarginalizedgroups.Signicantworkisalsoneededtoensurethatsocial
protection programmes are responsive to shocks, to avert adverse impacts on the incidence of child
labour. The measures deployed during the policy window provided by COVID-19 can and should also
be built on to prioritize investments to close critical gaps (ILO 2021d).
X
As systems are strengthened, countries should rapidly move towards universal social protection
for children. The response to the COVID-19 pandemic has both emphasized the importance of strong
social protection systems and the opportunity the crisis provided to make progress on universal social
protectionforchildren.Thiscanbeachievedinitiallythroughquasi-universaloruniversalchildbenets
(UCBs).Evidencefromcountrieswithlong-establisheduniversalchildbenetsdemonstratesthatthey
helptoachievegreaterpovertyreductionthanmeans-testedbenets.Moreover,incountriescur-
rently without UCBs, simulations show that a UCB scheme costing just 1 per cent of GDP would reduce
child poverty rates by as much as 20 per cent (ILO and UNICEF 2019; ODI and UNICEF 2020). This
hassignicantimplicationsforchildlabour,whichaloneisgoodreasonforpolicymakerstoconsider
a UCB.
Policymakers should be cognizant that countries do not build social protection systems after they
develop; they build social protection systems as part of development. Failure to build and invest in
social protection systems for children is irrational for any society that wishes to enjoy the prosperity that
comes with development. Investing in social protection not only assures children’s rights; it plays a critical
role in the virtuous cycle of development, part of which involves transitioning to more formal work; and
a strengthening of tax and transfer systems that reduce vulnerability and enable additional investments
in human capabilities, national infrastructure and other conditions that are conducive to the elimination
of child labour and more. The most effective social protection systems for addressing child labour and
its root causes are integrated systems, which are well coordinated internally and cross-sectorally. For
these reasons:
X
A systems approach from a child labour perspective should focus on how specic social pro-
tection instruments can complement one another in addressing contingencies rendering
households vulnerable to child labour. Figure 3.1, based on the evidence presented in Section 2,
illustrates the interaction of challenges and instruments within a social protection system and how it
50
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
canbeconstructedtoimprovetheeciencyandeectivenessofsocialprotectionresponsestochild
labour.Thereisno“onesizetsall”solutionintermsofsocialprotectionsystems.Instead,thespecic
mixofinterventionswillnecessarilydependoncontext,thespecicchallengesbeingaddressedand
a variety of other factors. Such an approach is fully in line with ILO Recommendation No. 202, which
emphasizes national ownership and the importance of national strategies for social protection exten-
sion formulated through social dialogue.
X Figure 3.1 Elements of an integrated social protection system for addressing child labour
X
Moreover, it is of tremendous importance that policymakers recognize and implement inte-
grated cross-sectoral social provision for children, with a key role for social protection sys-
tems.Specically,thismeanstheroleofchildandfamilybenetsthatdirectlyaddressthenancial
barriers that impede the realization of children’s rights, and their access to key human services that
protect them from child labour and promote their rights such as health and education. In this way,
well-designed social protection can “oil the wheels’ of social provision and much-needed structural
transformation. To develop an integrated systems approach means the coordination of the design and
implementation of childcare and education services, child protection services, access to healthcare
without hardship and more.
Cash transfers
In-kind transfers
Challenges rendering households vulnerable to reliance on child labour
'"Cash plus" programmes
Quasi-universal or universal child benefits
Public employment programmes
Unemployment protection
Maternity protection
Old-age pensions
Disability protection
Social health protection
Sickness benefits
Employment injury compensation
Survivors benefits
Universal basic income
Evidence of child labour reduction impact exists
Despite lack of child labour studies, high probability of a protective impact on child labour
General poverty and
vulnerability
Individual shocks
Collective shocks
Injury and illness
Lack of school access,
high costs of schooling
Job loss
Long-term disability
Income insecurity
associated with old
age
Other benefit categories
Benefits to children
and families
Social protection instruments
No identified impact
51
X
3. Where next for social protection and child labour?
Finally, in support of system building efforts, policymakers can utilize existing international policy
commitments to universal social protection, further building consensus for action. Pre-existing
commitments and policy frameworks, such as the Sustainable Development Agenda and Goals (SDGs)
and the strong tripartite policy consensus agreed by the International Labour Conference represent
such a possibility. Within the SDG Agenda, if Alliance 8.7 and the Global Partnership for Universal Social
Protection to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (USP2030) could join their forces to promote
universal social protection for eradicating child labour, this could be an important vehicle to advance this
effort and support Member States.
The UN Secretary General’s Common Agenda and the 2021 launch of the Global Accelerator for Jobs and
Social Protection for Just Transitions offers tremendous potential to realize the right to social protection
for all. The Accelerator is a UN system-wide initiative capable of developing an integrated policy response
that aims at helping lower-income countries to create at least 400 million decent jobs and extend social
protection to four billion people. If this initiative realises its potential, it could help ensure that more
children live their lives free from child labour, enjoying social protection and with their caregivers working
in decent formal jobs.
X
3.2 Designing social protection programmes
that prevent and reduce child labour:
What does the evidence say?
To complement Section 3.1 on recommendations for the social protection system that can best address
child labour concerns, this section offers specific recommendations on the design of social protection
schemes.
The evidence in this report has uncovered multiple promising practices for the design of social protection
schemes for preventing and reducing child labour. Programmes which applied these practices had stronger
reduction impacts on child labour, including its worst forms. These include the following:
Inclusive universal social protection programmes are more likely to reduce child labour. Well-
designed schemes can increase prospective entitlement holders’ take-up of benefits by limiting exclusion
errors (see Grosh et al. 2022; Kidd, Gelders, and Bailey-Athias 2017), ensuring ease of access to benefits and
reducing stigma and shame, as well as reducing procedural complexity and thereby lowering transaction
and opportunity costs. And so, policymaker should consider:
X
Lowering the administrative burden on the system and households, which can increase the risk of
exclusion for those most in need, by prioritizing categorical targeting where possible, and where this
is not the case, by improving means-testing or other targeting mechanisms, and ensuring that these
processes are transparent, rights-based and as unintrusive as possible.
20
Universal programmes have
muchlowerproceduralcomplexityforrightsholderstoaccessbenets.AUCBforexamplerequires
certicationjustoncethroughthebirthregistrationofachild.Poverty-targetedprogrammesrequire
frequent(re)certicationofeligibilitytoavoidexclusionerrors;however,high-frequencyrecertication
signicantlyraisesadministrativecosts(Groshetal.2022).Savingsinadministrativecoststherefore
leavesmoremoneyavailableforbenets.
X
Avoid using problematic design features such as hard, even punitive, conditionality in programmes
design.
20 An ILO appraisal concludes that the universal schemes reviewed exhibited the lowest average administration cost at
2.5 per cent of the total programme costs, whereas targeted programmes had an average administration cost of 11 per cent (Ortiz
et al. 2017).
52
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
X
Strive to implement programmes that are as inclusive as possible, prioritizing universal and uncon-
ditional programmes that cover all households with children irrespective of income status. Such an
inclusive design has critical implications for children in child labour and increases their opportunity to
access entitlements.
Social protection programmes should be child-sensitive, and designed considering the potential
implications in terms of child labour. The evidence clearly shows that programmes which increase
household income (such as cash transfers), while serving an essential poverty reduction goal, may risk an
increase in child labour, if children participate in the household’s expanded productive activities. A similar
concern is associated with livelihood promotion programmes (such as cash combined with productive
assets). To avoid such unintended effects on child labour and to boost protective impacts, it is important
to incorporate child labour concerns in the design of the programme, such as:
X
Adding sensitization or provision of information on hazards related to child labour, through regular
monthly sessions with multiple household members to raise awareness on child protection issues,
including hazardous child labour, labour-related child separation, and early and forced marriage.
X
Adding “messaging” on the relevance of education, as this is also associated with better child labour
and schooling outcomes from unconditional transfers.
Adequacy and predictability of social protection benefits is key for protective impacts on child
labour. Programmes delivering higher transfer amounts determined stronger reductions in children’s
work, while adverse or minor impacts on child labour are often attributed to low amounts. Therefore, to
improve the impact of social protection on child labour, policymakers should consider:
X
Settingadequatebenetlevels,takingintoaccounthouseholdsizeandcompositiontobetteraddress
household needs in line with international social security standards.
21
X
Adapting transfer amounts according to contexts such as local prices and wages, whilst accounting for
opportunity costs (foregone earnings) of schooling, including between rural and urban settings. This
could be informed by community-based participatory research including with children and families
which is needed to understand their basic needs and related costs.
X
Regularlyrevisingtransferamountstoaccountforination.
X
Ensuring that social protection payments are provided regularly, as household decisions on child
labour and schooling depend on income stability.
Combining social protection programmes with complementary interventions in the education and
health sectors, as these are particularly effective in reducing child labour. Key recommendations include:
X
Combining education supply-side interventions (such as better access to school or improved teaching
approaches)withcashtransferstoboostprogrammeeectivenessinreducingchildlabourand
improving schooling outcomes. Indeed, wherever education facilities are missing or of low quality,
householdslacksucientincentivestoremovechildrenfromworkandsendthemtoschool.
X
Publicservicesupplyisparticularlyrelevantinhumanitariansettings,wherealargeinuxofrefugees
can generate sudden increases in the local demand for services.
X
Other options include the provision of childcare services on public works sites to support households,
andspecicallywomen,intakingupemploymentwithoutrelyingonchildren(mostfrequentlygirls)
to substitute them in the care of younger children.
21 International social security standards provide guidance on transfer size. The ILO Social Protection Floors Recommendation,
2012(No.202)setsoutthatbasicincomesecurityshouldallowlifeindignity,andthatnationallydenedminimumlevelsof
income should correspond to a set of necessary goods and services, national poverty lines or comparable thresholds (para. 8).
ILOConventionNo.102(PartVII)setsminimumstandardsfortheprovisionoffamily(orchild)benetsintheformofaperiodiccash
benet,benetsinkind(suchasfood,clothing,housing)oracombinationofboth.
53
X
3. Where next for social protection and child labour?
X
Securing universal social health protection coverage for children and engaging with the health system
to secure the availability of quality health services adapted to children and available near home and
school is also paramount.
Finally, as work continues in the fight against child labour – including the compounding effects of
COVID-19 – more research is needed to build an adequate evidence base to guide and inform policy.
Evidence is needed both on the economic and social challenges rendering households vulnerable to child
labour, and on the effectiveness of a range of social protection instruments, and their combined effects, in
addressing these challenges. It is especially relevant to expand the evidence base on impacts on hazardous
child labour and other worst forms of child labour. This report has made clear that desirable outcomes
in terms of child labour are by no means automatic in the case of many social protection instruments:
this means that solid evidence of which approaches work in which circumstances, and why, is especially
important in addressing the continued scourge of child labour.
The eradication of child labour is not only a moral priority, but clearly an achievable goal provided both
political will and resources are in place. The evidence suggests that social protection can play a critical
role in achieving these ends.
54
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
Bibliography
Aborigo, R., C. Adamba, A.J. Akaligaung, G. Angeles, C. Barrington, J.K. Darko, R. Darko Osei, et al.
2018.
Ghana LEAP 1000 Programme: Endline Evaluation Report – Annex ATT Estimates
. Republic of
Ghana, Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection.
Adhvaryu Achyuta, R., and A. Nyshadham. 2012. “Schooling, Child Labor, and the Returns to Healthcare
in Tanzania”. Journal of Human Resources 47 (2): 364–96.
Ajefu, J.B., and O. Abiona. 2019. “Impact of Shocks on Labour and Schooling Outcomes and the Role of
Public Work Programmes in Rural India”. Journal of Development Studies 55 (6): 1140–57.
Albagli, P., and T. Rau. 2019. “The Eects of a Maternity Leave Reform on Children’s Abilities and
Maternal Outcomes in Chile”. The Economic Journal 129 (619): 1015–47.
Alderman, H., J.R. Behrman, V. Lavy, and R. Menon. 2001. “Child Health and School Enrollment: A
Longitudinal Analysis”. Journal of Human Resources, 185–205.
Al-Samarrai, S., P. Cerdan-Infantes, A. Bigarinova, J. Bodmer, M. Vital, M. Antoninis, B. Barakat, and Y.
Murakami. 2021. Education Finance Watch 2021. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Amarante, V., F. Mery, and A. Vigorito. 2013. “Teenage school attendance and cash transfers: An Impact
evaluation of PANES”. Economía 14 (1): 61–96.
Ambler, K., and A. Brauw. 2019. “Household Labor Supply and Social Protection: Evidence from
Pakistan’s BISP Cash Transfer Program”. IFPRI Discussion Paper 01815. Washington, DC: IFPRI.
Angeles, G., A. Chakrabarti, S. Handa, G. Spektor, R. Darko Osei, I. Osei-Akoto, and R. Groot. 2017.
Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty Programme: Endline Impact Evaluation Report. Chapel Hill:
Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Angeles, G., J. Hoop, S. Handa, K. Kilburn, A. Milazzo, and A. Peterman, on behalf of the Malawi
Social Cash Transfer Evaluation Team. 2019. “Government of Malawi’s unconditional cash transfer
improves youth mental health”. Social Science and Medicine, 225: 108–19.
Asfaw, S., B. Davis, J. Dewbre, S. Handa, and P. Winters. 2014. “Cash Transfer Programme, Productive
Activities and Labour Supply: Evidence from Randomized Experiment in Kenya”. Journal of
Development Studies 50 (8): 1172–96.
Aurino, E., J.-P. Tranchant, A.S. Diallo, and A. Gelli. 2019. “School Feeding or General Food Distribution?
Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Educational Impacts of Emergency Food Assistance during
Conict in Mali”. Journal of Development Studies 55 (S): 7–28.
Awaworyi Churchill, S., N. Iqbal, S. Nawaz, and S.L. Yew. 2021. “Unconditional Cash Transfers, Child
Labour and Education: Theory and Evidence”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 186 (C):
437–57.
Baird, S., F.H. Ferreira, B. Özler, and M. Woolcock. 2014. “Conditional, Unconditional and Everything in
between: A Systematic Review of the Eects of Cash Transfer Programmes on Schooling Outcomes”.
 6 (1): 1–43.
Baird, S., J.H. Hicks, M. Kremer, and E. Miguel. 2016. “Worms at Work: Long-Run Impacts of a Child
Health Investment”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 131 (4): 1637–80.
Bandiera, O., R. Burgess, N. Das, S. Gulesci, I. Rasul, and M. Sulaiman. 2013. “Can Basic Entrepreneurship
Transform the Economic Lives of the Poor?” CFPR Working Paper, no. 23. Dhaka: BRAC Research and
Evaluation Division.
Banerjee, A., E. Duo, R. Chattopadhyay, and J. Shapiro. 2011. “Targeting the Hardcore Poor: An Impact
Assessment”. Working paper.
Barrera-Osorio, F., M. Betrand, Leigh L. Linden, and F. Perez-Calle. 2011. “Improving the Design of
Conditional Transfer Programs: Evidence from a Randomized Education Experiment in Colombia”.
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3: 167–95.
55
Bastagli, F., I. Orton, and D. Stewart. 2020. “From COVID-19 Response to Recovery: What Role for
Universal Child Benets?”. Evidence for Action (blog). 16 October 2020.
Bastagli, F., J. Hagen-Zanker, L. Harman, V. Barca, G. Sturge, and T. Schmidt. 2019. “The Impact of Cash
Transfers: A Review of the Evidence from Low-and Middle-Income Countries”. Journal of Social Policy
48 (3): 569–94.
Basu, K., and P.H. Van. 1998. “The Economics of Child Labor”. The American Economic Review 88 (3):
412–27.
Belete, G.Y. 2021. “Impacts of Social Protection Programmes on Children’s Resources and Wellbeing:
Evidence from Ethiopia”. Child Indicators Research 14 (2): 681–712.
Berhane G., J. Hoddinott, N. Kumar, and A. Margolies. 2017. The Productive Safety Net Programme in
Ethiopia: Impacts on Children’s Schooling, Labour and Nutritional Status, 3ie Impact Evaluation Report
55. New Delhi: International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie).
Bierbaum, M., and V. Schmitt. 2022. “Investing More in Universal Social Protection Filling the Financing
Gap through Domestic Resource Mobilization and International Support and Coordination”. ILO
Working Paper No. 44. Geneva: ILO.
Bustelo, M. 2011. “Three Essays on Investment in Children’s Human Capital”. Doctoral Dissertation,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Cahyadi, N., R. Hanna, B.A. Olken, R.A. Prima, E. Satriawan, and E. Syamsulhakim. 2020. “Cumulative
impacts of conditional cash transfer programs: Experimental evidence from Indonesia”. American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy 12 (4): 88–110.
Cameld, L. 2014. “Growing up in Ethiopia and Andhra Pradesh: The Impact of Social Protection
Schemes on Girls’ Roles and Responsibilities”. The European Journal of Development Research 26 (1):
107–23.
Canaan, S. 2022. “Parental Leave, Household Specialization and Children’s Well-Being”. Labour
Economics, 102127.
Canelas, C., and M. Niño-Zarazúa. 2019. “Schooling and Labor Market Impacts of Bolivia’s ‘Bono
Juancito Pinto’ Program”. Population and Development Review, 155–79.
Carneiro, P., K. Loken, and K. Salvanes. 2015. “A Flying Start: Maternity Leave Benets and Long Run
Outcomes of Children”. Journal of Political Economy 123 (2): 365–412.
Carter, B., K. Roelen, Eneld S., and W. Avis. 2019. Social Protection Topic Guide. Revised. K4D Emerging
Issues Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
Cepaluni, G., T.K. Chewning, A. Driscoll, and M.A. Faganello. 2022. “Conditional Cash Transfers and
Child Labor”. World Development 152: 105768.
Chakrabarti, A., S. Handa, G. Angeles, and D. Seindenfeld. 2020. “A Cash plus Program Reduces Youth
Exposure to Physical Violence in Zimbabwe”. World Development 134: 105037.
Chong, A., and M. Yáñez-Pagans. 2019. “Not so Fast! Cash Transfers Can Increase Child Labor: Evidence
for Bolivia”. Economics Letters 179: 57–61.
Churchill, S.A., N. Iqbal, S. Nawaz, and S.L. Yew. 2021. “Unconditional Cash Transfers, Child Labour and
Education: Theory and Evidence”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 186: 437–57.
Cookson, T.P. 2018. Unjust Conditions: Women’s Work and the Hidden Cost of Cash Transfer Programs.
Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
Costa, G.W., A. Carraro, F.G. Ribeiro, and M.F. Borba. 2020. “The Impact of Child Labor Eradication
Programs in Brazil”. The Journal of Developing Areas 54 (4).
Costa, L.V., S. Helfand, and A.P. Souza. 2018. Rural Development Policies and Conditional Cash Transfers
in Brazil: An Impact Evaluation of the IFAD-Supported Gavião Project and Potential Synergies with Bolsa
Família. A Conference Paper, 30th International Conference of Agricultural Economists.
Cunha, J., G. Giorgi, and S. Jayachandran. 2019. “The Price Eects of Cash versus In-Kind Transfers”.
Review of Economic Studies 86: 282–312.
56
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
Dammert, A.C., J. Hoop, E. Mvukiyehe, and F.C. Rosati. 2018. “Eects of Public Policy on Child Labor:
Current Knowledge, Gaps, and Implications for Program Design”. World Development 110: 104–23.
Danzer, N., and V. Lavy. 2018. “Paid Parental Leave and Children’s Schooling Outcomes”. The Economic
Journal 128 (608): 81–117.
Davala, S., R. Jhabvala, S. Mehta, and G. Standing. 2015. Basic Income: A Transformative Policy for India.
London: Bloomsbury Academic.
De Carvalho Filho, I.E. 2012. “Household income as a determinant of child labor and school enrollment
in Brazil: Evidence from a social security reform”. Economic Development and Cultural Change 60 (2):
399–435.
De Hoop, J., and F.C. Rosati. 2014a. “Cash Transfers and Child Labor”. World Bank Research Observer 29
(2): 1–33.
De Hoop, J., and F.C. Rosati. 2014b. “Does Promoting School Attendance Reduce Child Labor? Evidence
from Burkina Faso’s BRIGHT Project”. Economics of Education Review 39: 78–96.
De Hoop, J., I. Kovrova, and F.C. Rosati. 2016. “Eliminating Child Labour in El Salvador through Economic
Empowerment and Social Inclusion: Impact Evaluation Report”. UCW Working Paper, March 2016.
Rome: Understanding Children’s Work.
De Hoop, J., J. Friedman, E. Kandpal, and F.C. Rosati. 2019. “Child Schooling and Child Work in the
Presence of a Partial Education Subsidy”. Journal of Human Resources 54 (2): 503–31.
De Hoop, J., M. Morey, H. Ring, V. Rothbard, and D. Seidenfeld. 2018a. “Min Ila” Cash Transfer Programme
for Displaced Syrian Children in Lebanon (UNICEF and WFP). Impact Evaluation Endline Report.
Arlington, Virginia: American Institutes for Research.
De Hoop, J., M.W. Gichane, V. Groppo, and S.S. Zuilkowski. 2020. “Cash Transfers, Public Works and
Child Activities: Mixed Methods Evidence from the United Republic of Tanzania”. Innocenti Working
Paper No. 2020-03. Florence: UNICEF Oce of Research – Innocenti.
De Hoop, J., P. Premand, F.C. Rosati, and R. Vakis. 2018b. “Women’s Economic Empowerment and
Children’s Human Capital Accumulation”. Journal of Population Economics 31 (2): 453–81.
De Hoop, J., V. Groppo, and S. Handa. 2020. “Cash Transfers, Microentrepreneurial Activity, and Child
Work: Evidence from Malawi and Zambia”. World Bank Economic Review 34 (3): 670–97.
De Oliveira, P.R., A.L. Kassouf, and J.M. De Aquino. 2017. “Cash Transfers to the Elderly and Its Spillover
Eects: Evidences from a Non-Contributory Program in Brazil”. Journal of Economic Studies 44 (2):
183–205.
De Schutter, O. 2020. Looking Back to Look Ahead: A Rights-Based Approach to Social Protection in the
Post-COVID-19 Economic Recovery. Report by the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human
rights. Geneva: OHCHR.
De Silva, I., and S. Sumarto. 2015. “How Do Educational Transfers Aect Child Labour Supply and
Expenditures? Evidence from Indonesia of Impact and Flypaper Eects”. Oxford Development Studies
43 (4): 483–507.
Del Carpio, X., N. Loayza, and W. Tomoko. 2016. “The Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on the
Amount and Type of Child Labor”. World Development 80 (C): 33–47.
DFID UK (Department for International Development, United Kingdom), HelpAge International, Hope
and Homes for Children, Institute of Development Studies, International Labour Organization (ILO),
Overseas Development Institute, Save the Children UK, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. 2009. “Advancing Child
Sensitive Social Protection”. Statement.
Diallo, Y., F. Hagemann, A. Etienne, Y. Gurbuzer, and F. Mehran. 2010. Global Child Labour Developments:
Measuring Trends from 2004 to 2008. ILO’s International Programme on the Elimination of Child
Labour (IPEC). Geneva: ILO.
Dias, P., Y. Haddad, K. Kamto, A. Molotsky, M. Morey, H. Ring, V. Rothbard, and D. Seidenfeld. 2021.
Impact Evaluation of UNICEF’s Let Us Learn Cash Transfer Supplement Social Protection Component in
Madagascar - Endline Report. Arlington, Virginia: American Institutes for Research.
57
X
Bibliography
Dinku, Y. 2019. “The Impact of Public Works Programme on Child Labour in Ethiopia”. South African
Journal of Economics 87 (3): 283–301.
Durán Valverde, F., J. Pacheco-Jiménez, T. Muzaar, and H. Elizondo-Barboza. 2020. Financing Gaps
in Social Protection: Global Estimates and Strategies for Developing Countries in Light of COVID-19 and
Beyond. Geneva: ILO.
ECLAC (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). 2020. The social
challenge in times of COVID-19. Special Report COVID-19 No. 3, 12 May 2020.
ECLAC. 2021. Social Panorama of Latin America 2020. (LC/PUB.2021/2-P/Rev.1), Santiago.
Edmonds, E. 2006. “Child Labor and Schooling Responses to Anticipated Income in South Africa”.
Journal of Development Economics 81 (2): 386–414.
Edmonds, E. 2010. “Selection into Worst Forms of Child Labor”. Research in Labour Economics, edited by
Randall K.Q.A., E. Edmonds, and K. Tatsiramos, 31:1–31.
Edmonds, E., and C. Theoharides. 2020. “The Short-Term Impact of a Productive Asset Transfer in
Families with Child Labor: Experimental Evidence from the Philippines”. Journal of Development
Economics 146: 102486.
Edmonds, E., and M. Shrestha. 2014. “You Get What You Pay for: Schooling Incentives and Child Labor”.
Journal of Development Economics 111: 196–211.
Edmonds, E., N. Pavcnik, and P. Topalova. 2010. “Trade Adjustment and Human Capital Investments:
Evidence from Indian Tari Reform”. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2 (4): 42–75.
Emezue, C., C. Pozneanscaia, G. Sheaf, V. Groppo, S. Bakrania, and J. Kaplan. forthcoming. The Impact
of Educational Policies and Programmes on Child Work and Child Labour in Low-and-Middle-Income
Countries: A Rapid Evidence Assessment. Florence: UNICEF Oce of Research – Innocenti.
Fenton, R., C. Nyamukapa, S. Gregson, L. Robertson, P. Mushati, R. Thomas, and J.W. Eaton. 2016.
“Wealth Dierentials in the Impact of Conditional and Unconditional Cash Transfers on Education:
Findings from a Community-Randomised Controlled Trial in Zimbabwe”. Psychology and Health and
Medicine 21 (8): 909–17.
Fernandez, L. 2007. Technical Note on Estimation of a Proxy Means Test Model (PMT) for Conditional Cash
Transfer (CCT) Pilot Program in the Philippines. Prepared for the Department of Social Welfare and
Development. Philippines: Quezon City.
Ferreira, F.H.G., D. Filmer, and N. Schady. 2009. “Own and Sibling Eects of Conditional Cash Transfer
Programs: Theory and Evidence from Cambodia”. Policy Research Working Paper No. 5001.
Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Fitz, D., and R. League. 2021. “School, Shocks, and Safety Nets: Can Conditional Cash Transfers Protect
Human Capital Investments during Rainfall Shocks?” Journal of Development Studies 57 (12): 2002–26.
Franceinfo Afrique. 2020. “Burkina Faso: Malgré le coronavirus, les enfants travaillent toujours dans la
carrière de Pissy”. 29 June 2020.
Frölich, M., A. Landmann, H. Midki, and V. Breda. 2014. “Micro-Insurance and Child Labour: An Impact
Evaluation of the National Rural Support Programme’s Micro-Insurance Innovation”. Social Finance
Working Paper No. 58. ILO’s Social Finance Programme and Mannheim University. Geneva: ILO.
Frölich, M., and A. Landmann. 2018. “Eects of Insurance on Child Labour: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post
Behavioural Changes”. The Journal of Development Studies 54 (6): 1002–18.
Fultz, E., and J. Francis. 2013. “Cash Transfer Programmes, Poverty Reduction and Empowerment of
Women: A Comparative Analysis: Experiences From Brazil, Chile, India, Mexico and South Africa”.
GED Working Paper No. 4. Geneva: ILO.
Gajate-Garrido, G., and R. Owusua. 2013. The national health insurance scheme in Ghana: Implementation
challenges and proposed solutions. IFPRI Discussion Paper 1309. Washington, D.C.: International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
Galiani, S., and P.J. McEwan. 2013. “The Heterogeneous Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers”. Journal
of Public Economics 103: 85–96.
58
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
Garcia-Mandicó, S., A. Reichert, and C. Strupat. 2021. “The Social Value of Health Insurance: Results
from Ghana”. Journal of Public Economics 194: 104314.
Gehrke, E., and R. Hartwig. 2018. “Productive Eects of Public Works Programs: What Do We Know?
What Should We Know?” World Development 107: 111–24.
Gentilini, U., M.B.A. Almen, J. Blomquist, P. Dale et al. 2022. Social Protection and Jobs Responses
to COVID-19: A Real-Time Review of Country Measures. 2 February 2022, “Living paper” version 16.
Washington, D.C: The World Bank.
Giné, X., and G. Mansuri. 2021. “Money or management? A Field experiment on constraints to
entrepreneurship in rural Pakistan”. Economic Development and Cultural Change 70 (1).
Ginja, R., J. Jans, and A. Karimi. 2020. “Parental Leave Benets, Household Labor Supply, and Children’s
Long-Run Outcomes”. Journal of Labor Economics 38 (1): 261–320.
Gray Molina, G., and E. Ortiz-Juarez. 2020. “Temporary Basic Income: Protecting Poor and Vulnerable
People in Developing Countries”. UNDP Transitions Series Working Paper. New York: UNDP.
Groce, N., M. Loeb, and B. Murray. 2014. The Disabled Beggar Literature Review: Begging as an Overlooked
Issue of Disability and Poverty. GED Working Pager No. 1. Geneva: ILO.
Groot, R., M. Milliano, F. Dompae, S. Handa, I. Osei Akoto, F. Otchere, T. Palermo, E. Valli, and N. Yaw.
2018. Ghana LEAP 1000 Programme: Endline Evaluation Report. Republic of Ghana, Ministry of Gender,
Children and Social Protection.
Grosh, M., Ph. Leite, M. Wai-Poi, and E. Tesliuc. 2022. 
at Old Dilemmas. Washington D.C: The World Bank.
Guilbert, N., C. Mahe, G. Sheaf, V. Groppo, I. Orton, and N. Tirivayi. forthcoming. The Impact of Social
Protection on Child Labour in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: Evidence Review and Policy Implications.
Background Paper. Florence: UNICEF Oce of Research – Innocenti.
Handa S., L. Natali, D. Seidenfeld, G. Tembo, and Zambia Cash Transfer Evaluation Team. 2016. “The
Impact of Zambia’s Unconditional Child Grant on Schooling and Work: Results from a Large-Scale
Social Experiment”.  8 (3): 346–67.
Handa, S., M. Park, R. Osei Darko, I. Osei-Akoto, B. Davis, and S. Daidone. 2014. Livelihood Empowerment
Against Poverty Program Impact Evaluation. Chapel Hill: Carolina Population Center, The University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Hanlon, J., A. Barrientos, and D. Hulme. 2010. Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution
from the Global South. Sterling, Virginia: Kumarian Press.
Herrmann, T., A. Leckcivilize, and J. Zenker. 2021. “The Impact of Cash Transfers on Child Outcomes
in Rural Thailand: Evidence from a Social Pension Reform”. Journal of the Economics of Ageing 19:
100311.
Hidayatina, A., and A. Garces-Ozanne. 2019. “Can Cash Transfers Mitigate Child Labour? Evidence from
Indonesia’s Cash Transfer Programme for Poor Students in Java”. World Development Perspectives 15:
100–129.
Hiziroglu Aygün, A., M.G. Kirdar, M. Koyuncu, and Q. Stoeer. 2021. “Keeping Refugee Children in
School and out of Work: Evidence from the World’s Largest Humanitarian Cash Transfer Program”.
Working Paper No. 2106. Istanbul: Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
Hoddinott, J., D.O. Gilligan, and A.S. Taesse. 2010. “The Impact of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net
Program on Schooling and Child Labor”. Social protection for Africa’s children, edited by Handa, S., S.
Devereux and D. Webb.71–95
Human Rights Watch. 2021. “I Must Work to Eat”: COVID-19, Poverty, and Child Labor in Ghana, Nepal, and
Uganda, New York: Human Rights Watch.
ILO and FAO. 2021. Extending Social Protection to Rural Populations: Perspectives for a Common FAO and
ILO Approach. Geneva and Rome: ILO and FAO.
ILO and UNICEF. 2019. Towards Universal Social Protection for Children: Achieving SDG 1.3: ILO-UNICEF
Joint Report on Social Protection for Children. Geneva and New York: ILO and UNICEF.
59
X
Bibliography
ILO and UNICEF. 2021. Child Labour: Global Estimates 2020 - Trends and the Road Forward. Geneva and
New York: ILO and UNICEF.
ILO and UNICEF. Forthcoming. Methodology of the 2020 ILO-UNICEF Global Estimates of Child Labour.
Geneva and New York: ILO and UNICEF.
ILO. 2008. Report III: Child Labour Statistics. ICLS/18/2008/III. Geneva: ILO.
ILO. 2013. World Report on Child Labour: Economic Vulnerability, Social Protection and the Fight against
Child Labour. Geneva: ILO.
ILO. 2018a. Resolution to Amend the 18th ICLS Resolution Concerning Statistics of Child Labour.
ICLS/20/2018/Resolution IV. Geneva: ILO.
ILO. 2018b. Women and Men in the Informal Economy: A Statistical Picture, third edition. Geneva: ILO.
ILO. 2019. Universal Social Protection for Human Dignity, Social Justice and Sustainable Development.
ILC.108/III/B. Geneva: ILO.
ILO. 2020a. “Extending Social Protection to Informal Workers in the COVID-19 Crisis: Country Responses
and Policy Considerations”. Social Protection Spotlight. 8 September 2020. Geneva: ILO.
ILO. 2020b. “Financing Gaps in Social Protection: Global Estimates and Strategies for Developing
Countries in Light of COVID-19 and Beyond”. Social Protection Spotlight. 17 September 2020. Geneva:
ILO.
ILO. 2020c. Parents Send Their Children to Child Labour to Overcome the Economic Crisis of COVID-19, Our
Impact, Their Voices Feature. Geneva: ILO.
ILO. 2020d. “Towards Universal Health Coverage. Social Health Protection Principles”. Social Protection
Spotlight. January 2020. Geneva: ILO.
ILO. 2021a. Extending Social Security to Workers in the Informal Economy: Lessons from International
Experience. Geneva: ILO.
ILO. 2021b. Resolution and Conclusions Concerning the Second Recurrent Discussion on Social
Protection (Social Security). ILC.109/Resolution III. Geneva: ILO.
ILO. 2021c. “Towards Social Protection Floors? The Role of Non-Contributory Provision during the
COVID-19 Crisis and Beyond”. Social Protection Spotlight. January 2021.
ILO. 2021d. 
Better Future. Geneva: ILO.
ILO. 2022. Social Protection Monitor: Announced Measures throughout the World.
International Cocoa Initiative. 2020. Changes in Hazardous Child Labour in Côte d’Ivoire’s Cocoa
Communities Before and After COVID-19 Partial Lockdown. Châtelaine, Switzerland: ICI.
International Cocoa Initiative. 2022. Cash Transfers, Resilience and Child Labour in Ghana. Châtelaine,
Switzerland: ICI.
Jayawardana, D., N.V. Baryshnikova, and N.T.A. Pham. 2021. “Can Unconditional In-Kind Transfers Keep
Children Out of Work and in School? Evidence from Indonesia”. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis
& Policy 21 (3): 1035–65.
Jiménez, M., and M. Jiménez. 2021. a Política del Ingreso Familiar de Emergencia (IFE): Su potencial
impacto en la participación de los y las adolescentes en el mercado de trabajo. Buenos Aires: ILO.
Juarez, L., and T. Pfutze. 2015. “The Eects of a Noncontributory Pension Program on Labor Force
Participation: The Case of 70 y Más in Mexico”. Economic Development and Cultural Change 63 (4):
685–713.
Juras, R. 2014. “The Eect of Public Employment on Children’s Work and School Attendance: Evidence
from a Social Protection Program in Argentina”. IZA Journal of Labor and Development 3 (1): 1–20.
Kandpal, E., H. Alderman, J. Friedman, D. Filmer, J. Onishi, and J. Avalos. 2016. “A Conditional Cash
Transfer Program in the Philippines Reduces Severe Stunting”. The Journal of Nutrition 146 (9): 1793–
1800.
60
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
Karimli, L., L. Rost, and L. Ismayilova. 2018. “Integrating Economic Strengthening and Family Coaching
to Reduce Work-Related Health Hazards among Children of Poor Households: Burkina Faso”. Journal
of Adolescent Health 62 (1S):S6-S14.
Karlan, D., and M. Valdivia. 2011. “Teaching Entrepreneurship: Impact of Business Training on
Micronance Clients and Institutions”. Review of Economics and Statistics 93 (2): 510–27.
Kazianga, H., D. De Walque, and H. Alderman. 2012. “Educational and Child Labour Impacts of Two
Food-for-Education Schemes: Evidence from a Randomised Trial in Rural Burkina Faso”. Journal of
African Economies 21 (5): 723–60.
Kazianga, H., D. Levy, L.L. Linden, and M. Sloan. 2013. “The Eects of ‘Girl-Friendly’ Schools: Evidence
from the BRIGHT School Construction Program in Burkina Faso”. American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics 3 (5): 41–62.
Kidd, S. 2015. “The Political Economy of Targeting of Social Security Schemes”. Pathway’s Perspectives
on Social Policy in International Development, No. 19, October.
Kidd, S., and E. Wylde. 2011. Targeting the Poorest: An Assessment of the Proxy Means Test Methodology.
Canberra, Australia: Australian Agency for International Development.
Kidd., S., B. Gelders, and D. Bailey-Athias. 2017. “Exclusion by Design: An Assessment of the Eectiveness
of the Proxy Means Test Poverty Targeting Mechanism”. Extension of Social Security (ESS) Working
Paper No. 56. Social Protection Department. Geneva: ILO.
Landmann, A., and M. Frölich. 2015. “Can Health-Insurance Help Prevent Child Labor? An Impact
Evaluation from Pakistan”. Journal of Health Economics 39: 51–59.
Li, T., and S. Sekhri. 2020. “The Spillovers of Employment Guarantee Programs on Child Labor and
Education”. The World Bank Economic Review 34 (1): 164–78.
Lincove, J.A., and A. Parker. 2016. “The Inuence of Conditional Cash Transfers on Eligible Children and
Their Siblings”. Education Economics 24 (4): 352–73.
Liu, K. 2016. “Insuring against Health Shocks: Health Insurance and Household Choices”. Journal of
Health Economics 46: 16–32.
Liu, Q., and O. Skans. 2010. “The Duration of Paid Parental Leave and Children’s Scholastic Performance”.
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 10 (1): 1–33.
Lopez-Calva, L.F., and H.A. Patrinos. 2015. “Exploring the Dierential Impact of Public Interventions on
Indigenous People’s Schooling and Child Labor: Lessons from Mexico’s Conditional Cash Transfers
Program”. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 16 (3): 452–67.
Marchetta, F., E.S. David, and L. Tiberti. 2019. “The Role of Weather on Schooling and Work of Young
Adults in Madagascar”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 101 (4): 1203–27.
Martorano, B., and M. Sanlippo. 2012. “Innovative Features in Poverty Reduction Programmes:
An Impact Evaluation of Chile Solidario on Households and Children”. Journal of International
Development 24 (8): 1030–41.
Mendolia, S., N. Nguyen, and O. Yerokhin. 2019. “The Impact of Parental Illness on Children’s Schooling
and Labour Force Participation: Evidence from Vietnam”. Review of Economics of the Household 17.
Miller, C., and M. Tsoka. 2012. “Cash Transfers and Children’s Education and Labour among Malawi’s
Poor”. Development Policy Review 30 (4): 499–522.
Molyneux, M. 2007. “Two cheers for CCTs”. Institute of Development Studies Bulletin 38 (3): 69–74.
Moussa, W., N. Salti, A. Irani, R. Al Mokdad, Z. Jamaluddine, J. Chaaban, and H. Ghattas. 2022. “The
Impact of Cash Transfers on Syrian Refugee Children in Lebanon”. World Development 150: 105711.
Neidhöfer, G., and M. Niño‐Zarazúa. 2019. “The Long(er)‐Term Impacts of Chile Solidario on Human
Capital and Labor Income”. Population and Development Review 45 (S1): 209–44.
ODI (Overseas Development Institute) and UNICEF. 2020.      
Options. London and New York: ODI and UNICEF.
Ortiz, I., A. Chowdhury, F. Durán-Valverde, T. Muzaar, and S. Urban. 2019. Fiscal Space for Social
Protection. A Handbook for Assessing Financing Options. Geneva: ILO.
61
X
Bibliography
Ortiz, I., F. Durán-Valverde, K. Pal, C. Behrendt, and A. Acuña-Ulate. 2017. “Universal Social Protection
Floors: Costing Estimates and Aordability in 57 Lower Income Countries”. Extension of Social
Security (ESS) Working Paper No. 58. Social Protection Department. Geneva: ILO.
Osei, R.D., and M. Lambon-Quayeo. 2021. “Cash Transfers and the Supply of Labor by Poor
Households: Evidence from the Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty Program in Ghana”.
Review of Development Economics 25 (3): 1293–1304.
Pace, N., S. Daidone, B. Davis, and L. Pellerano. 2018. “Shaping Cash Transfer Impacts through ‘Soft-
Conditions’: Evidence from Lesotho”. Journal of African Economies 28 (1): 39–69.
Patrinos, H., and R. Donnelly. 2021. “Learning Loss during COVID-19: An Early Systematic Review”.
CEPR COVID Economics, 77:145-53.
Pellerano, L., E. Porreca, and F.C. Rosati. 2020. “Income Elasticity of Child Labor: Do Cash Transfers
Have an Impact on the Poorest Children?” IZA Journal of Development and Migration 11 (1).
Pena, P., J. Urrego, and J.M. Villa. 2017. “Civil Conict and Conditional Cash Transfers: Eects on
Demobilization”. World Development 99 (C): 431–40.
Porter, C., and R. Goyal. 2016. “Social Protection for All Ages? Impacts of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety
Net Program on Child Nutrition2. Social Sciences and Medicine 59: 92–99.
Premand, P., and P. Schnitzer. 2018. “Eciency, Legitimacy and Impacts of Targeting Methods: Evidence
from an Experiment in Niger”. Policy Research Working Paper No. 8412. Washington, DC: The World
Bank.
Prifti, E., S. Daidone, G. Campora, and N. Pace. 2020. “Government Transfers and Time Allocation
Decisions: The Case of Child Labour in Ethiopia”. Journal of International Development 33 (1): 16–40.
Quimbo, S.A., A.D. Kraft, R.M. Molato-Gyares, C.A.R. Tan, and J.J. Capuno. 2021. “How Do the Intended
and Unintended Beneciaries Respond to the Philippines’ Conditional Cash Transfer Program?”
Review of Development Economics 25 (3): 1267–92.
Richardson, D., A. Carraro, V. Cebotari, A. Gromada, and G. Rees. 2020a. Supporting Families and
Children Beyond COVID-19: Social Protection in High-Income Countries. Florence: UNICEF Oce of
Research – Innocenti.
Richardson, D., V. Cebotari, A. Carraro, and K.A. Damoah. 2020b. Supporting Families and Children
Beyond COVID-19: Social Protection in Southern Europe and Central Asia. Florence: UNICEF Oce of
Research – Innocenti.
Rosas, N., and S. Sabarwal. 2016. “Public Works as a Productive Safety Net in a Post-Conict Setting
Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Sierra Leone”. Policy Research Working Paper No. 7580.
Washington, D.C: The World Bank.
Rossin-Slater, M. 2017. “Maternity and Family Leave Policy”. National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) Working Paper, no. 23069.
Salti, N., J. Chaaban, W. Moussa, A. Irani, R.Al Mokdad, Z. Jamaluddine, and H. Ghattas. 2022. “The
Impact of Cash Transfers on Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: Evidence from a Multidimensional
Regression Discontinuity Design”. Journal of Development Economics 155: 102803.
Samuels, F., F. Bastagli, and M. Stavropoulou. 2020. World Food Programme Multi-Purpose Cash
Assistance in Lebanon: Social Cohesion and Stability between Syrian Refugees and Host Communities.
London: Overseas Development Institute.
Save the Children, and UNICEF. 2021. Impact of COVID-19 on Children Living in Poverty: A Technical Note.
London and New York: Save the Children and UNICEF.
Sebastian, A., A.P. de la O Campos, S. Daidone, N. Pace, B. Davis, O. Niang, and L. Pellerano. 2019.
“Cash Transfers and Gender Dierentials in Child Schooling and Labor: Evidence from the Lesotho
Child Grants Programme”. Population and Development Review 45 (S1): 181–208.
Shah, M., and B.M. Steinberg. 2021. “Workfare and Human Capital Investment Evidence from India”.
Journal of Human Resources 56 (2): 380–405.
Silwal, A.R., S. Engilbertsdottir, J. Cuesta, D. Newhouse, and D. Stewart. 2020. “Global Estimate of
Children in Monetary Poverty: An update”. Poverty & Equity Discussion Paper. Washington, D.C: The
World Bank.
62
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
Standing, G., and I. Orton. 2018. “Development and Basic Income: An Emerging Economic Model”.
In , edited by
Diana Barrowclough. 59-102. Geneva and New York: UNCTAD, United Nations.
Strobl, R. 2017. “Does Health Insurance Reduce Child Labour and Education Gaps? Evidence from
Rwanda”. Journal of Development Studies 53 (9): 1376–95.
Strupat, C., and F. Klohn. 2018. “Crowding out of Solidarity? Public Health Insurance versus Informal
Transfer Networks in Ghana”. World Development 104: 212–21.
Sulaiman, M. 2010. Assessing Impact of Asset Transfer on Children’s Education: A Case of BRAC’s Ultra-Poor
Programme in Bangladesh, Background Paper for Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2010.
Paris: UNESCO.
Sulaiman, M. 2015. “Does Wealth Increase Aect School Enrolment in Ultra-Poor Households: Evidence
from an Experiment in Bangladesh”.  26(2):139-156.
Tafere, Y., and T. Woldehanna. 2012. “Beyond Food Security: Transforming the Productive Safety Net
Programme in Ethiopia for the Well-Being of Children”. Working Paper No. 83. Oxford: Young Lives,
Department of International Development, University of Oxford.
Tagliati, F. 2019. “Child Labor under Cash and In-Kind Transfers: Evidence from Rural Mexico”. Banco
de Espana Working Paper, no. 1935.
Tang, C., L. Zhao, and Z. Zhao. 2020. “Does Free Education Help Combat Child Labor? The Eect of a
Free Compulsory Education Reform in Rural China”. Journal of Population Econonomics 33: 601–31.
Thévenon, O., and E. Edmonds. 2019. “Child Labour: Causes, Consequences and Policies to Tackle it”.
OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 235. Paris: OECD.
Thirumurthy, H., J. Gra Zivin, and M. Goldstein. 2008. “The Economic Impact of AIDS Treatment:
Labour Supply in Western Kenya”. Journal of Human Resources 43 (3): 511–52.
Tirivayi, N., D. Richardson, M. Gavrilovic, V. Groppo, L. Kajula, E. Valli, and F. Viola. 2020. “A Rapid Review
of Economic Policy and Social Protection Responses to Health and Economic Crises and Their Eects
on Children: Lessons for the COVID-19 pandemic response”. In Innocenti Working Papers 2020-02.
Florence: UNICEF Oce of Research – Innocenti.
UBOS (Uganda Bureau of Statistics). 2021. The Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) 2019/2020.
Kampala, Uganda: UBOS.
UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). 2020. Seizing the Moment: Tackling
Entrenched Inequalities to End Epidemics. Global AIDS Update 2020. Geneva: UNAIDS.
UNDESA (United Nations Department of Economics and Social Aairs). 2019. World Population Prospects
2019: Data Booklet. New York: UNDESA.
UNDESA. 2017. Household size and composition around the world 2017—Data booklet (ST/ESA/SER.
A/405). New York: UNDESA.
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). 2021. “Education in Africa”. Montreal, Quebec: UIS.
UNGA (United Nations General Assembly). 2020. Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons
in Africa: Report of the Secretary-General. A/75/322, New York: United Nations.
UNICEF Brazil. 2020. UNICEF alerta para Aumento de Incidência do Trabalho Infantil Durante a Pandemia
em São Paulo. São Paulo: UNICEF.
UNICEF Ecuador, and Inclusión SAS. 2020. El Choque COVID-19 en la Pobreza, Desigualdad y Clases
Sociales en el Ecuador: Una mirada a los hogares con niñas, niños y adolescentes. Quito: UNICEF.
UNICEF. 2016a. “Conditionality in Cash Transfers: UNICEF’s Approach”. In Social Inclusion Summaries,
Feb. 2016.
UNICEF. 2016b. The State of the World’s Children 2016: A Fair Chance for Every Child. New York: UNICEF.
UNICEF. 2019. UNICEF’s Global Social Protection Programme Framework. New York: UNICEF.
UNICEF. 2021. Seen, Counted, Included: Using Data to Shed Light on the Well-Being of Children with
Disabilities. New York: UNICEF.
63
X
Bibliography
UNICEF. 2022a. Child Labour and Disability: A Sector Review. Kathmandu: UNICEF ROSA.
UNICEF. 2022b. UNICEF Strategic Plan 2022–2025. New York: UNICEF.
United Nations. 2021. Investing in Jobs and Social Protection for Poverty Eradication and a Sustainable
Recovery (Secretary-General’s Policy Brief. New York: United Nations.
USP2030. 2019. Together to Achieve Universal Social Protection by 2030 (USP2030) – A Call to Action. Global
Partnership for Universal Social Protection.
Vera-Cossio, D.A. 2019. “Dependence or Constraints? Labor Supply Responses from a Cash Transfer
Program”. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Working Paper No. 01064. Washington: IDB
Veras Soares, F., and I. Orton. 2017. Debating Graduation. Policy in Focus No. 39. International Policy
Centre for Inclusive Growth, 14(39).
Villa, J. 2018. “The Continuous Treatment Eect of an Antipoverty Program on Children’s Educational
Attainment: Colombia’s Familias En Accion”. Review of Development Economics 22 (3): 1239–62.
Weber Costa, G., A. Carraro, F. Garcia Ribeiro, and M. Furtado Borba. 2020. “The Impact of Child Labor
Eradication Programs in Brazil”. Journal of Developing Areas 54 (4): 117–27.
WHO and IBRD/The World Bank. 2020. Global Monitoring Report on Financial Protection in Health 2019.
Geneva and Washington, DC: WHO and IBRD/The World Bank.
Woode, M., M. Bousmah, and R. Boucekkine. 2017. “Parental Morbidity, Child Work, and Health
Insurance in Rwanda”. Journal of Demographic Economics 83 (1): 111–27.
World Bank. 2013. Philippines Conditional Cash Transfer Program Impact Evaluation 2012. Washington,
DC: The World Bank.
World Bank. 2018. The State of Social Safety Nets 2018. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
World Bank. 2020. “Classication of Fragile and Conict-Aected Situations”. Washington, DC: The
World Bank.
World Bank. 2022. “World Development Indicators”.
World Bank. n.d. “Measuring Income and Poverty Using Proxy Means Tests”. Dhaka, Bangladesh: The
World Bank.
World Vision. 2020. Act Now: Experiences and Recommendations of Girls and Boys in West Africa during
COVID-19. Geneva: World Vision.
64
X
The role of social protection in the elimination of child labour: Evidence review and policy implications
Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work Branch (FUNDAMENTALS)
Social Protection Department (SOCPRO)
International Labour Office
4 route des Morillons
CH-1211 Geneva 22 – Switzerland
T: +41 (0) 22 799 61 11
E: childlabour@ilo.org
ilo.org/childlabour
ilo.org/secsoc
UNICEF Office of Research - Innocenti
Via degli Alfani 58
50121, Florence – Italy
T: (39055) 20330
F: (39055) 2033220
E: florence@unicef.org
www.unicef-irc.org