EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 8.11.2023 SWD(2023) 696

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EUROPEAN

COMMISSION

Brussels, 8.11.2023

SWD(2023) 696 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Türkiye 2023 Report

Accompanying the document

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the

European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions

2023 Communication on EU Enlargement policy

{COM(2023) 690 final} - {SWD(2023) 690 final} - {SWD(2023) 691 final} -

{SWD(2023) 692 final} - {SWD(2023) 693 final} - {SWD(2023) 694 final} -

{SWD(2023) 695 final} - {SWD(2023) 697 final} - {SWD(2023) 698 final} -

{SWD(2023) 699 final}

 
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Table of Contents 
1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 3 
1.1 Context ................................................................................................................................................ 3 
1.2. Summary of the report  ...................................................................................................................... 4 
2. Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process ........................................................................... 12 
2.1. Functioning of democratic institutions and Public Administration Reform .................................... 12 
2.1.1  Democracy .............................................................................................................................. 12 
2.1.2. Public administration reform .................................................................................................... 21 
2.2. Rule of law and fundamental rights ................................................................................................. 23 
Chapter 23: judiciary and fundamental rights .................................................................................... 23 
Chapter 24: justice, freedom and security .......................................................................................... 44 
2.3. Economic criteria ............................................................................................................................. 60 
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy ...................................................................... 60 
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union ........... 68 
2.4. Public procurement, statistics, financial control ............................................................................. 71 
Chapter 5: Public procurement ........................................................................................................... 71 
Chapter 18: Statistics .......................................................................................................................... 73 
Chapter 32: Financial control .............................................................................................................. 75 
3. Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation ........................................................................... 78 
4.Ability to assume the obligations of membership …………………………………………………………………….81 
Cluster 2: Internal Market ....................................................................................................................... 81 
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods .................................................................................................. 82 
Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers .................................................................................. 84 
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services ................................................. 85 
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital ................................................................................................. 86 
Chapter 6: Company law ..................................................................................................................... 87 
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law ................................................................................................... 88 
Chapter 8: Competition policy ............................................................................................................ 90 
Chapter 9: Financial services ............................................................................................................... 91 
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection .................................................................................... 93 
Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth ................................................................................... 95 
Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media ................................................................................... 95 
Chapter 16: Taxation ........................................................................................................................... 97 
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy ....................................................................................... 99 
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment ...................................................................................... 100 

 
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Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy .................................................................................... 103 
Chapter 25: Science and research ..................................................................................................... 104 
Chapter 26: Education and culture ................................................................................................... 105 
Chapter 29: Customs Union .............................................................................................................. 108 
Cluster 4: The Green agenda and sustainable connectivity .................................................................. 109 
Chapter 14: Transport policy ............................................................................................................ 110 
Chapter 15: Energy ............................................................................................................................ 111 
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks ............................................................................................. 113 
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change ................................................................................. 114 
Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion .................................................................................... 117 
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development ............................................................................... 117 
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy ......................................................... 118 
Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture ............................................................................................. 119 
Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments .................................. 120 
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions .............................................................................. 122 
Cluster 6: External relations .................................................................................................................. 123 
Chapter 30: External relations .......................................................................................................... 123 
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy ............................................................................ 125 
Annex I – Relations between the EU and Türkiye ................................................................................. 131 
 
 
   

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 CONTEXT

Türkiye

remains a key partner for the European Union and a candidate country. Türkiye has

been linked to the EU by an association agreement since 1964 and a Customs Union was

established in 1995. The European Council granted Türkiye the status of candidate country in

December 1999 and accession negotiations were opened in October 2005. Within the

framework of accession negotiations, 16 chapters have been opened and one has been

provisionally closed. Accession negotiations with Türkiye, however, remain at a standstill, in

line with the Council Conclusions of June 2018 as reiterated by the Council Conclusions of

December 2022. Türkiye continued to move away from the EU and did not reverse the

negative trend in relation to reform, despite its repeated statements of commitment to EU

accession. The EU’s serious concerns on the continued deterioration of democratic standards,

the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and respect for fundamental rights were not

addressed.

Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Türkiye in May 2023. The ruling

coalition retained its majority in the parliament and the incumbent President was re-elected.

The priorities of the new government include post-earthquake relief and reconstruction,

financial stability and a constitutional overhaul.

In February 2023, two powerful earthquakes and multiple aftershocks struck south-eastern

Türkiye. The devastating earthquakes caused the death of tens of thousands of people and

resulted in widespread destruction of public and private infrastructure, including schools and

healthcare facilities. The EU’s reaction was immediate and substantial emergency assistance

was provided both through humanitarian funding and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. In

March 2023, the European Commission and the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU

hosted, in coordination with the Turkish authorities, an international donors’ conference to

mobilise funds from the international community to support the early recovery, relief and

reconstruction of the affected areas. This conference raised more than EUR 6 billion. The

implementation of the assistance pledged by the European Commission has begun.

The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern

Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship

with Türkiye. The European Council in June 2022 reconfirmed its expectation that Türkiye

fully respects international law, contributes to the de-escalation of tensions in the interest of

regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and promotes good-neighbourly relations in a

sustainable way. The European Council in June 2023 invited the High Representative and the

Commission to submit a report to the European Council on the state of play of EU-Türkiye

relations, building on the instruments and options identified by the European Council and

with a view to proceeding in a strategic and forward-looking manner. The Foreign Affairs

Council discussed Türkiye in July 2023.

During the reporting period, Türkiye did not engage in any unauthorised drilling activities in

the Eastern Mediterranean. It continued to refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and

repeatedly advocated a two-state solution in Cyprus, contrary to relevant UN Security

Council Resolutions.

In line with the request of the Republic of Türkiye regarding the use of the country's new official name in

English, this document uses the name “Türkiye” instead of “Turkey” in English. This administrative change is

limited to the nomenclature used in EU documents, does not have a retroactive effect, and entails no legal

consequences. This approach is without prejudice to the nomenclature used by Member States.

The 2016 EU-Turkey Statement continued to yield results and remained the key framework

for cooperation on migration. Türkiye sustained its remarkable efforts to host 3.6 million

refugees from Syria and other countries. The EU has mobilised close to EUR 10 billion to

support refugees and host communities since 2012. The Commission continued to implement

the additional package of EUR 3 billion covering 2021-2023, providing assistance in areas

such as basic needs, border management, education, healthcare, protection and socio-

economic support.

1.2. SUMMARY OF THE REPORT

There are serious deficiencies in the functioning of Türkiye’s democratic institutions.

Democratic backsliding continued during the reporting period. Structural deficiencies in the

presidential system remained in place.

Presidential and parliamentary elections took place on 14 May 2023. A second round of the

presidential election was held on 28 May. The elections were held under the new electoral

law adopted in March 2022. The elections offered voters a choice between genuine political

alternatives and voter participation remained high, but biased media coverage and the lack of

a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage to the incumbent.

The constitutional architecture kept powers centralised at the level of the Presidency and does

not ensure a sound and effective separation of powers between the executive, the legislature

and the judiciary. The ineffective checks-and-balances mechanism means that the executive

branch is democratically accountable only through elections.

Political pluralism continued to be undermined by the targeting of opposition parties and

individual members of parliament. The government’s pressure on mayors from opposition

parties continued to weaken local democracy. Most regulatory authorities remain directly

linked to the Presidency. The recommendations by the Council of Europe’s Venice

Commission on the presidential system remain unaddressed.

The situation in the south-east region remained a cause for concern, particularly after the

earthquakes in February 2023. The Turkish government conducted security and military

operations in Iraq and Syria. Border areas faced a security risk with terrorist attacks by the

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is listed as a terrorist group by the EU. The

government has a legitimate right and a responsibility to fight terrorism, but it is essential that

it does so in full compliance with the principles of the rule of law, human rights and

fundamental freedoms. Anti-terror measures need to be proportionate. There was no progress

in resuming a credible political peace process to resolve the Kurdish issue. Following the

earthquakes, the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) declared a period of unilateral truce,

during the run-up to the May elections, which was terminated in June. Turkish officials

linked the PKK-affiliated People’s Protection Units (YPG) to an attack in Istanbul in

November 2022, but the PKK denied involvement. The EU unambiguously condemned the

PKK’s attacks and expressed solidarity with the families of the victims. Türkiye continued to

carry out airstrikes against the PKK and affiliated groups in northern Syria and Iraq.

This report covers the period from June 2022 to June 2023. It is based on input from a variety of sources,

including contributions from the government of Türkiye, the EU Member States, European Parliament reports

and information from various international and non-governmental organisations. It also includes the results of

comparative assessments and indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law.

The report uses the following assessment scale to describe the state of play: early stage, some level of

preparation, moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made

during the reporting period, it uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some

progress, good progress and very good progress. Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used.

Serious backsliding regarding civil society issues continued. Civil society organisations faced

increased pressure and shrinking space to operate , limiting their freedoms of expression,

association and assembly. The implementation of the Law on preventing financing of

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction placed further restrictions on civil society

organisations. However, despite increasing pressure from the authorities, civil society

continued to be vocal and to participate actively in civic life, including by providing support

to the people affected by the February 2023 earthquakes.

Civilian oversight of the security forces was not consolidated. The executive branch

maintained significant control over the security forces. The civilian component of the

Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) remained unchanged. The military judicial system’s

authority was curbed, with civilian higher courts reviewing appeals against military court

decisions. However, effective civilian oversight of the security forces remained incomplete

and lacking in effective accountability mechanisms. Strengthening parliamentary oversight of

security institutions is necessary.

Türkiye is in between some and moderate level of preparation in the field of public

administration reform. It made no progress in this area over the reporting period. There is

still a lack of political will to reform the public administration and public financial

management. The restructuring of the executive branch and the overhaul of the public

administration in line with the presidential system introduced in 2018 resulted in highly

centralised policymaking system. The level of accountability of the administration remains

insufficient. Its human resources management system needs to be reformed. Politicisation of

the public administration has continued. The share of women in managerial posts in the civil

service is still low.

Türkiye remains at an early stage of preparation in the area of judiciary. Serious backsliding

continued and, despite several judicial reform packages in recent years, the structural

deficiencies in the judicial system remained unaddressed. The continued refusal to implement

certain rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) remains a matter of concern.

There was no progress in eliminating undue influence and pressure by the executive on

judges and prosecutors, which negatively affects the independence, impartiality and quality

of the judiciary. Implementation of the 2021 Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) and the

2019 Judicial Reform Strategy (JRS) continued, but the activities foreseen in these

documents fell short of addressing the structural problems and issues identified in the

previous reports of the European Commission. The lack of objective, merit-based, uniform

and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors remains a

source of concern.

Türkiye is at an early stage in the fight against corruption. There was no progress in the

reporting period. Outstanding deficiencies in key areas of the fight against corruption over the

last years remained unaddressed. A fully-fledged corruption prevention policy still remains to

be developed, including the relevant institutions, contrary to the United Nations Convention

against Corruption, to which Türkiye is party. Legislative gaps still remain in several fields of

the fight against corruption. The limitations of the legal framework and the institutional

architecture allowed undue influence on the investigation and prosecution phases of

corruption cases. The accountability and transparency of public institutions need to be

improved. The absence of an anti-corruption strategy and action plan indicates the lack of

will to fight decisively against corruption. The Council of Europe’s Group of States against

Corruption (GRECO) recommendations remained unimplemented. Overall, corruption

remains a problem.

Türkiye has some level of preparation in the fight against organised crime and there was

some progress at operational level through participation in an increasing number of joint

operations with EU Member States and neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, it is important

for Türkiye to further increase its operational willingness to cooperate and exchange

information with EU law enforcement partners. The legal framework for the fight against

organised crime and police cooperation is only partially aligned with the EU acquis. The

completion of an international agreement between the EU and Türkiye on the exchange of

personal data between Europol and the Turkish authorities responsible for fighting serious

crime and terrorism is still pending, considering also that the Turkish data protection

legislation is still not aligned with the EU acquis. The legal framework regulating the fight

against money laundering and terrorist financing needs to be improved in line with the

recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Venice Commission on

the Law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The deterioration of human and fundamental rights continued. The Turkish legal

framework includes general guarantees of respect for human and fundamental rights, but the

legislation and its implementation need to be brought into line with the European Convention

on Human Rights (ECHR) and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law. No

legislative amendments were adopted to eliminate the remaining elements of the 2016 state of

emergency laws.

Türkiye’s refusal to implement certain ECtHR rulings is a source of concern regarding the

judiciary’s adherence to international and European standards. Türkiye has not implemented

the July 2022 ruling of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, which

was issued in the framework of the infringement procedure launched by the Committee of

Ministers against Türkiye, that points to a drifting away from the standards of human rights

and fundamental freedoms that it has subscribed to as a member of the Council of Europe.

The implementation of the human rights action plan adopted in 2021 continued. However, it

did not address critical issues. The overall human rights situation did not improve.

On freedom of expression, the serious backsliding continued. Broad restrictions on the

activities of journalists, writers, lawyers, academics, human rights defenders and critical

voices continued to have a negative effect on the exercise of their freedoms. The

implementation of the criminal laws relating to national security and anti-terrorism continued

to contravene the ECHR and to diverge from ECtHR case law.

The May 2023 election campaign witnessed restrictions on freedom of expression, both

private and public media did not ensure editorial independence and impartiality in their

coverage of the campaign, detracting from the ability of voters to make an informed choice.

There was no progress in the area of freedom of assembly and association, where legislation

and its implementation are not in line with the Turkish Constitution, European standards or

the international conventions that Türkiye is party to. There were recurrent bans,

disproportionate use of force and interventions around peaceful demonstrations.

Demonstrators were subject to investigations, court cases and administrative fines on charges

of terrorism-related activities or of violating the Law on demonstrations and marches.

The rights of the most disadvantaged groups and people belonging to minorities need better

protection. Roma

people are still largely excluded from formal employment and their living

conditions deteriorated severely. In January 2023, Türkiye adopted a new Roma strategy

In line with the terminology of European institutions the umbrella term ‘Roma’ is used here to refer to a

number of different groups, without denying the specificities of these groups.

covering the period 2023-2030 and an action plan covering the period 2023-2025. The

February 2023 earthquakes affected the Roma population disproportionately, and increased

the difficulties they faced in the affected areas in terms of living conditions, livelihood and

basic needs and health, especially for women and children. Gender-based violence,

discrimination and hate speech against minorities and against lesbian, gay, bisexual,

transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons are still a matter of serious concern.

On migration and asylum policy, Türkiye made some progress. The EU-Turkey Statement

remained the main framework for cooperation between the EU and Türkiye. Some progress

was made in further strengthening the capacity for surveillance and protection of the land

borders with Iran and Iraq. The Commission expects Türkiye to uphold its commitments

under the EU-Turkey statement, in line with the European Council conclusions of October

2021, including prevention of irregular migration from land and sea routes, and resuming

returns. The return of irregular migrants from the Greek islands under the EU-Turkey

Statement remained suspended. The full and effective implementation of the EU-Turkey

readmission agreement towards all EU Member States is pending. Political and technical

dialogue is ongoing on migration and security. The next EU-Türkiye high level dialogue on

migration is scheduled to take place on 23 November 2023. Overall, the number of illegal

border crossings between Türkiye and Greece remained significantly lower than it was prior

to the adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement. In 2022, the number of irregular migrants

arriving increased on most routes by comparison with 2021. In the first half of 2023, the

number of irregular arrivals from Türkiye into the EU was lower than in the same period in

2022. Arrivals in Greece increased by 62%, while the sea route to Italy saw a substantial

decrease (down by 52%) and the number of arrivals in Cyprus via the Green Line went down

significantly by 42%. Türkiye has still not implemented the provisions relating to third-

country nationals in the EU-Turkey readmission agreement, which entered into force in

October 2017.

Türkiye continued to make significant efforts to host and meet the needs of one of the largest

refugee communities in the world. Out of the almost EUR 10 billion in EU support to

refugees allocated since 2011, some EUR 7 billion had been disbursed by September 2023.

Efficient integration measures are needed to address the prolonged presence of refugees in

the country. Access to public health for migrants and refugees should be improved. No

outstanding benchmarks under the visa liberalisation roadmap were fulfilled. Türkiye still

needs to further align its legislation with the EU acquis on visa policy.

Türkiye is an active and significant actor in the area of foreign policy, which constitutes an

important element in the context of the EU-Türkiye relationship. Nevertheless, Türkiye’s

unilateral foreign policy remained at odds with the EU’s priorities under the common foreign

and security policy (CFSP). Türkiye maintained a very low alignment rate of 10% with the

EU stance on foreign and security policy (as of August 2023), compared to 8% in 2022. Its

rhetoric in support to terrorist group Hamas following its attacks against Israel on 7 October

2023 is in complete disagreement with the EU approach.

Following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye condemned the Russian

military aggression, including at the UN General Assembly, and engaged politically and

diplomatically, including by facilitating the export of Ukrainian grain and the exchange of

prisoners. The UN- and Türkiye-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative was terminated by

Russia in July 2023. Türkiye also sought to facilitate talks between Ukraine and Russia and to

work on de-escalation and bringing about a cease-fire. Nevertheless, Türkiye refrained from

aligning itself with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia. As of March 2023, Türkiye

has implemented a ban on exporting to Russia sanctioned goods originating from the EU, the

United States and the United Kingdom. This ban specifically targeted goods that were in

transit, stored in warehouses or located within free zones in Türkiye. However, the potential

transportation of dual-use and sensitive technology goods, as well as the unrestricted

movement of sanctioned goods from Türkiye to Russia still need to be addressed. Overall,

Türkiye significantly intensified its trade and economic ties with Russia, and the Turkish

economy became more dependent on Russia in crucial sectors, particularly in energy.

Türkiye intensified its ‘regional normalisation’ policy with the Arab states, with Armenia and

with Israel. Following the Hamas terrorist group’s attacks against Israel in October 2023,

Türkiye refrained from condemning and qualifying them as terrorism and strongly criticised

Israel’s response. Türkiye strongly condemned the loss of civilian lives on both sides and

proposed to act as a mediator between Israel and Hamas. Türkiye is currently re-evaluating

its ties with Israel. On the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), Türkiye’s position aligns with

the EU’s position supporting the two-state solution. Türkiye's rapprochement with the Syrian

regime, brokered by Russia, occurred in spite of the lack of a political resolution to the Syrian

conflict and is at odds with the EU’s policy. At the same time, Türkiye shared a common goal

with the EU to achieve a stable and prosperous Syria, primarily by implementing UNSCR

2254. Türkiye has a growing presence and geopolitical ambition in the South Caucasus and

Central Asia. It also continued its efforts to extend its relations with African, Latin American

and Asian countries. Türkiye’s pragmatic engagement on Afghanistan and its vocal position

on the developments in Sudan underscored its ambition to be a key player in the context of

major international crises.

Türkiye continued to seek involvement in the common security and defence policy (CSDP)

and EU defence initiatives while persisting in its exclusion of a Member State from all

possible cooperation with NATO. Türkiye remained actively involved in EU crisis

management missions and operations within the framework of the CSDP. In March 2023, the

Turkish National Assembly approved Finland’s NATO accession and during the NATO

summit in July 2023, the Turkish President pledged to promptly submit Sweden’s accession

protocol to the Turkish parliament for ratification. The president submitted the bill for

ratification to the Parliament on 23 October 2023.

Regarding good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation, Türkiye continued to

refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and repeatedly advocated a two-state solution in

Cyprus, contrary to relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. The EU remains fully

committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework,

in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions, in line with the principles on which the

EU is founded and the acquis. The EU has called, most recently in the European Council

conclusions of June 2023, for the speedy resumption of negotiations and expressed its

readiness to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process with all

appropriate means at its disposal. There were no unauthorised drilling activities by Türkiye in

the Eastern Mediterranean during the reporting period.

Relations between Türkiye and Greece deteriorated until early 2023. However, following the

devastating earthquakes in Türkiye in February 2023, there was a marked improvement in the

relations. As of February 2023, violations of Greek airspace diminished drastically, and no

flights over Greek inhabited areas were reported.

Pursuing dialogue in good faith and abstaining from unilateral actions which run counter to

the EU interests and violate international law and the sovereign rights of EU Member States

is an essential requirement to ensure stable and secure environment in the Eastern

Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship

between the EU and Türkiye. Türkiye is expected to unequivocally commit itself to good

neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes, in

accordance with the United Nations Charter, having recourse, if necessary, to the

International Court of Justice.

Regarding the economic criteria, the Turkish economy is well advanced but made no

progress over the reporting period. Serious concerns persist over the proper functioning of

Türkiye’s market economy. There was backsliding on important elements, such as the

conduct of monetary policy and the institutional and regulatory environments over most of

the reporting period. Since the May parliamentary and presidential elections, the authorities

have taken some steps to revert to more stability oriented macroeconomic policies. Although

economic growth remained robust in 2022, Türkiye moved further away from market-

oriented policies, which weakened its economic fundamentals and increased vulnerabilities

and risks. Inflation decreased somewhat but remained very high as monetary policy

prioritised exceptionally low interest rates, which remain deeply negative in real terms and

are sustained by a web of regulatory and prudential measures. After the presidential and

parliamentary elections in spring 2023, monetary policy has started to tighten, also signalling

a gradual simplification of the macroprudential framework. The current account deficit

increased to 5.4% of GDP in 2022, driven by a negative terms-of-trade shock and large

imports of non-monetary gold. The relatively good budget performance in recent years masks

an underlying trend of growing fiscal risks. The authorities’ commitment to fiscal discipline

wavered, as the fiscal stance turned pro-cyclical in 2023, with earthquake-related expenditure

pressure adding to pre-electoral budgetary largesse. However, the fiscal stance was tightened

after the elections and a revised budget, including sizeable tax increases, was adopted in July.

The institutional and regulatory environment lacks predictability and transparency, and

complicates the post-electoral economic policy normalisation. Market exit remains costly and

slow. However, Türkiye has made progress in digitalising government services to businesses.

Although the size of the informal economy has fallen in recent years, it still accounts for a

significant share of economic activity. State intervention in price-setting mechanisms persists.

The provision of State aid lacks proper implementation rules, enforcement and transparency.

The banking sector remained broadly stable but is facing financial stability challenges due to

the numerous overly complex and far-reaching macroprudential and regulatory measures.

The labour market strengthened further, although structural challenges remain significant, in

particular for youth and female employment. Regional labour market disparities declined and

reached one of the lowest levels in years. The recent net minimum wage increases were pro-

cyclical.

Türkiye has a good level of preparation and made limited progress in achieving the capacity

to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Despite improved

vocational training, the mismatch between the education system and labour market needs

remains a concern. Expenditure on research and development continued to increase, albeit at

a very slow pace, and is still below the government’s target. Investment was relatively

subdued in 2022. There was progress in the diversification of energy supplies and the share of

energy generated from renewable sources increased significantly. However, the local content

requirement in the renewable energy generation sector is a discriminatory practice and a

cause for concern. Trade openness increased further, but integration with the EU continued

falling, although remaining high. Deviations from Türkiye’s obligations under the EU-Turkey

Customs Union continue to hinder bilateral trade.

Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of public procurement, with significant gaps

remaining to align with the EU acquis. There was backsliding in the reporting period as

Türkiye increased the use of the negotiated procedure and of discriminatory domestic price

advantage practices, and continued to allow offsets that favour local content. Türkiye is

moderately prepared on statistics and made some progress, with work continuing to

harmonise its statistical methodology with EU standards. The Turkish Statistical Institute

(TurkStat) improved its compliance with the timeframes for publishing annual national

accounts and excessive deficit procedure notifications. It took further steps to improve

cooperation with other main data providers. However, Türkiye needs to increase the

credibility of TurkStat and public trust in official statistics. Türkiye has a good level of

preparation on financial control. It made no progress over the reporting period. The public

internal financial control policy paper was not updated. The purpose, authority and

responsibility of internal audit are undermined by the lack of a legal requirement to have

internal audit units in ministries.

Regarding its ability to assume the obligations of membership, Türkiye has pursued

alignment with the EU acquis on a rather ad hoc basis and to a limited degree.

The internal market cluster is key to the good functioning of the EU-Turkey Customs

Union and to integrating Türkiye into the EU’s internal market. Türkiye has achieved a good

level of preparation for the free movement of goods. However, technical barriers to trade and

requirements discriminating against EU products remained in place. Preparations in the areas

of freedom of movement for workers, the right of establishment and freedom to provide

services are at an early stage, and substantial efforts are still required to align with the

acquis. Türkiye is moderately prepared on free movement of capital, as limitations remain on

foreign ownership and on capital movement. Türkiye needs to continue to address

outstanding issues in its framework regulating the fight against money laundering and

terrorist financing.

Türkiye is well advanced in the area of company law but needs to make further progress in

aligning with the EU acquis. Türkiye has a good level of preparation in the area of

intellectual property law, notably in terms of legislative alignment, but it needs to improve

implementation and enforcement. Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of

competition policy. Backsliding was observed as serious concerns persist in relation to the

legislative framework, enforcement capacity and transparency in the field of State aid.

Türkiye has a good level of preparation in the area of financial services, however the

banking sector faced a challenging operating environment in the reporting period. Türkiye

has a good level of preparation on consumer and health protection, with limited progress

made, notably on strengthening its surveillance system for health (security) services. The

capacity of the healthcare system was seriously affected by the February 2023 earthquakes in

south-east Türkiye.

Within the cluster on competitiveness and inclusive growth, Türkiye has some level of

preparation in the area of digital transformation and media. Türkiye’s preparations in the

area of science and research are well advanced and Türkiye made good progress during the

reporting period, notably as a result of joining Horizon Europe and continued efforts to raise

awareness of, and capacity for the programme. Türkiye is moderately prepared on education

and culture, and continued to make some progress, notably through the continued

implementation of the national qualifications system and the increased participation in some

EU programmes. Access to education in south-east Türkiye was significantly impacted by

the February 2023 earthquakes.

On the economy-related chapters, backsliding continued on economic and monetary policy,

where Türkiye has some level of preparation. The Central Bank continued to loosen its

unorthodox monetary policy stance, which triggered multi-year high inflation and unhinged

inflation expectations. Until the parliamentary and presidential elections in May 2023, the

Central Bank was subject to significant political pressure to keep real interest rates deeply

negative. Far-reaching prudential and regulatory measures disrupted the functioning of

financial markets and increased risks. After the elections, the Central Bank has started to

tighten monetary policy and the new government took measures to limit the bulging fiscal

deficit. Türkiye is moderately prepared and made limited progress on enterprise and

industrial policy. Major challenges in relation to measures incompatible with EU industrial

policy principles remain unaddressed. Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of

social policy and employment. The labour market situation improved but concerns remain

over trade union rights and effective social dialogue, persistent levels of informal economic

activity and the gender gap in employment. The February 2023 earthquakes had a major

impact on the labour market in the affected regions.

Türkiye is moderately prepared on taxation. It made no progress during the reporting period

and still needs to enable tax information exchange with all EU Member States. Türkiye

maintains a good level of preparation for the customs union but made limited progress over

the reporting period. However, Türkiye’s deviations from its obligations under the EU-

Turkey Customs Union continued, contributing to a number of trade irritants.

Regarding the cluster on the Green Agenda and sustainable connectivity, Türkiye is

moderately prepared in transport policy. It made limited progress during the reporting period,

mainly linked to the update of the nationally determined contribution under the Paris

Agreement with a specific chapter on transport mitigation policies. Türkiye is moderately

prepared in the area of energy, and made limited progress overall. Efforts continued on

renewable energy deployment, reforms in the natural gas sector and legislative alignment on

nuclear safety. Türkiye continues to be an important transit country for the EU, but remains

reliant on Russia for fossil fuel imports and nuclear energy. Türkiye is well advanced on

trans-European networks and made no progress. The trans-Anatolian pipeline continues to

operate smoothly and transmit gas to the European section of the Southern Gas Corridor. The

construction of the flagship Halkali-Kapikule railway line connecting the EU border to

Istanbul continued.

Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of environment and climate change, and

made limited progress over the reporting period. On climate change, Türkiye submitted its

updated nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement. It faces critical

environmental and climate challenges, and needs more ambitious and better coordinated

environment and climate policies, strategic planning, substantial investment and stronger

administrative capacity.

On the cluster covering resources, agriculture and cohesion, Türkiye reached some level

of preparation in the area of agriculture and rural development. Backsliding continued during

the reporting period, as its agricultural policy keeps moving away from the main principles

of the EU common agricultural policy and as Türkiye continued to restrict imports of

agricultural products from the EU. Türkiye is a major exporter of food products to the EU

and made limited progress in the area of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy,

where it reached some level of preparation. Full implementation of the EU acquis in this area

requires significant further work. Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of fisheries and

aquaculture, and made some progress on fisheries governance, inspection and control.

Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of regional policy and the coordination of

structural instruments, and continued to make some progress in accelerating the absorption

of IPA II funds and setting up the structures for IPA III funds. Türkiye has some level of

preparation in the area of financial and budgetary provisions but made no progress during the

reporting period.

In the external relations cluster, Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of external

relations and made no progress over the reporting period. Türkiye has some level of

preparation in the area of foreign, security and defence policy, and made no progress overall

in the reporting period. Türkiye is a significant actor in the area of foreign policy, which

constitutes an important element in the context of the EU-Türkiye relationship. Stepping up

efforts to ensure alignment with the EU's common foreign and security policy would be a

significant signal of Türkiye's commitment to the EU in the new geopolitical context.

2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS

2.1. FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM

Democracy

The functioning of Türkiye’s democratic institutions continued to be severely hampered. The

structural shortcomings of the presidential system remained. Democratic backsliding and

political polarisation increased in the run-up to the presidential and parliamentary elections.

Following the earthquakes, which hit 11 provinces in February

2023, a state of emergency

was introduced in the affected provinces and expired in May 2023. Furthermore, even though

the nationwide state of emergency was lifted in July 2018, a number of legal provisions

granting extraordinary powers to government officials and maintaining a number of the

emergency’s restrictive elements remain in effect. Some of these provisions have been

extended for another 2 years, but most of the provisions related to the 2018 state of

emergency expired in July 2022.

The State of Emergency Inquiry Commission ruled on all the applications within the scope of

the 2018 Law on the establishment of the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency

Measures and completed its work in January 2023. Of the total number of applications

submitted to the Inquiry Commission (127 292), the Inquiry Commission accepted 17 960

cases and rejected 109 332.

Elections

Presidential and parliamentary elections took place on 14 May 2023. A second round to

determine the new President of the Republic was held on 28 May. According to the

preliminary conclusions of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

(the ODIHR), which deployed an election observation mission, voters had a choice between

genuine political alternatives and voter participation was high. However, the incumbent-

biased media coverage and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage to

the incumbent.

Parliamentary elections were held in Türkiye on 14 May 2023 to elect the 600 members of

the Grand National Assembly. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) of the

incumbent President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, led the People’s Alliance, which also included

the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Great Union Party (BBP) and the New Welfare

Party (YRP). The People’s Alliance retained its majority in the parliament with 322 members

of parliament. During the second round of the presidential elections on 28 May, President

Erdoğan was re-elected with 52.18% of the vote (the Republic People’s Party CHP

opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu received 47.82%). The elections took place in a

deeply polarised environment. The elections offered voters a choice between genuine

political alternatives and voter participation remained high, however, biased media coverage

and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage to the incumbent. In the

subdued yet competitive campaign, candidates were able to campaign freely. However,

harsher rhetoric, inflammatory and discriminatory language by both contestants, along with

the continued intimidation and harassment of supporters of some opposition parties

undermined the process. Election days were generally calm and well-administered. However,

instances of deficient implementation of certain procedures, particularly during the vote

count, were noted. The electoral campaign was held during the state of emergency in the 11

provinces affected by the earthquakes, where voting difficulties were widely reported.

OSCE/ODIHR deployed an election observation mission (EOM) with 28 long-term and 350

short-term observers, with additional embedded observers from the Parliamentary Assembly

of the Council of Europe (PACE). Local NGOs and the political parties also deployed

thousands of volunteers to monitor the elections. The elections were held under the new

electoral law adopted in March 2022. The new law introduced significant changes, such as a

revised seat allocation system, changes to eligibility criteria for political parties and changes

to the method of appointing mid-level electoral councils. It positively addressed an ODIHR

recommendation to lower the parliamentary threshold from 10% to 7%. Most other ODIHR

recommendations (including those related to seat distribution, voter and candidate rights,

campaign financing and election dispute resolution) remain unaddressed. The Venice

Commission criticised several aspects of the amended law, such as the new system for

selecting the chairpersons and members of provincial and district election appeal boards with

a lottery rather than taking experience into account.

Any further amendments that Türkiye makes to its electoral framework, including its

legislation on political parties, need to be made in line with international standards, after

thorough consultation.

The 48 mayors displaced by government-appointed trustees following the 2019 local

elections in the south-east have not been reinstated and no action was taken to address the

relevant Venice Commission’s June 2020 opinion. This remains a source of serious concern

as it undermines local democracy and denies voters their preferred representation.

Parliament

The presidential system has largely weakened the national parliament’s legislative and

oversight functions. The President’s extensive powers allow him to take decisions across a

broad spectrum of policy areas, thereby limiting the parliament’s legislative function. The

parliament lacks the tools needed to hold the government to account. Targeting of the

political opposition continued. The closure case of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) is

still ongoing.

During the reporting period, the legislative function of the parliament was curtailed by the

extensive use of presidential decrees and presidential decisions. From January to December

2022, the parliament adopted 80 of the 749 proposed laws. By contrast, during the same

period, 273 presidential decrees issued under the state of emergency on a variety of policy

issues (including socioeconomic issues) were brought before parliamentary committees.

The parliament’s legislative and agenda-setting duties remained mainly under the control of

the ruling AKP-MHP alliance, which has a parliamentary majority. Opposition parties had a

very limited ability to influence parliamentary debates.

The fourth GRECO evaluation report of 2022 highlighted the points that the asset

declarations made by members of parliament are not verified for their accuracy, and that

there are no effective sanctions for violations of rules in this area. Moreover, the content of

these declarations is not made publicly available promptly after their submission to the

parliament.

Parliamentary oversight of the executive remained very weak. The parliament lacks the

necessary means to hold the government accountable. Members of parliament can submit

written questions to the Vice-President and ministers, but it is not foreseen by the law that

they can submit formal questions to the President. Ordinary presidential decrees are not

subject to parliamentary review. However, presidential decrees issued under the state of

emergency must be submitted to the parliament for approval. The supervision of public

expenditure by the parliament must be substantially strengthened.

Political pluralism continued to be undermined by the judiciary’s targeting of opposition

parties and of individual members of parliament (particularly from the People's Democratic

Party (the HDP)) for alleged terrorism offenses. The system of parliamentary immunity did

not provide sufficient legal protection for opposition parliamentarians to express their views

within the limits of free speech. Approximately 5 000 HDP members and officials are

currently imprisoned. One of the detained defendants in the Gezi trial was elected as a deputy

from the Workers’ Party of Türkiye (the TIP) in the May 2023 elections but was not released

from prison and was therefore not allowed to be sworn in as a member of parliament. By the

end of the 27

legislative term (2018-2023), the total number of members of parliament

subject to the legislative immunity resolution and a request for the lifting of their immunity

was 206 (180 of them belonged to the parliamentary opposition). During the reporting period,

no deputies had their immunity revoked or were detained on terrorism-related charges. Two

former HDP co-chairs and several former HDP legislators are still in prison despite a

European Court of Human Rights ruling in their favour.

The HDP’s closure case on terrorism charges, including the banning from political life of 451

HDP members, remain pending before the Constitutional Court. In April 2023, the HDP

waived its right to oral defence, arguing that the case was politically motivated and that it

should be postponed until after the May 2023 elections. The General Assembly of the Court

recorded the party’s decision and sent the file to the Rapporteur. In January 2023, the

Constitutional Court suspended State funding for the HDP but reinstated it in March

following an appeal. In June 2023, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Treasury aid paid to

the HDP could not be legally blocked.

Despite the March 2022 lowering of the electoral threshold from 10% to 7%, the legal

framework for elections and political parties remains problematic. Türkiye has yet to

implement the outstanding recommendations of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic

Institutions and Human Rights and of the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission. The level

of participation of women in decision-making, politics and employment remained low by

international standards. Following the May 2023 elections, the percentage of women in the

parliament increased from 17.1% during the previous term to 20.1% (from 104 to 121 out of

600). This is the highest ever ratio of women’s representation in the parliament but women

are still under-represented.

Governance

The presidential system continues to be characterised by a lack of checks and balances, as

well as the politicisation of the public administration. Most regulatory authorities remain

directly linked to the Presidency. The recommendations by the Council of Europe’s Venice

Commission on the presidential system still need to be addressed. The government’s pressure

on mayors from opposition parties continued to weaken local democracy.

As highlighted by the Venice Commission's 2017 opinion and the European Commission's

previous country reports, the presidential system still lacks the necessary checks and balances

to prevent an undue concentration of power and to safeguard the independence of the

judiciary. The highly centralised presidential system continues to impair the legislative

branch of government, the judicial branch and the public administration.

The use of traditional instruments of oversight of the executive by the parliament, such as

a vote of confidence and the ability to ask the executive oral questions, has not been allowed

since the entry into force of the presidential system in 2018. The absence of effective checks

and balances and the parliament’s inability to effectively supervise the office of the President

mean that the latter’s political accountability is limited to election time. The public

administration, courts and security forces are under the heavy influence of the executive. The

Presidency exercises direct authority over all key institutions and regulatory bodies. The

public sector remained politicised, especially at senior management level.

The legal framework allowed regulatory authorities to be subject to excessive political

influence. The President has the authority to appoint the chiefs and board members of the vast

majority of the regulatory agencies. These regulatory bodies, notably in the media sector,

issued decisions that disproportionately target (including with heavy pecuniary fines) media

that are critical of the government.

The Ombudsman’s caseload continued to increase during the reporting period and a high

number of cases was adjudicated. However, the Ombudsman did not address politically

sensitive issues concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms.

As regards local self-governance, the government maintained its pressure on opposition

mayors, including through administrative and judicial investigations. In December 2022, the

metropolitan mayor of Istanbul was sentenced to a suspended prison sentence on charges of

insulting members of the Supreme Electoral Council. The mayor is also under administrative

investigation by the Ministry of Interior for allegedly ‘employing terrorists’ in the

municipality. In June 2023, a new case was opened against the mayor for alleged

involvement in rigging a public works tender in 2015. In May, during a rally in Erzurum, the

mayor was among those physically attacked, with the violence being condoned rather than

condemned by senior AKP officials.

In the south-east, local democracy remained severely constrained. Since the 2019 municipal

elections, 48 HDP mayors have been removed from office on terrorism-related accusations.

Governors continued to serve as trustees in place of the deposed mayors. Hundreds of elected

municipal officials have been detained on suspicion for ties to terrorism. These actions

violate citizens’ right to be governed by their elected representatives.

The legal framework governing the tutelary powers of the Ministry of Interior over locally

elected officials was not revised in accordance with Türkiye’s commitments under the

European Charter of Local Self-Government.

The municipal law provides for the engagement of local administrations with the public and

with civil society. Citizens’ assemblies, which seek to bring together professional and civil

society organisations and other local stakeholders, remained inactive in most provinces.

Civil society

Serious backsliding regarding the civil society environment continued. Civil society faced

continuous pressure from the authorities. Human rights organisations, which were closed

under the state of emergency, were not offered any legal remedy in relation to confiscations.

Human rights defender Osman Kavala and his co-defendants in the Gezi trial remained in

prison without parole, despite a ruling by the ECtHR.

The implementation of the Law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction added further restrictions and pressure on civil society.

Despite all these negative developments, civil society continued to be vocal and to participate

actively in civic life, including by providing support to the people affected by the February

2023 earthquakes. Systematic and inclusive mechanisms for the effective consultation of

independent civil society organisations on new legislation and policies need to be put in

place.

A free, empowered and diverse civil society is a key component of any democratic system.

Civil society organisations in Türkiye continued to make crucial contributions in areas, such

as education, women’s rights, rights for LGBTIQ persons, rights of persons belonging to

minorities, rights of persons with disabilities, freedom of religion and belief, the environment,

anti-discrimination and support for refugees.

In the immediate aftermath of the February 2023 earthquakes, civil society faced pressure

from the authorities when delivering aid on the ground and was prevented from reporting on

the situation in the affected regions.

Human rights organisations and human rights defenders faced judicial and administrative

pressure, partly due to Türkiye’s broad definition of terrorism. In some cases, however, the

judiciary issued positive decisions, acquitting and releasing a number of human rights

defenders from prison. As regards the infringement procedure launched by the Committee of

Ministers of the Council of Europe in February 2022, the ECtHR ruled in July 2022 that

Türkiye had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 46 (1) of the Convention. Türkiye’s

refusal to implement the ECtHR’s ruling in the Kavala case contravenes its obligations as a

long-standing member of the Council of Europe. The seven co-defendants of Osman Kavala

in the Gezi case, who were each sentenced in April 2022 to 18 years of imprisonment,

remained in prison. In the Büyükada case, the Court of Cassation annulled the terrorism-

related convictions of all the defendants in October 2022, ruling that they had been made with

‘inadequate investigation’. The case was referred back to the local court, which acquitted the

four human rights defenders in June 2023.

Some media outlets close to the government continued to portray human rights defenders as

terrorists and criminals, notably for accepting funds from international donors, including the

EU. The defamatory rhetoric used by high-level public officials to comment on court

proceedings of human rights defenders is a matter of serious concern and casts doubt on the

integrity of judicial proceedings and on the right to a fair trial.

Women’s organisations faced pressure in the form of defamation, detentions, investigations

and arrests. Women activists also faced detentions and police violence while exercising their

right to freedom of assembly. The closure case against the Tarlabaşı Community Centre in

Istanbul continued. The court cases against the executives of the Rosa Women’s Association

based in Diyarbakır continued. Concerning the closure case against ‘We Will Stop Femicides

Platform’ on the grounds of ‘conducting activities contrary to law and morality’, in

September 2023, the first instance court decided to reject it.

Stigmatisation, hate speech and discriminatory discourse targeting LGBTIQ civil society

organisations and persons remained very strong. Anti-LGBTIQ discourse was

instrumentalised by the governing coalition during the electoral campaign. Anti-LGBTIQ

rallies took place in a number of cities during the autumn of 2022, whereas pride marches

were banned and heavily repressed by the police.

The legal framework regulating the work of civil society organisations lacks clarity and

carries the risk of arbitrariness during implementation. It remained compulsory for all

associations to register their members in the Ministry of Interior’s information system. This

legal obligation is not in line with the OSCE/Council of Europe guidelines on freedom of

association.

The Law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continued

to be used by the authorities to disproportionally target independent rights-based

organisations, despite the Venice Commission’s and the UN Special Rapporteurs’

recommendations that the government should reconsider certain aspects of the legislation.

The Law should not be used to hinder civil society’s freedom of association and assembly,

including their fundraising activities.

The Law on collection of aid continued to impose burdensome requirements for permits that

discourage fundraising activities by civil society organisations and de facto limit civil society

activities. The distribution of public funds to civil society organisations remained

untransparent. Heavy taxation hampered the functioning and development of foundations and

associations. The status of ‘public benefit’ for associations and ‘tax exemption’ for

foundations are vaguely defined and are arbitrarily granted by the President. Foreign donors

providing financial support to civil society in Türkiye were often slandered and beneficiary

NGOs ran the risk of having their activities criminalised because they had received foreign

funds.

In August 2022, the Ministry of Interior’s Directorate General for Relations with Civil

Society published the draft civil society strategy document and action plan (2023-2027) for

consultation. Despite public consultations, strategy development lacked transparency and

clarity.

Open and transparent participatory and consultation mechanisms are needed for cooperation

between the authorities and civil society, for policymaking and for amending the legal

framework. Overall, the legal, financial and administrative environment needs to be more

conducive to developing civil society in Türkiye.

Civilian oversight of the security forces

In the reporting period, the executive branch continued to hold extensive authority over the

security forces. The civilian component of the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ), which is

responsible for setting the military agenda and making such decisions as appointments,

promotions and dismissals of high-ranking military personnel, did not change. The scope of

the military judicial system was curbed. Civilian higher courts continued to review appeals

against the decisions of military courts. However, civilian oversight of the security forces

remained incomplete due to the lack of effective accountability mechanisms. Parliamentary

oversight of the security institutions needs to be strengthened. The legal framework for

overseeing military expenditure was not improved.

The culture of impunity continued to prevail within the security sector, where security

personnel benefited from de facto judicial and administrative protection in cases involving

alleged human rights violations and the disproportionate use of force. Military personnel and

high-ranking command officials still have special legal privileges when prosecuted.

Moreover, the investigation of alleged offences committed by security personnel requires

prior authorisation by either military or civilian superiors.

Situation in the east and south-east

The situation in the south-east remained worrying and was exacerbated by the earthquakes in

February 2023, which also affected part of the region. The Turkish government continued its

domestic and cross-border security and military operations in Iraq and Syria, including after

the earthquakes. The security situation remained precarious in border areas with terrorist

attacks led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which remains on the EU list of persons,

groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. The government retains a legitimate right to

fight terrorism, however, related activities should be in line with the rule of law, fundamental

rights and freedoms. There was no progress towards the resumption of a credible political

peace process to achieve a sustainable solution to the Kurdish issue. The Kurdistan

Communities Union (KCK) declared a unilateral truce in Türkiye after the earthquakes in

February and extended it until the Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections in May.

The truce was terminated in June 2023.

In the aftermath of the November 2022 attack in Istanbul, which left 6 dead and 81 wounded,

Turkish officials rapidly arrested a Syrian national, as the alleged main perpetrator of the

attack, and attributed the attack to the PKK-linked People’s Protection Units (YPG), even

though the PKK denied its involvement. Türkiye launched a series of airstrikes in northern

Syria and Iraq against the PKK and affiliated groups.

In March 2023, the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) published a report on its visit to the

high-security prison on the island of Imralı, where the PKK’s leader Öcalan and three other

inmates are being held. The report stated that detention conditions had significantly improved

for Mr Öcalan and remained satisfactory for the three other inmates. However, the CPT

expressed serious concern that the prisoners’ contact with the outside world had been further

limited. During the reporting period, Mr Öcalan was not allowed to receive visits from his

family or his lawyers.

In Diyarbakir’s Sur municipality, after the state took possession of land from its owners for

public use, several court cases were launched by owners challenging the assessed value of

their expropriated property. The principle of participation by the local residents was ignored

in the planning of the area’s reconstruction. Serious violations of human rights by security

forces (including alleged instances of torture, ill-treatment, arbitrary arrests and procedural

rights violations) continued to be reported. There have also been reports of severe acts of

violence and other abuses committed by the security forces in the aftermath of the

earthquakes and during the state of emergency.

Eastern and south-eastern provincial governors often imposed blanket bans on meetings,

demonstrations and events in their provinces. The longest of these has been in force in Van

since 2016. The broad interpretation of terrorism, judicial and administrative pressure

imposed on journalists, political opponents, bar associations and human rights defenders

working on the Kurdish issue raised repeated concerns. Many associations, Kurdish-language

media outlets and cultural rights institutions remained closed.

The 15 Kurdish journalists and one media worker, who were detained in Diyarbakır in June

2022, were released in July 2023 under judicial control condition and the next trial session is

due in November. Over 100 people (including several journalists, lawyers, members of

political parties, artists and members of civil society) were detained in April 2023 in a

coordinated operation across 21 Turkish provinces on the grounds of alleged ‘membership in

a terrorist organisation’. Some lawyers and journalists were released, but a court case was

launched against 11 Kurdish journalists. The 2021 Constitutional Court judgment annulling a

provision of the emergency decree regarding the closure in 2016 of media outlets on the

grounds of ‘posing a threat to national security’ and annulling a provision that allowed the

seizure of properties of closed media outlets was not implemented. In January 2023, the

Diyarbakir Regional Court of Appeals upheld the prison sentence against journalist

Abdurrahman Gök for photographing the killing by the police of university student Kemal

Kurkut during the 2017 Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakır. The local court had sentenced

Gök in June 2022 to more than one year in prison on the grounds of propagandising for a

terrorist organisation while acquitting him of ‘being a member of an illegal organisation’.

Hate crimes and hate speech against Kurds continued. The court case in relation to the hate

killing of HDP staff member Deniz Poyraz in Izmir was concluded in December 2022 and the

court sentenced the perpetrator to aggravated life imprisonment (i.e. the most severe penalty

under Turkish law) on the charge of ‘intentional killing’ as well as other minor offences.

Several attacks against HDP buildings and election offices have been reported, including

during the electoral campaign period.

In January 2023, an investigation was launched against the presidents of 12 bar associations

over their joint statement against Turkish military operations in northern Syria and Iraq and

calling for peace, on the grounds of ‘insulting the Turkish Nation, the State of the Republic of

Türkiye and its institutions’.

The March 2023 Kurdish Newroz celebrations took place amid a heavy police presence. The

Diyarbakir Bar association reported that law enforcement forces used excessive and

disproportionate force during the celebrations. The police detained 350 people, most of whom

were shortly released.

The Kobane trial of 108 members and executives of the HDP continued. During the April

2023 session the prosecutor of the case issued his final opinion and demanded aggravated life

sentences for 36 HDP executives (including the party’s former co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş)

and the re-arrest of 12 released defendants. The trial was adjourned to July 2023 and is still

ongoing. There were numerous new detentions and arrests of HDP members and mayors,

municipal council members and municipal executives on terrorism-related charges in the east

and south-east of Türkiye. Requests by the prosecution to the parliament to remove the

immunity of almost all HDP lawmakers are pending. The closure case against the HDP

continued in the Constitutional Court (see above under ‘the parliament’).

Former HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş remained in prison despite two final ECtHR

judgments ruling in favour of his immediate release. In March 2023, the Committee of

Ministers of the Council of Europe urged Türkiye to release Mr Demirtaş, in line with the

ECtHR judgments. The Constitutional Court’s ruling of June 2020 on the violation of

Mr Demirtaş’ right to liberty and security was not implemented. Former HDP MP and co-

chair Aysel Tuğluk, who was reportedly seriously ill, was released from prison in October

2022.

In October 2022, the ECtHR, in its ruling on the case of 13 imprisoned former HDP MPs,

found that several articles of the ECHR had been violated and stated that the arrests were

politically motivated. In July 2022, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Turkish State had

violated the rights of former HDP co-chair Figen Yüksekdağ to freedom of thought and

expression by stripping her of her parliamentary immunity in 2016, and ordered the State to

pay Yüksekdağ TRY 30 000 for non-pecuniary losses.

In June 2023, out of the 65 municipalities won by the HDP in the 2019 local elections, 48

remained ruled by State-appointed trustees and another 6 by AK party mayors. Since the first

trustee appointment in June 2019, 83 co-mayors have been detained, 39 mayors arrested and

6 HDP co-mayors remain in prison. The March 2022 Recommendations on Türkiye of the

Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe need to be

implemented.

Court cases continued regarding government-funded construction projects on cultural,

historical and religious heritage sites, which were damaged in the 2015 and 2016 operations.

There were renewed tensions around several new mining projects, including in the Tunceli

Mountains, which is part of a national park and a sacred site for Alevis.

There was no comprehensive and consistent approach in place for missing persons, the

exhumation of mass graves or the independent investigation of all alleged cases of

extrajudicial killing by security and law enforcement officers. Most of the investigations of

cases of enforced disappearance from the 1990s have passed the 20-year statute of

limitations. Out of more than 1 400 cases of missing persons since then, only 16 court cases

have been launched and 14 of these ended in the acquittal of the alleged perpetrators.

Concerns remained about the continued justification of extraterritorial abductions and forced

returns under the pretext of combating terrorism and protecting national security. The village

guard system, a paramilitary force supporting the Turkish security forces, was maintained.

Some village guards were linked to widespread human rights violations and excessive use of

force, particularly against the Kurdish population. The village guard system is hindering the

return of displaced villagers and continues to impede progress towards a political resolution

of the Kurdish issue.

Refugees and internally displaced persons

Türkiye continues to host one of the largest refugee populations in the world. In August 2023,

according to official data, Türkiye was hosting 3 298 817 Syrian refugees with temporary

protection status, and some 91 711 Syrians with residence status. Around 1.7 million of these

were being hosted in the 11 provinces affected by the earthquakes.

According to official sources, 223 881 Syrians had been granted Turkish citizenship in

December 2022. 561 758 Syrian refugees had voluntarily returned to Syria from Türkiye

according to government data. In May 2023, according to the Presidency for Migration

Management, in addition to the Syrian refugees, Türkiye hosted 300 720 asylum-seekers

from other countries. In December 2022, 1 345 488 foreign nationals holding residence

permits were present in Türkiye, including humanitarian residence permit holders. The return

of irregular migrants from the Greek islands, which Türkiye unilaterally suspended on public

health grounds in March 2020, has not resumed. The EU has repeatedly called on Türkiye to

resume return operations in line with the commitments made under the EU-Turkey

Statement. Resettlement of Syrian refugees from Türkiye to EU Member States continued in

the reporting period totalling 39 648 by September 2023. Recurrent allegations of human

rights violations in the field of migration, particularly in removal centres, remain a concern.

Over the last year, media and civil society continued to report on policies and practices in

breach of human rights standards and Turkish legislation. Türkiye needs to further align its

practice in removal centres with European standards, in particular with regard to protection of

human rights (including access to legal counselling and interpreters) and protection of

vulnerable groups (in particular, children staying with their families) (see Chapter 24).

Public discontent with the presence of Syrian refugees increased, and became an important

electoral topic and a matter of constant debate. A large majority of refugees and asylum

seekers do not have effective access to the labour market, in particular to formal employment,

due to low employability (lower levels of education and skills), language barriers and limited

access to information and services.

Türkiye made sustained significant efforts to support refugees and ensure wider access to

healthcare and schooling, although restrictions to registration hampered access to these

services. By February 2023, over 846 000 refugee children had been enrolled in formal

education in Türkiye, which was about 104 000 more than the previous academic year. Over

720 000 of these were of Syrian origin. However, more than 400 000 school-aged refugee

children were still out of school and did not have any access to education opportunities.

Refugees (mainly Syrians under temporary protection) continued to benefit from free-of-

charge healthcare services provided in 190 migrant health centres funded by the EU through

its Facility for Refugees in Turkey and in Turkish hospitals. The EU supported the

employment of almost 4 000 healthcare workers to ensure that refugees and people under

subsidiary protection have access to healthcare services. Over 7 million primary health care

consultations were conducted in EU-supported primary level healthcare facilities in 2022.

The capacity of mental health and psychosocial support services, reproductive health

services, mobile health services and health literacy for the refugees have also improved.

Furthermore, the health infrastructure was also improved by the completion of the

construction of two new state hospitals in Dörtyol Hatay and Kilis, which were fully financed

by the EU and inaugurated during the reporting period.

There was no progress on the situation of internally displaced persons resulting from the

violence in the south-east in the 1990s and in more recent years.

After the February 2023 earthquakes, which affected an estimated 15 million people in 11

provinces, there were massive population relocations, both within the provinces and away

from them. An estimated 2.9 million people have moved away from the affected provinces.

Public administration reform

Türkiye is in between some and moderate level of preparation in the field of public

administration reform. It made no progress over the reporting period. The country still lacks

the political will to reform the public administration and public financial management. The

restructuring of the executive branch and overhaul of the public administration in line with

the presidential system introduced in 2017 resulted in very high levels of centralisation of the

policymaking system. The level of accountability of the administration remains insufficient.

Its human resources management system remains outdated and needs to be reformed. The

politicisation of all branches of the administration has continued. The share of women in

managerial posts in the civil service is still low. The public administration does not use

evidence-based methods or participatory mechanisms in policymaking.

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.

In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ prepare and adopt an interinstitutional public administration reform document in line with

EU principles and values, and with the necessary political ownership and support;

→ introduce merit-based recruitments, appointments and promotions, notably to the senior

positions;

→ review the policymaking process to achieve inclusive and evidence-based methods of

preparing policy planning documents and legislative proposals.

Strategic framework for public administration reform

Türkiye still lacks both a comprehensive strategy for public administration reform and the

political will to reform. In 2022, the administration produced numerous policy planning and

sectoral policy documents on multiple aspects of public administration. In the absence of a

comprehensive strategy, these documents lack a sound budget forecast and a coherent

approach. An administrative unit with the legal mandate to design, coordinate and monitor

public administration reform and public policy documents has yet to be established. The unit

would need to coordinate with the Ministry of Finance and Treasury to ensure strategic

planning is consistent with fiscal planning and to efficiently tackle the issue of managerial

accountability.

Policy development and coordination

Türkiye continued the strong trend to centralise policymaking under the presidential system,

further preventing an inclusive, participatory and evidence-based policymaking process.

Policy coordination, policy planning and inter-agency cooperation among government

institutions needs to be improved. In the absence of well-functioning administrative controls

and parliamentary scrutiny, policy planning, monitoring and reporting of government

performance remains inadequate. The administration does not carry out regulatory impact

assessments or public consultations systematically.

Public financial management

Türkiye still lacks an overarching public financial management reform programme.

Parliamentary engagement and oversight over the budget remain weak. Numerous exceptions

introduced in the public procurement Law limit the transparency of tenders and public

expenditure. (see also Chapter 5 – Public procurement). Türkiye does not have in place an

independent oversight body to ensuring fiscal discipline. Given the lack of adequate ex post

monitoring and reporting, major public investment programmes lack transparency.

On external audit, the Turkish Court of Accounts (TCA) continued to carry out a range of ex

post controls. The TCA’s audit reports continued to provide substantive information for

parliamentary oversight and public scrutiny. However, shortcomings remain in the legal

framework of the Law on the Court of Accounts and in the associated process of

parliamentary scrutiny. There needs to be greater parliamentary and judicial follow-up to the

TCA’s audit reports.

There is limited parliamentary oversight of the budget, which resulted in a low degree of

budget transparency. The Turkish State Wealth Fund (TWF) lacks accountability and

transparency. The 2022 audit report was not published on the TWF website, which contains

limited information overall (see Chapter 32 - Financial control).

Following the February earthquakes, the parliament adopted a law creating a Disaster

Reconstruction Fund, governing the allocation of resources to restore infrastructure in areas

affected by various natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, fires and landslides in

regions classified as 'disaster zones'. However, the law lacked details on the decision-making

process, and on the transparency rules for managing the Fund, apart from an obligation to

report financial data to the public on a quarterly basis.

Public service and human resources management

The 1965 legal framework governing human resources management in the civil service is

outdated. The civil service legal framework fails to ensure the political neutrality of the civil

service. There is growing concern about the lack of merit-based recruitment and

appointments in the civil service. The appointment procedure for senior civil service posts

lacks competitive objective criteria, leaving appointments open to nepotism and political

interference. There is a set of uniform criteria for demotion, dismissals and disciplinary

measures, but there is a general lack of transparency in implementing the criteria. The civil

service remuneration system is not standardised across the institutions. The ethics committees

were ineffective against allegations of corruption and wrongdoings.

Accountability of the administration

Under the presidential system, accountability is centralised and held by the President. Given

that internal control and audit do not function effectively, the level of accountability of

agencies is weak and insufficient to protect citizens’ right to good administration.

Citizens’ right to access public information is regulated by the Law on the right to

information, which does not require proactive disclosure and provides broad exemptions. A

simplified online access system received millions of requests to access information. The

Board of Review of Access to Information is responsible for assessing appeals filed against a

refusal to provide access to public information. The backlog of cases continues to hamper

citizens’ rights to administrative justice and their right to seek compensation.

Strong concerns remain on the quality of the work of the Inquiry Commission on the State of

Emergency Measures, even though it has completed the examination of all cases. Strong

concerns remain as to whether cases were examined individually, whether the rights of

defence were upheld and whether the assessment procedure was in line with international

standards.

Service delivery to citizens and businesses

A thorough process is needed to simplify administrative procedures. However, in the

continuous absence of a law on general administrative procedures, which is necessary to give

citizens and businesses greater legal certainty, simplifying administrative procedures remains

problematic.

The government continued to develop user-focused administration at central and local

government level and expanded access to e-government services. Several public services are

accessible through e-government tools. A monitoring system needs to be set up to reduce the

barriers to access services for persons with disabilities.

2.2. RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

2.2.1. Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights

The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective

(independent, high-quality and efficient) judicial system and an effective fight against

corruption are of paramount importance, as is respect for fundamental rights in law and in

practice.

Türkiye remains at an early stage of applying the EU acquis and European standards in the

area of rule of law and fundamental rights. There was backsliding during the reporting

period.

Major issues identified in previous reports, such as the systemic lack of independence of the

judiciary and the urgent need to improve the human rights situation, remain unaddressed. The

2019 judicial reform strategy (JRS) and the 2021 human rights action plan (HRAP) tackle

some of the areas where reforms are needed but did not include concrete steps to remedy the

most acute problems.

Functioning of the judiciary

Türkiye remains at an early stage in this area. Serious backsliding continued and despite the

several judicial reform packages in recent years, the structural deficiencies in the judicial

system remained unaddressed. The continued refusal to implement certain rulings of the

ECtHR remains a matter of serious concern. Undue pressure by the authorities on judges and

prosecutors continued to have a negative effect on the independence and quality of the

judiciary. Implementation of the 2019 JRS and the 2021 HRAP continued, but the activities

foreseen in these documents fell short of addressing the structural problems and the issues

identified in the previous reports of the European Commission. The lack of objective, merit-

based, uniform and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and

prosecutors remains a source of concern. Several politically motivated cases against

opposition politicians were initiated during the reporting period.

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not addressed. Türkiye needs to

adopt and implement measures to significantly improve the overall functioning of the

country’s judicial system.

In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ create a political and legal environment in line with European standards that allows the

judiciary to carry out its duties independently and impartially; strengthen judicial

responsibilities, with the executive and legislature fully respecting the separation of

powers; and ensure that lower courts respect judgments by the Constitutional Court,

whose decisions should abide by ECtHR jurisprudence;

→ amend the structure and process of selecting the members of the Council of Judges and

Prosecutors (HSK) so that the role and influence of the executive is limited; and introduce

safeguards against any interference by the HSK or high-level officials in judicial

proceedings;

→ provide effective guarantees against transfers of judges without their consent;

→ in accordance with the guarantee of judicial independence under the Constitution, limit

any suspension of judges from office to cases where there are well-founded suspicions of

serious misbehaviour; and take measures to remedy the damage caused by dismissals that

have taken place in breach of procedural rights;

→ revise the system of disciplinary proceedings so that it is based on objective criteria and

without any undue influence from the executive;

→ in relation to the administrative and judicial measures taken against individuals, ensure

that any allegation of wrongdoing or crime is subject to due process and based on

concrete evidence, and follows fully transparent procedures under the authority of an

independent judiciary;

→ ensure that all judicial proceedings respect fundamental rights (including procedural

rights), in particular the presumption of innocence, individual criminal responsibility,

legal certainty, the right to defence, the right to a fair trial, equality of arms and the right

to an effective appeal.

Strategic documents

Implementation of the 2021 HRAP and the 2019-2023 JRS continued. A new (seventh)

judicial reform package was adopted in April 2023. The government’s implementation report

for the JRS stated that, as of May 2023, 70% of the activities had been completed. However,

the actions included in the HRAP do not address Türkiye’s fundamental human rights

shortcomings. The 7

judicial reform package failed to address many structural issues of

concern related to the judicial system indicated in the previous annual reports of the European

Commission. However, it did provide some positive steps regarding the increased sentences

for smuggling and the possibility of postponing the execution of a sentence for convicted

women due to a child’s sickness.

Management bodies

Concerns remain around the structure of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK), its

lack of independence from the executive and the appointment process for its members. In

accordance with the Constitution, the President appoints 4 out of 13 members and the

parliament elects 7 by qualified majority. The remaining 2 seats are allocated ex officio to the

Minister of Justice and the Deputy Minister. None of the members are elected by their peers.

Due to its lack of independence, the HSK has been suspended from participating in the

European Network of Councils for the Judiciary since December 2016.

The budget allocated to the HSK increased to TRY 312 551 000 in 2023 (TRY 193 657 975

in 2022).

Independence and impartiality

Although the principle of separation of powers and judicial independence is enshrined in the

Constitution and other legislative provisions, there are strong concerns regarding political

influence on the judiciary. The HRAP included some actions to improve the independence of

the judiciary, but these actions have not been implemented.

High-level officials and representatives of the executive (including the President) continued

to comment publicly on ongoing judicial cases, thus undermining judicial independence.

They also publicly criticised the ECtHR and Constitutional Court case law. Lower courts at

times ignored or significantly delayed implementation of decisions reached by the

Constitutional Court. The non-implementation of the administrative courts’ decisions by the

administration also remains an issue of concern.

Individual applications to the Constitutional Court had limited effect, especially with regard

to politically motivated trials.

Accountability

The obligation for judges and prosecutors to declare their assets every 5 years is still

applicable. No information is available on the sanctions imposed if this procedure was not

followed. A credible and functioning verification system needs to be developed, including

appropriate follow-up for late or incorrect declarations of assets.

Professionalism and competence

The selection and recruitment of judges and prosecutors is conducted in a non-transparent

manner. The Ministry of Justice supervised the selection boards for new judges and

prosecutors, while the HSK had no role in the selection boards. The annual appraisal of

judges and prosecutors was done by the HSK. There was limited progress in setting objective,

merit-based, standardised and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and

prosecutors.

Quality of justice

As of September 2023, Türkiye had 16 225 full-time judges (19.13 per 100 000 inhabitants)

and 7 601 full-time prosecutors (8.96 per 100 000 inhabitants). Out of 23 826 judges and

prosecutors, 8 871 are women. The final budget for the entire justice system increased to

TRY 51.2 billion in 2022 (while TRY 34.37 billion was initially approved) compared with

almost TRY 24 billion in 2021.

Pre-service training for candidate judges and prosecutors and in-service training continued to

be delivered by the Justice Academy. The Academy has scientific, administrative and

financial autonomy by law, but there are still concerns related to its independence because its

management is left to its president, who is appointed by the President of the Republic. The

Academy’s lack of independence affects its capacity to provide training programmes that

meet the requirements of openness, competence and impartiality. The European Judicial

Training Network (EJTN) therefore maintained the suspension of the Academy’s observer

status that was originally decided in 2017.

The quality of judicial decisions and indictments remains insufficient due to the lack of legal

reasoning and sufficient factual evidence to lead to convictions that often relate to alleged

offences supporting terrorism. The defence lawyers’ access to case files for a specific

catalogue of crimes is sometimes restricted until the indictment is issued. In some politically

sensitive cases, the indictments took months to be finalised.

Pre-trial detention continues to be frequently imposed, despite the fact that this is a measure

of last resort by European standards. Defendants were increasingly held in prisons or

detention centres far from the location of the alleged crime, appearing at their hearing via an

audiovisual system rather than in person. Frequent transfers of judges and prosecutors

continued to impair the quality of justice, as did the appointment of newly recruited and less

experienced judges and prosecutors to criminal courts.

Trial-monitoring organisations and lawyers reported that in politically sensitive cases judges

frequently barred journalists and observers and sometimes even the defendants’ lawyers from

the courtroom. In terrorism-related cases, the practice of providing evidence extracted

coercively from secret witnesses who cannot be cross-examined or from a single witness

without supporting evidence remained a major concern. Frequent use of the confidentiality of

decisions in political cases should be revised because it is often used to limit lawyers’ access

to their clients’ files, thus violating the right of defence.

In October 2022, the Council of State ruled in favour of the reinstatement of 178 judges and

prosecutors dismissed under the 2016 state of emergency decrees on the basis of alleged ties

to the Gülen movement, arguing that the acts attributed to them were insufficient to prove

their links to the movement. The Council of State also ordered the State to pay compensation

and damages to the judges and prosecutors. As of March 2023, 3 683 of the dismissals had

been finalised and 3 cases were ongoing. 845 dismissed/suspended judges and prosecutors

had been reinstated. As of March 2023, 343 judges and prosecutors who had filed a

complaint with the Council of State on the issue of their removal had been reinstated. This

decision followed an ECtHR ruling that the government had violated the ECHR by detaining

167 judges and prosecutors after the attempted coup in 2016.

Efficiency

The backlog of cases remained a problem. Large parts of the judiciary continued to be under

severe pressure to handle cases quickly. Delays in criminal cases, which are often postponed

for months, and delays in cases where the defendants were arrested pending trial violate the

defendants’ rights.

Regarding the backlog of cases in the high courts, at the end of 2022, 293 207 criminal and

64 126 administrative cases for the Court of Cassation were postponed to 2023, compared

with 296 907 and 76 455 respectively in 2021. 120 773 cases for the Council of State were

transferred from 2022 compared with 128 961 in 2021. As regards the regional courts of

appeals, in 2022, a total of 809 989 cases were transferred from 2021; the courts received

1 258 366 new cases and settled 1 146 065 cases. Individual applications to the Constitutional

Court continued to increase. In 2022, 109 779 applications were lodged and 73 036 were

concluded.

Fight against corruption

Türkiye is at an early stage in the fight against corruption. There was no progress in the

reporting period. Türkiye has not addressed outstanding deficiencies in key areas of the fight

against corruption in recent years. It has not taken preventive action and has not set up anti-

corruption bodies in line with the United Nations Convention against Corruption, to which

Türkiye is party. The legal framework and institutional architecture need to be improved to

limit undue political influence on the prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases. The

accountability and transparency of public institutions need to be improved. The absence of an

anti-corruption strategy and action plan indicated a lack of political will to fight decisively

against corruption. The Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)

recommendations remained unimplemented. Overall, corruption remains a major issue. In the

coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ implement its international obligations in relation to the fight against corruption, in

particular the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the relevant Council of

Europe Conventions;

→ ensure effective follow-up of the recommendations issued by GRECO, including through

adopting the necessary legislation;

→ elaborate an anti-corruption strategy that reflects a clear political will and vision to

effectively address corruption, underpinned by a credible and realistic action plan.

Track record

The track record of investigations, prosecutions and convictions in corruption cases remained

poor, particularly in relation to high-level corruption cases involving politicians and public

officials. Sentences are lenient and do not have a deterrent effect. Cooperation between audit

and inspection units with prosecution offices needs to be improved. Political party and

election campaign financing, local administrations, land administration and management, and

the construction and transportation industries (especially when implementing projects via

public-private partnerships) remained particularly prone to corruption. The increasing use and

wide scope of exemptions in procurement procedures undermined the integrity of public

procurement. Outstanding GRECO recommendations on political party financing have not

been addressed.

Institutional framework

Prevention measures

Türkiye continued to lack a permanent, functionally independent anti-corruption prevention

body. The level of coordination between various preventive bodies remains inadequate. The

State Supervisory Council, which is responsible for coordinating preventive anti-corruption

measures, is not independent. Financial control of political parties remained ineffective.

There have been no regular awareness-raising campaigns on anti-corruption.

Law enforcement

There are no specialised law enforcement authorities, prosecution services and courts

specifically dedicated to the fight against corruption. The executive retained undue political

influence over the judicial police. Financial investigations are not systematically started in

corruption and organised crime cases. The legal framework of anti-corruption remains weak,

including for the private sector.

Legal framework

Türkiye is party to all international anti-corruption conventions, including the United Nations

Convention Against Corruption. However, Türkiye needs to fully implement such provisions.

The legislative amendments envisaged in previous anti-corruption strategies (i.e. the Law on

general administrative procedure, the Law on public procurement, the Code of Ethics for

Members of Parliament and the Law on whistle-blower protection) have not been adopted.

In November 2022, the OECD Working Group on Bribery also underlined Türkiye’s

continued inaction with respect to long-standing recommendations on the liability of legal

persons in particular in relation to foreign bribery, as well as issues concerning whistle-

blower protection and prosecutorial independence, and the lack of enforcement of its foreign

bribery laws.

Türkiye failed to comply with the GRECO recommendations on judicial independence, and

on transparency of the legislative process and political party financing. Legal loopholes

remain in the Criminal Code’s corruption-related provisions, which do not meet the standards

put in place by the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Public procurement legislation

is not in line with the EU’s acquis. The legal privileges of public officials continued to

provide legal protection for public officials and hamper anti-corruption criminal and

administrative investigations. The legal framework on conflicts of interest as well as public

officials’ asset declarations remained inadequate. Türkiye has no legislation governing

lobbying.

Strategic framework

Previous anti-corruption strategies and action plans failed to meet most of their key

objectives. Outstanding anti-corruption measures for these action plans have not been

followed up. There is no ongoing anti-corruption strategy and action plan, and no efforts were

made to develop new ones with the involvement of relevant institutions and civil society.

Fundamental rights

Human rights continued to deteriorate and no progress was made on last year’s

recommendations. The Turkish legal framework includes general guarantees of respect for

human and fundamental rights, but the legislation and its implementation need to be brought

into line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of

Human Rights (ECtHR) case law. No legislative amendments were adopted to eliminate the

remaining elements of the 2016 state of emergency laws. The Council of Europe’s

Parliamentary Assembly continued to monitor Türkiye’s respect for human rights, democracy

and the rule of law. Türkiye’s continued refusal to implement certain ECtHR rulings further

increased concerns regarding the judiciary’s adherence to international and European

standards. The 2021 HRAP continued to be implemented but did not address critical issues or

improve the overall human rights situation. Trials and convictions of journalists, writers,

lawyers, academics, human rights defenders and other critical voices for alleged support for

terrorism have continued.

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out in this section, which have still not been

addressed, Türkiye should in particular in the coming year:

→ align its criminal and anti-terror legislation, and its implementation of European

standards, the ECHR, ECtHR case law and the Venice Commission recommendations;

→ ensure that any allegations of offences are subject to due process, based on concrete

evidence and fully transparent procedures carried out under the authority of an

independent and impartial judiciary; and fully respect the right to a fair trial and relevant

procedural rights, in particular the presumption of innocence, the principle of legal

certainty, the right to defence, equality of arms and the right to an effective remedy;

→ improve the legislative framework and its implementation, in order to effectively tackle

all forms of violence against women, including domestic violence, psychological and

physical abuse, sexual harassment, rape, so-called ‘honour’ crimes, stalking and forced

marriage;

→ improve the legislative framework and its implementation to effectively tackle all forms

of racism and discrimination, including against LGBTIQ persons and ensure the

protection of minorities.

→ implement the ECtHR judgments as a matter of priority, including in the case of Kavala v

Türkiye.

Türkiye is a party to most international human rights instruments, but serious human

rights violations continued. The Council of State ruled in January 2023 that the President’s

decision to withdraw from the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating

violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention) was lawful.

Türkiye has not yet signed the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from

Enforced Disappearance and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

continued its full monitoring procedure.

In June 2023, there were 23 851 applications pending before the ECtHR. The ECtHR

delivered judgments on 637 applications and found breaches of the European Convention on

Human Rights (ECHR) in 66 out of 69 cases (against 70 violations in 2022) that mainly

concerned the right to respect for private and family life, the right to a fair trial, the right to

liberty and security and freedom of assembly and association. During the reporting period,

there were 13 232 new applications allocated to a decision body of the ECtHR. There are

currently 184 cases against Türkiye under enhanced supervision by the Committee of

Ministers.

There were no developments with regard to the implementation of the ECtHR’s July 2022

Grand Chamber judgment on the Kavala case as part of the ongoing infringement procedure

launched by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe against Türkiye (see the

‘Judiciary’ section).

Regarding promotion and enforcement of human rights, the March 2021 human rights

action plan (HRAP) continued to be implemented. The annual monitoring report, which was

due in March 2023, has not been published and an evidence-based assessment of the

implementation of the HRAP is missing. The HRAP does not include measures to address the

main shortcomings in the human rights situation in Türkiye that were identified in previous

years’ reports by the European Commission.

The Human Rights and Equality Institution of Türkiye (HREI) and the Ombudsman are the

main human rights institutions. The Ombudsman processes complaints against the actions of

the public administration while the HREI only accepts cases that fall outside the

Ombudsman’s remit. The HREI lacks ex officio powers to initiate investigations and to

intervene in cases with legal remedies. The number of cases treated by the two institutions

increased, but concerns remain regarding the operational, structural and financial

independence of both institutions and the appointment of their members. The effectiveness of

both institutions remained limited. The HREI was accredited to the Global Alliance for

National Human Rights Institutions with a B status in October 2022.

In 2022, the HREI received 2 020 applications (1 185 in 2021), visited 63 institutions

(including prisons) and adopted 69 reports prepared within the scope of visits. The HREI

makes prison visits in its role as the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM), but does not

have set and independent criteria for announced visits. In some visits, it only interacted with

the administration and did not speak to the detainees. It has not visited all the prisons with the

highest number of allegations of human rights violations, or did so with a significant delay.

The recommendations mainly deal with minor issues and do not make concrete statements on

serious human rights abuses. The HREI needs to improve its reputation regarding effectively

tackling human rights issues and engaging in constructive dialogue with civil society. The

HREI remained largely ineffective due to legislative and structural restrictions, including by

not accepting applications filed by civil society organisations and by being overly cautious in

tackling cases of torture and ill treatment. 132 of the 3 638 applications filed with the

parliament’s Human Rights Inquiry Committee in 2022 were not processed.

The term of office of the State of Emergency Commission expired in January 2023. The

Commission found 17 960 of the 109 332 filed applications to be admissible but rejected

86% of them.

The space for civil society organisations and human rights defenders continued to be very

limited due to continuous pressure through judicial and administrative investigations, threats,

surveillance, arbitrary detentions and ill-treatment of human rights defenders. The

chairperson of the Turkish Medical Association was arrested after calling for an investigation

into allegations that the Turkish armed forces had used chemical weapons in Northern Iraq.

She was later released and the case is ongoing. Similar cases, coupled with smear campaigns

by some media outlets close to the government and aggressive language by high-level

officials, had a chilling effect on civil society. Intimidation of, and court cases against,

lawyers who provide legal assistance to members of the civil society and human rights

defenders continued.

The three court cases lodged against the Human Rights Association’s chairperson ended in

acquittal, but appeals were made against two of them and are pending before courts of appeal.

The court case continued regarding the 2015 killing of Tahir Elçi, a lawyer and the

chairperson of the Diyarbakir Bar Association. Several female human rights defenders and

activists were detained and faced fines for participating in demonstrations for women’s

rights. The GÖÇİZ-DER court case in which 23 human rights defenders are being tried for

‘using EU and UN funds to conduct research and develop projects on social migration

movements in line with the aims and objectives of the PKK’ continued. There were concerns

regarding the recurrent and disproportionate use of anti-terrorism legislation against NGOs

and human rights defenders.

The retrial of the Büyükada case resulted in the acquittal of four human rights defenders,

including Amnesty International Türkiye's honorary chair, who had been originally sentenced

to over 6 years in prison on charges of ‘membership in a terrorist organisation’.

Concerning the right to life, urgent measures need to be taken by the authorities to align

legislation with ECtHR case-law in order to ensure that credible and effective investigations

are held into reported killings by the security services. The legislation adopted in June 2016,

which grants judicial privileges to the security services and increases the risk of impunity, has

remained in force. In many cases, the authorities did not grant permission to prosecute civil

servants, thus seriously limiting accountability and fostering a climate of impunity for the

security forces. No credible investigations were launched into some of the death cases

reported in the media. No adequate investigations have been carried out regarding the alleged

cases of abductions and enforced disappearances by the security services that have been

reported since the 2016 attempted coup. Alleged killings by the security forces in the south-

east, especially during the events in 2015, have not been investigated and prosecuted

effectively. Military or police officers have been implicated in most of these cases (as also

underlined by the ECtHR judgments and the reports of the UN Working Group on ‘Enforced

or Involuntary Disappearances on Turkey’) and investigations have never been properly

carried out. The statute of limitations remains a major concern as regards the impunity of the

offenders. Most of the crimes dating from the 1990s in the south-east have ended in impunity

through acquittal or due to the statute of limitations (for example, the murder of the writer

Musa Anter in Diyarbakır in 1992).

According to various reports, torture and ill-treatment continued to occur in detention

centres, prisons, informal places of detention and transportation vehicles, and on the street

during demonstrations. Disproportionate use of force by security forces continued. Although

tasked with the role of the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM), the HREI does not meet

the key requirements under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and

other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) and did not

effectively process cases referred to it. The authorities have not authorised the publication of

the 2016, 2018, 2021 and 2022 reports by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the

Prevention of Torture (CPT). There have been reports documenting several cases of violence,

torture and other abuses committed by the police and gendarmerie in the regions affected by

the February 2023 earthquakes as well as threats against lawyers who documented a torture

case. In some limited cases, administrative actions were taken against the accused officers.

The UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT) visited Türkiye in September 2022 to

assess how the authorities and Türkiye’s national preventive mechanism had implemented the

SPT’s previous recommendations. Effective investigations into allegations of torture and ill

treatment remained limited.

While the number of prisons continued to increase, overcrowding remains a major problem.

As of April 2023, the prison population exceeded 350 000 (with a capacity of 290 000) and

continued to be the largest in Europe. Incidents broke out in Hatay's T-Type Closed Prison

after the authorities denied the inmates’ requests to see their families affected by the

earthquakes. Pilot projects are being implemented in several prisons to improve inmates’

contact with their families, notably via secure video teleconference systems. However,

allegations of human rights violations (including arbitrary restrictions on the rights of

detainees, denial of access to medical care, mistreatment, limitation of open visits and solitary

confinement) continued to be reported. Education, rehabilitation and resocialisation

programmes remained limited. The new S-type security prisons are assessed as increasing

inmates’ isolation. Communal activities remained limited and arbitrary. Transfer to remote

prisons continued, sometimes without early warning. Such transfers had a negative effect on

family visits, especially for poor families and juvenile inmates.

There were allegations of discrimination by prison authorities, especially against LGBTIQ

persons. There was no improvement regarding investigations into allegations of suicides,

strip-searches and discriminatory behaviour by prison guards. Concerns related to the

independence of the Forensic Medicine Institute persisted. Access to medical care for sick

inmates continued to be uneven and at times delayed or denied, causing deaths in prison or

soon after release. Following complaints about food quality and living conditions, the daily

allowance for prison food was increased from TRY 20 to TRY 50 in March 2023.

The HREI, as the national preventive mechanism, is also tasked with monitoring the prison

administration and observation boards, but this work has remained ineffective. The work of

the boards is not transparent and not supervised by independent bodies.

On the protection of personal data, the 2016 Personal Data Protection Law is still not

aligned with the EU acquis, notably with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

and the Law Enforcement Directive (LED) that constitutes a potential obstacle in several

policy areas, including with regard to enhanced operational cooperation with Eurojust and

Europol. The scientific commission that was established in 2021 to advance acquis

harmonisation continued its work, but progress has been slower than anticipated. The

legislation needs to be improved, notably with regard to the exceptions for processing of

personal data by judicial and law enforcement authorities and the independence of the

Personal Data Protection Authority. The 2018 Protocol amending the Convention for the

Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Council of

Europe, CETS No 223) has yet to be signed.

On freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of worship continued to be

generally respected. The lack of legal personality for the non-Muslim and Alevi communities

remained a serious concern, notably in relation to the lack of legal status for the patriarchates,

the chief rabbinate, synagogues, churches and Cem houses (Alevi places of worship). The

Venice Commission’s recommendations on the legal status of non-Muslim religious

communities and the right of the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul to use

the title ‘Ecumenical’ have yet to be implemented and have continued to be challenged.

Following the publication in June 2022 of the long-awaited Community Foundations Election

Regulation, the vast majority of minority foundations completed their elections, albeit under

strict control and restricted by the state electoral process, and new boards of directors have

taken office. However, rules for the election of the board members in the foundations

controlling community hospitals have yet to be issued. Five articles of the Election

Regulation were improved in September 2022. Decisions in cases related to the property of

religious communities still need to be implemented. The lack of legal provisions on

conscientious objection to army service remained an issue for Jehovah’s Witnesses and other

citizens because refusal to serve in the military results in conviction for desertion. Several

ECtHR judgments and a decision by the United Nations that found violations of the rights of

Jehovah’s Witnesses remained unimplemented. School textbooks need to be revised in order

to remove all discriminatory elements and hate rhetoric against all religious and faith groups.

Further damage to Hagia Sophia was reported, indicating a lack of proper care of this

historical monument. No steps were taken to address the UNESCO World Heritage

Committee’s grave concern about the potential impact of the monument’s status change into

a mosque on the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia. No steps were taken to re-open

the Halki (Heybeliada) Greek Orthodox Seminary, which has been closed since 1971.

Attacks continued against Cem houses and Alevi religious leaders during the reporting

period. The court case concerning the July 2022 attacks in Ankara was concluded at the first

instance court in July 2023, with the main perpetrator sentenced to 3 years in prison, for

damaging places of worship and for deliberate injury. A presidential decree establishing the

Alexi-Bektash Culture and Cemevi Presidency was adopted in November 2022. The Decree

defines the duties and powers of this new state body attached to the Presidency of the

Republic. However, it does not recognise Cem Houses as places of worship. Alevi

organisations held demonstrations in several cities, demanding legal rights and official

recognition of Cem houses.

In March 2023, Türkiye submitted an action plan to the Council of Europe regarding the

implementation of four ECtHR judgments filed by the Alevi community on compulsory

religion and ethics classes and the status of Cem houses. In June 2023, the Committee of

Ministers reviewed the cases. On the positive side, this review led to developments allowing

the partial elimination of the imbalance in religious public services provided to the Alevi

community by the State. However, no measures were taken by the authorities to address the

shortcomings identified by the Court as regards the compulsory religious culture and ethics

classes.

Hate speech and hate crimes against Christians, Protestants, Jews and Alevis continued (see

the section on minorities below). No official data exists, but the general trend is that those

most targeted and subjected to hate speech and crimes are Syrians (often refugees), Greeks,

Armenians, Jews and Alevis. The Jewish community and the Chief Rabbi hold annual

holocaust remembrance ceremonies in İstanbul, which are occasionally attended by

authorities at local level. Protestants continued to face problems in gaining official

recognition for their places of worship. Hate speech and insults against atheists and deists

continued. The court case on the killing/disappearance of the Chaldean Catholic couple in

Şırnak in 2020 continued.

The Diyanet (Religious Affairs Presidency) Academy that was established with the amended

March 2022 law started vocational training for imams and Diyanet staff. Reports of

maltreatment and sexual abuse within some Sunni sects continued. The increased work,

powers and influence of the Diyanet continued in all spheres of public life.

Acts of vandalism and destruction of minority worship places and cemeteries were reported

during the period and need to be investigated and prosecuted effectively. In July 2022, the

Jewish cemetery in Istanbul was vandalised and 81 gravestones were damaged. In January

2023, a fire broke out at the Surp Pırgiç Armenian Church lodgings and resulted in the death

of two elderly residents. The authorities condemned the incidents and investigations were

launched. Regarding the fight against antisemitism, Türkiye is an observer country to the

International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance and it has been taking actions to support and

preserve Jewish cultural heritage.

Two non-Muslim persons were elected as members of parliament in May 2023, one

Armenian and one Syriac. As the Venice Commission underlined in 2010, Türkiye should

continue the reform process and introduce legislation to eliminate all obstacles preventing

non-Muslim religious communities from exercising all their rights and acquiring legal

personality, in accordance with European standards.

There are reports concerning the ill-treatment and detention of members of the Ahmadi

Religion, currently kept in the detention centre of Edirne, for attempting to seek asylum at the

border with Bulgaria. A request for interim measure with the European Court of Human

Rights for their release was rejected on the grounds that national measures need to be

exhausted first.

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Freedom of expression

Türkiye continues to be at an early stage in this area and the serious backsliding observed in

recent years continued. The implementation of the criminal laws relating to national security

and anti-terrorism continued to contravene the ECHR and to diverge from ECtHR case law.

Cases and convictions of journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, writers, opposition

politicians, students, artists and social media users continued. The dissemination of

opposition voices and freedom of expression were impaired by the increasing pressure and

restrictive measures. Regarding the May 2023 elections, the ODIHR identified an

environment with restrictions on freedom of expression, both private and public media did

not ensure editorial independence and impartiality in their coverage of the campaign, thus

reducing voters’ ability to make an informed choice.

The recommendations from the European Commission’s last five annual reports were not

addressed. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ release journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, writers and academics being held in

pre-trial detention and ensure that the criminal cases against them are concluded in

accordance with the criteria set by the ECHR and the ECtHR;

→ ensure a safe and pluralist environment that enables the media to carry out their work

independently and without fear of reprisals and dismissals. This includes ending the

practice of both state and non-state agents of intimidating, interfering with, and putting

pressure on the media;

→ revise criminal legislation, in particular the anti-terror law, the Criminal Code, the data

protection law, the internet law, the new media law in relation to the definition of ‘fake

news’, and the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) law, to ensure that they

comply with European standards and are implemented in a proportionate manner, which

does not curtail freedom of expression;

→ ensure that criminal law provisions on defamation and other similar offences are not used

as a means of putting pressure on critical voices.

Intimidation of journalists

Activities of journalists, writers, lawyers, academics, human rights defenders, opposition

politicians and critical voices continued to be restricted through arrests, detentions,

prosecutions and convictions. These practices continued to hinder the exercise of their

freedoms and led to self-censorship. A few journalists covering the search and rescue efforts

in the area of the earthquakes were reportedly blocked by the police on the basis of the three-

month State of Emergency declared in the region. Some were taken into custody on the

grounds that they had taken pictures without permission. Earthquake victims who spoke to

journalists were also threatened.

Türkiye is ranked 165

out of 180 in the Reporters without Borders (RSF) 2023 annual

World Press Freedom Index (down from 149

in 2022). As of June 2023, 59 journalists and

media employees were in prison, either awaiting trial or serving a sentence. In 2022, at least

40 (41 in 2021) journalists were taken into custody and 28 (35 in 2021) journalists were

sentenced to a total of 50.5 years in prison (92.5 in 2021). A large number of cases continued

to be launched against writers and journalists. Threats and physical attacks on journalists and

media organisations due to their work continued during the reporting period. At least 55

opposition journalists in Türkiye were physically assaulted by politically motivated groups.

Prosecutions were initiated against over 700 people, with some 180 people being detained

and more than 40 people arrested, for their social media posts on the February 2023

earthquakes.

Legislative environment

The current laws on anti-terrorism, the internet, intelligence services and the Criminal Code

impede freedom of expression and run counter to European standards. Selective and arbitrary

application of legislation continued to raise concerns as it infringes the basic principles of the

rule of law and right to a fair trial. Despite legislative changes introducing the need for a

strong evidence base in ‘catalogue crimes’, cases relating to freedom of expression remained

in the category of crimes that automatically requires ‘arrest pending trial’.

No legislative changes to the Criminal Code and the anti-terrorism law to comply with

ECtHR case law took place in relation to the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 2021

resolution on a long-standing series of freedom of expression cases against Türkiye.

The case fi to enable the concentration of resources on rescue efforts, led with the Council of

State by the Union of Turkish Bar Associations against the circular issued by the President in

January 2022 addressed to all print, audio and visual media, including social media and

digital platforms, is ongoing. The circular’s aims include to ‘protect youth, children and

family institutions from bad habits and ignorance and to protect national and moral values

from alienation and degeneration’.

A new Media Law was adopted by the parliament in October 2022. It raises concerns due to

its vague and ambiguous language with regard to what constitutes ‘false or misleading

information’, as it allows arbitrary use of the law to stifle criticism of the government. The

Law leaves the final decision as to what is ‘fake news’ to the judiciary, which does not have

the tools to examine complex situations and does not provide guarantees of independence

from the executive power. Equally worrying is the provision of the Law that stipulates

imprisonment for the crime of disinformation. The Law also increases the punitive powers of

the Press Advertisement Agency (BIK) and increases the sanctions to be imposed on internet

service providers that breach provisions related to information requests from the authorities.

On the positive side, the Law allows internet news sites to benefit from public advertisements

and allows journalists working for internet sites to receive press cards and enjoy certain social

security benefits.

The new Media Law may have serious negative consequences for freedom of expression as it

may foster self-censorship and stifle public debate. Several hundred cases were launched

against social media users on the basis of the Law in relation to the government’s post-

earthquake response. The opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader was the first

high-profile public figure to be charged with ‘disinformation’ for his criticism of the

government response to the earthquakes. He was also charged with ‘insulting the Turkish

nation, the State of the Republic of Türkiye, and the institutions and organs of the State’. An

individual application was lodged with the Constitutional Court on behalf of the first

journalist convicted on charges of ‘openly disseminating information misleading the public’

in December 2022.

The Venice Commission issued an urgent opinion in October 2022 on the draft amendments

to the Turkish Penal Code introducing a provision on ‘false or misleading information’. This

opinion criticised the new Media Law for its lack of proportionality and the risk of increased

media self-censorship and violation of the right of anonymity over the internet.

Implementation/institutions

Selective and arbitrary application of the legislation continued to raise concerns. The quality

of the indictments and accusations remains low as they fail to make a direct and credible link

between the alleged offence and the act. The alleged offences are often acts which constitute

constitutional guarantees, such as attending press conferences or trade union activities.

Despite the 2022 final ECtHR ruling on the Vedat Şorli case, which pronounced that the

article of the Turkish Penal Code providing a maximum sentence of 4 years for insulting the

President is not in line with ECHR principles. This article continued to be used extensively to

prosecute persons who criticised the President.

Following the Constitutional Court judgment of July 2019 (finding that the conviction of the

‘Academics for Peace’, who had been dismissed from their positions after signing a

declaration criticising the government over human rights violations in the 2015-2016

operation in the south-east, violated their freedom of expression), some courts have since

ruled in their favour and opened the way for their reinstatement. As a result, a number of

academics were reinstated in their university positions.

The 15 Kurdish journalists and one media worker, who were detained in Diyarbakır in June

2022, were released in July 2023 under judicial control condition. The next trial session is

due in November.

11 journalists were detained in April 2023 and subsequently charged with ‘membership of a

terrorist organisation’.

In January 2023, the Turkish Medical Association (TMA) Chair was sentenced to 2 years, 8

months and 15 days in prison for ‘terror propaganda’ because she had called for an

investigation into the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Turkish armed forces. She was

released from pre-trial detention and the case is being appealed.

The Press Advertising Agency (BIK), which is responsible for placing public advertisements

in the media, replaced its General Board Decision on the Code of Press Ethics of 1994. The

new Decision now includes vague wording on possible violations that may contribute to

further media self-censorship. It also includes ambiguous and generic provisions such as

‘sharing information and visuals on terror organisations’ that are open to interpretation and

can contribute to media censorship. The Constitutional Court ruled in August 2022 that the

broad-ranging authority granted to the BIK concerning the imposition of sanctions (such as

public advertisement bans and fines) and the way it was used violated the right to freedom of

expression. BIK then issued a decision stating that it would not examine applications on Code

of Press Ethics until the parliament amended the law. At the same time, the BIK continued to

allocate public advertising in a discriminatory way that favoured pro-government media. The

discriminatory application of its powers risks pushing independent media into self-

censorship. Measures therefore need to be taken to ensure that the State advertising budget is

fairly distributed in an impartial, accountable and transparent way.

Public Service Broadcasters

The public service broadcaster Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) is affiliated

with the Presidential Communication Authority, and the Radio and Television Supreme

Council (RTÜK) is affiliated with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. No changes were

made to TRT’s editorial policy, which reflects the government’s official lines. RTÜK has

continued to impose fines on independent television and radio channels for their broadcasting

content, on the vague grounds that the content is ‘contrary to the national and moral values of

society, general morality and the principle of family protection’. Media outlets critical of the

government were frequently fined by RTÜK on various grounds, ranging from displaying the

imprisoned former HDP co-chair Demirtaş’ new book to ‘failing to be objective’ when

reporting on the government’s response to the earthquakes. The Industry and Technology

Ministry did not extend the operating license of Deutsche Welle’s (DW) Turkish office,

which closed at the end of March 2023. This decision meant that DW was not able to insure

its employees who can therefore only continue practising journalism as freelancers. In August

2023, upon the request of the RTÜK, a criminal judge of peace decided to block access to the

Voice of America Turkish service, for providing broadcasting services over the internet

without obtaining a broadcast license. The concerns relating to RTÜK’s independence and

neutrality persisted as members continue to be elected by the parliament without any

consultation of civil society or professional media organisations. Currently, six members are

nominees of the ruling coalition, two from the CHP party and one from the HDP party.

Economic factors

The ownership of the Turkish media outlets, which is heavily concentrated in a few large

companies close to the government, undermined the independence of editorial policies as it

lacked transparency. In addition, the distribution channels of printed media, which are used to

allocate public advertising revenues and deliver newspapers to retail outlets, are owned by a

single company close to the government. The Broadcasting Law, which does not ensure fair

competition because it does not prevent monopolisation, was not amended.

Internet

The current legislation and its implementation do not guarantee an open and free internet in

Türkiye. There were frequent website and social media bans for those who expressed views

critical of the government. Authors of such websites faced harassment and at times

prosecution. There are no official statistics on banned websites or the blockage of content, in

accordance with the rulings of the criminal judges of peace. In August 2023, upon the request

of the RTÜK, a criminal judge of peace decided to block access to the Voice of America

Turkish service, for providing broadcasting services over the internet without obtaining a

broadcast license.

By March 2023, RTÜK had issued 25 penalties based on its authority to inspect online

broadcasts. In February 2023, the Information and Communication Technologies Authority

(BTK) blocked access to one of Türkiye’s most popular social networks, the online

discussion forum Ekşi Sözlük, due to its coverage of the post-earthquake response. The

authorities also reduced Twitter’s bandwidth on the second day of the earthquakes. Access

was reinstated the next day after severe criticism that this had put search and rescue efforts at

risk. Legal action was taken against 609 persons, 150 people were detained and 29 were

arrested for ‘provoking the public into hatred and hostility’ on social media platforms in

connection with the recent earthquakes.

Professional organisations and working conditions

Journalism in Türkiye remains a precarious and risky profession, with low wages, a high risk

of judicial harassment and no job security. Trade union rights are limited and labour

legislation is not properly applied. According to the Journalists Union of Türkiye, only 11%

of journalists are unionised. The new Media Law made the issuing of press cards and

accreditations highly arbitrary, due to the composition of the Press Card Commission, in

which only 1 of the 19 members comes from the journalists’ union and the others have been

appointed by the executive branch of the government. Investigative journalism on politically

sensitive issues continued to be subject to editorial pressure, self-censorship and judicial

harassment (see also Chapter 10 on digital transformation and media).

The existing legislation includes vague provisions that can be used to restrict freedom of

artistic expression. A number of artistic events and performances were banned by the

authorities, and artists critical of government policies were subject to intimidation and

insulting remarks by pro-government figures and RTÜK officials.

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There was no progress in the area of freedom of assembly and association where legislation

and its implementation are not in line with the Turkish Constitution, European standards or

the international conventions that Türkiye is party to. Bans on peaceful gatherings were

widely imposed and public events were often dispersed with a disproportionate use of force

by the police. Demonstrators frequently faced investigations, court cases and administrative

fines on charges of terrorism or of violating the Law on demonstrations and marches. Attacks

on opposition gatherings and premises were often not investigated or prosecuted. Türkiye

needs to urgently apply the ECtHR case law and to revise relevant national laws.

Protests and demonstrations for human rights, environmental rights, and political and socio-

economic rights were banned and dispersed by the police on several occasions (including

demonstrations by dismissed civil servants, on the occasion of the International Women’s

Day and by mothers of disappeared persons). Participants in public events were often

detained (including with the use of force) and later released. The legislation on meetings and

demonstrations allowed authorities to prohibit meetings and demonstrations on the basis of

vague, discretionary and arbitrary criteria. All activities related to the “Armenian Genocide

Commemoration Day” were banned in April 2023. All activities and gatherings to mark anti-

homophobia and Pride Month in May and June 2023 were also banned. Some activists that

participated in the June march were detained and later released.

In a positive development, the Constitutional Court ruled in September 2022 that the blanket

ban on demonstrations issued by Ankara’s governor between 2016 and 2018 constituted a

violation of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court ruled in February 2023 that the

Beyoğlu District’s governor’s ban on the gathering of the Saturday Mothers violated their

rights. Following the Court’s decision, the Saturday Mothers tried to meet in their original

venue, but they were repeatedly detained and released on the same day. The court case

against 46 human rights defenders and the relatives of Saturday Mothers continued.

Dozens of women and a journalist were detained for gathering to mark the International Day

for the Elimination of Violence against Women in November 2022. There were reports of

torture and ill-treatment by the police in Cizre. The ‘November 25 Platform’ lodged a

criminal complaint about the police brutality on that day in İstanbul.

Regarding freedom of association, many human rights defenders were detained or arrested

and NGOs, especially in the south-east, were subjected to police raids. The legal provision

requiring information on the identity of members of associations by the authorities remained

in place. Regarding political associations, the 8

Administrative Court of Ankara found

unlawful the stance of the Ministry of Interior, which prevented the establishment of the

Green Party by not providing a ‘received’ certificate for the application and decided to stay

the execution of the process. The Court of Appeal has since removed the stay of execution

decision regarding the Ministry of Interior’s act, the Green Party is again prevented from

being established and the case is still pending. The file for the establishment of the Humanity

and Freedom Party is pending before the Constitutional Court.

The Law on the prevention of financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

has continued to be implemented in a manner not compatible with international human rights

standards and this is threatening freedom of association in Türkiye. The Council of Europe

Venice Commission’s July 2021 opinion on the law was not taken into account. Türkiye used

the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations to categorise NGOs as medium to

high risk for terrorism financing abuse in an arbitrary way, and to subject rights-based NGOs

to frequent and burdensome audits. Many associations and foundations, especially recipients

of international funds, have been subjected to repeated audits. The case against the Ministry

of Interior’s October 2021 circular, requiring NGOs to be audited based on a risk analysis, is

ongoing. The recommendations made in the 2021 Venice Commission opinion should be

implemented, including with regard to fundraising activities by NGOs.

Issues of labour and trade union rights are further covered in Chapter 19 on social policy

and employment.

On property rights, the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures, whose

term ended in January 2023, did not provide an effective domestic remedy for confiscations.

There are ongoing court cases against the decisions of the Inquiry Commission. The case of

the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality against the Directorate-General for Foundations

(DGF) on the ownership of the Taksim Gezi Park is ongoing.

In March, the EctHR found Türkiye in violation of property rights in the case of the Chief

Rabbinate of Türkiye – İzmir Jewish Synagogue Foundation and ordered a retrial of the case.

In December 2022, the Constitutional Court found the transfer of the Armenian Sanasaryan

Inn to the State unlawful. There will be a retrial of the case, which was launched by the

Armenian Patriarchate. In January 2023, the Constitutional Court ruled that there had been a

violation of the right to property regarding the Greek Bebek Aya Haralambos Church, Bebek

Aya Yani Cemetery Dova Church and the Cemetery Foundation. In April 2023, the Mor

Batlo Syriac Orthodox Church and the cemetery in Mardin/Turabdin were transferred to the

Housing Development Administration (TOKI). Court cases regarding the 2016 expropriations

in Diyarbakir Sur District are ongoing.

In the south-east, the restoration of cultural and religious heritage and urban housing

construction continued. Several important cultural and religious heritage sites were damaged

by the February 2023 earthquakes in the region, especially in Hatay/Antakya. Regarding the

implementation of the Law on foundations for minority communities, many appeals on

rejected claims for the restitution of property were ongoing either before a local court or at

the EctHR. Litigation brought forward by state institutions or municipalities against returned

immovable property resulted in lengthy legal proceedings and uncertain property rights. The

case of the Mor Gabriel Monastery Syriac Orthodox Church Foundation’s land borders

continued before the Constitutional Court. Other cases in relation to the ownership of the land

of the Mor Gabriel Monastery continued. Other non-Muslim community foundations also

have properties that have not yet been returned. Council of Europe Resolution 1625 of 2008

regarding property rights on the islands of Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) still

needs to be fully implemented. There is an urgent need to revise the relevant legislation on

the issue of property rights for non-Muslim minorities and other legislation covering all

issues of property rights to ensure a more comprehensive framework.

Legislation on non-discrimination is not in line with European standards and not duly

enforced in practice. There were serious concerns regarding the implementation of the April

2021 Law on security investigations and archive checks for people who are to be appointed to

public posts for the first time, as this takes into consideration not only final convictions but

also other factors (e.g. ongoing investigations, pending cases and even intelligence against a

person). The law decree issued under the State of Emergency to allow arbitrary dismissals

expired in July 2022. However, dismissals with no objective criteria of civil servants

continued on the basis of the Law on civil servants. Reports on profiling and discrimination

against civil servants in employment on vague legal grounds continued. Cases of

discrimination and hate crimes based on ethnic, religious grounds, sexual orientation and

gender identity continued to be reported. Diyarbakır football team was subjected to racist

attacks in two different provinces during matches. The HREI, which is in charge of applying

non-discrimination legislation, finalised the examination of 166 applications in 2022 but

received 355 new applications during the year falling under the scope of the task of

‘combating discrimination’. The finalised decisions are sent to the relevant public authorities,

but there is no systematic follow-up of corrective actions that were taken. School textbooks

still need to be revised, especially regarding some content on minorities, secularism, religion

and gender equality. The HREI and the Ombudsman did not accept applications on sexual

orientation and identity. Türkiye should urgently adopt a law on combating discrimination in

line with the EU acquis as well as the ECHR, covering discrimination on the grounds of

sexual orientation. Protocol 12 of the ECHR, which provides for the general prohibition of

discrimination, remained unratified and the recommendations of the Council of Europe

Commission against racism and intolerance (ECRI) were not implemented. Legislation

against hate crime, including hate speech, is still not in line with international standards and

does not cover hate offences on the basis of sexual orientation, ethnicity, age or gender

identity. No progress was made with the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the

Convention on Cybercrime concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic

nature committed through computer systems.

In the area of gender equality, the backsliding on the rights of women and girls remained.

Türkiye ranked 129

out of 146 countries, as measured by the World Economic Forum’s

Global Gender Gap Report 2023 (compared to 124

place in the 2022 Report).

Widespread promotion of stereotyped gender roles and definitions continued, including in

school textbooks and in the media. Statements by the authorities targeting independent

women’s organisations and women activists threatened the freedom of operation of women’s

rights associations. State authorities increasingly came under the influence of Sunni religious

sects that promote illegal practices, such as early marriage. Efforts should be increased to

prevent school drop-out due to early marriage (e.g. establishing early warning systems in

schools, ensuring that domestic violence is properly investigated and prosecuted, and

establishing a sufficient number of shelters for vulnerable individuals).

The Council of State concluded in its final ruling that the decision to withdraw from the

Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and

Domestic Violence (also known as the Istanbul Convention) was in compliance with Turkish

law. The Istanbul Convention is an important international standard, so this constitutes

serious backsliding in Türkiye’s progress. According to reports, 334 women were killed in

2022 (339 in 2021) and 245 more women died in suspicious circumstances. There is no

comprehensive data collection system in this area. Despite the continued implementation of

the Fourth National Action Plan for Combating Violence against Women (2021-2025), there

are no effective policies (including deterrent sentences), implementation of legislation is

weak and the quality of available support services is low. The February 2023 earthquakes

worsened the already difficult situation of women and children in the region, due to the

collapse of women’s shelters, crowded temporary accommodation and a lack of proper

preventive policies. In the earthquake areas, priority has been given to certain basic needs,

but the provision of hygiene products for women, separate and protected toilets, and

reproductive health facilities was neglected.

The protection of the rights of the child remained weak, including in the juvenile justice

system and in relation to the consequences of the earthquakes. Urgent action is needed to

ensure protection of children in the areas affected by the February 2023 earthquakes in order

to avoid exploitation and abuse.

Several human rights violations were reported in the regions affected by the earthquakes,

including against children and persons with disabilities. The Religious Affairs Presidency

issued a ruling (fatwa) soon after the earthquakes, stating that there is no religious obstacle to

a marriage between a person and their adopted child. This is cause for very serious concern.

A coherent and effective monitoring mechanism by public institutions for children in

earthquake regions, including for unaccompanied and missing children, is urgently needed.

In January 2023, a Parliamentary Commission for Investigation of Child Abuse was

established at the National Grand Assembly. A national action plan needs to be put in place

to combat and prevent child, early and forced marriages and to raise awareness of the harmful

impacts of child marriage. Consistent efforts are needed to eradicate child labour, especially

among refugees.

Türkiye is effectively pursuing a de-institutionalisation strategy. However, 60% of the

children living in the childcare system are in institutional care. Adequate funding should be

directed towards reinforcing community-based care and ensuring proper de-

institutionalisation. Particular concern is caused by the construction of new institutions

following the earthquakes and the wars in Syria and Ukraine.

Children can benefit from free legal aid for criminal disputes, but no such scheme is in place

for civil cases and/or other complaint mechanisms. Concerns remained about juveniles facing

arrest and detention on charges of membership of terrorist organisations. Non-custodial

measures for children need to be improved. The capacity of NGOs and bar associations to

intervene, monitor and lodge strategic litigation is limited, both in law and practice. There is

an insufficient number and geographical coverage of specialised child courts, child assize

courts and qualified staff including judges, prosecutors, lawyers and experts. Almost half of

the children on trial are still being tried before non-specialised courts. There are currently 81

juvenile courts and 12 juvenile high criminal courts, in accordance with the law that requires

that there is a juvenile court in every province. However, this is not enough for the needs of

big cities. Child-specific services (such as child-friendly interview rooms and child

monitoring centres) were reportedly interrupted in various cities. A comprehensive training

programme for all professionals working with children in contact with the law, with a

certification mechanism and incentives, needs to be developed.

Concerning the rights of persons with disabilities, a national action plan to implement the

‘2030 Barrier-Free Vision Document’ was adopted by the government in February 2023,

covering actions until 2025. The action plan pursues a rights-based approach and largely

reflects the EU strategy in this field. The Monitoring and Evaluation Board on Rights of

Persons with Disabilities became operational in November 2022 and convenes twice a year

under the coordination of the Ministry of Family and Social Services, of which it is

structurally part. Türkiye has ratified the UN Convention for the Protection of the Rights of

Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol, but shortcomings persist in its

transposition and implementation. There is insufficient data collection in the field of

accessibility of services and public infrastructure. The consequences of the February 2023

earthquakes will need to be reflected in the national action plan, including to ensure that

public institutions include persons with disabilities in their preparedness, evacuation and

post-disaster recovery plans. This will require a number of actions, including a thorough

assessment of the number of people who became disabled as a consequence of the

earthquakes, along with proper rehabilitation and psychological support measures.

Türkiye continued to pursue a de-institutionalisation policy for persons with disabilities,

coupled with a home-based care support programme. However, independent-living

mechanisms and opportunities remained very limited. The human resources capacity of

services for people with chronic mental disorders and intellectual disabilities was enhanced in

2022. Quality standards developed for community mental health centres are now in active

use. However, Türkiye has no mental health legislation and no independent monitoring

mechanism for mental health institutions. In school education, the proportion of students with

disabilities attending inclusive classrooms reached 75%. The remaining 25% (more than 60

000 children) continued to attend special schools.

The lack of protection for the fundamental rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,

intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons continued to raise serious concerns. The lack of

legal protection against hate speech and hate crimes based on sexual orientation or gender

identity was further exacerbated by negative stereotyping in the media and discriminatory

rhetoric from high-level officials, including the highest political level. Anti-LGBTIQ rallies

were organised in various parts of the country during the reporting period and were allowed

by the authorities. LGBTIQ associations were regularly targeted by pro-government media

for being funded by foreign countries. Discrimination, intimidation and violence against the

LGBTIQ community and especially transgender persons increased, in part due to the lack of

effective criminal sanctions. Several court cases related to LGBTIQ persons who were

murdered or seriously assaulted continued. Access to gender reassignment surgery and to

health and social services remained cumbersome and problematic for trans persons. LGBTIQ

prisoners suffered discrimination and solitary confinement. LGBTIQ activities, marches and

pride parades were banned in several provinces and police intervened to disperse participants.

The appeal case against the Middle East Technical University (METU) students who took

part in a pride gathering on the university campus in May 2019 continued. A new court case

was launched against METU students for their participation in the pride march of 2022. The

court case against the former executives of the Ankara Bar Association for criticising the

Diyanet’s president’s homophobic speech continued. A court case against the Izmir Bar

Association’s former president and ten board members started in April 2023 on charges of

insulting religious values, due to the statement they issued on their official website against

the discriminatory Friday sermon of the president of religious affairs against private life,

different life preferences and LGBTIQ individuals. The Human Rights and Equality

Institution (HREI) continued to not process applications by LGBTIQ persons on the grounds

that it does not consider discrimination against LGBTIQ to be within its remit, because the

law establishing the HREI does not consider ‘sexual orientation and gender identity-based

discrimination’ to be a criterion for discrimination.

On procedural rights, legislation and its implementation are not in line with the EU acquis

or European standards, since basic minimum procedural rights’ standards are missing. The

2023 earthquakes seriously hindered access to justice in the affected areas, especially for

disadvantaged groups, women and children. In addition to the loss of life, many lawyers’

offices and some bar associations’ premises were destroyed by the earthquakes. The Union

of Bar Associations provided support to lawyers in the affected regions but, overall,

problems of access to justice remained extensive. Several complaints were launched by bar

associations concerning human rights violations, property rights and other issues.

ECtHR judgments condemning Türkiye for violating the right to a fair trial and the

presumption of innocence due to its failure to respect procedural rules continued to be

handed down. The 2018 law issued under the state of emergency that restricted fundamental

freedoms (including in the Code on Criminal Procedures and Anti-Terror Law) remained in

force.

Access to legal assistance for convicted children remained limited. Lawyers (especially those

providing legal assistance to human rights defenders and civil and political activists)

continued to face difficulties in performing their duties. In some cases, lawyers were

subjected to ill-treatment by law enforcement personnel.

Protection of victims’ rights is regulated under the penal legislation. The presidential decree

on Supporting the Victims of Crime has been in force since June 2020. Accordingly, there is

a specialised Department of Victims’ Rights under the Ministry of Justice. The ‘Judicial

Support and Victim Services Directorates’ established in 167 courthouses provide

information, orientation and psycho-social support services to the victims of crime during

judicial proceedings. Currently, there are 166 forensic interview rooms in 159 courthouses in

81 provinces, where victims can give their statements outside the courtroom with the support

of experts and without having to face the alleged perpetrator. Compensation and redress for

victims remained limited. Steps need to be taken to align national legislation with the EU

Victims’ Rights Directive and the directive relating to compensation for crime victims.

Hate speech and hate crime remained a serious issue for persons belonging to ethnic and

national minorities. No steps were taken to revise school textbooks to remove discriminatory

and derogatory references. Minorities continued to face difficulties, such as the lack of legal

status for religious institutions, protection for languages, schooling support, clergy training,

the economic non-viability of media in minority languages and complications in enjoying

property rights for foundations. The lack of legal personality for minority communities’

churches, synagogues, patriarchates, monasteries and chief rabbinates continued to create

difficulties in exercising their freedom of association and religion, and impacted their

property rights. Minority schools received no public funds. Regular and substantive subsidies

to the newspapers run by members of the Armenian, Greek, Jewish and Syriac communities

were granted by the Press Advertising Authority, in order to ensure their viability, given their

limited circulation. In the court case against public officials involved in the killing of

Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007, the Court of Cassation in June 2023 upheld some of

the convictions given by the local court and some acquittals. In April 2023, as a result of an

on-going investigation, a new case was launched against some of the perpetrators of Dink’s

murder on charges of ‘being a member of an armed organisation’, ‘deliberate killing’ and

‘attempting to remove the constitutional order’. The first hearing was held in June 2023.

The ‘Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day’ was banned by the Istanbul governorate and

other provinces. During the reporting period, a member of the Armenian community was

appointed as a sub-province governor (kaymakam) for the first time. The restoration studies

continued on the Büyükada (Prinkipo Island) Greek Orphanage, a cultural heritage

monument. Mechanisms should be in place to support the participation of minorities in

decision-making and to ensure that they are adequately represented in the public

administration and in politics (see also Chapter 23 on cultural rights).

Concerning the Roma, Dom and Abdal communities, Türkiye adopted in January 2023 a new

Roma strategy and a related action plan covering the period until 2030. The aim is to align

with the EU Roma Strategic Framework, however, a horizontal objective of fighting

antigypsyism and discrimination and quantitative national targets connected to indicators and

baselines that would allow measuring progress towards the EU level headline targets remains

to be defined. The implementation of the strategy needs to be monitored inclusively,

including with the broad participation of civil society. Ten municipalities across Türkiye

voluntarily took part in an EU programme to promote participation in local governance using

social mediators. Specific policy measures are needed for the inter-sectional vulnerabilities of

Roma women. No official data on the situation and living conditions of Roma exists in

Türkiye.

The February 2023 earthquakes increased the difficulties of the Roma population in the

affected areas in terms of living conditions, livelihood, basic needs and health, especially for

women and children. Dramatic increases in housing prices particularly hit Roma families,

who often live in poor conditions and have limited property ownership. Lack of emergency

savings and high dependence on informal jobs made Roma in earthquake-affected regions

more vulnerable. The Roma were among the vulnerable groups who had more difficulties in

accessing relief aid. A holistic approach is needed to address drug use disorder among the

Roma, taking particular account of social and economic factors. Roma children being more

integrated into the education system would contribute to eliminate child labour and early

marriage. Targeted support measures for Roma entrepreneurs and self-employed need to be

introduced. The problem of incorrect diagnosis of Roma children with mental disabilities or

learning difficulties should be effectively tackled. No EU-Türkiye Joint Roma Seminar was

held. Concrete measures should be taken to prevent the increase of antigypsyism and to

combat prejudice and discrimination against Roma. The capacity of the National Roma

Contact Point to programme and mainstream funds targeting all aspects of Roma inclusion

remained limited. No members of parliament in the new parliamentary term have an overt

Roma identity.

On cultural rights, there were no legislative developments to allow public services to be

provided in languages other than Turkish. Legal restrictions on mother-tongue education in

primary and secondary schools remained in place. Optional courses in Kurdish and

Circassian are provided in public state schools, but the requirement of a minimum of 10

students for these courses continued to be an impediment. The small number or complete lack

of teachers for these courses remained another limiting factor. University programmes are

available in Kurdish, Arabic, Syriac, Zaza and Circassian. Only a few political parties

explicitly included mother-tongue education in their election platforms. The state-appointed

trustee mayors in the south-east continued changing the original names of streets. The

increased powers of the governors and arbitrary censorship continued to have a negative

impact on arts and culture and a number of art and culture groups in Kurdish language were

dismissed by the trustees. A dozen concerts, festivals and cultural events were banned by

governorates and municipalities on the grounds of ‘security and public order’. Kurdish

cultural and language institutions, media outlets and numerous art spaces remained mostly

closed, as they have been since the 2016 coup attempt, which contributed to a further

shrinking of their cultural rights (see also Chapter 26 – Education and culture).

2.2.2. Chapter 24: justice, freedom and security

The EU has common rules for border control, visas, residence and work permits, external

migration and asylum. Schengen cooperation entails the lifting of border controls within the

EU. The Member States also cooperate with Türkiye in the fight against organised crime and

terrorism, and on judicial, police and customs matters, all with the support of the EU justice

and home affairs agencies.

Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of justice, freedom and security. Some progress

was made in relation to the further strengthening of the surveillance and protection capacity

of the land border with Iran. Türkiye has still not implemented the provisions pertaining to

third-country nationals in the EU-Turkey readmission agreement, which entered into force in

October 2017. Türkiye continued to make significant efforts to host and meet the needs of 3.6

million refugees. Türkiye still needs to align its legislation on data protection with European

standards.

Most of last year’s recommendations still need to be addressed and remain valid. In the

coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ fully implement the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 (notably the returns from the

Greek islands and the prevention of irregular routes to all Member States) and implement

all the provisions of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement towards all EU Member

States;

→ align legislation on personal data protection with European standards, which could have a

positive effect for the possible conclusion of an international agreement between the EU

and Türkiye on the exchange of personal data between Europol and Türkiye;

→ revise legislation and practices on terrorism in line with the European Convention on

Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights case law and the EU acquis and

practices. The proportionality principle should be observed in practice;

→ adopt and implement a strategy and action plan on border management with the aim of

enhancing coordination between border services at national and international levels.

Fight against organised crime

Türkiye has some level of preparation to implement the EU acquis in this area. Some

progress was made at operational level through participation in an increasing number of joint

operations with EU Member States and neighbouring countries. A new strategy and new

action plan against organised crime were adopted. However, Türkiye needs to improve the

effectiveness of law enforcement in fighting certain forms of crime, such as money

laundering and financial crimes. Coordination remains crucial for all stakeholders involved in

fighting organised crime.

In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ improve the legal framework and practices on counterterrorism in line with the EU

acquis; and continue addressing the remaining recommendations in order to be delisted

from the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) ‘grey list’;

→ conclude an international agreement with the European Union on cooperation with

Eurojust;

→ enhance efforts in the fight against the smuggling of migrants, including final convictions

and asset confiscation;

→ revise Law No 7262 in line with the recommendations of the Venice Commission;

→ increase its operational willingness to cooperate and exchange information with EU law

enforcement partners.

Institutional set-up and legal alignment

There are a number of specialised departments dealing with various forms of organised

crime, under two main law enforcement agencies; namely the gendarmerie and the police

under the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The Coast Guard Command also plays an important role

in preventing migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. The Financial Crimes

Investigation Board (MASAK) is the Turkish financial intelligence unit attached to the

Ministry of Treasury and Finance. Cybercrime is addressed by a specialised department for

combating cybercrime affiliated to the Turkish national police (the TNP) as well as the public

order division of the gendarmerie at central level and the 31 provincial gendarmerie branches.

The TNP comprised a total of 339 563 officers (equivalent to 399.48 officers per 100 000

inhabitants). By comparison, the EU average is 335.3 officers per 100 000 inhabitants

(Eurostat, 2019-2021). The total number of gendarmerie staff (excluding conscripts) was

196 285 (equivalent to 230.34 gendarmerie personnel per 100 000 inhabitants). The Coast

Guard Command comprised of 8 343 personnel (equivalent to 9.81 personnel per 100 000

inhabitants). Between April 2022 and April 2023, 1 054 personnel were dismissed from the

gendarmerie. These figures include the personnel dismissed due to their affiliation to the

Gülen movement and the Parallel State Structure (PDY).

The legal framework for the fight against organised crime and police cooperation is partially

aligned with the EU acquis.

Türkiye adopted a new national strategy (2022-2027) and an action plan (2022-2024) against

organised crime in December 2022. The Ministry of Interior’s Department of Smuggling

Intelligence, Operations and Data Collection is responsible for coordinating the

implementation.

The legal framework pertaining to trafficking in human beings is largely in accordance with

international conventions and the EU acquis. A new action plan on trafficking in human

beings requested by the Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking

in Human Beings (GRETA) has not been adopted. Türkiye needs to fully align its definition

of trafficking in human beings with the Council of Europe Convention on Action against

Trafficking in Human Beings.

The completion of an international agreement between the EU and Türkiye on the exchange

of personal data between Europol and the Turkish authorities with responsibility for fighting

serious crime and terrorism is still pending considering also that the Turkish data protection

legislation is still not aligned with the EU’s acquis.

Türkiye is party to the Council of Europe’s ‘Budapest’ Convention on cybercrime, but it has

yet to sign its Second Additional Protocol on enhanced cooperation and disclosure of

electronic evidence, which was opened for signature in May 2022.

Türkiye’s Information and Communication Technologies Authority has been a member of

INHOPE (International Association of Internet Hotlines) since 2011 and cooperates with

other hotlines to fight against child sexual abuse. Article 21 (entitled ‘Protection of

Children’) of the By-law on the provision of radio, television and on-demand media services

via the internet environment requires media service providers that have been granted an

online broadcasting license and online media platform operators that have been granted an

authorisation certificate for the online transmission of media services to take measures to

ensure parental control. It also makes these institutions responsible for taking the necessary

technical measures to protect children and young audiences. In this context, examples such as

PIN systems, and child profile and protective symbol systems are used by media service

providers operating in Türkiye to protect children in online audiovisual media services. In

January 2023, the Turkish parliament set up a research commission with the objective of

preventing child abuse. The establishment of this commission was prompted by a specific

case involving the forced marriage of a six-year-old girl (see the section on fundamental

rights of the child).

MASAK is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, which facilitates

cooperation and intelligence sharing between national financial intelligence units to

investigate and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing.

Türkiye is party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and the

Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the

Proceeds of Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS No 198).

Türkiye has a witness protection system to protect witnesses from intimidation and threats.

However, the scope of the Law on witness protection needs to be expanded to include all

types of serious crimes and procedural rules need improvement.

Implementation and enforcement capacity

In the reporting period, operational capacity continued to be strengthened through new

recruitment and training programmes.

In total, 6 145 operations were carried out by the gendarmerie and the Turkish national

police (the TNP) to tackle organised crime, cybercrime, smuggling of migrants and

trafficking in human beings.

Concerning firearms trafficking, 2 388 small and light weapons (SALW) were seized by the

gendarmerie and 4 138 by the TNP during the reporting period. In 2022, 877 cases of

firearms trafficking (Article 12 of the Turkish Criminal Code) were brought before criminal

courts, resulting in the conviction of 584 persons.

Since July 2004, cooperation between Europol and Türkiye has been based on the Strategic

Agreement on Cooperation. This does not include the possibility of sharing personal data, but

it does facilitate cooperation in a range of areas. A Turkish liaison officer has been seconded

to Europol since 2016. Türkiye is connected to and configured for the full use of the Secure

Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) with third parties and EU Member

States. The EU (through Europol) and Türkiye have a joint interest in stepping up law

enforcement cooperation to effectively address common challenges.

16 EU Member States have 30 liaison officers in Türkiye and Türkiye has 10 liaison officers

in 7 EU Member States. A cooperation agreement with the European Union Agency for Law

Enforcement Training (CEPOL) has been in place since 2010. Its revision has been pending

since the end of 2022. Exchange and training programmes were carried out involving the

gendarmerie and the TNP. As well as participating in the courses held by EU Member States,

TNP also organises joint workshops with CEPOL.

The track record on combating money laundering and terrorist financing showed a gradual

improvement. Turkish judicial statistics showed a consistent upward trend. There were 19

files, 49 separate offences and 47 convictions in 2020, while there were 26 files, 61 separate

offences and 61 convictions in 2021. In 2022, 39 criminal files and 118 offences resulted in

116 convictions.

The domestic terrorist asset freeze mechanism continued to be implemented through the joint

decisions issued by the Ministry of Treasury and Finance and the Ministry of Interior. In

2021, the assets of 1 145 real persons and 16 corporate identities were frozen through three

interministerial decisions. In 2022, 4 interministerial decisions resulted in the assets of 64 real

persons and 14 corporate identities being frozen.

The country’s geographic location makes it an important player in the fight against organised

crime groups, in particular drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, arms trafficking, intellectual

property crime and money laundering. Türkiye is used as a financial hub between south-east

Asian countries, the Gulf region and Europe for facilitating illicit money flows in exchange

for irregular migrants and illicit commodities. As far as participation in the European Multi-

disciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) is concerned, Türkiye was in 2022

a participant in one operational action (in the operational action plan on intellectual property

crime, counterfeit goods and currencies). In 2023, Türkiye is participating in 16 operational

actions. Regarding cross-border cooperation, Türkiye has not participated in any EU joint

investigation teams (JITs) to date.

Türkiye continues to be an important transit and destination country for trafficking in

human beings. By the end of 2022, the number of victims identified by the Turkish

authorities stood at 345 (compared to 2021 when 403 victims were identified). Sexual and

labour exploitation constitute the highest number among the purposes of trafficking. Most

victims are of Syrian origin. In 2022, 115 cases of trafficking in human beings (Article 80 of

the Turkish Criminal Code) were brought before Türkiye’s criminal courts. 23 cases ended

with convictions. 65 people accused of trafficking were convicted by the criminal courts of

first instance.

There are two shelters in Ankara and Kirikkale provinces run by the Presidency for Migration

Management (PMM). Their total capacity to host victims of trafficking in human beings is 42

persons. There is an urgent need to increase the capacity to host and provide services to

victims of human trafficking. Additional shelters are planned for the provinces of Aydin and

Kutahya. Türkiye should bolster its collaboration with civil society organisations to enhance

its capacity in identifying victims and delivering essential victim support services.

Specialised services should be strengthened for all victims of trafficking.

The many Syrian and other refugees, including children, are vulnerable to being exploited

through forced labour. Reports of early marriages increased in the wake of the pandemic as a

negative economic coping mechanism.

There are insufficient training programmes for law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and

judges that focus on a victim-centred approach. Partnership with civil society should be

sought in order to encourage the identification of victims of trafficking and to provide them

with shelter and services. The reasons why the crime of trafficking in human beings is not

prosecuted should be identified and measures should be taken to ensure that victims are

allowed to appear in court via video link when the circumstances of the case and the

vulnerability of the persons concerned require this.

Gun violence in Türkiye has surged in recent years, while the overwhelming majority of

firearms owned by individuals are unregistered due to lax enforcement of the Law on

unregistered weapons.

In 2022, 47 079 suspects were detected in 8 252 cases of cybercrime (Articles 243/1, 244,

103 and 226 of the Turkish Criminal Code), resulting in the conviction of 123 persons. In the

reporting period, there was no national strategy and action plan in place against cybercrime.

The National Cyber Security Strategy and Action Plan 2020-2023 covers public

administration systems, information systems belonging to critical infrastructures operated by

the public and private sectors, small and medium-sized industry, and all the components of

cyber space at the national level (including all private and legal persons).

Cooperation in the field of drugs

Institutional set-up and legal alignment

The High Council for the Fight against Drugs consists of 12 ministers and is responsible for

coordination and monitoring at national level. The national strategy and the action plan aimed

at combating illegal drugs, which have been in effect for the period of 2018-2023, are coming

to an end. The secretariat for coordinating their implementation is within the Ministry of

Health’s Directorate-General for Public Health. All ministers involved in the implementation

of the strategy and action plan are also members of the High Council. A research committee

conducts research into drug addiction and a scientific committee provides recommendations

for studies, training and awareness-raising activities on drug abuse. An Action Plan on the

Fight Against Methamphetamine 2022-2024 has been in force since August 2022 under the

coordination of the Ministry of Interior. The Ministries of Justice, Family and Social

Services, Interior, Defence, Health and Trade take part in the implementation.

Türkiye is a member of the European Information Network on Drugs and Drug Addiction

(Reitox).

The Turkish Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (TUBİM) continues to act as

the national focal point of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction

(EMCDDA) and is the national drug observatory. Türkiye has had a participation agreement

in place with the EMCDDA since 2007 and is a member of the Management Board of the

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). It has a monitoring

role at national and international level and drafts the annual Turkish drug report. It collects

data, makes risk assessments and provides recommendations with regard to the National

Early Warning System on new psychoactive substances. A total of 1 006 new psychoactive

substances have been included in the national legislation and 35 of these were put on the list

in 2022. The instant data-flow system, which uses encryption and anonymisation of personal

data for monitoring and reporting, is operational. The responsible body for controlling drug

precursors is the Turkish Medicine and Medical Devices Agency of the Ministry of Health,

which grants licences and permits for manufacture, possession, selling, purchase,

transportation, consumption, distribution, importation, exportation and legal use including for

pharmaceutical and industrial purposes.

Within the framework of the 7

Judicial Reform Package adopted in April 2023, some

penalties have been increased under the Turkish Penal Code with regard to manufacturing

and trading certain types of drug substances, which have a higher potential to cause addiction

and serious health problems. The minimum imprisonment penalty was increased from 10 to

15 years. Some amendments were made in relation to treatment, rehabilitation and probation.

Random tests may be conducted under probation, and compulsory treatment and

rehabilitation can be exercised on the convict or prisoner.

Implementation and enforcement capacity

Türkiye remains a transit route for drugs between Asia and Europe, but information exchange

and collaboration with EU law enforcement partners are to be enhanced, particularly for

heroin. In 2022, Turkish law enforcement services conducted operations that resulted in the

seizure of, inter alia, 71 967 kg of cannabis including skunk (2021: 64 125 kg), 2 276 kg of

cocaine (2021: 2 841 kg), 7 957 kg of heroin (2021: 22 202 kg), 16 210 kg of

methamphetamine (2021: 5 528 kg), 5 050 325 ecstasy tablets (2021: 7 618 013) and 23 945

026 captagon tablets (2021: 13 790 648).

In 2022, a total of 69 430 cases in relation to Article 188/3 of the Turkish Criminal Code

involving 90 919 suspects were launched by the prosecution for illicit drug related offences.

28 181 suspects were convicted.

In the field of prevention, the Ministry of Health (MoH) operates 237 counselling centres in

81 provinces. In 2022, 30 new centres became operational. The anti-drug counselling hotline

received 78 152 calls in 2022. There are 135 treatment centres for drug dependence in 81

provinces. 59 of the centres focus on inpatient treatment and 20 of those are specifically

dedicated to treating children. The other 76 centres are outpatient centres and 20 of those are

specifically dedicated to children. The waiting time for applicants to be admitted to the

treatment centres is currently 1-3 days. Bed capacity is 1 372. Despite improvements, the

rehabilitation and treatment capacity remains insufficient.

Fight against terrorism

Institutional set-up and legal alignment

Türkiye’s continuing efforts to tackle terrorism reduced terrorist activity and improved the

security situation. The country continued to face threats from various terrorist groups. The

EU has condemned all acts of terrorist violence perpetrated in Türkiye. Türkiye has

prioritised the fight against the PKK and the dismantling of the Gülen movement. The PKK

remains on the EU’s list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. Türkiye

has a legitimate right to fight terrorism. However, bringing the Turkish anti-terrorism

legislation in line with EU standards still remains an essential outstanding reform.

The legal framework regulating the fight against money laundering

and terrorist financing should be aligned with the recommendations provided by the FATF

and those outlined by the Venice Commission on the Law on preventing financing of

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Türkiye has been on the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring (the ‘grey list’) of the

Financial Action Task Force (FATF) since October 2021. Türkiye's EU candidate status and

commitment to address shortcomings identified by the FATF and to align with the EU’s

acquis have prevented it from being added to the EU’s high-risk third countries list.

Türkiye’s response to the concerns of the EU and the FATF continues to be closely

monitored in the framework of the Association Agreement. Türkiye must diligently adhere to

the outstanding FATF Action Plan items to secure its removal from the grey list. With regard

to the outcomes of the FATF’s Mutual Evaluation Report on Türkiye and the recommended

actions by the FATF, Türkiye promulgated an overarching national AML/CFT strategy

document in July 2021. The strategy document was revised in 2022 to comply with the

outstanding recommended actions. Türkiye also updated its National Risk Assessment at the

end of 2022. The country is also supported by the EU’s Global Facility on Anti-Money

Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism project.

In 2022, Türkiye adopted regulations regarding politically exposed persons and guidance to

the private sector on detecting terrorist financing. It also increased its financial intelligence

agency’s proactive dissemination of financial intelligence. In July 2023, the FATF concluded

that Türkiye has taken positive steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime. Türkiye is

now compliant with 14 recommendations, largely compliant with 25 recommendations, with

only one recommendation (Recommendation 15 on new technologies) remaining as partially

compliant.

The Law on the prevention of financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has

not been revised in line with the Venice Commission’s recommendations. The Ministry of

Interior and the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) developed a risk-based

methodology for the audit of the non-profit organisations (NPOs). As a result of the risk-

based methodology, the Ministry of Interior’s audits prioritised the humanitarian aid NPOs.

More than 600 NPOs have been audited repeatedly in accordance with the provisions of law

since 2021. None of the audited NPOs and their executives have been prosecuted as a result

of these audits. Civil society remained concerned about potential disproportionate

implementation of the law to further restrict the legitimate activities of NGOs and to put

additional pressure on critical voices.

Türkiye is an active member of the Global Coalition against Daesh.

Implementation and enforcement capacity

Türkiye faces threats from various terrorist groups. Türkiye actively engaged in the regular

biannual review of the EU terrorism list under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (‘CP 931’).

The PKK, IBDA-C, DHKP/C and TAK remain on the EU’s terrorism list. However,

terrorism prosecutions often disproportionately targeted legitimate activities of political

opposition. Counterterrorism efforts need to be pursued in accordance with the rule of law

and fundamental rights and freedoms.

In the reporting period, MASAK continued to strengthen its institutional capacity as well as

its cooperation with law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities. MASAK has

consistently built a sound track-record. The number of suspicious transaction reports

submitted decreased from 504 995 in 2021 to 425 322 in 2022. Systematic inter-agency

cooperation between the law enforcement agencies, prosecution and MASAK has improved.

As a result of its anti-money laundering / countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT)

analysis and inspections, MASAK forwarded criminal complaints to the prosecution for 496

persons.

Türkiye reaffirmed its commitment to freeze the assets of persons/entities designated by the

United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee. The government also continued to

use the domestic assets freezing instrument as a deterrent.

Judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters

Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters is regulated by the Law on international

civil law and procedural law, circulars and international conventions. Türkiye is a party to

most international conventions. However, it has not acceded to relevant international

conventions in the area of civil justice, many of which were drawn up by the Hague

Conference on Private International Law, including in particular the 1996 Convention on

Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of

Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, the 2007 Convention on

the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance and the

2005 Convention of Hague on Choice of Court Agreements. Türkiye has not yet ratified the

European Convention on the Compensation of Victims. In 2022, within the scope of the

Convention on Civil Procedure, 15 judicial legal assistance requests were made by EU

Member States and 196 by Türkiye. Within the scope of the Convention on the Taking of

Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 77 judicial legal assistance requests were

made by EU Member States and 1 937 by Türkiye.

The main legislation governing judicial cooperation in criminal matters has been in place

since 2016 and Türkiye has acceded to most of the international conventions. 33 mutual legal

assistance requests following the introduction of videoconferencing have been processed and

2 of these have been finalised. Under the new ‘consensual extradition’ procedure, extradition

of an offender now takes 1-2 months on average, whereas the previous extradition procedure

lasted around a year. As for the transfer of sentenced persons, introduction of the procedure

of ‘exact execution’ paved the way for the removal of the obligation on local courts to

comply with domestic legislation. In 2022, a total of seven convicts were transferred to

Türkiye from EU Member States under the new procedure, while one convict was transferred

from Türkiye to an EU Member State. The independence and accountability of the justice

system has to be substantially strengthened for a smooth application of the principle of

mutual recognition of judgments and court decisions in criminal matters.

In 2022, EU Member States accepted 18 extradition requests from Türkiye, while 29 were

rejected, 19 requests became redundant and 151 are still pending. Of the 15 extradition

requests from EU Member States, 3 were rejected and 12 are still pending. EU Member

States did not agree to any transfer of convicts to Türkiye, but Türkiye agreed to 2 transfers to

EU Member States. Five contact points have been designated by Türkiye to coordinate and

follow up judicial cooperation on criminal matters with Eurojust. In 2022, Türkiye was

involved in 13 Eurojust cases on terrorism, terrorism financing, cybercrime (fraud), migrant

smuggling, attempted murder, money laundering, forgery and drug smuggling (compared

with 15 cases in 2021). However, negotiations for an International Agreement with the EU on

cooperation with Eurojust have not started yet.

Cooperation arrangements should also be established with the European Public Prosecutor’s

Office (EPPO), which started operating in June 2021. In 2022, there were four EPPO cases

involving Türkiye. Until August 2023, Türkiye had not formally communicated whether it

would cooperate with the EPPO on the basis of the declarations made by Member States to

the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, recognising the EPPO

as a national competent authority for the purpose of the Convention.

Legal and irregular migration

Institutional set-up and legal alignment

The Presidency for Migration Management (PMM) is in charge of coordinating migration

policy; ensuring coordination between relevant agencies and organisations; carrying out

functions and actions related to foreigners’ entry into, stay in and exit from Türkiye as well as

their removal, international and temporary protection; and the protection of victims of

trafficking in human beings. The PMM currently has 13 267 personnel.

Following the December 2019 amendment of the Law on foreigners and international

protection, which introduced alternatives to detention, the implementing regulation on

alternative obligations to administrative detention was adopted on 14 September 2022. The

regulation breaks down the procedures applicable for the implementation of each alternative

to detention. In addition to alternatives to detention based on residence and notification duty

that were already implemented (before the regulation entered into force), methods such as

return counselling and family-based return have been rolled out. Alternatives to detention that

require an electronic infrastructure (such as voice recognition software and electronic

bracelets) have yet to be put into practice. Irregular migration bureaus are set up to monitor

the implementation of alternatives to detention in all the Provincial Directorates of Migration

Management (PDMMs). Monitoring working groups were established in the İstanbul,

Ankara, İzmir and Antalya PDMMs.

Implementation and enforcement capacity

The EU-Turkey Statement remained the main framework for cooperation between the EU

and Türkiye.

The PMM suffered loss of personnel and infrastructure due to the devastating February 2023

earthquakes, which affected 11 provinces of Türkiye. The buildings of the PDMMs in

Malatya, Osmaniye, Hatay, Adıyaman and Gaziantep were damaged, while a large number of

personnel from other provinces have been appointed to the affected areas to provide services

to foreigners. In the reporting period, PMM continued to employ a limited number of

psychologists, social workers, interpreters and lawyers, some of whom are financed by the

EU.

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 378 migrants lost their

lives in the Eastern Mediterranean in 2022 (111 in 2021). Between January and September

2023, 22 421 irregular migrants arrived in the EU from Türkiye (including Greece, Italy and

Bulgaria) compared to 22 821 arrivals during the same period in 2022. The sea route to Italy

saw a substantial decrease (down by 55%), while arrivals in Greece increased considerably

by 123%. However, the number of arrivals in Cyprus via the Green Line went down by 42%

between January and September 2023, in comparison with the same period in 2022.

The average number of daily irregular arrivals in Greece from Türkiye was 42 in 2022 (up

from 20 in 2021). In 2023, by September, the average number of daily irregular arrivals in

Greece from Türkiye increased to 78. Turkish irregular migrants occupied the top spot among

those who arrived in Greece, followed by Syrians and Afghans. In 2022, the number of

irregular arrivals in Cyprus reached 17 365 (11 600 in 2021), most of whom crossed the

Green Line after arriving from Türkiye via the non-government-controlled area of Cyprus. In

2023, by September, 6 969 irregular arrivals were recorded in the government-controlled area

of Cyprus.

As regards the irregular sea route from Türkiye to Italy in 2023, 4 913 irregular arrivals were

recorded until September, compared to 10 805 in the same period in 2022. The total number

of irregular migrants who arrived in the EU from Türkiye in 2022 stood at 33 514 (including

15 582 in Greece, 15 805 in Italy, 1 884 in Bulgaria and 173 in Romania), a substantial

increase compared to 21 295 irregular arrivals in 2021 (7 410 in Greece, 12 916 in Italy, 936

in Bulgaria and none in Romania). At the same time, in 2022, the number of irregular arrivals

in Cyprus via the Green Line also increased substantially to 17 365, from 10 918 in 2021.

280 206 irregular migrants were apprehended in Türkiye in 2022 (162 996 in 2021). As in

past years, irregular migrants from Afghanistan, Syria and Pakistan were the most frequently

apprehended nationalities. The Turkish Coast Guard (TCG) rescued 49 518 irregular migrants

at sea in 2022 (23 676 in 2021).

In 2023, by August, the Turkish authorities had apprehended 102 746 irregular migrants,

around 24 405 of whom were intercepted by the TCG. Nationals of Afghanistan, Syria and

Palestine topped the list of nationalities. According to the government, law enforcement

forces apprehended 9 149 smugglers in 2022 (an increase on the 7 942 apprehensions in

2021). As regards 2023, as of August, 3 259 migrant smugglers had been apprehended. 1 720

people and organised crime groups were convicted for migrant smuggling in 2022.

No progress was made as regards the full implementation of the EU-Turkey Readmission

Agreement. Türkiye maintained its position that it would not implement the provisions

concerning third-country nationals until the visa requirement for its citizens travelling to the

Schengen Area is lifted.

Türkiye has unilaterally suspended the return of irregular migrants from the Greek islands on

public health grounds since March 2020. The European Commission and Greece have

repeatedly called on Türkiye to resume return operations in line with the commitments made

under the EU-Turkey Statement. The resumption of returns to Türkiye remains key to

effectively fighting irregular migration and migrant smuggling networks in the region.

Between 2016 and 2020, 2 140 persons (including 412 Syrian nationals) were readmitted to

Türkiye from Greece under the ‘One-for-One’ scheme. The bilateral Readmission Protocol

between Greece and Türkiye remained suspended. Türkiye did not readmit third-country

nationals from Bulgaria under either the bilateral border agreement or the EU-Turkey

Readmission Agreement.

As regards resettlement from Türkiye to the EU under the ‘One-for-One’ scheme, 5 046

Syrian refugees were resettled in eight EU Member States in 2022. Moreover, the

Resettlement Support Facility run by the European Union Agency for Asylum in Istanbul

facilitated the processing of 2 585 resettlement candidates. The total number of Syrian

refugees resettled from Türkiye to the EU Member States under the ‘One-for-One’ scheme

reached 39 648 as of September 2023. At the same time, 561 758 Syrian refugees were

voluntarily repatriated from Türkiye to Syria between 2016 and 2023 according to

government data. Out of the total number, 58 758 Syrians were repatriated in 2022.

Türkiye returned effectively 124 441 irregular migrants to their home countries in 2022, an

increase of more than 160% on the 2021 figure of 46 653. The total number of irregular

migrants returned since 2018 reached 372 790. The total number of Afghan nationals

returned from Türkiye in 2022 was 66 534, while 12 385 Pakistani nationals and 40 898 other

countries’ nationals had been returned to their countries as of 22 December 2022. None of

these returns were carried out within the scope of the readmission agreements that are in

force between Türkiye and third countries. Türkiye did not sign any new readmission

agreements in the reporting period.

Türkiye continued voluntary returns of irregular migrants financed through national as well

as EU funds. 737 irregular migrants were returned through the national voluntary return

scheme while 2 259 were returned with the assistance of IOM and EU financing in 2022.

According to the government, 280 206 irregular migrants were prevented from entering

Turkish territory in the eastern and southern provinces in 2022 by Turkish security forces.

Some of the 30 removal centres were heavily damaged by the February 2023 earthquakes and

the capacity to host irregular migrants dropped from 18 000 to 15 710. The removal centre in

Hatay was evacuated due to heavy damage and is no longer operational, whereas hosting of

migrants in other removal centres was suspended pending reparations. The number of

temporary accommodation centres managed by the PMM increased from 7 to 9, leading to an

increase in capacity from around 66 000 to 77 000. Temporary accommodation centres also

started hosting earthquake victims of Turkish origin along with Syrians.

Civil society, bar associations and various media reported incidents of alleged human rights

violations as well as pervasive challenges relating to access to rights and services in removal

centres, particularly with regard to access to information and legal aid. In 2022, more than

280 000 irregular migrants were apprehended, most of whom were subject to return

procedures in removal centres. A limited number of irregular migrants (939) benefited from

free legal aid in 2022 (1 059 in 2021). In addition to the free legal aid scheme, 37 876

migrants were able to have access to and meet their lawyers in removal centres.

Overall, irregular migration continued to be a polarising topic in society and was heavily used

by political parties in their electoral campaigns.

1 345 488 foreigners were legal residents in Türkiye on 1 December 2022 (1 275 741 in

2021). Nationals of Iraq, Russia, and Turkmenistan were the most common holders of

residence permits. The number of Russian nationals with residence permits increased from

approximately 66 000 in 2021 to around 155 000 in 2023. Approximately 560 000 Ukrainians

have arrived in Türkiye since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in

February 2022. Many had already left for a third country or voluntarily returned to Ukraine

by September 2022. Around 46 000 Ukrainians were residing in Türkiye in April 2023.

The legislation on the acquisition of nationality by foreign investors remained unchanged

during the reporting period. Moreover, according to Articles 35 and 36 of the Land Registry

Law, natural persons who are the nationals of countries designated by the President of the

Republic can acquire real estate in Türkiye. As of October 2022, the list contained 185

countries. The list is not publicly available because it is not published on the website of the

General Directorate of Land Registry. Such schemes pose risks in relation to security, money

laundering, tax evasion, terrorist financing, corruption and infiltration by organised crime. As

a candidate country, Türkiye should refrain from any measure that could jeopardise the

attainment of the EU’s objectives when using its prerogatives to award nationality.

Asylum

Institutional set-up and legal alignment

The Presidency for Migration Management (PMM) is the main institution responsible for all

asylum-related procedures. The status determination processes are carried out by the

Provincial Directorates of Migration Management (PDMMs) as well as by the International

Protection Bureaus (decision centres) in Ankara and Istanbul (established in 2018 and 2019

respectively), with a view of reducing case backlog. A new International Protection Bureau

was established in Samsun in 2022. In addition to those bureaus, mobile teams were

established in 2019. Decisions on refugee status determination are subject to administrative

and judicial appeal procedures.

Legislation in this area is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The Law on foreigners and

international protection maintains the reservation (geographical limitation) expressed in the

New York Protocol to the 1951 Geneva Convention as a result of which the vast majority of

persons seeking international protection in Türkiye cannot apply for fully-fledged refugee

status but only for ‘conditional refugee’ status and subsidiary protection. Conditional refugee

status limits the stay in the country ‘until the moment a recognised conditional refugee is

resettled to a third country’. By law, Syrian refugees are granted a specific refugee status

under the Temporary Protection Regulation. However, in February 2022, the Ministry of

Interior announced that newly arriving Syrians who have not been registered will not

automatically receive temporary protection status in 16 provinces. According to the

announcement, residence permit applications by foreigners would not be accepted in any

neighbourhood in which 25% or more of the population consisted of foreigners (this was

reduced to 20% in June 2022).

Implementation and enforcement capacity

Türkiye continued to host one of the largest refugee populations in the world, with (as of 31

August 2023) 3 298 817 Syrians under temporary protection and slightly over 300 000 non-

Syrians (including those who hold or who have applied for international protection status).

The number of asylum seekers slightly increased over the reporting period. 33 246

international protection applications were received in 2022 (29 256 in 2021). 19 400

applications were made by Afghans, 7 131 by Ukrainians and 4 083 by Iraqis. This was a

different pattern from 2021 due to the Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In 2022,

Türkiye granted international protection (refugee status, conditional refugee status or

subsidiary protection) to 12 857 applicants, a slight decrease compared with 13 227 in 2021.

The authorities rejected 12 030 applications (11 908 in 2021). In 2022, the cumulative total of

pending international protection applications stood at 272 336. Despite a slight decrease on

last year, this remains a significant backlog that has not been reduced over the years. There is

no publicly accessible data on international protection with a breakdown by category of

decisions and of pending cases at the end of the year.

As of June 2022, Türkiye officially closed registration of temporary protection applications in

16 provinces in an attempt to avoid an increase in the number of foreigners where they

already exceed 20% of the total population. When asylum seekers are denied registration in a

‘closed’ province, they are most often not officially referred to another province with

supporting documentation. Outside the officially ‘closed’ provinces, NGOs and lawyers

repeatedly referred to the de facto closure of international protection registration in other

provinces, except for highly vulnerable cases. Such barriers to registration hinder access to all

other essential services and put asylum seekers in an irregular situation if they are

apprehended.

Almost half of all Syrians in Türkiye are registered in four provinces – Istanbul, Gaziantep,

Hatay and Şanlıurfa. The rest reside in various other provinces across Türkiye. 67 548

Syrians are hosted in seven temporary accommodation centres (50 736 in 2021). 230 998

Syrians had been granted Turkish citizenship as of April 2023.

The destructive earthquakes of 6 February 2023 affected a total of 11 provinces

(Kahramanmaraş, Hatay, Gaziantep, Malatya, Kilis, Osmaniye, Diyarbakir, Adana,

Adıyaman, Sanliurfa) where most of the migrant and refugee population (in particular 1 738

035 Syrians under Temporary Protection) had been living. According to a statement by the

Interior Minister, 6 969 foreigners (mostly Syrians) lost their lives because of the

earthquakes. The earthquakes have led to great human mobility, including refugees and

migrants, inside the country.

In ordinary circumstances, Türkiye imposes travel restrictions on refugees, prohibiting them

from travelling out of the provinces in which they are registered with local authorities unless

they have a permit. On 7 February 2023, the authorities lifted these restrictions for about

1.7 million refugees under temporary and international protection in the earthquake region for

90 days (with the exception that they could not travel to İstanbul). A second circular reduced

this to 60 days and granted those travelling from the worst-affected five provinces (Hatay,

Malatya, Kahramanmaraş, Adıyaman, and Gaziantep) unconditional access to other

provinces, but made travel from the other five (Kilis, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, Adana, and

Osmaniye) dependent on the applicant’s home being seriously damaged and the existence of

medical needs that could only be met in other provinces. This circular is still in place and is

extended on a regular basis excluding Istanbul. Another administrative order gave Syrians

under temporary protection, registered and residing in the 11 earthquake-affected provinces,

the opportunity to return to Syria temporarily. Syrians returning temporarily can stay in Syria

for up to 6 months. Temporary returns to Syria started in February 2023 and by June the total

number of temporary returns was 70 086 individuals. By September 62 936 individuals had

returned to Türkiye. The deadline for re-entry to Türkiye was 15 September 2023, after which

the temporary protection status of Syrians who had not returned to Türkiye was cancelled.

The earthquakes and their consequences resulted in increasing discomfort for a large portion

of the public. In the lead-up to the general elections in May 2023, opposition politicians made

speeches that further fuelled anti-refugee sentiment and called for Syrians to return to Syria.

Throughout 2022, the PMM continued the verification of data of Syrians under temporary

protection, updating and completing the information gathered during their original

registration. 2 071 051 Syrians’ data was verified in 2022.

Additionally, in the context of the 20% rule, the PMM introduced an address-verification

exercise for Syrians. As a result of this exercise, the temporary protection status of Syrians

who were found to be residing in locations other than their officially registered addresses has

reportedly been deactivated. The PMM invited these individuals to approach their provincial

offices to declare their current residential addresses so that they could reactivate their

protection status. In practice, deactivation of the status means discontinued access to services

such as education and healthcare.

A key mechanism for identifying vulnerable asylum seekers is protection desks in PDMMs

which interview and make referrals based on their specific needs assessment. There are

protection desks in 50 provinces. In 2022, protection desks identified and processed referrals

for 153 054 asylum seekers. In 2022, 181 unaccompanied children were referred to the

Ministry of Family and Social Services (MoFSS) by various agencies. Unaccompanied

children continue to face protection risks, particularly during initial identification and age

assessment processes, which are undertaken by different agencies (including law enforcement

services). Children are referred to hospitals for bone x-rays, which give a broad two-year age

range. In the absence of holistic age-assessment processes, individuals whose results indicate

that they are aged 16-18 might be registered as adults. A multi-disciplinary approach to age

assessment procedures, which take psychosocial aspects into consideration, is necessary in

order to increase compliance with European standards.

Applicants for international protection, conditional refugee status holders and people under

temporary protection, i.e. Syrians, can apply for work permits. However, a large majority of

refugees and asylum seekers do not have effective access to the labour market, in particular to

formal employment, due to low employability (lower levels of education and skills), language

barriers and limited access to information and services. Around 400 000 refugee children in

Türkiye (especially in the 15-18 age group) do not regularly attend school. According to the

Ministry of National Education, 822 524 refugee students were enrolled at schools in 29

provinces in January 2023.

The EU has mobilised close to EUR 10 billion in support for refugees in Türkiye since 2011.

The full operational budget of EUR 6 billion of the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey was

committed, with over EUR 5.1 billion disbursed by June 2023. The Facility mobilises both

humanitarian and development assistance for refugees and host communities in Türkiye to

meet basic needs, increase access to education and healthcare (including for vulnerable

groups, children and women) and strengthen border protection at the eastern borders with

Iran and Iraq.

A first top-up of EUR 535 million was allocated in 2020 and an additional EUR 3 billion was

mobilised by the EU in June 2021 to continue support for refugees and host communities in

Türkiye in 2021-2023. This funding is committed to continuing the provision of basic needs,

inclusive quality education for refugees, their socio-economic empowerment in Türkiye as

well as border management. Part of it (EUR 350 million) is being mobilised to support

refugees and host communities in the regions affected by the February 2023 earthquake.

The PMM and the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) continued their cooperation

with the implementation of the 2022-2023 Cooperation Roadmap, which offers capacity-

building support and peer-to-peer exchanges on best practices in the fields of asylum,

reception, resettlement and organisational change.

NGOs and lawyers report concerns about the quality of decisions on asylum, their reasoned

notification and challenges with the awareness of and access to legal aid for appeals.

Visa policy

Türkiye made no progress in meeting the six unfulfilled benchmarks of the visa liberalisation

roadmap (on the anti-terror law, personal data protection legislation, implementation of the

EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement, conclusion of an international agreement with the EU

on Europol, implementation of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)

recommendations on anti-corruption and judicial cooperation with all EU Member States).

Türkiye needs to further harmonise its visa policy with the EU’s visa policy. This would

include further aligning Turkish visa requirements with the EU lists of visa-free and visa-

required countries; full phasing-out of the issuing of visas at borders (currently the citizens of

33 countries are eligible to obtain a visa on arrival, compared with 24 in 2021) and of

electronic visas; and ensuring that the issuing of visas at its diplomatic missions is carried out

in line with the conditions and procedures set out in the EU Visa Code. Türkiye continues to

apply a discriminatory visa regime against nationals of Cyprus, but it has abolished the short-

stay visa requirements for the other 26 Member States.

Türkiye has introduced the biometric collection of fingerprinting for sticker visas issued by

its diplomatic missions in a number of countries (primarily in Africa) with a view to

increasing the authorities’ capacity to tackle irregular migration. The authorities have relaxed

the rules governing the entry and residence of Ukrainian nationals in Türkiye as a result of

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Schengen and external borders

Institutional set-up and legal alignment

No new legislation for the sector was adopted during the reporting period. The coordination

of the work of the State bodies dealing with border management matters is the responsibility

of the Directorate-General for Provincial Administration in the Ministry of the Interior (MoI).

The Border Management Implementation Board did not meet in the reporting period, while

preparations for its 6

meeting since its establishment in 2016 have been underway for some

time. Its supervising body, the Integrated Border Management Coordination Board, has not

yet met. In addition, relevant interinstitutional meetings were held at technical level on

specific topics.

The Ministry of the Interior created a new department in autumn 2021 for the coordination of

the future work of the National Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Centre (NACORAC).

Several border management services within the Turkish administration assigned staff to

NACORAC, which is located in Ankara. Given its responsibilities at Türkiye’s green border,

personnel from the Land Forces Command (in the Ministry of National Defence) should be

assigned. The centre was formally established in 2016 and an inauguration ceremony was

held in November 2022 to formalise the handover of EU-financed equipment, but it is not yet

fully operational. Staff detachments from all other relevant institutions have been completed,

but the staff assignment process from the Land Forces Command is still ongoing.

NACORAC has started collecting data from central and local institutions, albeit at a basic

level. The risk analysis process has also been initiated to a limited extent, while negotiations

with all relevant institutions for enhanced data-sharing are ongoing.

Following the establishment in February 2021 of the Institute of Heads of Civil Border

Administration, transfer of certain border management responsibilities from governors in 11

border regions (mostly in eastern Türkiye) to the Directorate-General for Provincial

Administration has continued. Two heads were appointed at land borders during the reporting

period, bringing the total number of heads appointed by the Directorate-General for

Provincial Administration for border gates to eight (six at airports, including Istanbul,

Ankara, Izmir and Antalya; and two at land borders). This reform seeks to streamline the

coordination of border management at central level.

In terms of new coordination mechanisms at local level, ‘Security Commissions’ have been

established (under the chairmanship of the Civil Border Administration with the participation

of the representatives of the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, the Ministry of Trade,

the Ministry of Health, the Turkish National Police and the gendarmerie) and will meet every

month at civil airports, ports and border gates to develop, implement and evaluate measures

with regard to security, training and inspection services.

Similar to last year’s recommendations, in order to bring the country’s border management

system in line with the EU acquis, Türkiye should further improve inter-service and

international cooperation, accelerate the adoption of an integrated border management (IBM)

strategy and update its IBM national implementation action plan from 2006. It also needs to

take steps to enact new legislation to set up a non-military border management body in

charge of all aspects of border management, including border surveillance at the green

border, which is currently under the responsibility of the Turkish land forces.

Implementation and enforcement capacity

Türkiye continued to invest significant effort and financial resources in modernising border

security at the land border, especially in the south and south-east of the country. After the

construction of a modular security wall and a panel/barbed-wire fence, patrol roads, lighting,

sensors and thermal cameras along the Syrian border, the installation of modern electro-

optical communication and surveillance masts continued at the Iranian border.

Communication and surveillance masts were also being erected on the western land border.

The EU provides substantial support to Türkiye to modernise its border surveillance

infrastructure, including at its eastern borders with Iran and Iraq.

Relations with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) are based on the

Memorandum of Understanding of 2012 and a three-year cooperation plan covering the

period 2020-2022. The authorities continued to provide monthly reports on irregular

migration flows at the country’s western land and sea borders. Türkiye did not engage in joint

operations in the reporting period but did participate in training sessions and conferences.

Cooperation with neighbouring Greece and Bulgaria within the framework of a trilateral

Police and Customs Co-operation Centre at the Bulgarian-Turkish border crossing point at

Kapitan Andreevo/Kapıkule continued through data-sharing, and regular ad hoc meetings

between the countries’ respective authorities within the scope of existing agreements.

Türkiye continued contributing to Interpol’s databases, albeit only on the basis of manual

inquiries in case of need (using the ‘POLNET’ website of the TNP’s Interpol & Europol

Department). Interpol’s ‘Stolen and Lost Travel Documents’ (SLTD) database is not

integrated with Türkiye’s local database and there is no access to other international police

databases. Local database connections are used by authorised officers of the Turkish National

Police in all 81 provinces. Certain staff members in the following services have access to the

databases: the Presidency of Migration Management (PMM), the Disaster and Emergency

Presidency (AFAD), the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, the Turkish Atomic Energy

Authority, the Ministry of Trade (DG Customs Enforcement), the Turkish Coast Guard

Command and the General Gendarmerie Command.

Türkiye has committed itself to removing all anti-personnel landmines by 31 December 2025

in order to fulfil its obligations under the Ottawa Convention (or Anti-personnel Mine Ban

Treaty). This deadline has been extended several times since 2014. So far, only a relatively

small stretch of the total of 2 949 km of land border has been cleared entirely. Türkiye needs

to substantially increase its national investment in removing mines not only along its borders

with Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Armenia, but also inside Türkiye in order to fulfil its obligations

under the Ottawa Convention. The EU is currently providing significant financial support for

demining.

2.3. ECONOMIC CRITERIA

In line with the conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993, EU

accession requires the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope

with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.

2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy

The Turkish economy is well advanced but made no progress over the reporting period.

Serious concerns persist over the continued proper functioning of Türkiye’s market economy.

There has been prolonged backsliding on important elements, such as the conduct of

monetary policy and the institutional and regulatory environment over most of the reporting

period. Since the May parliamentary and presidential elections, the authorities have taken

some steps to revert to more stability-oriented macroeconomic policies.

Although economic growth remained robust in 2022, Türkiye moved further away from

market-oriented policies, which weakened its economic fundamentals and increased

vulnerabilities and risks. Inflation decreased somewhat but remained very high as monetary

policy prioritised exceptionally low interest rates, which remain deeply negative in real terms

and are sustained by a web of regulatory and prudential measures. After the presidential and

parliamentary elections in spring 2023, monetary policy has started to tighten, also signalling

a gradual simplification of the macroprudential framework. The current account deficit

increased to 5.4% of GDP in 2022, driven by a negative terms-of-trade shock and large

imports of non-monetary gold. The relatively good budget performance in recent years masks

an underlying trend of growing fiscal risks. The authorities’ commitment to fiscal discipline

wavered, as the fiscal stance turned pro-cyclical in 2023, with earthquake-related expenditure

pressure adding to pre-electoral budgetary largesse. However, the fiscal stance was tightened

Table 5.1: 2020 2021 2022

Türkiye - Key economic figures

GDP per capita (% of EU-27 in PPS)

65 61 63 69

Real GDP growth 4.3 1.8 11.4 5.6

Economic activity rate of the population aged 15+ (%), total 52.1 49.3 51.4 53.1

female 32.8 30.9 32.8 35.1

male 72.0 68.2 70.3 71.4

Unemployment rate of the population aged 15+ (%), total 11.1 13.2 12.0 10.4

female 13.8 15.0 14.7 13.4

male 9.9 12.3 10.7 8.9

Employment of the population aged 15+ (annual growth %) 2.3 -4.8 7.9 6.7

Nominal wages (annual growth %) 16.5 18.0 19.3 73.2

Consumer price index (annual growth %) 11.2 12.3 19.6 72.3

Exchange rate against EUR 4.2 8.0 10.4 17.4

Current account balance (% of GDP) -2.7 -4.5 -0.9 -5.4

Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP) 1.1 0.6 0.8 0.9

General government balance (% of GDP) -2.0 -2.9 -2.3 -1.1

General government debt (% of GDP) 29.0 39.7 41.8 31.7

Notes:

1) Eurostat

Source: national sources

2014-19

average

after the elections and a revised budget, including sizeable tax increases, was adopted in July.

The institutional and regulatory environment lacks predictability and transparency, and

complicates the post-electoral economic policy normalisation. Market exit remains costly and

slow. However, Türkiye made progress in digitalising government services to businesses.

Although the size of the informal economy has fallen in recent years, it still accounts for a

significant share of economic activity. State intervention in price-setting mechanisms persists.

The provision of State aid lacks proper implementation rules, enforcement and transparency.

The banking sector remained broadly stable but is facing financial stability challenges due to

the numerous overly complex and far-reaching macroprudential and regulatory measures. The

labour market strengthened further, although structural challenges remain significant, in

particular for youth and female employment. Regional labour market disparities declined and

reached one of the lowest levels in years. The recent net minimum wage increases were

pro-cyclical.

The Commission’s recommendations from 2022 were not fully implemented and remain

valid. In order to improve the functioning of the market economy, Türkiye should in

particular:

→ restore the independence of the central bank and tighten monetary policy in order to

reduce inflation sustainably towards the target;

→ develop a credible medium-term fiscal consolidation plan that underpins a gradual return

to primary surpluses, while accommodating transparent reconstruction spending and

addressing fiscal risks, including from contingent liabilities;

→ further improve the business environment, including by reducing State interference in

price-setting mechanisms, simplifying the macroprudential and regulatory framework,

and enhancing the transparency and control of State aid.

Economic governance

Türkiye moved further away from market-oriented policies, weakening economic

fundamentals and increasing risks, but has taken some steps to reverse this course since

the May elections. Monetary policy prioritised maintaining deeply negative real interest

rates, despite soaring inflation and tightening global financial conditions. This necessitated

the adoption of far-reaching macroprudential and regulatory measures that have disrupted the

functioning of the financial markets and increased vulnerabilities. However, the central bank

has started to tighten monetary policy after the presidential and parliamentary elections in

spring 2023, also signalling a gradual simplification of the macroprudential framework.

Fiscal policy turned strongly expansionary in the first half of 2023, with earthquake-related

expenditure pressure adding to pre-electoral budgetary largesse. Ad hoc policy measures have

increasingly become the norm, undermining, in conjunction with high macroeconomic

instability, the credibility of medium-term planning. A budget rebalancing and large tax hikes

in July have sought to limit the bulging budget deficit. Subsidies and transfers to curb the

effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine increased significantly in 2022 but are

planned to decline in 2023. Türkiye has not joined the EU restrictive measures against Russia

and continued to benefit from its extensive and growing trade relations with it, particularly in

energy, tourism and agriculture. The implementation of the policy guidance set out in the

conclusions from the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2022 has been limited.

Macroeconomic stability

Türkiye’s economic growth

remained upbeat but unbalanced.

Real GDP grew by 5.5% in 2022,

which was above the five-year

average (2018-2022) of 4.5%,

although, after a strong first half of

the year, it decelerated in the second

half. It expanded further in the first

half of 2023 and growth even

strengthened a bit, despite the

devastating February earthquakes.

Domestic demand, in particular very

strong household consumption fuelled by pre-election expenditure, remained the main driver

of this. Net exports’ contribution to growth turned negative in the second half of 2022,

following a loss in export momentum and a pick-up in imports, which worsened further in

early 2023. Inventories continued to wind down and very weak construction investment

pulled down total investment growth last year. A notable expansion of technology-intensive

and export-oriented sectors lifted industrial production to record high levels in 2022. The 6

February earthquakes caused a tragic loss of life and significant destruction of capital assets.

High frequency indicators captured the first negative economic effects of the earthquakes

already in February, with steep monthly falls in industrial production and retails sales, and

declining economic confidence. However, economic activity rebounded quickly in the

following months and consumer confidence increased sharply to levels not seen in 5 years,

before steeply falling back in the aftermath of the elections. Due to Türkiye’s relatively

strong performance during the COVID-19 crisis, income convergence with the EU resumed,

with per capita GDP in purchasing power standards rising to 69% of the EU average in 2022

from 59% in 2019, and above its 2015 high of 68%.

External imbalances increased and remained a major vulnerability. The current account

deficit swelled to 5.4% of GDP in 2022 and increased further in the first half of 2023 to more

than double its average in 2018-2022, as the negative terms-of-trade shock and large imports

of non-monetary gold (a traditional safe asset in times of policy uncertainty in Türkiye) drove

the trade deficit back into double digits for the first time in a decade. However, excluding

gold and energy trade, the current account recorded a 5% surplus. The high external deficits

remain a key macroeconomic vulnerability, aggravated by the strong reliance on short-term

borrowing, a very high sovereign risk premium and the low level of foreign exchange

reserves (with a large share in non-

core foreign currencies). The central

bank’s net foreign assets even turned

negative in April as it used its

reserves to defend the exchange rate

before the elections. Reflecting

deteriorating market perception of

domestic economic policy, the five-

year credit default swap has been

high and very volatile. After peaking

in the summer of 2022 above 900 bps

(basis points), it declined to between

500 bps and 600 bps by the end of the year before spiking again following the presidential

and parliamentary elections in the spring of 2023. External debt remained moderately high at

-8

-4

2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Graph 5.1: Türkiye - Real GDP growth and

contributions

Priv. cons. Gov. cons. GFCF

Stocks Net exports Real GDP growth

Source: WiiW

% y-o-y

-6

-3

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Graph 5.2: Türkiye - Current account selected

components and FDI

Goods and services trade balance Workers' remittances balance

Current account balance Net FDI

% of GDP

Source: IMF and Central Bank of Türkiye

around 50% of GDP in early 2023, decreasing from the peak of 60% of GDP that it reached

during the COVID-19 crisis. However, the debt stock remains sensitive to the lira’s exchange

rate fluctuations and its structure worsened as economic agents increased their reliance on

short-term funding as a response to rising refinancing costs. Banks’ increased exposure to

foreign currency swaps with the central bank raises economy-wide foreign currency liquidity

concerns. The external debt roll-over ratios have been stable at close to 100% for the banking

sector but have rapidly come down under 100% in early 2023 (albeit from high levels) in the

non-banking sector. The non-financial sector’s foreign exchange deficit remained broadly

unchanged at less than 10% of GDP and its short-term position remained positive – important

factors attenuating external vulnerability.

Inflation remained high as, before the elections, monetary policy prioritised the

maintenance of exceptionally low interest rates sustained by an expanding web of

regulatory and macroprudential measures. Inflation peaked at 85.5% in October 2022. It

declined steeply in the following months on the back of sizeable base effects before

rebounding again since June, exceeding the 5% target by a very large margin. Before the

elections, inflation targeting and the free-floating exchange rate were effectively no longer

the guiding framework of monetary policy. The monetary policy transmission mechanism

was broken, with limited responsiveness by key market interest rates to the central bank

policy rate. Despite very high inflation and tightening global financial conditions, the central

bank lowered its key policy rate in the autumn of 2021 and cut it further in several steps by a

cumulative 1 050 bps to 8.5% in February 2023 (the last 50 bps cut was delivered after the

earthquakes). To sustain the resulting deeply negative real-interest rate and alleviate its policy

contradictions, the authorities have introduced an increasingly complex web of regulatory and

macroprudential measures to reduce dollarisation, support the lira, lower inflationary

pressures, ration and direct credit, and cap interest rates. This set of measures achieved some

short-term results but failed to address the fundamental drivers of high inflation; namely

deeply negative real interest rates, the absence of an effective policy anchor and the lack of

institutional independence of the central bank and key agencies. After depreciating by 40%

against the US dollar in the first three quarters of 2022, the lira remained broadly stable

before resuming its depreciation trend in early March 2023, which intensified (along with

exchange rate volatility) after the May elections. Starting in June and under the guidance of a

new central bank governor, the central bank increased the key policy rate to 25.0% in August

and signalled a gradual further tightening of monetary conditions and simplification of the

existing micro- and macroprudential framework.

The authorities’ commitment to fiscal discipline wavered and the fiscal stance turned

pro-cyclical in early 2023, necessitating the adoption of a revised budget in July. The

budget continued to outperform expectations, ending 2022 with a central government budget

deficit of 0.9% of GDP – significantly below the revised budget target of 3.4% and the

previous year’s deficit of 2.8% of

GDP. The general government deficit

fell to 1.1% of GDP, which was also

far below the expected 3.2% of GDP.

The initial 2023 central government

budget targeted a deficit of TRY

659.4 billion (3.5% of GDP) but was

based on a rather optimistic

macroeconomic assumption of 5%

real GDP growth and 24.9% average

consumer price inflation. Total

revenue was planned to increase by

36.0% and expenditure by 52.0% in comparison with the 2022 budgetary outcome. The

budget introduced some new measures but failed to fully exit the ‘crisis mode’ of ad hoc

decisions. On the revenue side, the 2% accommodation tax adopted in 2021 started to be

applied at the beginning of 2023. The corporate income tax rate has been lowered as planned

to 20%. Government expenditure increased strongly in early 2023 due to the elections and the

earthquakes. The government budget continued underwriting costly and poorly targeted

measures to support the lira and cushion the impact of high energy prices, although lower-

than-expected international gas prices and financial repression measures that forced domestic

banks to increase their holdings of government bonds led to some savings. Some spending

measures with a large budgetary impact (including public wage and pension hikes, and the

removal of the age requirement for early retirement) were finalised after budget adoption and

were not fully reflected in the original budget. The fiscal stance was tightened after the

elections. A revised budget was adopted in July, including multiple and sizeable tax increases

(VAT, corporate income tax, special consumption tax, motor vehicle tax, etc.) and additional

expenditure to cover earthquake reconstruction needs and pre-election spending measures.

The relatively good budget performance in recent years masks an underlying trend of

growing fiscal risks. The government debt ratio peaked at 42.3% of GDP in early 2022 but

came down to 31.2% of GDP in early 2023, helped by the strong denominator effect from the

very high level of inflation. Concerted ‘liraisation’ efforts increased the share of new

domestic borrowing in lira to 90% in 2022. Nonetheless, two thirds of the total debt stock

remains denominated in foreign currencies, while the average time to maturity of the debt

stock remained unchanged at 5.4 years, as external debt maturity decreased for the fifth year

in a row. Some measures, such as the FX-guaranteed lira deposits, had a direct and sizeable

impact on the budget and are a significant source of (contingent) budget liabilities, even after

they were fully transferred to the central bank in July. Successive crises and shocks triggered

the adoption of numerous ad hoc measures with budgetary effects that have strained public

finance management. The multiple and sizeable tax exemptions and reductions undermine tax

bases and complicate planning, while successive tax amnesties have become the rule rather

than the exception, despite official policy declarations. The planned new single consolidated

framework for all public-private partnerships has yet to be adopted. Even though fiscal

performance has been consistently robust in recent years, there are still no national fiscal

rules or independent fiscal institutions to monitor fiscal performance. The medium-term

budget framework is subject to frequent changes and is not sufficiently credible and binding.

-4

-2

2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Graph 5.3: Türkiye - Fiscal developments

Primary balance (lhs) Interest (lhs)

GG balance (lhs) Public debt (rhs)

Source: National sources

% of GDP

The macroeconomic policy mix remained largely focused on the pursuit of growth at the

expense of rising economic vulnerability. Fiscal policy turned expansionary in early 2023,

despite the very high level of inflation and large external imbalances. The maintenance of

deeply negative real interest rates by the central bank and the complex web of regulatory and

macroprudential measures to sustain them created major vulnerabilities, led to market

fragmentation and disrupted price signals. The low level of policy credibility and institutional

weaknesses (including the lack of central bank independence) undermine the effectiveness of

the policy mix and hinders the post-electoral economic policy normalisation.

Functioning of product markets

Business environment

The institutional and regulatory environment is characterised by weaknesses in

transparency, predictability and rule-based implementation. The government’s highly

interventionist pre-election policy increased uncertainty and volatility on the product and

financial markets. Türkiye lacks a mechanism for systematically consulting business

organisations and social partners during the preparation of new legislation. Intellectual

property right enforcement continues to be very weak. According to the e-Government

Benchmark report of the EU for 2022, Türkiye performed above the EU average in enabling

regular areas of business operation (such as administrative and tax requirements, human

resources and refund of VAT) on digital platforms, except for those that require cross-border

transactions. However, Türkiye's performance is lower in online services for new business,

which remain relatively cumbersome. Market exit remained costly and time-consuming due

to complicated insolvency procedures. Türkiye digitalised some steps in the insolvency

procedure, such as liquidation, but it still takes 1 037 days on average to complete a

bankruptcy process through the judicial system. Even though alternative dispute resolution

mechanisms have been promoted, commercial judicial processes are slow and a large backlog

of commercial court cases remains. The number of newly established businesses increased by

27.8% in 2022, while the number of liquidated companies went up by 26.0% and the number

of closed ones by 42.8%. The acquisition and management of companies under the

trusteeship of the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF) are carried out in a non-

transparent manner. In June 2023, the trusteeship of the Fund was managing 620 companies

based in 35 provinces across Türkiye, with a total asset value of TRY 128.9 billion and

27 213 employees.

The informal sector’s share in the economy declined but remains structurally high and

well above the OECD and EU averages. In 2022, the share of unregistered employment fell

to 26.8% from 34.8% in 2019, while in the non-agricultural sector it was down to 16.8% from

23.3%. The government announced its new action plan for the fight against the informal

economy (2023-2025) in December 2022. The plan includes 44 actions to measure the size of

the informal economy; raise the level of social awareness and voluntary compliance; improve

cooperation and interagency data sharing; adopt legal, administrative and technical measures;

and strengthen audit capacity. However, the plan lacks performance indicators to track its

implementation progress.

State influence on product markets

The State increased its intervention in the price-setting mechanism of key sectors. More

than a quarter of the consumer basket is composed of goods whose prices are set or heavily

influenced by public authorities. A 25% upper cap on rent increases was applied until July

2023. A month before the May elections, the Energy Market Regulatory Authority cut

electricity tariffs by 15%. Households and places of worship were exempted from natural gas

payment for a month and 25 cubic meters have been provided free of charge to citizens

starting in June 2023 for the following 11 months. Meanwhile, the regulators have continued

carrying out intensive price audits to investigate allegations of unfair pricing and stockpiling,

particularly in essential products. The VAT exemption period for new equipment and

machinery deliveries to the manufacturing sector for innovation, design and R&D activities

was extended until the end of 2024. Following the February 2023 earthquakes, the VAT rate

applicable to prefabricated buildings and containers to be delivered to the earthquake zone

was reduced from 18% to 1% until 31 December 2023.

State aid transparency and control remains weak. Legislation to implement the State aid

law has not been adopted. The newly established Directorate-General for State Aid has not

been assigned any enforcement power regarding the State aid law. The lack of implementing

legislation and an operational institutional framework mean that this law is not enforceable.

Türkiye has not formally set up a comprehensive state aid inventory or adopted an action plan

to align all State aid schemes with the EU acquis. The current structure of State aid control is

neither independent nor operational (see Chapter 8). The committed investment for the 64

supported projects reached TRY 491 billion in May 2023. As is the case for the general

incentive scheme, Türkiye has not published data concerning the actual support granted to

these projects. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) benefit from numerous support

measures and initiatives in a fragmented way. The SME Development Organisation of

Türkiye (KOSGEB) and the Ministry of Industry and Technology conducted evaluations of

four more support programmes in the reporting period and published them on KOSGEB’s

website.

Privatisation and restructuring

The scope of privatisation remained limited. Privatisation receipts increased from

USD 413 million in 2021 to USD 504 million in 2022 (less than 0.1% of GDP), with 87.5%

related to the sale of real assets. The Turkish Wealth Fund (TWF) holds shares in major

companies in the financial (including state-owned banks, Borsa Istanbul and consolidated

public insurance companies), telecommunications, petrochemicals, real estate, mining,

agriculture and transport sectors. The Law on the Istanbul Financial Centre adopted in June

2022 granted the TWF the right to conduct all business and management operations in the

Istanbul Financial Centre area for 20 years, with a managing company established as a joint

stock company. The involvement of the TWF through this company means that these

operations will be exempted from audit by the Turkish Court of Accounts (see Chapter 32).

In addition to the numerous immunities granted to the TWF, this law provides a series of new

tax exemptions, deductions and incentives. The TWF’s total assets increased to TRY 3.2

trillion (44.1% of GDP) at the end of 2021, up from TRY 2.2 trillion (43.6% of GDP) in

2020.

Functioning of the financial market

Financial stability

The banking sector has remained broadly stable but is facing financial stability

challenges. The commercial banks’ average regulatory capital ratio declined from its peak of

20.4% in early 2022 to 18.7% in July 2023 but stayed significantly above the required

minimum. The decline was more pronounced in State-owned banks, whose capitalisation fell

to 14.5% in early 2023 – a two-decade low – despite several recapitalisation rounds in

previous years, before rebounding to 16.3% in July. The fall in capitalisation was the result of

banks’ support for the authorities’ economic and development agenda, including in the

aftermath of the February 2023 earthquakes. Some of the macroprudential measures to

2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Graph 5.4: Türkiye - Labour market trends

(15+ age group)

Unemployment rate (lhs) Participation rate (rhs)

Employment rate (rhs)

Source: Turkstat

protect capital adequacy have been modified but remain in place (e.g., allowing the use of an

outdated FX rate and the suspension of mark-to-market accounting rules). Credit growth, the

extremely negative real interest rates and growing collateral valuation brought the non-

performing loans ratio down to a new low (falling in July 2023 to 1.6% in the banking sector

as a whole and to just 1.0% in the State-owned banks) while loan-loss provisioning increased

further. The share of stage 2 loans under close monitoring also declined to below 10%. Bank

profitability improved but remained negative in real terms. The average return on assets was

3.7% and return on equity was 49.9% for the banking sector as a whole in 2022, but were

only 2.0% and 29.9% respectively in State-owned banks. FX-guaranteed deposits were

around a quarter of total deposits in mid-2023, bringing the share of lira-denominated

deposits to 57.4% (still below their level a decade ago), while underlying dollarisation

increased.

Access to finance

The financial sector operates in an overregulated environment. Far-reaching

macroprudential and regulatory measures have disrupted the functioning of the financial

markets. Reducing interest rates and keeping them down necessitated additional actions to

mitigate the fundamental contradictions of such a policy in a high-inflation environment. A

series of incentives and restrictions have been introduced since late 2021, covering:

FX-protected lira-denominated deposits; maintenance of a certain share of lira-denominated

deposits; reserve and security requirements; collateral in swap and interbank money markets;

tax exemptions; FX-surrender requirements for exporters; capital adequacy ratios; risk

weighting; and commercial loans. These measures rationed and directed credit, and replaced

price signals with quantitative targets or directly socialised risk. As part of the economic

policy changes initiated after the elections, the authorities have undertaken some limited steps

to gradually simplify the macroprudential framework. After declining in 2022, total lending

rebounded in early 2023 (mainly driven by SME, consumer, and credit card loans) but was, at

52.1% of GDP in June, still far below its five-year moving average. Lending to non-financial

companies remained largely subdued – except for SME loans, which were supported by

regulatory measures. The very high level of inflation led to banking-sector assets falling

sharply from 127% of GDP in 2021 to 96% in 2022, while the share of foreign-owned banks

in total banking sector assets declined from 25.9 % to 24.9%.

Functioning of the labour market

The labour market strengthened but structural challenges remain significant. Job

creation was very strong in 2022 but slowed down in early 2023. In the second quarter of

2023, the seasonally adjusted labour force participation and employment rates reached 53.4%

and 48.2% respectively. The labour force moved into more productive activities. There were

notable job gains in industry and

construction, and particularly large job

creation in services, while agriculture

continued shedding labour. The shift in

employment out of agriculture also

caused a decline in the share of

workers without social security

registration to around a quarter of all

employment in early 2023. The

seasonally adjusted unemployment rate

declined to single digits for the first

time in 5 years. However, time-related

underemployment and the potential labour force increased from an already high level,

indicating labour market slack that is still structurally significant (as evidenced by the 23.5%

labour under-utilisation). Women’s participation in the labour market continued to increase,

although the gap with male participation remained very high (above 35 pps). Türkiye

maintained its strong focus on supporting entrepreneurial learning and women’s

entrepreneurship. However, job creation lagged and the gap between the male and female

employment and unemployment rates widened further. In the second quarter of 2023, the

share of young people (15-24 years) not in employment, education or training (NEET) stood

at 20.8%, falling across most educational levels. Regional labour market disparities declined

and reached one of the lowest levels in years, with the unemployment rate across different

regions ranging from 6.2% to 19.2% in 2022. Following two large increases in 2022, the net

minimum wage was raised again by 54.6% in early 2023 and by 34.0% in July – pro-cyclical

rises that fostered inflation and further disrupted the functioning of the labour market.

2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the

Union

Türkiye has a good level of preparation and made limited progress in achieving the

capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Despite

improved vocational training, the mismatch between the education system and labour market

needs remains a concern. Expenditure on research and development has continued to

increase, albeit at a very slow pace, and is still below the government’s target. Investment

was relatively subdued in 2022. There was progress in the diversification of energy supplies

and the share of energy generated from renewable sources increased significantly. However,

the local content requirement in the renewable energy generation sector is a discriminatory

practice and a cause for concern. Trade openness increased further, but integration with the

EU continued falling, although remaining high. Deviations from Türkiye’s obligations under

the EU-Turkey Customs Union continue to hinder bilateral trade.

The Commission’s recommendations from 2022 were not fully implemented and remain

valid. In order to improve competitiveness and support long-term growth, Türkiye should in

particular:

→ continue increasing enrolment in education (especially pre-education), support the school-

to-work transition and the activation of young people who are not in education,

employment or training (NEET) NEET and incentivise female labour market

participation;

→ take further steps to diversify energy supplies and increase the share of renewables in the

energy mix;

→ improve SMEs’ access to long-term finance.

Education and innovation

Efforts to improve human capital continued, but skills mismatch remains a key

concern. Total expenditure on education was 4.8% of GDP in 2021, representing a real year-

on-year decrease of 27.1%. Government spending was 3.4% of GDP in 2021, decreasing

further by 0.6 pps from 2020. In the 2021-2022 school year, net enrolment rates decreased for

primary education (the first 4 years) but increased for lower secondary education (the second

4 years), upper secondary (the final 4 years) and (marginally) for tertiary education. There

has been a significant progress in pre-school attendance (see Chapter 26). However, Türkiye

continues to score poorly in educational attainment in the Gender Gap Index calculated by the

World Economic Forum, ranking 129th of 146 countries in 2023. The share of students in

vocational and technical secondary education has reversed its previous downward trend and

increased by 0.6 pps to 28.0% in 2022. The share of pupils in religious education fell below

10% in upper secondary education for the first time in 8 years. It also decreased, albeit

marginally to 13.4%, in lower secondary education. Türkiye has the largest skills gap for

workers with tertiary education among the OECD countries. There is a persistent mismatch

between the skills acquired in the education system and the requirements of the labour

market, including those relevant for the digital transformation and green transition.

Investment in R&D increased further, albeit at a slow pace and lagging the EU’s

performance. R&D expenditure increased gradually from 0.8% of GDP in 2013 to 1.4% in

2021, but the gap with the EU average of 2.3% remains large. The government has intensified

its support for business research and innovation, including through tax incentives. The private

sector continues to be the main driver of R&D, with a 61.3% share of R&D expenditure.

There is still significant room to enhance cooperation between research institutions and

economic operators. In the Global Innovation Index 2022, Türkiye’s overall score has

improved so that it now ranks 37th out of 132 countries, thus entering the top 40 for the first

time ever. However, according to the EU innovation scoreboard, Türkiye’s innovation score

declined from 49.2% in 2021 to 47.7% in 2022 and the performance gap with the EU has

widened further. The number of domestic patent applications increased by 6.8% in 2022 by

comparison with 2021, but Türkiye’s total international patent applications declined

significantly by 25.0% in the same period.

Physical capital and quality of infrastructure

Investment activity was relatively subdued in 2022. In 2022, total investment accounted

for 29.2% of GDP, up by 1.0 pps from its 2021 level. Construction’s share of total investment

fell to a historic low level in 2022, but rebounded in the first half of 2023, with the

government’s social housing project and its reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of the

February earthquakes. Machinery and equipment’s share of investment followed the opposite

pattern, falling from its 2022 peak to 44.6% in the second quarter of 2023. Total net foreign

direct investment (FDI) were 0.9% of GDP in 2022, close to its 5-year average. Geopolitical

uncertainties, the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances and an unpredictable business and

regulatory environment remain the main obstacles to attracting foreign investment.

Diversification of energy supplies has improved and the use of renewables substantially

increased. Türkiye has high ambitions to become a regional energy hub and is investing

heavily in the exploration of new gas fields in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, as well

as in building new LNG terminals. However, dependence on oil and gas imports (particularly

natural gas imports from Russia) remains high and energy demand is steadily growing despite

energy efficiency measures. The establishment of a national emissions trading system (ETS)

aligned with the EU ETS and with a sufficient level of ambition (notably in the overall cap on

allowances) remains a necessary precondition for the economy’s cost-effective

decarbonisation. Türkiye raised the share of renewable energy in the country’s installed

power capacity to 54% in 2022. Private investment continued driving growth in renewable

installations and the preferential feed-in-tariff was extended until 2030. In addition, the

National Energy Plan (2023-2035) released in January 2023 aims at further increasing the

shares of renewable energy sources and of nuclear energy in installed capacity and in primary

energy consumption by 2035. The plan was prepared in line with Türkiye’s 2053 Net Zero

Emission Target, which implies a further increase of up to 50% of renewable energy sources

in primary energy consumption, as well as a sharp decrease in the share of fossil resources

from 83.3% in 2020 to 20.8% by 2053.

Competition and pricing mechanism issues persist in the energy sector. There was

limited progress in liberalising energy markets, as the unbundling of the State-owned gas

company BOTAȘ was once again suspended. As a result, BOTAȘ remained vertically

integrated (comprising gas trade, pipeline and LNG infrastructure) and retained its dominant

market position – thus hindering transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory pricing.

The local content requirement practices in the renewable energy generation sector are

discriminatory and a cause for concern because they impair EU companies’ competitiveness

in the Turkish energy market. Türkiye continues to be an important gas-transit country,

ensuring the smooth operation of the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) which, as part of

the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), transmits natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe by

connecting to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) (see Chapter 15).

The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the economy’s digital transformation. The

telecommunication sector is subject to specific taxation and various fees that were increased

as part of the budget consolidation efforts in July. Although the ICT sector’s share in GDP

remains low at 2.3% in 2022, the number of broadband internet subscribers reached

90.6 million in 2022, up from 88.2 million in 2021. The total number of mobile broadband

users was 71.7 million at the end of 2022, representing a population penetration rate of 84%

that remains significantly below the OECD average of 124.5%. Türkiye nevertheless has the

lowest average download speed of fixed broadband connection in the OECD. The share of

citizens using e-government rose from 58.9% in 2021 to 68.7% in 2022. Türkiye ranks 16 out

of 35 countries with an overall score of 72% in e-Government maturity, which is above the

EU average (68%). Digitalisation efforts in business continued, with the share of enterprises

involved in e-sales increasing to 19.3% in 2021, up by 6.8 pps from 2020 level (see Chapter

10).

Sectoral and enterprise structure

The economy is dominated by the service sector, but its share declined. Service sector

employment remained largely unchanged in the last 5 years, accounting for 56.6% of total

employment in 2022. Service activities surged in 2022, led particularly by accommodation

and food, transportation, and financial and insurance services. However, their share in GDP

declined to a multi-year low of 56.6%, largely due to the expansion of industry. Industry

accounted for 21.7% of employment in 2022, up by 0.3 pps from its 2021 level. It increased

its share of GDP from the low 20s pre-COVID-19 to above 26% of GDP in 2021 and 2022.

The construction sector slowed down, with its share in GDP decreasing slightly from 5.1% in

2021 to 4.9% in 2022. Similarly, the sector’s share in total employment declined to 6.0%,

down by 0.1 pps from its 2021 level. By contrast, the agriculture sector’s share in GDP

increased from 5.5% in 2021 to 6.5% in 2022. However, its share in total employment

dropped further to 15.7% in 2022 (down by 1.5 pps from its 2021 level).

Small and medium-sized enterprises are the backbone of the economy but face multiple

challenges. SMEs employ around three quarters of all workers and generate more than half

of the economy’s value added. Around 56% of SMEs in the manufacturing sector operate in

low technology sectors. Türkiye has continued to implement various economic support

schemes targeting SMEs. Targeted credit support improved SMEs access to finance and their

share in total loans increased to around 28% in the first half of 2023, up from 24% in the

previous 5 years. However, long-term finance remains a key problem for SMEs and they are

financed mostly through short-term loans or equity. KOSGEB provides support to companies

on R&D, innovation, product development, internationalisation, entrepreneurship and

investment in high technology and strategic products. The Scientific and Technological

Research Council of Türkiye also implements SME support schemes.

Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness

Economic integration with the EU declined further but remains high. Türkiye is the

EU’s seventh largest trading partner, representing 3.3% of the EU’s total trade in goods with

the world in 2022, while the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner by far.

The EU’s share of Turkish exports declined to 40.5% in 2022 – on a downward trend since

2018 – while the share of Turkish imports originating in the EU decreased strongly from

31.5% in 2021 to 25.6% in 2022 – well below its long-term average and largely due to strong

price effects and increased energy imports from non-EU countries (notably Russia). The

EU’s share of FDI inflows into Türkiye increased markedly from 40% in 2021 to 79% in

2022. The EU’s share in the overall stock of FDI rebounded to 68% in 2022 but was still

below its long-term average of around 70%. Trade openness continued to increase steeply in

2022, reaching 81% of GDP (up from levels around 50% before 2017) as both exports and

imports reached new highs.

In 2022, Türkiye removed some of the additional duties imposed on products of non-EU

origin and in free circulation within the EU-Turkey Customs Union. However, many

additional duties remain in force, in breach of the rules of the EU-Turkey Customs Union.

Non-tariff barriers, such as import surveillance and excessive customs checks, continue to

hinder trade flows.

2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS, FINANCIAL CONTROL

Chapter 5: Public procurement

EU rules ensure that the public procurement of goods and services in any Member State is

transparent and open to all EU companies on the basis of non-discrimination and equal

treatment.

Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of public procurement, with significant gaps

remaining to align with the EU acquis. There was backsliding in the reporting period as

Türkiye increased the use of the negotiated procedure (lacking transparency), of

discriminatory domestic price advantage practices and continued to allow offsets that favour

local content.

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented, and therefore

remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ revise its public procurement legislation to further align it with the 2014 EU directives on

public procurement, including utilities, concessions and public-private partnerships, and to

increase transparency;

→ reduce the excessive use of the negotiated procedure that distorts competition and limits

transparency;

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Graph 5.5a: Türkiye - Exports of goods

EU CEFTA Other

Source: WiiW

% of GDP

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Graph 5.5b: Türkiye - Imports of goods

EU CEFTA Other

Source: WiiW

% of GDP

→ repeal exemptions that are incompatible with the EU acquis and refrain from the use of

discriminatory domestic price advantages and offset practices.

Institutional set-up and legal alignment

In terms of the legal framework, Türkiye's national public procurement legislation broadly

reflects the principles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. However, it

includes compulsory domestic price advantages and offsets, which allow authorities to

demand compensatory measures if goods are not produced domestically, which is

discriminatory and contradicts the EU acquis.

The Public Procurement Law (PPL) is partially aligned with the EU Public Procurement

Directives of 2014. A growing list of exclusions that are incompatible with the acquis

reduces the scope of public procurement rules. In addition, many sector-specific laws limit

transparency. The legislation allows the mandatory procurement of goods and services from

the State Supply Office for public institutions and organisations. In practice, this mandatory

centralised purchasing system enables Türkiye to expand the scope of exclusions, as State

Supply Office procurements under TRY 66.2 million are exempt from the PPL. The

thresholds are also higher than those used in the EU for supplies and services.

The country still lacks a unified framework for coordinating, supervising and monitoring

public-private partnership operations. A more consistent legal framework for concessions and

public-private partnerships is needed to increase transparency and efficiency. Türkiye does

not publicly disclose information on public-private partnership contracts in a transparent

manner in order to avoid allegations of political influence on public tenders. Doing so would

also enable a better evaluation of contingent fiscal liabilities.

Public procurement legislation and policy papers, including Türkiye's Green Deal action plan,

do not include strategies for transitioning to green procurement, which would contribute

significantly to sustainable consumption and production.

Türkiye's 11

Development Plan (2019-2023) and 2023 Presidential Annual Programme aim

to increase domestic production by using public procurement as tool to grant subsidies. For

this purpose, it makes available a compulsory domestic price advantage of up to 15% for

some ‘medium and high-technology industrial products’ and has put in place legislation

encouraging offset practices. Based on updated statistics, a high percentage of international

tenders apply the domestic price advantage, rising from 37% in 2017 to 43.5% in 2022. The

overall value of these tenders increased from 44% to 52.4% of the total over the same

timeframe. The domestic price advantage, distorting competition against international

tenderers, was applied in 63% of supply tenders, 38% of work tenders, 74% of consultancy

and 18% of service tenders, corresponding to 41%, 65%, 23% and 74% of the total value of

tenders respectively.

The operational independence of the Public Procurement Board within the Public

Procurement Authority is potentially impaired since the President of the Republic is

authorised to directly appoint the chair and members without specific regard to candidates'

education or sector experience.

Implementation and enforcement capacity

The size of Türkiye's public procurement market increased slightly from 4.1% in 2021 to

4.8% of GDP in 2022.

The level of monitoring of contract awards and implementation is satisfactory. The Public

Procurement Authority issues statistics every six months to help measure performance and

improve the public procurement system. The capacity of contracting authorities to manage

public procurement processes continued to improve. Türkiye extended the mandatory use of

electronic procurement to cover 47 659 tenders (up from 30 198 in 2021).

Mechanisms are in place to identify and tackle corrupt and fraudulent practices, including

rules on integrity and conflict of interest. However, the use of the negotiated procedure

continued to increase significantly, reaching nearly one third of all tenders (both in value and

number). Contracting authorities are allowed to exercise discretion in certain unexpected

circumstances that cannot be objectively measured. This limits competition and transparency

regardless of any threshold when using this procedure. In 2022, it was the case in 91.34% of

the tenders (in value) where the negotiated procedure was used. Such widespread use of this

practice, which limits transparency and competition, strengthened allegations of political

influence on public tenders. It is important to develop instruments to evaluate contract

performance and benchmark the economic performance, effectiveness, and efficiency of

public procurement procedures and of contract management by an individual contracting

authority or entity. A risk indicator system is needed to alert on potential integrity problems

in the procurement process.

Efficient remedy system

The right to a legal remedy, secured in the Constitution and the Public Procurement Law,

creates an institutional framework and a mechanism for handling complaints. The review and

remedies system ensures that complaints and penalties are dealt with and resolved in an

efficient, timely and competent manner. However, the system needs to be further aligned with

the EU Remedies Directive. To that end, creating a fully independent procurement review

board, separate from the Public Procurement Authority and ensuring the independence of

board members, remains pending as a priority.

The implementation capacity of the Public Procurement Board remains stable with 341 staff.

The Board received 1 773 complaints in 2022 (2.08% of contracts that allow for complaints),

down from 2 343 complaints in 2021 (which corresponded to 3.25% of contracts). The

appointment policy and the Board’s position as part of the Public Procurement Authority

remained a source of concern. A fully independent Public Procurement Board would

eliminate potential conflicts of interest and increase transparency.

Chapter 18: Statistics

EU rules require Member States to produce statistics based on professional independence,

impartiality, reliability, transparency, and confidentiality. Common rules are in place for the

methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information.

Türkiye is moderately prepared on statistics and made some progress in the reporting

period, with work continuing to harmonise its statistical methodology with EU standards. The

Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) improved its compliance with the timeframes for

publishing annual national accounts and excessive deficit procedure notifications. It took

further steps to improve cooperation with other main data providers. However, Türkiye needs

to increase the credibility of TurkStat and public trust in official statistics.

The Commission’s 2022 recommendations were only partially met, and therefore remain

valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ increase the credibility of TurkStat and public trust in its macroeconomic statistics by

different measures, including setting transparent, professional criteria on the appointment

of the president of TurkStat and any grounds for dismissal, which cannot compromise

TurkStat’s professional or scientific independence;

→ step up efforts to fully align national accounts with the European System of Accounts

2010 (ESA 2010) and the requirements of the ESA 2010 transmission programme;

→ improve statistics on agriculture, migration and asylum, and make progress towards

alignment with the new requirements in short-term business statistics.

As regards statistical infrastructure, Türkiye’s statistics legislation is based on the

European Statistics Code of Practice. TurkStat is an associated institution to the Ministry of

Treasury and Finance. However, there are concerns about the credibility of TurkStat and

about the declining public trust in certain macroeconomic statistics. Frequent previous

changes in management have significantly undermined the institution’s credibility. The

principles of transparency and merit-based selection processes are important for the integrity

of the institution. The institution still lacks transparent appointment and dismissal procedures,

including transparent, professional criteria for the appointment of the president of TurkStat.

Preparations for the fifth strategic plan (2024-2028) are ongoing. In February 2023, TurkStat

published a new regulation outlining the principles and procedures for preparing and

implementing official statistics programmes. Improvements have been made to the use of

public institutions' administrative records and in cooperation between TurkStat and other data

providers. Registers in the statistical office are updated regularly. The main classifications are

aligned with the EU acquis.

Regarding macroeconomic statistics, Türkiye improved the level of compliance of its annual

national accounts in terms of timeliness, but there are still data gaps, both for annual and

quarterly national accounts. Gross National Income (GNI) calculations are not yet fully in

line with the ESA 2010, and its GNI inventory is not fully aligned with the latest Eurostat

GNI Inventory Guide. Türkiye made some progress in the excessive deficit procedure

reporting, in particular in terms of data timeliness, but further efforts are required to timely

prepare and transmit complete excessive deficit procedure notifications and government

finance statistics. Türkiye produces good quality statistics on international trade in goods. It

continued reporting quarterly balance of payments and international investment position data.

It provided monthly data for the harmonised index of consumer prices. Türkiye submits all

the data required for the calculation of purchasing power parities.

Türkiye continues to extend the use of administrative data to produce business statistics.

TurkStat works on aligning its statistical business registers with the European Business

Statistics Regulation requirements. Short-term business statistics are partly aligned. Research

and development statistics have achieved a high level of compliance. The annual surveys on

the use of information and communication technologies meet EU standards to a large extent.

Rail, maritime and regional transport statistics also have a high level of compliance. In

August 2022, a data transfer agreement was signed between TurkStat and the Ministry of

Transport and Infrastructure for road freight transport statistics. The country has not yet

transmitted data to Eurostat on foreign affiliates statistics.

On social statistics, Türkiye published the results of the 2021 population and housing census

in December 2022. TurkStat conducted a survey on building and dwelling characteristics to

provide administrative data sources on housing characteristics for the census. It carries out

the survey on income and living conditions in line with EU standards and sends data to

Eurostat. Social protection statistics are highly compliant with EU standards and labour

market statistics are fully aligned. TurkStat has yet to provide Eurostat with Labour Force

Survey data in line with the new EU acquis. Türkiye regularly sends data for the labour cost

index, though the data is not yet fully complete. It runs the structure of earnings survey every

four years, in line with EU legislation. Statistics on education and vocational training are

available. Based solely on administrative registers, Türkiye published indicators on higher

education employment for the first time in August 2022. Public health statistics are available,

but further progress is needed on health expenditure, non-monetary healthcare statistics and

causes of death statistics. TurkStat also provides some data on the functioning of the justice

system and prison statistics. Türkiye also produces statistics on immigration and emigration,

but it does not yet collect statistics on asylum in line with EU requirements.

On agricultural statistics, Türkiye has not carried out an agricultural census since 2001. The

2016 farm structure survey results have not yet been sent to the Eurofarm system. TurkStat

and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry have to strengthen their efforts to improve

administrative registers. Statistics for most of the crops and for most of the critical animal

production, milk and dairy are available and sent to Eurostat, even though sometimes with

delay. Cereals and oil seed crop balances are also transmitted to Eurostat. The economic

accounts for agriculture are still not fully in line with the EU acquis.

Energy statistics are mostly in line with EU requirements. Monthly and annual energy

statistics are sent regularly. Data on energy prices are also sent to Eurostat regularly and are

of good quality. Work is ongoing on energy consumption in households. TurkStat is making

progress in physical energy flow accounts. On environmental statistics, Türkiye produces

waste and water statistics, but further progress is still needed on water resources, water

abstraction and waste generation statistics. Statistics related to greenhouse gas emissions,

environmental taxes, material flow accounts, air emission accounts and environmental

protection expenditure accounts are available.

Chapter 32: Financial control

The EU promotes the reform of national governance systems to improve managerial

accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of

public funds. The financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against

fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting.

Türkiye has a good level of preparation on financial control. It made no progress over the

reporting period. The public internal financial control policy paper was not updated. The

purpose, authority and responsibility of internal audit are undermined by the lack of a legal

requirement to have internal audit units in ministries.

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.

In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ organise a new round of public expenditures and financial accountability (PEFA) to assess

the performance of the current public finance management, help prepare a comprehensive

public financial management strategy and update the public internal financial control

policy paper and the related action plan;

→ adopt a national anti-fraud strategy;

→ review the arrangements for including municipalities and state-owned enterprises in the

treasury single account.

Public internal financial control

The strategic framework is partially in place. There has been no progress on the update of

the public internal financial control policy paper since 2012. Türkiye still lacks a

comprehensive strategic framework for public administration reform and for public finance

management. Public finance management-related goals are contained in different planning

documents and strategies, and there is no mechanism to coordinate implementation of

reforms and to ensure regular monitoring and reporting.

The Turkish administration has a uniform management structure that combines elements of

managerial accountability and delegation with a results-oriented performance management

system. The Public Financial Management and Control Law (PFMC Law) applies to all

public institutions and specifies the elements of financial control. It sets out the

responsibilities of the heads of public institutions, including managerial duties and delegates

authority to authorising officers, with the Ministry of Finance and Treasury assigned a

coordinating role. Further efforts are needed to harmonise legislation, managerial

accountability, including reporting structures, delegating decision-making responsibilities and

the functioning of internal control. The use of public finance management diagnostic tools

such as PEFA could help identify and fill current gaps in implementing the public financial

management and control Law.

The PFMC Law regulates internal control, which functions largely in line with international

standards. Implementation of internal control systems remains undermined by capacity and

ownership issues. Work needs to continue to apply risk management. The monitoring and

reporting of irregularities also merits further development. Türkiye has a treasury single

account, but the fact that it includes in its scope local administrations and state-owned

enterprises raises concerns.

Internal audit practice is regulated in line with international standards in the PFMC Law.

The internal audit manual and a code of ethics prepared by the Central Harmonisation Unit

have not been updated since 2013. Türkiye has adopted implementing legislation on working

procedures and principles of internal audit and took steps to increase the number of internal

auditors and provide training. However, there is still no legal requirement for ministries to

have an internal audit unit, only for internal auditors. In addition, there is no formal status for

heads of internal audit as unit heads. There is no entity that performs the role of an audit

committee and therefore auditors report directly to their deputy ministers or to a senior

manager. These reporting arrangements could compromise auditor independence. There is no

systematic follow-up to the implementation of internal audit recommendations. The lack of

clarity in the legislation and in practice between the internal audit and inspection

organisations compromises the effectiveness of the internal audit function.

Two Central Harmonisation Units (CHU) are tasked with setting standards, monitoring and

reporting on implementing public internal financial control. The CHU for financial

management and control sets standards and the methodology providing guidance, training

and overall coordination to public administrations in this field. The Internal Audit

Coordination Board is the CHU for internal audit, which notably monitors the internal audit

systems of the public administrations, develops internal audit standards and publishes

manuals. The CHU for financial management and control has prepared a draft guide on

internal control quality reviews and completed pilot projects in three public administration

bodies. The Internal Audit Coordination Board consists of seven members appointed by the

President for four years and is now fully attached to the Ministry of Finance and Treasury.

Further action is needed to ensure its independence and boost its capacity, organisational

structure and resources to fulfil its mandate.

External audit

The constitutional and legal framework provides for the independence of the Turkish Court

of Accounts (TCA). There are concerns regarding the fiscal discipline, transparency and

accountability of the Türkiye Wealth Fund (TWF), chaired by the President of the Republic

and not fully subject to direct audit by the TCA. The TWF is audited by an independent audit

firm and by auditors appointed by the President. Not all companies in the TWF portfolio are

audited by the TCA. The 2022 audit report was not published on the TWF website. In 2022,

amendments to the Law on the establishment of the Türkiye Wealth Fund Management

Company (TWFMC) introduced exemptions and exceptions. These new provisions are

applicable to companies, funds and their subsidiaries of which the TWF or the TWFMC is the

controlling shareholder. Operations and management of the Istanbul Financial Centre will be

carried out by a TWF managing company, which is not accountable to the TCA. The Disaster

Reconstruction Fund, created in 2023 to manage the funds allocated to disaster recovery

work, is excluded from the general budget and the TCA audit scope. The law establishing the

Fund requires it to be audited in line with international auditing standards, but it does not

clearly specify the procurement principles to be used for Fund expenditure.

Turkish Court of Accounts Law is in line with International Organisation of Supreme Audit

Institutions (INTOSAI) standards. It provides for an almost exhaustive audit mandate and

gives the TCA full discretion in discharging its responsibilities. The TCA has both audit and

judicial functions. In 2022, it had 1 837 staff, including 819 auditors, down from 1 920 staff

in 2021, of which 865 were auditors. The TCA is implementing its 2019-2023 strategic plan,

which includes running risk-based audits and strengthening its human resources capacity. It

has updated its manuals for public enterprise audit, performance audit, audit reporting and

local government company audit.

The TCA has improved the quality of audit work. It submits four audit reports a year to the

parliament in addition to a statement of general conformity. The TCA reports are only

evaluated by parliament during its budget deliberations.

Regarding the impact of audit work, TCA reports are published online every year, with the

exception of those on state-owned economic enterprises. The audited institutions should

systematically and swiftly implement the TCA recommendations. A working group between

the TCA and the Ministry of Treasury and Finance is operational but more parliamentary

scrutiny of TCA audit findings and recommendations is needed. There is a need to separate

the discussion of budget and audit issues. Setting up a working group between the TCA and

the parliament solely dedicated to discussing the performance of public institutions and their

spending could be instrumental in this regard.

Protection of the EU’s financial interests

Although Türkiye has reached a good level of alignment with the EU acquis, it still needs to

fully align its legislation with the EU Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU’s

financial interests by means of criminal law. The State Supervisory Council was designated

as the anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS); AFCOS is operational and held its first

meeting in June 2022. There is no national anti-fraud strategy for protecting the EU’s

financial interests. Türkiye reported 917 cases to the Commission via the online irregularity

management system from 2006 to 2022, of which 127 cases were reported in 2022. Türkiye

needs to continue on the path of its improved track record of cooperating with the

European Commission during investigations. It should keep on building its track record on

reporting of irregularities along the trends of the last years.

Protection of the euro against counterfeiting

Türkiye has reached a high level of alignment with the EU acquis in this area. A dedicated

department in the Central Bank carries out technical analysis of counterfeit money, including

euro banknotes and coins. In addition, the Turkish State Mint carries out technical analyses of

counterfeit coins, including euro coins. Credit institutions that do not withdraw counterfeits

from circulation are subject to financial penalties.

3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION

Cyprus

Türkiye continued to refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus. Despite repeated calls by

the Council of the EU and the European Commission, Türkiye has yet to fulfil its obligations

as outlined in the Declaration of the European Community and its Member States of 21

September 2005 and in Council Conclusions, including those of December 2006 and

December 2015. Türkiye did not fulfil its obligation to ensure the full and non-discriminatory

implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and did not remove

all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links

with the Republic of Cyprus. Türkiye also refused to cooperate with the Republic of Cyprus

on security-related issues, including terrorism. Türkiye continued to veto applications by the

Republic of Cyprus to join several international organisations, including the Organisation for

Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

There were no unauthorised drilling activities by Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean during

the reporting period. Türkiye issued several navigational telexes (NAVTEX) for conducting

seismic surveys and scientific research activities but none in areas that include parts of the

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Cyprus. The EU remains committed to defending its

interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. In

November 2022, following the third annual review of the framework for restrictive measures

in response to Türkiye’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, the

European Council extended the regime for a further year until 12 November 2023. Currently,

two individuals are subject to sanctions.

Türkiye’s military exercises in the maritime zones of Cyprus continued. Violations by

Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles in the Nicosia flight information region and the national

airspace of the Republic of Cyprus also continued unabated. Türkiye continued to increase

the militarisation of the occupied area by upgrading the military drone base in Lefkoniko and

the naval base in Bogazi. The harassment of Cypriot fishing vessels by Türkiye also

continued.

In the reporting period, Türkiye continued to criticise the decision of the UN Security

Council (UNSC) to renew the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

(UNFICYP) without the consent of the Turkish Cypriot community. UNFICYP’s mandated

authority extends throughout the island of Cyprus and the restrictions on its freedom of

movement can pose serious risks to the safety and security of United Nations personnel

serving in peacekeeping operations. In August 2023, after unauthorised construction work

was conducted by the Turkish Cypriot side within the UN buffer zone near Pyla/Pile, Türkiye

rejected the UN Security Council’s statement condemning the violation of the status quo,

which subsequently led to escalating tensions. This escalation included the assault on

UNFICYP peacekeepers by Turkish Cypriot personnel on 18 August 2023, an act strongly

condemned by the EU. In October 2023, the UN brokered an understanding between both

sides on the way forward regarding Pyla/Pile area, which was welcomed by Türkiye and the

EU. Nevertheless, these developments continued to undermine the prospect of resuming

negotiations and reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Despite international condemnations, and the inadmissibility of the settlement of any parts of

Varosha by people other than its inhabitants as stipulated in UNSC resolution 550 (1984),

Türkiye continued with its plan to open the entire fenced-off area of Varosha, creating a new

fait accompli on the ground. The new restrictions imposed in 2022 on the activities of

UNFICYP within the fenced-off area of Varosha remained in effect – challenging

UNFICYP’s ability to execute its tasks in accordance with its mandate, and violating UNSC

Resolution 789 (1992).

Türkiye repeatedly advocated for a two-state solution in Cyprus, contrary to relevant UN

Security Council Resolutions. In November 2022, the so-called but not internationally

recognised ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ was accepted as an observer in the

Organization of Turkic States (OTS). This violates the principle of territorial integrity and the

UN Charter. The EU recognises only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law,

in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and has stressed that any

action to facilitate or assist in any way the international recognition of Turkish Cypriot

secessionist entity severely damages efforts to create an environment conducive to resuming

settlement talks under the auspices of the United Nations.

The EU remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue, within

the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions and in line with the

principles on which the EU is founded and its acquis. The EU has called, most recently in the

European Council conclusions of June 2023, for the speedy resumption of negotiations and

expressed its readiness to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process,

with all the appropriate means at its disposal.

As emphasised in the Negotiating Framework and Council declarations, Türkiye is expected

to actively support the negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the

Cyprus issue within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council

resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the EU acquis. It

is important that Türkiye reaffirms its commitment to the UN-led settlement talks on Cyprus

in line with the relevant UNSC resolutions, including their external aspects. No unilateral

actions should be taken that could raise tensions on the island and prevent the resumption of

talks. On Varosha, Türkiye must immediately reverse the unilateral actions announced on

20 July 2021 and all steps taken since October 2020 that run contrary to the relevant UNSC

resolutions. The EU underlines the importance of the status of Varosha and calls for full

respect of UNSC resolutions (particularly Resolutions 550, 789 and 1251).

Peaceful settlement of border disputes

Relations between Türkiye and Greece deteriorated until early 2023. Hostile rhetoric grew

during this period, including threatening statements regarding the sovereignty of Greek

islands. However, the February 2023 earthquakes prompted a marked improvement in

relations. Greece rapidly provided humanitarian aid and support to Türkiye, which helped de-

escalate tensions and rhetoric. This was followed by several high-level phone calls and

meetings. The Turkish and Greek foreign ministers met in March 2023 on the margins of the

International Donors’ Conference organised by the European Commission and the Swedish

Presidency of the Council of the EU. The Turkish and Greek deputy foreign ministers met in

Ankara in March 2023 to relaunch the fourth round of the Positive Agenda talks between the

two countries. The Greek Defence Minister visited Türkiye in April 2023.

In July, the Greek Prime Minister met with the Turkish President on the sidelines of the

NATO Summit in Vilnius. The meeting took place in a good atmosphere. The two leaders

agreed to build on the positive momentum and activate multiple channels of communication

in the coming period, including holding the next meeting of the High-Level Cooperation

Council between Greece and Türkiye in Thessaloniki. The two leaders tasked the Ministers of

Foreign Affairs to guide the process and keep them informed on progress.

The possible extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in the Aegean Sea

under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

continued to weigh on Greece-Türkiye relations. The 1995 declaration of the Turkish Grand

National Assembly that any unilateral action by Greece to extend its territorial waters would

be considered a casus belli, still holds.

The Turkish violations of Greek airspace intensified in 2022 and in December 2022 Türkiye

also threatened Greece with retaliation if the latter proceeded with any expansion of its

territorial waters in the Aegean. As of February 2023, violations of Greek airspace

diminished drastically, and no flights over Greek inhabited areas were reported.

As highlighted by the Council Conclusions in December 2022 and the European Council’s

Conclusions of June 2022 and stemming from obligations under the Negotiating Framework,

Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations,

international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes having recourse, if

necessary, to the International Court of Justice. Türkiye must avoid threats and actions that

damage good neighbourly relations, normalise its relations with the Republic of Cyprus and

respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well

as all their sovereign rights, including inter alia the right to explore and exploit natural

resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the UNCLOS.

In October 2022, Türkiye and the Government of National Unity of Libya signed a

memorandum of understanding (MoU) for the development of bilateral scientific, technical,

technological, legal, administrative and commercial cooperation in the field of hydrocarbons

on land and at sea based on the 2019 MoU on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas

between Türkiye and the National Unity Government of Libya. The MoU infringes on the

sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with UNCLOS and cannot produce any legal

consequences for third states. Actions that could undermine regional stability should be

avoided.

Regional cooperation

Good neighbourly relations are an essential part of Türkiye’s accession process. Bilateral

relations with other enlargement countries were good overall but remained challenging with

neighbouring EU Member States, particularly Greece and Cyprus. Tensions in the Aegean

and Eastern Mediterranean were markedly reduced after the February 2023 earthquakes.

Türkiye’s policy in the Western Balkans is generally aligned with the EU’s strategic

objectives of regional stability, Euro-Atlantic integration and economic development.

Türkiye portrayed itself as an EU partner in the region, while leveraging its distinctive

cultural and economic ties. Türkiye continued to ask for action against alleged members of

the Gülen movement in the region, urging their extradition and the closure of all affiliated

schools. This caused friction with some countries in the region.

Türkiye’s relations with Albania have continued to strengthen with regular high-level

contacts and the agreement by the two countries to bring their bilateral relations to the level

of strategic partnership. Albania extradited, Faruk Fatih Ozer, the founder of the Turkish

crypto-exchange Thodex. Türkiye reiterated its readiness to strengthen Albania’s defence

capacity.

Türkiye remained close to Bosnia and Herzegovina and President Erdoğan visited the

country in September 2022. Türkiye maintained regular contacts with all members of Bosnia

and Herzegovina’s tripartite Presidency, keeping a balanced approach and supporting the

country’s territorial integrity and stability. Türkiye supported the Office of the High

Representative.

Türkiye’s relations with Serbia are very good. The two Presidents maintained frequent

contacts. President Erdoğan visited Serbia in September 2022. President Erdoğan emphasised

Türkiye’s readiness to support a solution between Serbia and Kosovo



. The two countries

signed a number of agreements, including on the mutual abolition of tourist visas.

Türkiye maintained strong cultural and economic ties with Kosovo

and continued to lobby

for its international recognition. Prime Minister Kurti paid his first official visit to Türkiye in

February 2023. Türkiye and Kosovo explored cooperation opportunities in the economic,

commercial, security and defence fields.

Türkiye’s relations with Montenegro were stable. The two countries publicly stated that they

aimed at further developing their bilateral cooperation.

Türkiye and North Macedonia continued to engage actively in the economic, educational

and cultural sectors. The two countries celebrated 30 years of diplomatic relations.

Türkiye is Georgia’s second largest trading partner and its relations with Georgia are at a

strategic partnership level. High-level contacts were regular. Türkiye strongly supported

Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Türkiye also supported Georgia’s NATO

integration efforts.

Türkiye’s relations with the Republic of Moldova remained stable and at the level of

strategic cooperation. Türkiye continued to support Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial

integrity. Türkiye also welcomed the EU’s decision to grant candidate status to Moldova.

Türkiye’s relations with Ukraine are at the level of strategic partnership. Türkiye

consistently supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Türkiye rejected Russia’s aggression

against Ukraine, called for the rights of Crimean Tatars to be respected, provided

humanitarian aid and military assistance to Ukraine and engaged politically and

diplomatically, including in the facilitation of the export of Ukrainian grain and of the

prisoners’ exchange, aiming at facilitating talks between Ukraine and Russia and working on

de-escalation and bringing about a cease-fire.

4. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP

CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET

This cluster covers: free movement of goods (Chapter 1), freedom of movement for workers

(Chapter 2), right of establishment and freedom to provide services (Chapter 3), free

movement of capital (Chapter 4), company law (Chapter 6), intellectual property law

(Chapter 7), competition policy (Chapter 8), financial services (Chapter 9), and health and

consumer protection (Chapter 28). This cluster is key to the good functioning of the EU-

Turkey Customs Union and to integrating Türkiye into the EU’s internal market.

Türkiye has achieved a good level of preparation for the free movement of goods. However,

technical barriers to trade and requirements discriminating against EU products remained in

place. Preparations in the areas of freedom of movement for workers, and the right of



This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ

Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

establishment and freedom to provide services are at an early stage, and substantial efforts

are still required to align with the acquis. Türkiye is moderately prepared on free movement

of capital, as limitations remain on foreign ownership and on capital movement. Türkiye

needs to continue to address outstanding issues in its framework regulating the fight against

money laundering and terrorist financing, while ensuring objective implementation that does

not restrict the legitimate rights of NGOs.

Türkiye is well advanced in the area of company law but needs to make further progress in

aligning with the EU acquis. Türkiye has a good level of preparation in the area of

intellectual property law, notably in terms of legislative alignment, but it needs to improve

implementation and enforcement. Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of

competition policy. Backsliding was observed as serious concerns persist in relation to the

legislative framework, enforcement capacity and transparency in the field of State aid.

Türkiye has a good level of preparation in the area of financial services, however the

banking sector faced an increasingly challenging operating environement in the reporting

period. Türkiye has a good level of preparation on consumer and health protection, with

limited progress made, notably on strengthening its surveillance system for health (security)

services. The capacity of the healthcare system was seriously affected by the February 2023

earthquakes in the affected regions.

Chapter 1: Free movement of goods

The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU

based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the

principle of the free movement of goods prevents these from creating unjustified barriers to

trade.

Türkiye has achieved a good level of preparation on the free movement of goods. It made

some progress in aligning with the EU acquis, particularly under the 'old approach' and the

'new and global approach' to product legislation. The market access barrier on agricultural

and forestry tractors was removed following alignment with the EU acquis. However,

technical barriers to trade, unjustified checks for EU products and requirements

discriminating against EU products remained, in breach of Türkiye’s obligations under the

Customs Union.

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially met, and therefore

remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ eliminate the remaining non-tariff barriers to the free movement of goods that are in

breach of Customs Union obligations, including the surveillance regimes for the import of

certain products, export restrictions, prior registration requirements, conformity

assessments and inspections, licencing surveillance and other documentation requirements

for imports, and non-acceptance of EU certificates of good manufacturing practices;

→ review the remaining schemes setting local content requirements or relocating production;

→ increase the coverage and effectiveness of market surveillance measures and ensure timely

reporting on results for public transparency.

General principles

The EU framework for the free movement of goods is largely in place in Türkiye. However,

implementation issues remain, as Türkiye continues to implement a range of non-tariff

barriers to the free movement of goods that are in breach of Customs Union obligations. In

the reporting period it further extended the scope of the surveillance regime to cover the

import of certain products, such as photovoltaic cells. Export restrictions, prior registration

requirements, risk-based import control system, conformity assessments and inspections and

other documentation requirements remained in place. Türkiye still does not accept EU good

manufacturing practices certificates. While Türkiye adopted several measures to adjust the

localisation and prioritisation schemes for pharmaceuticals, the EU’s assessment on whether

Türkiye has completed the implementation of all findings in the Arbitrators’ Award is still

ongoing. The local content requirements in renewable energy remain in place and new local

content requirements were put in place for tobacco products. These schemes create de facto

market access barriers for EU products, which are not in line with the Customs Union.

Türkiye’s product safety controls on imported goods processed through its electronic

TAREKS system can require the provision of additional documentation and information on

products coming from the EU, contrary to the Customs Union provisions.

Non-harmonised areas

Türkiye’s mutual recognition legislation in the non-harmonised areas is in line with the EU

acquis. However, Türkiye has notified only five product legal acts in the non-harmonised

areas in the reporting period. This is not sufficient, given the size of Türkiye’s economy and

legislative activity and close ties with the European Union’s economy under the Customs

Union.

Harmonised areas: quality infrastructure

Türkiye is aligned with the EU acquis on standards, technical regulations, conformity

assessment, accreditation, metrology and market surveillance. It has also aligned with the EU

acquis on general product safety, the European Conformity mark (CE mark), conformity

assessment bodies, notified bodies and conformity assessment methods.

The national Standards Institute is independent, adequately resourced and financed, and able

to implement European and international standards. Since 2012 it is a full member of the

European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for

Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC). By the end of the reporting period, it had

adopted 24 318 national standards aligned with European standards. The rate of

harmonisation with both CEN and CENELEC standards is 99.96%. Eight Turkish economic

operators are full members of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)

and one is an observer.

Türkiye has 64 notified bodies, five recognised third-party organisations, and two technical

approval bodies in place. The Turkish Accreditation Agency (TÜRKAK) is a signatory of

multilateral agreements as part of the European cooperation for Accreditation (EA) and takes

part in the mutual recognition of data agreement of the OECD Good Laboratory Practices

Working Group (OECD-GLP). The National Metrology Institute (TÜBITAK-UME) is a

member of the European Association of National Metrology Institutes (EURAMET). The

Ministry of Industry and Technology participates in the European Legal Metrology

Organisation (WELMEC). TÜBİTAK-UME chairs a Technical Committee and participates

in the Committee of the European Metrology Programme for Innovation and Research at

EURAMET.

Türkiye implements market surveillance in compliance with the EU acquis and submits its

annual programme to the European Commission. There is a horizontal framework for market

surveillance in place in line with the applicable EU acquis. The relevant ministries published

separate market surveillance regulations governing personal protective equipment and

construction products in the reporting period. According to the market surveillance report for

2022, a total of 233 644 products were checked by market surveillance authorities in 2022

representing a 11.8% increase as compared to 2021. About 10 881 products were found

uncompliant or unsafe as against 12 455 products in 2021. Access to information on market

surveillance activities is important for producers and consumers. The budget allocated to

market surveillance increased by 51% in 2022 as compared to 2021, in a high inflation

environment. Surveillance remained limited with regard to activities in e-commerce.

Harmonised area: sectoral legislation

On the ‘new and global approach’ to product legislation, Türkiye adopted legislation to

align with the latest acquis on medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices. It also

aligned with the acquis on eco-design and on energy labelling of several types of heaters,

computers, servers, and several types of household goods.

On the ‘old approach’ to product legislation, in January 2023, the new Turkish legislation

on agriculture and forestry tractors entered into force, phasing out the discriminatory

treatment of EU tractors in terms of engine emission requirements, thus solving the relevant

market access barrier. It also adopted legislation aiming to align with the acquis on certain

medicinal products, good distribution practices of medicinal products for human use and on

vaccines and immune serums. Türkiye adopted legislation designed to align with the latest

acquis on good clinical practice and pharmacovigilance. Türkiye aligned to a large extent its

cosmetics regulatory framework with the acquis by adopting a new cosmetics regulation in

May 2023. A new guideline on free from claims in cosmetics was published in June 2023

Türkiye does not accept EU good manufacturing practice certificates on medicines for human

use, in breach of Customs Union rules. Regarding chemicals, Türkiye has adopted two new

regulations on the export and import of hazardous chemicals and on hazardous substances in

electrical and electronic equipment, aligning with the EU acquis. Türkiye is almost fully

aligned with the European Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and

Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), apart from on biocidal products.

On procedural measures, Türkiye has specific licencing and regulation systems for

economic operators dealing with drug precursors, with a strict follow-up and monitoring

system in cooperation with the police and customs. It is aligned with the EU acquis regarding

licencing procedures for firearms. However, it made no progress on alignment with the

acquis on cultural goods.

Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers

Citizens of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be

given the same working and social conditions as other workers.

Preparations in the area of freedom of movement for workers are at an early stage and no

progress was made during the reporting period.

Türkiye made no progress on access to the labour market or on the coordination of social

security systems. The number of bilateral social security agreements with EU Member States

remained the same, with 15 agreements concluded. Türkiye should prepare its legislation and

administrative practices in view of joining the European Labour Authority and the European

Employment Services (EURES) network. There were no developments on future

participation in the EURES network.

Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services

EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and

to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on mutual

recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal services focus on improving the quality of

universal service, gradual market opening to competition, and the establishment of an

independent regulator.

Preparations in the area of right of establishment and freedom to provide services are at an

early stage. There was no progress in the reporting period. Right of establishment continues

to be restricted, service providers registered in the EU still face requirements on registration,

licencing and authorisation. Postal services are not regulated in line with the acquis.

Continuous and substantial efforts are needed on the mutual recognition of professional

qualifications. Overall, substantial efforts are still required to achieve alignment in this area.

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.

In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ align its national legislation with the Services Directive and set up a point of single

contact;

→ continue aligning with the EU acquis in the area of postal services;

→ align its national legislation with the EU acquis on mutual recognition of professional

qualifications, including the Professional Qualifications Directive and the Proportionality

Test Directive.

There was no progress on the right of establishment, which continues to be restricted by

several requirements in Türkiye.

Regarding the freedom to provide cross-border services, service providers registered in the

EU still face requirements on registration, licencing and authorisation. The point of single

contact has not yet been created.

No progress was made in the area of postal services. Legislation regulating postal services

in accordance with the EU acquis has not yet been adopted. Türkiye has yet to align with the

provisions of the Postal Services Directive, as a reserved area in the letter mail market is

maintained for the state-owned universal service provider. The Information and

Communication Technologies Authority (ICTA) monitors postal market development.

National legislation still needs to be aligned with the provisions of the Regulation on cross-

border parcel delivery services.

On the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, the Vocational Qualifications

Authority continued to implement the national qualification framework. The number of

occupations that require compulsory certifications has increased (204 occupations in total).

The number of national occupational standards reached 901 and the number of national

qualifications prepared in line with occupational standards reached 650. The Turkish

Referencing Report to the European Qualifications Framework is still not updated. Some

regulated professions still require reciprocal mutual recognition. Nationality and language

requirements have not been removed. However, it is possible to make an online application

for the recognition and equivalence of higher education qualifications. There is no specific

regulation or practice governing the temporary or occasional provision of services.

Continuous and significant steps are needed to align national legislation with the EU acquis

in this area.

Chapter 4: Free movement of capital

In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restrictions, with common

rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to

support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.

Türkiye is moderately prepared on free movement of capital. Overall, there was some

progress in this area in the reporting period. Limitations on foreign ownership persist in

numerous sectors. There are still restrictions on capital movements and foreign exchange-

denominated transactions. Türkiye has improved its instant payment system infrastructure.

The country remains on the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring ('grey list') by the

Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Though the FATF did not call for the use of increased

due diligence measures in the reporting period, Türkiye needs to take more steps to

implement its action plan and tackle the strategic shortcomings in its anti-money laundering

and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. It is important for Türkiye to

ensure an objective implementation that does not instrumentalise measures to target or restrict

the legitimate rights of NGOs.

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented to some extent. In the

coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ minimise limitations on foreign ownership and on capital movements;

→ make further progress in tackling the strategic shortcomings in its AML/CFT regime, in

line with the EU acquis and FATF recommended actions in order to be delisted from the

FATF grey list;

→ address the recommendations of the Venice Commission regarding the law on the

prevention of financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Concerning capital movements and payments, restrictions on foreign ownership are still in

place in many sectors, including broadcasting, education, transportation, financial services,

the electricity market and real estate. Türkiye’s legislation on real estate acquisition by

foreigners remains opaque and does not apply to all EU nationals in a non-discriminatory

way. On this point, Türkiye lags behind its commitments under the EU-Turkey Association

Agreement. The ability for citizens of neighbouring countries in border provinces to buy real

estate is still restricted for national security reasons. Türkiye maintains its restrictions on

capital movements and foreign exchange-denominated transactions. Exporters are still

required to sell 40% of their foreign-earned income to the Central Bank and Türkiye brought

in some additional incentives to encourage exporters to convert their foreign-earned revenues

into Turkish lira. Türkiye also imposes a range of informal measures on banks and operators

to limit the purchase of foreign currencies.

Türkiye has made some progress in payment systems adding to the good level of preparation

already achieved. The Central Bank has increased the scope and coverage of the Instant and

Continuous Transfer of Funds (FAST) system. Banks began to provide services via the Open

Banking Gateway (GEÇİT) infrastructure. Türkiye also launched FAST Merchant Payments

in 2023. The first payment transactions were made on the Digital Turkish Lira Network.

Meanwhile, the Central Bank published guidelines on data sharing services in payment

services in December 2022. The Central Bank also launched the Security Overlay Service to

facilitate the exchange of information with a view to improving the detection of illicit

transactions. All Turkish banks had stopped accepting the Russian MIR payment system by

October 2022.

Türkiye has made some progress in the fight against money laundering and terrorist

financing. Türkiye has been on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) list of jurisdictions

under increased monitoring ('grey list') since October 2021, but has not been added to the

EU’s list of high-risk third countries. This is due to Türkiye's candidate status, high-level

political commitment to the EU to tackle the outstanding shortcomings identified by the

FATF and to its endeavours to reach full alignment with the EU acquis.

Türkiye revised its national strategy document on anti-money laundering and countering

the financing of terrorism in 2022 to comply with FATF recommended actions. In 2022,

Türkiye adopted regulations regarding politically exposed persons to comply with the FATF

Standards and the EU acquis. Also in 2022, Türkiye issued guidance to the private sector on

detecting terrorist financing and increased its financial intelligence agency’s proactive

dissemination of financial intelligence. In July 2023, the FATF concluded that Türkiye has

taken positive steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime. Consequently, the FATF

upgraded the country’s ratings on five of its recommendations, including Recommendation 8

on the audit of the non-profit organisations. Türkiye remains partially compliant on one

recommendation. Nevertheless, the law on the prevention of financing of the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction has not been revised in line with the Venice Commission’s

recommendations.

The Turkish Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) strengthened its capacity and

the level of cooperation with law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities. The number

of suspicious transaction reports submitted fell from 504 995 in 2021 to 425 322 in 2022. The

number of money laundering prosecutions has been rising in recent years. 70 cases resulted in

conviction between 2013 and 2018. Since 2018, 225 people have been convicted in money

laundering cases and in 2022 alone, 4 904 people were convicted in Türkiye.

Türkiye reaffirmed its commitment to freeze the assets of people/entities designated by the

United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee. The government also continued to

use the domestic assets freeze instrument effectively.

Chapter 6: Company law

The EU has common rules on the formation, registration and disclosure requirements of a

company, with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting, and statutory

audit.

Türkiye is well advanced in the area of company law. Some progress was made during the

reporting period, by adopting the financial reporting standards for small and micro

companies. However, there was no progress on the other 2022 recommendation, which

remains valid.

In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ align national legislation with the acquis on encouraging long-term shareholder

engagement;

→ align national legislation with the acquis on cross-border conversions, mergers and

divisions and on the use of digital tools and processes in company law.

On company law, Türkiye took limited legislative action over the reporting period.

Alignment is needed on some outstanding issues in the context of cross-border mergers,

domestic mergers and divisions, and takeovers. Alignment is also necessary with the 2019

acquis on the use of digital tools and on cross-border operations (mergers, divisions,

conversions) with the rules on shareholders’ rights, including on the encouragement of long-

term shareholder engagement and on gender equality on boards of directors. As regards the

disclosure of company documents in the business register, the country still lacks provisions

requiring all limited liability companies to publish annual accounts and on the online filing of

company documents. Türkiye also lacks a fully online process to register limited liability

companies.

On company reporting, a Presidency decision on the procedures and principles for

determining the companies subject to independent audit was published in November 2022.

This lowered the audit exemption thresholds. In January 2023, the Public Oversight,

Accounting, and Auditing Standards Authority (POA) published the financial reporting

standard for small and micro enterprises. Based on changes in the International Code of

Ethics for Professional Accountants (including International Independence Standards), the

POA also updated the standards in the Code of Ethics for Auditors, in March 2023. There is

still a lack of clarity regarding the alignment of non-financial information and reports on

payments to the government. Türkiye will need to align with the 2022 EU Directive on

corporate sustainability reporting. As regards transparency requirements for listed

companies, the Law on capital markets regulates the general responsibilities of issuers.

Implementing rules are published by the Capital Markets Board with the aim of aligning with

the EU acquis in this area. The Turkish Commercial Code was amended to increase

transparency and provide the identity information of bearer shareholders.

Chapter 7: Intellectual property law

The EU has harmonised rules for the legal protection of intellectual property rights (IPR),

and trade marks, designs, biotechnological inventions and pharmaceuticals. Rules for the

legal protection of copyright and related rights cover, for instance, books, films, software and

broadcasting.

Türkiye has a good level of preparation, notably in terms of legislative alignment. No

progress was made during the reporting period. Some legislative discrepancies remain, as do

outstanding problems regarding implementation and enforcement, notably in relation with

judicial procedures. Türkiye was the second major country of provenance by number of

counterfeit articles entering the EU.

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.

In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ improve enforcement measures to efficiently fight against industrial and intellectual

property rights infringements, including online sales of counterfeit and pirated goods,

improve the level of specialisation in courts dealing with IPR infringements and resolve

difficulties in the judicial procedures to obtain search and seizure warrants for criminal

law enforcement;

→ improve cooperation with IPR owners for efficient implementation and effective

enforcement of the Law on industrial property, in particular in cases of accelerated and

simplified destruction procedures by the judiciary and the customs authorities;

→ ensure the collection and processing of accurate statistical data, especially on effective

judicial enforcement of intellectual and industrial property rights, with a view to

facilitating the analysis of systemic IPR shortcomings.

Regarding copyright and related rights, Türkiye amended one specific article of the Law on

all works, performances, phonograms, productions and broadcasts, in addition to computer

programmes. The Law on copyright has yet to be fully modernised to provide sufficient

protection, in line with technological developments. Systemic issues continue, particularly

regarding collective rights management, the lack of autonomy and the supervision of

collective rights management organisations (CMOs), as well as discrimination against foreign

right holders in the management of CMOs. A number of issues remained unresolved, in

particular the lack of fair distribution of private copy levies, licencing difficulties,

uncertainties in online education exceptions, public performance right problems,

unauthorised use of copyrighted material via online platforms and well-known e-commerce

websites. Türkiye is not yet aligned with the Directive on copyright and related rights in the

Digital Single Market.

Regarding industrial property rights, the Turkish Patent and Trademark Office continued to

strengthen its administrative capacity and digitalise services. The lack of a precise definition

of bad faith applications as regards trade marks has made the invalidation procedure

ineffective. The procedures to revoke, oppose and invalidate trade marks remained expensive

and lengthy. There are currently no legal provisions for supplementary protection certificates.

Another area of continued concern is the absence of an effective system for protecting

undisclosed test and other data generated to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical

and agrochemical products. Even though Türkiye has in place a regulatory data protection

regime since 2005, the scope is limited and excludes biologics and combination products.

The length is also limited reducing the effective protection period in Türkiye. Turkish law

links the length of the regulatory data protection with the duration of patent protection.

Hence, once a product is considered off-patent, it automatically loses its regulatory data

protection.

Concerning judicial enforcement, criminal courts rarely order deterrent fines for commercial

scale IP infringements, even though legal provisions may provide for higher penalties.

Stakeholders continue to report complaints about inefficient litigation procedures, including

at courts of appeal. They report difficulties and inconsistencies in deciding preliminary

injunctions and monetary compensation claims, storage and destruction problems and

financial burdens related to the storage of counterfeit goods, and the overuse of expert

witness statements.

Despite strong evidence provided by right holders about counterfeiting, few search and

seizure warrants are granted and very few counterfeit goods are seized. Public prosecutors

and judges require additional evidence, which is not reasonable to substantiate the claims of

the right holders. Obtaining preliminary injunctions also remains difficult and the level of

deterrence of the penalties ordered by judicial authorities is reportedly low. Enforcement

authorities, in particular the police and judges, need to increase the efficiency of action

against IP infringements. The number of IP courts has decreased over the past years in

Türkiye, which has a negative effect on the quality and consistency of the court decisions.

Action to combat counterfeiting at physical marketplaces remains insufficient. The Law on e-

commerce and its implementing regulation introduced new provisions relating to the notice

and takedown procedure and clarified the responsibility of e-commerce intermediary and

direct service providers in complaints regarding the infringement of intellectual property

rights. There has been an increase in online sales of counterfeit goods at well-known e-

commerce marketplaces. In this context, and with a view to stopping IPR infringements, it

will be important for Türkiye to apply notice and takedown procedures.

The number of customs applications for seizures increased from 2 431 in 2021 to 2 637 in

2022. However, Türkiye needs to improve customs enforcement to combat counterfeit goods,

in particular for goods in transit and exports, which makes Türkiye the second major country

of provenance by number of counterfeit articles entering the EU, according to the 2022 report

on the EU enforcement of IPR. The number of articles coming from Türkiye detained at the

EU borders by customs authorities has increased. Counterfeiting concerns a wide range of

products from food and alcoholic beverages to vehicles, vehicles accessories and spare parts.

The customs enforcement legislation is not fully aligned with the acquis.

There are only limited awareness campaigns from public institutions on the dangers of

counterfeiting and piracy to public health, consumer safety, rule of law and labour market,

and on the economic benefits of IPR-intensive sectors. Stronger political commitment is

needed to enforce IPR and to stop the flow of counterfeit trade from Türkiye to the EU.

Chapter 8: Competition policy

EU rules enable free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements

between companies and the abuse of a dominant position, and also include rules on

concentrations between companies which would significantly impede effective competition.

EU rules also set out a system of State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant

State aid if strict conditions are met, with a view to prevent distortion competition.

Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of competition policy. Backsliding was

noted due to serious concerns in relation to the legislative framework, enforcement capacity

and transparency in the field of State aid. Institutional framework and the new administrative

structure clearly deviate from the EU acquis. By repeatedly postponing the creation of a

functional enforcement structure, Türkiye’s legislative framework is, de facto, ineffective.

The lack of a transparent State aid inventory covering all aid schemes remains a source of

concern.

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.

In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ ensure the independence and functionality of the State aid institutional framework in

accordance with the EU acquis;

→ implement the State aid Law by adopting implementing legislation without further delay;

→ make available a transparent and up-to-date inventory of all aid schemes.

Antitrust and mergers

The legislative framework is broadly aligned with the EU acquis. The Law on the protection

of competition broadly reflects Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the

European Union (TFEU). Implementing legislation in this field is largely in place. The

relevant legislation must still be aligned in order to ensure full compliance with the Vertical

Block Exemption Regulation.

In terms of the institutional framework, the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) is

responsible for enforcing the Law on the protection of competition. Its decision-making body,

the Competition Board, has seven members. Despite being affiliated with the Ministry of

Trade, the TCA has administrative and financial autonomy.

The enforcement capacity of the Authority is adequate. In 2022, overall implementation was

effective and the number of decisions in the areas of antitrust (78 compared with 74 in 2021),

exemption/negative clearance decisions (19 compared with 22 in 2021) and

merger/acquisition/joint venture/privatisation (245 compared with 309 in 2021) were

comparable with those adopted in the previous year. The total amount of fines levied by the

Authority for infringements of competition law (fines related to substance) remained at

TRY1.7 billion, an average for the previous five years. The total number of ex-officio

investigations and preliminary investigations increased from 15 in 2021, to 18 in 2022. In

2022, 80% of the 139 judgements concluded as a result of appeals against the Turkish

Competition Authority decisions were upheld by Turkish courts.

State aid

Action taken in 2022 on the legislative framework amounted to a backslide. Türkiye’s Law

on the monitoring and supervision of State aid is broadly in line with Articles 107 and 108

TFEU. However, by repeatedly postponing the creation of a functional enforcement structure,

Türkiye has rendered its legislative framework, de facto, ineffective.

Following the abolition of the Directorate General for State Aid (DGSA), in 2022, Türkiye

established a new DGSA, under the Presidency of Strategy and Budget. However, the new

DGSA does not have the same full legal mandate as its predecessor. The decree establishing

the new DGSA gives a different definition of State aid than the definition given in Law on

the monitoring and supervision of State aid, which was aligned with the EU acquis. The

President postponed implementation of the law and its implementing legislation indefinitely.

As a result, not only the law is not enforceable, but the institutional framework and the new

administrative structure also clearly deviate from the EU acquis. Accordingly, Türkiye still

needs to make substantial efforts to align its legislation with the EU acquis.

In 2023, the project-based investment programme – where the transfer of State resources is

provided on a selective basis (i.e. only to certain undertakings) – included 64 projects with an

investment amount of TRY 491 billion (incentives granted since the beginning of 2022,

covering 25 projects with an investment of TRY 336 billion). The breakdown of State aid for

these investments was not disclosed, contrary to the commitments made under the EU-

Turkey Customs Union. The lack of a transparent State aid inventory covering all aid

schemes – including the amount or budgeted amount of the State support granted – remains a

source of concern.

Liberalisation

State-owned enterprises are subject to competition and State aid rules, however the overall

challenges in the area of State aid also apply to state-owned enterprises.

Chapter 9: Financial services

EU rules aim to ensure fair competition among, and the stability of, financial institutions,

namely banking, insurance, supplementary pensions, investment services and securities

markets. They include rules on authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions.

Türkiye has a good level of preparation in the area of financial services. It made limited

progress in the reporting period by strengthening the insurance market and developing new

alternative financing instruments. However, Türkiye's pre-2023 election approach to apply a

set of unorthodox macroprudential and regulatory measures made the operating environment

for the banking sector increasingly challenging during the reporting period. The country

should make further efforts to align with the financial services acquis, focusing on the

priorities identified based on the current state of play.

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented, and

therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ gradually phase out distortive macro-prudential and regulatory measures and improve the

transparency of asset quality review;

→ further strengthen bank governance and supervision, crisis management and the resolution

framework;

→ continue to support the development of Türkiye's capital markets and their supervision.

Regarding banks and financial conglomerates, Türkiye is in line with the Basel III

framework (but not taking into account the Basel III Finalisation of 2017) according to the

Basel Committee. In October 2022, Türkiye released the 2022-2025 participation finance

strategy, with the aim of building a legal, administrative and corporate infrastructure for

participation finance.

Overall, the banking sector has remained resilient, with the indicators tracking asset quality

improving. The share of non-performing loan ratios continued to fall, down to 1.9% in

February 2023. The capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector remained above the legal

thresholds, supported by the sector's strong profitability performance. Action is needed to

improve the transparency and predictability of the financial sector regulatory framework,

including by carefully phasing out distortive regulatory measures and conducting transparent

asset quality reviews.

Türkiye made some progress on insurance and occupational pensions. In October 2022, the

Insurance and Private Pension Regulation and Supervision Agency (SEEDK) published a

new regulation laying down the procedures and principles for the collection, storage and

sharing of insurance data. Under a new regulation on the state contribution to the private

pension system, state contributions can be received in the following years for contributions

paid above the annual limit. In November 2022, SEEDK announced its roadmap for traffic

insurance aiming at overcoming structural weaknesses in the sector. It mainly plans to switch

to person-based insurance and to improve the arbitration process. In June 2023, a possibility

of electronic applications was introduced for insurance arbitration system through an online

platform. Following the February 2023 earthquakes, SEEDK took several measures to ease

the burden of insurers such as extending the maturities of all expired mandatory earthquake

insurance policies or removing the penalty for delays to compulsory motor insurance.

As regards financial market infrastructure, the Capital Markets Board adopted some

amendments to the sale methods and distribution principles applied to initial public offering

of shares to protect investors’ rights. It also amended the criteria for institutional investors.

Portfolio management companies are now considered individual investors and no longer as

institutional investors. To raise awareness of sustainability among companies trading in the

Borsa Istanbul markets, Türkiye launched futures contracts based on BIST Sustainability 25

Index for trading on the derivatives market in January 2023.

Regarding securities markets and investment services, the Borsa Istanbul made some

amendments to the regulations on precious metals in August 2022 by expanding the scope of

conversion transactions to include all precious metals. As part of the efforts to develop

alternative investment instruments, Turkish State mint gold certificates started trading on the

commodity market segment of the Borsa Istanbul Equity Market at the end of November

2022.

On sustainable and digital finance, Türkiye took a number of steps to accelerate the digital

transformation of the banking sector over the last few years. Amendments were made to the

remote identification services of banks, mainly allowing legal entities to access these

services, and facilitating the use of the system by persons with disabilities. The use of crypto

currency and crypto assets directly or indirectly as an instrument of payment is still banned in

Türkiye. In February 2022, Türkiye adopted guidelines on green debt instruments, sustainable

debt instruments, green lease certificates and sustainable lease certificates. They are based on

the Green Bond Principles of the International Capital Markets Association (ICMA) and aim

to improve transparency and international comparability of green bonds, sustainable bonds,

green sukuk and sustainable sukuk.

Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection

EU rules protect consumers’ economic interests and in relation to product safety, dangerous

imitations and liability for defective products. The EU also ensures high common standards

for tobacco control, blood, tissues, cells and organs, and medicines for human and veterinary

use. The EU also has rules for upholding patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare and in

preparing for and responding to cross-border health threats, including communicable

diseases.

Türkiye has a good level of preparation on consumer and health protection. Limited

progress was achieved overall over the reporting period in this chapter. Efforts were made to

strengthen its surveillance system for health (security) services and to tackle serious cross-

border health threats. However, implementation issues remain regarding consumer protection

and enforcement, and consumers continue to face problems in exercising their rights. The

capacity of the healthcare system was seriously affected by the February 2023 earthquakes in

south-east Türkiye.

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.

In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ strengthen consumer rights enforcement and further improve coordination and

cooperation with the consumer movement and with enforcement bodies; increase raising

awareness activities and take more measures on infringements in the digital environment

and more measures to support vulnerable consumers;

→ strengthen its primary healthcare services by providing sufficient resources for public

health emergencies risk assessment and risk management at central and provincial levels;

→ boost its workforce and administrative capacity to ensure effective multi-sectoral

preparedness and response to disasters, within and across the relevant sectors.

Consumer protection

While Türkiye’s national legislation remains mostly aligned with the acquis on consumer

protection in non-safety-related issues, with further legislative alignment on consumer

arbitration, issues remain in the application of consumer rights. Consumers face problems in

exercising their right to choose, and consumer awareness and education remain insufficient.

The level of cooperation and coordination between consumer organisations and enforcement

bodies remains low. The national consumer information system (TÜBİS) is complex,

preventing its widespread usage. Consumer NGOs lack financial and professional support

and are unable to participate actively in legal and public decision-making mechanisms.

Consumer arbitration committee members remain insufficiently trained and lack a common

understanding of the legal issues. Of 602 613 decisions taken by consumer arbitration

committees in 2022, 50% were in favour of consumers and 50% against them. Cooperation

between out-of-court and court consumer systems is yet to be improved. Alignment with the

representative actions Directive is at an early stage and significant work is still needed.

On safety-related measures, there is a low level of consumer awareness of the national

unsafe products information system. Regular monitoring and more robust regulatory tools are

required to combat online sales of counterfeit goods that endanger consumer and public

health (see Chapter 7- Intellectual property law). Market surveillance of e-commerce

remained limited, although the volume of online shopping has increased (see Chapter 1-Free

movement of goods).

Public health

In the field of public health, while Türkiye was recovering from the impact of COVID-19

pandemic, two earthquakes hit the country in February 2023. The earthquakes had a direct

impact on 15 million people, claiming over 50 500 lives and injuring over 120 000 people.

Hospitals, family health centres and public health laboratories in the region suffered damage.

The earthquakes interrupted the diagnostics chain from health facility to laboratory. Disease

surveillance was set up for infections and communicable disease outbreaks, including

airborne and waterborne diseases. The capacity of the health system remained insufficient to

meet the healthcare needs in the earthquake-affected areas, especially the mental health

needs, and psychological and nutrition needs. The COVID-19 pandemic and the February

2023 earthquakes have shown that inter-sectoral linkages and collaboration on emergency

prevention, preparedness and response are vital in ensuring public health safety and

wellbeing in the aftermath of disasters.

Türkiye’s health system faces a growing burden from non-communicable diseases,

including cardiovascular diseases and cancer. These illnesses have a significant impact on

premature mortality. In 2022, Türkiye scaled up its cancer screening activities to 7.3 million

scans across the country from 4.4 million in 2021. Of these scans, 2.8 million were for breast

cancer, 2.7 million for cervical cancer, and 1.8 million were for colon cancer.

Türkiye made good progress on serious cross-border health threats including communicable

diseases, especially in workforce development and in building institutional capacity for

central and provincial public health professionals. To strengthen the capacity to detect and

counter the threats posed by outbreaks of infectious diseases, Türkiye introduced a molecular

laboratory-based surveillance component to its national health surveillance system. It

prepared acute public health threats guidelines for biological, chemical, environmental and

radio nuclear threats at central level and distributed the guidelines to the provincial

authorities for implementation.

On tobacco control, the actions planned to meet the targets set under Türkiye's 2017-2025

non-communicable diseases action plan to reduce tobacco and salt consumption by 30% are

insufficient. Tobacco is consumed by 31% of the Turkish population.

No progress was made regarding patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare, neither on

drug abuse prevention. On blood, tissues, cells and organs, Türkiye developed a patient

blood management software for ensuring quality, safety and effectiveness of transfusion

applications.

On mental health, Türkiye set up community mental health centres and provided

psychological first aid for children as part of the earthquake response., Türkiye’s capacity to

provide mental health and psychosocial support is not sufficient to meet the needs resulting

from the crisis. In earthquake-impacted regions, 20% of people are estimated to have

developed a mental health disorder due to earthquake-related traumas, and 5% are

experiencing severe long-term mental health problems.

On health inequalities, vulnerable groups namely LGBTIQ persons, people living with HIV

and sex workers as well as refugees are subject to discrimination and continue to face

significant challenges to access healthcare information and services.

CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH

This cluster covers: digital transformation and media (Chapter 10), taxation (Chapter 16),

economic and monetary policy (Chapter 17), social policy and employment (Chapter 19),

industrial policy (Chapter 20), science and research (Chapter 25), education and culture

(Chapter 26), and Customs Union (Chapter 29).

Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of digital transformation and media. It

continued to backslide as it did not address concerns regarding the lack of sufficient

competition, lack of transparency of media funding, concentration of media ownership,

political influence on editorial policies, restrictions on the freedom of expression and the

lack of independence of regulatory authorities. Türkiye’s preparations in the area of science

and research are well advanced and Türkiye made good progress during the reporting period,

notably as a result of joining Horizon Europe and continued efforts to raise awareness of and

capacity for the programme. Türkiye is moderately prepared on education and culture, and

continued to make some progress, notably through the continued implementation of the

national qualifications system and the increased participation in some EU programmes.

Access to education in south-east Türkiye was significantly impacted by the February 2023